

INTER-ETHNIC RECONCILIATION, RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND HUMAN SECURITY IN THE BALKANS

Proceedings of the Second ECPD
International Conference

Editors:

Takehiro Togo/Jeffrey Levett/Negoslav P. Ostojić



EUROPEAN CENTER FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
of the University for Peace established by the United Nations

INTER-ETHNIC RECONCILIATION, RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND HUMAN SECURITY IN THE BALKANS

Proceedings of the Second ECPD
International Conference

Belgrade, October 27–28, 2006.

Editors:

Takehiro Togo/Jeffrey Levett/Negoslav P. Ostojić



EUROPEAN CENTER FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
of the University for Peace established by the United Nations

Published by **European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD)
of the United Nations University for Peace**
Terazije 41, 11000 Beograd; tel: (+381 11) 3246-041, 3246-042,
fax: 3240-673, 3234-082; e-mail: office@ecpd.org.yu

For the publisher: **Negoslav P. Ostojić**, ECPD Executive Director

Editor in chief: **Takehiro Togo / Jeffrey Levett / Negoslav P. Ostojić**

Editorial Board: **Takehiro Togo
Negoslav P. Ostojić
Todor Mirković
Jeffrey Levett
Yves-Rastimir Nedeljković
Darko Tanasković
Bojan Starec**

Design **Nataša Ostojić-Ilić**
Copy editing **Vera Gligorijević**
Number of copies 1 000 in English
ISBN 978-86-7236-049-3

Printed by: **graficom|uno**

Belgrade, 2007.

© All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission
in writing from the publisher

PREFACE

INTER-ETHNIC RECONCILIATION, RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND HUMAN SECURITY IN THE BALKANS

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ECPD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

The Second ECPD International Conference on “National Reconciliation, Ethnic and Religious Tolerance – RECONCILIATION AND HUMAN SECURITY – in the Balkans”, was held in Belgrade, on 27-28 October, 2006. The Conference formed part of the ECPD project „National Reconciliation, Ethnic and Religious Tolerance in the Balkans“ being derived from the ECPD major long-term research and educational programme “**The Balkans in the 21st Century** – The Ways Leading to Peace and Stability in the Balkans”.

Within the scope of this project, the First ECPD Conference (Symposium) was held in Belgrade, on 28-29 October, 2005. The Conference had 80 participants and 20 observers. The Proceedings of the Conference were published and widely distributed. The Second Conference was preceded by the formation and the first meeting of the ECPD International Permanent Study Group – its first meeting was held in Sveti Stefan (Montenegro), on 17 June 2006. Both events as well as the Second Conference had the same aim: to contribute to the improvement of the national/in-terethnic reconciliation and inter-religious tolerance in the Balkans as a vital prerequisite for building a lasting peace and stability in the region.

The Second Conference had 86 participants and eight observers. The participants came from all Balkan countries, most other European countries and several non-European countries, including Japan and the United States. Among them, there were well-known academicians: Vladeta Jerotić (Serbia), Paskal Milo (Albania); Vladimir Stipetić (Croatia); Boris Shmelev (Russia), and Dragan Vukčević and Branislav Šoškić (Montenegro); many high-ranking officials and diplomats: Yasushi Akashi (former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Former Yugoslavia), Peter Bas-Backer (Senior Deputy, High Representative, OHR, B&H), Sir James Mancham (founder and the first president of the Republic of Seyshelles), Nano Ružin (Macedonian Ambassador to NATO), Song, Yong Cheol (President of the Universal Peace Federation, the European Chapter), Mark Brann (Secretary General of the European UPF Chapter),

H.E. Tadashi Nagai (Ambassador of Japan to Serbia and Montenegro), H.E. Professor Darko Tanasković (Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro to the Holy See), H.E. Ambassador Wolfgang Wolte (Austrian Society for European Policy), Milorad Šćepanović (Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Montenegro), Milomir Mihaljević (Advisor to the Prime Minister of Montenegro). The participants in the Conference were also professors from numerous universities, including Belgrade and Niš (Serbia), Zagreb (Croatia), Podgorica (Montenegro), Sarajevo and Banja Luka (B&H), Skopje (Macedonia), Vienna (Austria), Trieste (Italy), West England (UK), Saint Paul (Canada); Georgetown (Washington, D.C), Purdue (Indiana), Johns Hopkins (New York), Madrid (Spain) and others. Directors of several research institutes or research centres also took part in the Conference: Armand Clesse (IEIS, Luxembourg), Boris Shmelev (Center for Political Research, Russian Academy of Sciences and Arts), Valentin Yakushik (Institute for European Studies, Academy of Sciences, Kiev, Ukraine) and others.

The presence of the leaders of all three main religions in the region: Archbishop Stanislav Hočevar, Mufti Hadži Hamdija Jusufspahić and the President of the Belgrade Christian Center, Professor Radovan Bigović, was especially important.

The Conference was chaired by H.E. Takehiro Togo, President of the ECPD Academic Council, and co-chaired by H.E. Yasushi Akashi, Sir James Mancham, H.E. Ambassador Wolfgang Wolte, Academicians Boris Shmelev and Vladimir Stipetić, and H.E. Ambassador Darko Tanasković. The opening of the Conference and its work were given comprehensive coverage by electronic and print media.

The organization and work of the First ECPD Study Group Meeting and the Second Conference were supported and/or financially helped by Tokyo Club, Tokyo; Government of Montenegro; Universal Peace Foundation – European Chapter, and the Municipal Assembly of the City of Belgrade. The editors and the publisher wish to thank the sponsors for their generous help in the organization of these very important events. We are especially grateful to H.E. Takehiro TOGO for his tremendous efforts geared to the organization and managing of these events. We also express our gratitude to the high representatives of the religious denominations who briefly addressed the Conference and took part in its work. We also wish to thank the distinguished persons such as H.E. Yasushi Akashi, Sir James Mancham, Boris Shmelev, Wolfgang Wolte, Dragan Vukcevic, Peter Bas-Backer and others who took part in the Conference for their great contribution to its work and promotion. We are greatly indebted to all

other participants who presented their statements and/or took part in the discussions and made this event very successful.

We expect the support and participation of interested institutions and individuals in the further ECPD activities focussed on the promotion of reconciliation and tolerance, peace and development in the Balkan region.

The Editors

CONTENST

PREFACE **iii**

INTRODUCTION **ix**

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS **xvii**

Takehiro TOGO: OPENING ADDRESS **xxi**

CHAIRMAN'S CONCLUDING REMARKS **xxvi**

I Chapter – BALKAN'S PROBLEMS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 1

Yasushi AKASHI

GREETINGS AND OBSERVATION OF THE BALKANS
IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT **3**

Sir James Mancham

GREETINGS SPEECH **7**

Vladimir STIPETIĆ

WEST BALKAN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION, 1989–2005 **9**

Wolfgang WOLTE

FURTHER BUILDING EUROPEAN UNION AND THE BALKAN COUNTRIES **20**

Valentin YAKUSHIK

ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRUCTURING OF INTER-REGIONAL
AND INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS: CONFRONTING TYPES OF SOLUTIONS **23**

Yves-Rastimir NEDELJKOVIĆ

PEACE EDUCATION BY UNITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ABILITIES,
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
– Based on the Anthropology, History of Morality and Cultures **31**

Damir KUKIĆ

THE BALKANS: FROM HERE TO THE PAST **45**

Pavle B. BUBANJA

PEACE IS THE NEW IDEA OF THE HUMAN WORLD **54**

Srdjan CVIJIC

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STABILITY PACT FOR SEE
IN THE RECONCILIATION PROCESSES IN THE SEE REGION **61**

Jeffrey LEVETT

HEALTH WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN SECURITY **63**

Samir BANOOB

THE HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION **79**

II Chapter – EXPERIENCES OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES IN RECONCILIATION AND TOLERANCE 93

Charles INGRAO	
DEMOCRACY & DISSOLUTION: THE CASE OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA	95
Branislav GOŠOVIĆ	
YUGO-NOSTALGIE – FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMATIQUE OF WEST BALKANS	98
Svetozar LIVADA	
THE NEGATION AND DESECRATION OF THE VICTIM	135
Miroslav JOVANOVIĆ	
Serbia and the European Union – HOW MUCH DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION NEED SERBIA AND HOW MUCH DOES SERBIA NEED THE EUROPEAN UNION?	144
Mila ALEČKOVIĆ-NIKOLIĆ	
IN THE NAME OF EUROPE: WHAT ERRORS WERE MADE IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION TAKEN IN THE BALKANS, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SERBIAN DIASPORA	167
Azem VLLASI	
SOLVING THE POLITICAL STATUS OF KOSOVO – AN IMPORTANT CONDITION FOR NORMALIZING THE ALBANIAN-SERBIAN RELATION IN THE BALKANS	175
Dragan K. VUKČEVIĆ	
FROM THE FORTRESS TO THE BRIDGE	179
Milomir MIHALJEVIĆ	
APPROACH OF THE MONTENEGRO TO THE RECONCILIATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	182
Nano RUŽIN	
NATO AS ICONOGRAPHY OF TOLERANCE AND DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE RELIGIONS IN THE BALKANS – THE EXAMPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA	184
Tihomir JOVANOVSKI	
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE NATIONAL, INTER-ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS AND RECONCILIATIONS	187
Islam YUSUFI	
“PROGRESS IN NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN MACEDONIA”	193
Vjekoslav DOMLJAN	
ABANDONING THE 1965 REFORM	198
Peter BAS-BACKER	
RECONCILIATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	205
Robert DONIA	
RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO: EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS	210
Alfonso OJEDA	
IMMIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES	215
Matilde CARLÓN RUIZ	
LAST DEVELOPMENTS OF THE SPANISH MODEL OF DECENTRALIZATION UNDER THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK	221

Tomaž VUGA

TWO CITIES – ONE SPACE
NOVA GORICA (SLOVENIA) – GORIZIA (ITALY) 224

Aleksandar MITIĆ

KOSOVO 2006: KOSOVO YESTERDAY: A DISPUTED LAND,
KOSOVO TODAY: “UNMIK TITANIK” and
KOSOVO TOMORROW: THE MAKING OF A COMPROMISE 229

Todor MIRKOVIĆ

EDUCATION FOR PEACE AND TOLERANCE IN THE BALKANS 241

III Chapter – INTER-CONFESSIONAL TOLERANCE 245

Stanislav HOČEVAR

HUMAN RIGHTS RECONCILIATION AND TOLERANCE
– The Catholic Church 248

Hadži Hamdija JUSUFSPAHIĆ

LET US ALWAYS LIVE IN PEACE AND HARMONY 250

Prof. Dr Radovan BIGOVIĆ

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 252

Vladeta JEROTIĆ

BETWEEN NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS
IDENTITY AND GLOBALISM 257

Darko TANASKOVIĆ

STATE AND CHURCH IN THE WESTERN BALKANS 263

Vern REDEKOP

THE RELEVANCE OF TEACHINGS OF BLESSING AND JUSTICE
OF BLESSING FOR RECONCILIATION IN BOSNIA I HERZEGOVINA 287

Boško BOJOVIĆ

RELIGION – IDENTITY – MODERNITY
In Post-Yugoslav Serbia from Traditionalism to Tolerance and Pluralism 310

Nilgun SARP

WOMEN IN ISLAM
“Helping others by putting oneself in their place” 326

Christine SAMANDARI-HAKIM

EDUCATION FOR PEACE – A GLOBAL APPROACH
TO LOCAL CHALLENGES 335

IV Chapter – ANNEX

**FIRST SESSION OF ECPD INTERNATIONAL
PERMANENT STUDY GROUP 339**

Takehiro TOGO: OPENING ADDRESS 343

**LIST OF THE STUDY GROUP MEMBERS
THAT TOOK PART IN THE MEETING 345**

Jonathan BRADLEY

PROPOSAL OF THE STUDY GROUP PROGRAM OF WORK 347

Valentin YAKUSHIK

**PROPOSAL OF THE STUDY GROUP PROGRAM OF WORK
AT THE FIRST SESSION 352**

Todor MIRKOVIĆ / Momčilo SAKAN

DEFINING THE PROJECT'S PROGRAM OF WORK 354

CHAIRMAN'S CONCLUDING REMARKS 364

**REPORT IN BRIEF ON THE FIRST ECPD INTERNATIONAL
PERMANENT STUDY GROUP SESSION 367**

INTRODUCTION

The European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD) of the University for Peace established by the United Nations included the project “**National Reconciliation, Ethnic and Religious Tolerance in the Balkans**” in its medium-term programme. This project was initiated at the ECPD International Conference (Symposium), held in Belgrade, on 28-29 October, 2005. The recommendation was accepted and the ECPD Academic Council made the appropriate decision that the project should be realized by organizing the annual conferences and work of the ECPD International Permanent Study Group.

The Study Group was organized in order to study and analyze inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in the Balkans, to identify the problems and to recommend their solutions, as well as to prepare and propose the agenda for the Conference. Its first meeting was held in Sveti Stefan, Montenegro, on 17 June, 2006. The Second Meeting of the Study Group was held in Belgrade, on 26 October that same year, in order to prepare the Second Conference which was held for two days.

The Meeting of the Study Group and the Second Conference were held in a rather favourable situation in the region. Several events (peaceful dissolution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, two Balkan countries, Bulgaria and Romania, were ready to join the EU on 1 January 2007, improvement of the inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia, etc.) indicated positive trends. However, many other issues were not solved and threatened to jeopardize peace and stability in the Balkans, especially in its western part. Long-time suffering during the fratricidal conflicts inflicted new wounds on different ethnic and religious groups, and stirred up hatred and animosity being still carried deeply within them. The region was also liable to wide-spread corruption, illegal trafficking in women, children and drugs, which also causes unrest among the people and threatens peace and development. Therefore, almost a decade-long armed conflict in the region had grave social and economic consequences, including lagging in development. Namely, the majority of the West Balkan countries

has not yet reached the level of per capita GDP they had twenty years ago, while lagging in development provides a solid background for numerous unlawful and criminal actions. All these and other phenomena led the ECPD to accept, as its philosophy, the notion of causality between peace and development and that **without peace there will be no sustainable development and that without sustainable development there will be no lasting peace**. Along with this comes the idea that **without reconciliation there will be no stability and peace and without sustainable development there will be not reconciliation and tolerance in the Balkans**. Bearing these ideas in mind, the ECPD accepted the recommendation from the First Study Group Meeting to focus its attention, in the realization of the project, on **reconciliation and human security in the Western Balkans** as the prerequisites for peace and prosperity in the region. That idea was used as guidance in the preparation and organization of the Second Conference.

The Conference was held in accordance with the Agenda, anticipating the opening ceremony and seven plenary working sessions, i.e.:

- Balkan Problems in a Global Context;
- Lessons to be Drawn from the Final Demise of Yugoslavia;
- Reconciliation: How to Avoid the Cycle of Violence and Counter-violence in the Balkans;
- Contribution by the International Community in Reconciling the Two Opposite Tendencies: European Integration and Balkan Fragmentation;
- Education for Peace and Tolerance in the Balkans;
- Tolerance: Fundamental Religious Principles Related to Peace, Tolerance and Human Rights, and the Ways of Their Implementation;
- and
- Development and Reconciliation.

The Conference was chaired by H.E. Takehiro TOGO, while each plenary session was managed by a special moderator or discussion leader: Sir James Mancham (Seychelles), Prof. Charles Ingrao (USA), H.E. Ambassador Wolfgang Wolte (Austria), Academician Boris Shmelev (Russia), Academician Dragan Vukčević (Montenegro), H.E. Ambassador to the Holy See, Prof. Darko Tanasković (Serbia), and Academician Professor Vladimir Stipetić (Croatia). Each plenary session had five or six speakers and open discussions lasting from one and a half to two hours. Most speakers presented their statements in writing, which will be published in the proceedings. In general, the speeches and discussions were in con-

formity with the aim and nature of the Conference, even there were also different views both on the causes of the problems and on the ways in which they can be solved.

The papers were arranged into three groups or chapters according to their contents:

- Balkan Problems in the Global Context;
- Experiences of Specified Countries in Reconciliation and Tolerance, and
- Inter-religious Tolerance.

The fourth part, ANNEX, contains the materials from the First ECPD International Study Group Meeting.

Most speakers and discussants pointed out that the West Balkan region is still far away from the European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes. They stressed that the main reason should be sought in underdevelopment, inter-ethnic disputes, unsettled Kosovo issue, etc. H.E. Yasushi Akashi presented his works for the United Nations and compared some Asian issues with those in the Balkans. Academician Professor Vladimir Stipetić presented, in an illustrative way, the very fast and deep fall and slow economic recovery of the Balkan countries after the beginning of their economic transition. According to Academician Stipetić, this is a serious obstacle to building peace and stability in the region and accession to the European Union. Others saw the “European perspective for all Balkan countries”. Some discrepancies within the European Union were also mentioned (the existence of some economic and social issues, governance without the Constitution, etc. – Wolte, Jovanović), and to resistance to its further enlargement. The need for larger foreign direct investment and economic assistance was emphasized.

Several participants noted that reconciliation, as a prerequisite for human security, was progressing at a slow pace. They pointed out that the reasons were numerous and multifaceted. This should be sought both in history and in the current situation. Academician D. Vukčević said, for example, that the Balkan region is located at the crossroads where the diverse and frequently hostile worlds met and came into conflict... leaving the members of the Balkan societies ... who “know how to fight against each other”. The underdeveloped health-care institutions in the Western Balkans and “recent spread of infectious diseases and increasing use of illicit drugs are among these emerging threats”, says Professor Levett, while Professor Samir Banoob emphasized importance of respecting human rights for reconciliation and human security.

The main responsibility for peace and stability in the Balkan countries lies with the political leaders. However, they neglect the importance of reconciliation and tolerance or, even worse, they intensify inter-ethnic disputes and rivalry by their action. “Inter-ethnic and religious tolerance... have not been the priority issue in the Western Balkans”, said D. Kukić, while S. Livada, condemning the leaders of some newly established states for the lack of reconciliation, said: “Criminals, war forgers... have established themselves in the system of banana states”. D. Kukić also noted that the winners (the recent elections in B&H) were again those... whose political platforms are based on the national attributes”. D. Kukić holds that the failure to hand over the major war criminals to the Hague Tribunal is also a serious obstacle to reconciliation.

Branislav Gošović in his comprehensive analysis of the emerging and demise of the SFR of Yugoslavia “cannot be understood fully, unless analysed within the broader context of world public politics and with appropriate recognition of Yugoslavia’s role and place in the World War II and in the global arena”. Despite the difficulties, the promotion of reconciliation in the Balkans is not only needed, but also possible. “Reconciliation is not a utopian dream or mission impossible”, said Peter Bas-Backer, but to make it possible “we and, in particular political-civil society and religious leaders have to work on it actively and persistently”.

There are various paths to the promotion of reconciliation, peace and stability, but education is one of the safest, as was emphasized at the Conference. “The time ahead of us is the time which requires systematic research, revised education of generations from the elementary to the university level”, said Y-R. Nedeljković, while P. Bubanja stressed the “necessity to address the issue of peace as teaching something honourable for present and future generations”. Academician Vukčević acquainted the participants with the plan for opening the School on Tolerance in Bar, Montenegro, while Dr Todor Mirković presented his view on the possible forms, context and levels of education for peace and tolerance in the Balkans.

One of the main objectives of the Conference was to present the current state and progress made in reconciliation and human security in the West Balkan countries. Numerous participants from the region expressed their views on the causes and consequences of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, improvements in and/or stagnation of post-conflict reconciliation and suggested the ways and means for the continuation of that process.

In the brief yet concise statement, Professor Ingrao, as the discussion leader of the second working session, asserted that the causes of the dissolution of Yugoslavia could be sought in the very social system and, later on, in Milošević's policy. However, the new "democratic" states have to march a long way in order to achieve genuine democratization. On the other hand, Professor Livada said that "our former elite, being incapable of settling the crisis through dialogue, agreed only on waging an undeclared civil war for the division of the territory, plundering of goods and installation of the new elite...". "They (the political elites in the Balkan states) now manipulate with the victims, making a distinction between 'ours' and 'yours' and neglecting 'yours'". In Croatia, according to S. Livada, "this phenomenon has been persisting too long, both among the Serbs and the Croats, as a 'stabilizer', or negation of the 'other'". With such a negation and desecration of the victims, it is hard to make any progress in reconciliation and tolerance, says S. Livada.

Professor V. Domljan holds that the former Yugoslavia the one collapsed because there were no adequate economic reforms, or because they (of 1965, for example) were not completed. "The Yugoslav way was the process driven by the preservation of the leading role of the Communist elites rather than by rational choice and well prepared design". Today, slow economic recovery, inter alia, makes reconciliation in B&H more difficult, says V. Domljan. Referring to reconciliation in B&H, Peter Bas-Backer noted: "Reconciliation is the key to sustainable peace and stability in a war-torn country... but for peace you also need the absence of fear, which is still present in B&H". R. Donia holds that "reconciliation" takes many forms and it is a prerequisite for "reintegration" and can also be achieved among individuals, as well as among the entire groups. He presented his noteworthy experience in trying to implement a minor reintegration project in the Zvornik community.

During the Conference two main problems were reiterated, which aggravate reconciliation in Serbia and its inclusion in European integration process. They are: cooperation with The Hague and Kosovo. M. Jovanović holds that Serbia needs the European Union and that the European Union needs Serbia. Both needs could be fulfilled should these two problems be resolved. However, the Kosovo issue is too complex and "it will take much time and efforts to eliminate consequences and restore the process of reconciliation", said A. Vllasi, who also stated that Kosovo "will be a new independent state". Mila Alečković-Nikolić in other hand, listed and elaborated errors made by the international community towards the

Balkan peoples and states, contributing greatly to making the Balkans as a conflict-ridden region.

According to the Macedonian representatives, inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia are improving. N. Ružin appreciates what the NATO is doing in Macedonia and holds that the year 2001, when the Ohrid Framework Agreement was concluded, was “the year when the reconciliation between the ethnicities belonging to different religions, staled...”, while T. Jovanovski gives priority to economic development as the basis for further inter-ethnic harmonization. I. Yusufi praises the Macedonian decentralization project “which has proven to be a tool for the country’s democratization, stabilization and European integration”.

Prof. A. Ojeda and M. Carlon Ruiz presented their statements on inter-ethnic relations in some parts of Spain, and T. Vuga – how people live in one city at two places (in two states, Slovenia and Italy). Their statements were viewed as the models how similar problems can be solved in different surroundings.

For the Balkans, where three main European religions meet and clash, religious tolerance is of utmost significance. Therefore, the presence of the leaders of all three religious denominations in the region was particularly important.

Archbishop S. Hočevar and Mufti Jusufspahić addressed the Conference and expressed their views on inter-religious relations, stressing the need for further rapprochement of the religions and the peoples of different faiths. The Archpriest and President of the Christian Cultural Centre, Professor R. Bigović, submitted his statement on the Orthodox Church in the European Union.

Several renowned professors and religious experts presented their views on various aspects of religion and its influence on human and spiritual development; relations between religion and societies; religion and globalization, etc. Academician Professor Vladeta Jerotić presented his view on the relations “Between National and Religions Identity and Globalism”; H.E. Ambassador, Prof. D. Tanasković spoke on the relations between “State and Church in the Western Balkans”; Professor V. Redecop presented the results of his research on “The Relevance of Teaching Blessing and Justice of Blessing for Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”; Professor B. Bojović presented his view on “Religion – Identity – Morality in Post-Yugoslav Serbia”, while Professor N. Sarp elaborated the position of “Women in Islam”, and C. Samandary-Hakim spoke on “Education for Peace as a Global Approach to Local Challenges”.

According to most participants and others, the Conference was very successful. The speakers and the discussants expressed many interesting ideas and recommendations, which will be taken into account in the further ECPD activities relating to the promotion of reconciliation and human security. At the end, it was concluded, inter alia, that in 2007 two international meetings should be held: in June – the ECPD Study Group and expert meeting, and in October – the Third International Conference.

More details about the above mentioned ideas and recommendations can be found in the papers presented in these Proceedings. However, the views expressed in these papers solely the views of the authors and not necessarily the views of the European Center for Peace and Development as the organizer of the Conference and the publisher of the Proceedings.

THE EDITORS



THE EUROPEAN CENTER FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY FOR PEACE EST. BY THE UNITED NATIONS

**ECPD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION,
ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN THE BALKANS
- RECONCILIATION AND HUMAN SECURITY -**

Belgrade, October 27-28, 2006



CITY OF BELGRADE



**UNIVERSAL
PEACE FEDERATION**



**GOVERNMENT OF
MONTENEGRO**

TCF

**TOKYO CLUB
FOUNDATION**

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Togo, Takehiro	President of the ECPD Council and Chairman of the Conference, Professor, Tokai University, Tokyo, former Japanese Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Singapore and the Republic of Turkey
Akashi, Yasushi	Former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia
Nagai, Tadashi	Ambassador of Japan to Serbia and Montenegro
Ostojić, Negoslav P.	ECPD Executive Director
Jusufspahić, Hadži Hamdija	Mufti, Islamic Religious Community Belgrade
Hočevar, Stanislav	Belgrade Archbishop
Bigović, Radovan	Professor, Faculty of Theology, University of Belgrade President of Christian Cultural Centre, Belgrade
Mancham, Sir James*	President, Global Peace Council of Universal Peace Federation (UPF) Seychelles, Founding President of Seychelles, Seychelles
Song, Yong Cheol	Chairman of UPF Europe
Adamović, Ljubiša*	Professor, Florida State University, Tallahassee, USA
Alečković-Nikolić, Mila	Representative of the Serbian Diaspora in France
Balas, Johannes	Professor, University of Vienna, Austria
Banoob, Samir	Professor, Johns Hopkins University, South Florida & New York, Chair, American Public Health Association & Member of its International Human Rights Committee
Bas-Backer, Peter	Senior Deputy High Representative, OHR, B&H
Bojović, Boško	Professor, Faculty for Social Studies, Paris, France
Bradley, Jonathan*	Professor, University of the West of England, UK
Brann, Mark	Secretary General of the European Chapter of the UPF (Universal Peace Federation)
Burgwyn, James H.	Professor Emeritus, West Chester University, Philadelphia, USA
Bubanja, Pavle	Professor, University of Niš, Serbia
Carlón, Matilde	Professor, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain
Carter, Nigel	Director, EnVenture, UK
Cicmil, Svetlana	Director of MBA Programme, Bristol Business School, UK
Clesse, Armand	Director, IEIS, Luxembourg
Cvetković, Viktor	Director, Caritas of Belgrade Archdiocese

Cvijić, Srđan	Stability Pact for SEE
Domljan, Vjekoslav*	Professor, University of Sarajevo, B&H
Donia, Robert	Center for Russian and East European Studies, University of Michigan, USA
Đokanović, Tihomir	Professor, University of Belgrade, Serbia
Gošović, Branislav	ECPD Branch Office Geneva
Hasić, Enes	Ombudsman, Republic of Srpska, B&H
Ingrao, Charles	Professor, Purdue University, Indiana, USA
Jerotić, Vladeta	Academician, Professor, Faculty of Theology, Belgrade
Jouan, Patrick	Secretary-General UPF France
Jovanović, Miroslav	Professor, UN Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva
Jovanovski, Tihomir	Professor, St. Cyrill and Methodius University, Macedonia
Kim R. S.	Chairman West Balkan Region UPF
Knežević, Radule	Professor, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Kukić, Damir	Professor, University of Tuzla, B&H;
Lang, Slobodan*	Professor, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Lazović, Budimir	Deputy Dean of ECPD International Postgraduate Studies
Levett, Jeffrey*	Professor National School of Public Health, Athens, Greece
Mihaljević, Milomir	Advisor to the Prime Minister of Montenegro
Mirković, Todor	ECPD Special Adviser, Project Coordinator
Mojović, Nikola	Professor, University of Banja Luka, RS/B&H
Nedeljković, Yves-Rastimir	Professor at ECPD Postgraduate Studies
Ojeda, Alfonso*	Professor, Complutense University of Madrid, Spain
Paunovska, Sanja	Public Relations Manager, Program “Primus”, Skopje, Macedonia
Popović, Vitomir*	Professor Ombudsman of the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, B&H
Putnik, Dušan	Ambassador for Peace and Professor of Religious Studies, UPF, Serbia
Richter, Melita	Professor, University of Trieste, Italy
Randelović, Slobodan	Secretary General UPF Serbia, Serbia
Redekop, Vern	Professor, University of Saint Paul, Canada
Rogelj, Melita	ECPD Branch Office, Brussels
Ružin, Nano*	Ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia to NATO
Sakan, Momčilo	Professor, ECPD
Samandari-Hakim, Christine*	Communauté Internationale Baha'ie, Paris
Sarp, Nilgun	Professor, Ankara University, Ankara, Turkey
Šćepanović, Milorad	Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro
Šijaković, Bogoljub	Professor, University of Belgrade, Serbia
Shala, Behxhet	Director, Council for the Defence of Human Rights & Freedoms, Prishtina

Shikano, Masao	Resident Representative, JICA Austria Office
Shinada, Teruhiko	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Japan, Serbia
Shmelev, Boris	Academician Director, Center for Political Research, Russian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Moscow, Russian Federation
Starec, Bojan	ECPD General Coordinator for International Relations and Cooperation
Stipetić, Vladimir	Academician, Professor at the University of Zagreb, Croatia
Stojanović, Svetozar	Serbian-American Society, Belgrade
Syrri, Despina	Board Member of Humanitarian Defence, South and East Research Center, Athens, Greece
Šoškić, Branislav	Former President of the Republic of Montenegro
Tanasković, Darko*	Professor, Ambassador of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro to the Holy See, Rome
Todorović, Miodrag	Dean, Clinical and Postgraduate Studies USAIM (University of Seychelles American Institute of Medicine)
Vilus, Jelena	Director of ECPD Law Studies
Vllasi, Azem	Lawyer, Prishtina
Vujović, Predrag	Professor, Ambassador for Peace and PR Advisor to various Balkan UPF, Serbia
Vukčević, Dragan*	Academician, Professor at the University of Podgorica, Montenegro
Vukoja, Mario	Professor, Institute for Dialogue of Cultures and Civilisation, Sarajevo, B&H
Wallace Jr., Don	Professor, Georgetown University, Washington D.C. Chairman of the Board, International Law Institute (ILI)
Wolte, Wolfgang*	Ambassador, Austrian Society for European Politics, Vienna
Yakushik, Valentin*	Deputy Director of the Institute of European Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Professor of University Kiev-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine
Yusufi, Islam	Professor, Center for Policy Studies, Budapest, Hungary
OBSERVERS	
Antonović, Maja	Faculty of Diplomacy, Gorizia, Italy
Ichihara, Tatsuhiko	Faculty of Diplomacy, Gorizia, Italy
Lilleorg, Kristiina	ECPD
Miura, Akihito	Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan, Serbia
Sunada, Tsutomu	First Secretary, Embassy of Japan, Serbia
Ojdanić, Saša	Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia, Department for International organizations
Ota, Shinobu	Embassy of Japan, Serbia
Zirojević, Aleksandra	Christian Cultural Centre, Belgrade





TAKEHIRO TOGO

PRESIDENT OF THE ECPD COUNCIL AND THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE

OPENING ADDRESS

Honourable Participants of the Conference, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my pleasant duty to declare open International Conference on “Reconciliation and Human Security”.

This year’s Conference is a continuation of the last years’ Symposium on “National and Inter-ethnic Reconciliation and Religious Tolerance in the Western Balkans” initiated by the Government of Japan. It was a notable success, having been widely reported not only in the countries of the Western Balkan Regions but also in other parts of Europe and United States. At the Symposium it was decided to continue such efforts by establishing International Permanent Study Group and by convening the Conferences in order to address to the imminent issues still afflicting the Region.

The International Permanent Study Group had its first session on June 17 in San Stefan. Its second session was convened just yesterday preceding this Conference. They discussed the most pressing issues in preparation for the Conference and produced the Draft Agenda of the Conference and Statement for the Conference, as well as adopting tentative programme of work for the Study Group in 2007 and beyond.

1. STATEMENT OF THE STUDY GROUP FOR THE CONFERENCE.

1) Overview

The first session of the International Study Group was held on June 17 this year in San Stefan, when Montenegro voted for its independence at a referendum and with Serbia having confirmed its status as sovereign independent state. The status of Kosovo is still under serious deliberations and we are waiting for the final solution to be achieved by agreement of all sides. Bosnia Herzegovina is still undergoing a difficult process of deciding her ultimate form of state after the withdrawal of international con-

tingents, but the reconciliation of three ethnic and religious groups are far from having been achieved, and may be exacerbated if the pressure of the international contingents will be lifted without due preparation. Apparently, the wounds are still too deep for them to allow for such reconciliation in the immediate future.

In this imminent situation, the Study Group will present the conclusion of the first session in San Stefan, as well as the result of their discussion in the second session yesterday in the form of statement and recommend to this year's Conference adequate agenda for discussion, so that the Conference may come out with a clear cut conclusion through deliberation and make necessary recommendation for concrete measures to be taken in the present situation.

Our session also formulated our programme of action for 2007 and the ensuing years, so that we can prepare for further stages of development in this region through accumulated analysis of the situation in the region, past present and future, and that we can make pertinent recommendations to the future Conferences and necessary studies and researches could be conducted in SG.

In the changing situation in the West Balkan Regions, the discussion touched upon many important issues that should be seriously analyzed in SG. The basic tone was that the long lasting disintegration process in the Region is now coming to its culmination, and a new turning point seems to be looming in the horizon. The peaceful separation of Montenegro from the State Union with Serbia may signify a new trend in the general political climate in the Region, and should the status of Kosovo be decided by an agreement by all the parties, a new order of things may prevail whereby peace rather than war is a remedy for resolution of differences. The Region suffered long enough in fratricidal conflicts and animosities. There are still many issues to be solved as is the case with Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina, but if an element of optimism may be discerned in situation in the region it should be nurtured by its all countries and entities in the Region. The role of ECPD lays in analyzing and identifying such elements in the present turn of events in the region as well as in making them known in the region and beyond, so as to accelerate such a process in the right direction and make it irreversible. We must seriously discuss and suggest possible ways and means by which peoples in the region can at last look to the future, while remembering the roots and cause of the horrendous conflict and turmoil of the past. It must also be emphasized that peoples of the region can look to the future in a qualitatively different international environment in Europe, where consistent integration

process is taking place, and they will sooner or later join in that process. Reconciliation and stability of the region will create better setting for their earlier participation in this process of integration in Europe.

2) **The issues raisin**

The greater nation states nationalism as well as the deterioration of economic situation leading to more acute differences in economic welfare ignited the whole process of fratricidal war, ethnic cleansing and disintegration. The approach of the international community in some cases aggravated such processes. In ensuing conflicts, victims were on many sides. It must be squarely admitted and apologized. This is the basis for reconciliation.

Inviting representative of all religions in the region may be conducive to religious tolerance.

The underdevelopment of economy, high rate of unemployment, trade deficit, inflation and lack of direct foreign investment in the Region are exacerbating the tension leading to instability in society.

Corruption, illegal trafficking in women, children and drug are a negative phenomenon in many countries and areas of the Balkan Region.

Education is important for teaching the young about what happened in the past and to think of the future of their society, as well as to deepening their understanding of culture, religion, literature and society of other peoples.

Improving of health conditions in the region is indispensable.

The session was also dominated by two topics: Human Security and Education for Peace and Tolerance.

3) **Human Security**

The first session of SG adopted the proposal providing for the issue of Human Security being on the agenda at the Second International Conference and for being one of the major topics in the future programme of working of SG.

In order to include Human Security in the SG programme of work as a universal and global issue, it may be necessary to explain the notion and aim of this concept, or specifically, to select the issues which will be the subjects of the SG research. Also we need to define activities required for project implementation (researches, education, international meetings, etc).

The concept of Human Security was introduced in the UNDP “Report on Human Development” of 1994 which stressed that, up to this moment, the concept of development put too much emphasis on states and national economy, and that there is a need for the development of individuals. There are too many threats in the world hindering such development and there is a need for assuring Human Security in economy, food, health, environment, individuals, regional societies and politics.

This concept was further analyzed and elaborated in the Report of the Commission on Human Security of 2003.

Chapter 1 of the Report “Human security now” explains human security in detail. Human security focuses on people – not on states. In post Cold War world, destruction of environment, poverty, domestic wars and ethnic conflicts, terrorism, diseases are greater sources of threats than inter-states conflicts. Traditionally, state would monopolize the rights and means to protect its citizens. State power and state security would be established and expanded to sustain order and peace. But in 21st century, both challenges to security and its protectors have become more complex. The state remains to be the main guarantor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfil its security obligations – and at times has even become a source of threats to its own people. That is why attention must now shift from the security of the state to the security of the people – to human security.

The Report also presented an important approach of protection and empowerment. To protect people – the key to human security, their basic rights and freedoms must be protected. To do so requires concerted efforts to develop national and international norms, processes and institutions, which must address insecurities in ways that are systematic not makeshift, comprehensive not compartmentalized, preventive not reactive. Human security helps identify gaps in the infrastructure of protection as well as to strengthen or improve it. The Report elaborates areas for protection in separate chapters as Chapter 2, People caught up in violent conflict, Chapter 3, People on the move, Chapter 4, Recovering from Violent Conflicts, Chapter 5, Economic Security – the Power to Choose Among Opportunities, Chapter 6, Better Health for Human Security, Chapter 7, Knowledge, Skills and Values for Human Security. Each Chapter analyzes in depth the situation and makes policy conclusions.

Empowerment is explained in the following terms. People’s ability to act on their own behalf – and on behalf of others – is the second key to human security. Empowerment is important because people develop their potential as individuals and as communities. Strengthening peoples’ abilities to act on their own behalf is also instrumental to human security.

People empowered can demand respect for their dignity when it is violated. Supporting peoples' ability to act on their own behalf means providing education and information so that they can scrutinize social arrangements and take collective action.

Protection and empowerment are mutually reinforcing. People protected can exercise many choices. And people empowered can avoid some risks and demand improvement in the system of protection.

Chapter 8, *The Way to Advance the Security of People*, returning to the overarching question of how to create a human security initiative, proposes concrete actions. The Commission proposes that a global initiative be mobilized to place human security at the top of local, national, regional and global agendas. Putting human security at the top of the agenda will change the way local, national and global actors pursue their missions. It also calls for strengthening overall measures for protection and empowering people and calls for formation and consolidation of a network of public, private and civil actors who can develop norms, embark on integrated activities and monitor progress and performance. With a conscious focus on human security, more integrated social arrangements more integrated global efforts can address the big threats and make people more secure.

Such integrated approach on human security is much needed in the West Balkan Region, and SG may pay serious attention to this initiative to strengthen security and the well being of the peoples of this Region.

2. DELIBERATIONS AT THE CONFERENCE

Such is the statement by SG and the Draft Agenda for the Conference was prepared on the basis of this statement, so that you, the participants of the Conference, will have a rough orientation of the discussion to take place during the Conference. Of course, any new initiative or points of discussion are welcome. I would appreciate your active participation in discussion so that concrete proposals for the solution of the problems in the West Balkan Region can be clearly formulated as the conclusion of the Conference.

Last but not least, I would like to express my heartfelt appreciation for the support given by the Tokyo Club of Japan, Government of Montenegro and Universal Peace Federation, which have made the work of SG and this Conference possible.

H.E. TAKEHIRO TOGO, PH.D.

PRESIDENT OF THE ECPD COUNCIL AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE

CHAIRMAN'S CONCLUDING REMARKS

Honourable Participants of the Conference, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Allow me to conclude this Conference by presenting to you the summary of what was achieved and what lay ahead. With your permission, I would like to introduce several provisions as an outcome of this event.

ECPD will further continue the activities in the direction determined by this Conference as an action-oriented institution, in order to achieve reconciliation and human security in the West Balkan Regions with a view to accelerating the process of joining the overall European integration. Through deliberations of the Conference, in spite of the very difficult situation in the region, some positive trends in the turn of events have been confirmed, such as the peaceful separation of Montenegro and more conciliatory attitudes in the afflicted regions. Such a trend should be nurtured and encouraged, because reconciliation and stability is the prerequisite condition for economic development and acceleration of the general European integration process to reach this region. And it allows the peoples of the region at last to look to the future after a long spell of suffering in fratricidal wars and conflicts.

ECPD will continue to concentrate its efforts for the peace and stability in the Balkan regions, and for this purpose, it will continue to organize similar Conferences, possibly in other capitals of the countries in the region, and next year in Kosovo as graciously offered by the representative from Kosovo. The Permanent International Study Group will continue its work to further the analysis of causes and consequences of the conflicts in the region and ways and means for achieving peace, reconciliation, human right and economic development of the region. For this purpose, SG will continue to work under the general theme of "Reconciliation and Human Security" in 2007 and to prepare for the next year's Conference. In this work, several priority issues may be assigned to separate working groups to be created under the SG. ECPD as an institution for education for peace will establish within its general educational curriculum, courses for "Education for Peace" with masters and doctors degree in view.

ECPD will try to organize and promote regional cooperation, so that efforts for reconciliation and economic development of the region could be coordinated through many public and private organizations and institutions of the countries of the region.

These are the concrete results obtained through deliberations of the Conference. Now I would like to share with you some of the salient points of discussions to which all the participants of the Conference so assiduously contributed.

International society has gone through visible changes after the end of the cold war.

Major inter-state wars have decreased but internal conflicts increased, and human right came more to the centre of attention of the world community, hence human right and human security attracted more attention. Under the UN authority, peace building efforts have been stepped up.

Yugoslavia played important role in history and the countries in the Balkan Region have every right to occupy honourable place in the integration process of Europe.

The causes of the conflicts must be ascertained and apology for the sufferings caused should be apologized. Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia is one step in this direction.

Some trends for ethnic reconciliation are observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo should be encouraged in other areas as well. Economic development is important for reconciliation. Long term reconciliation is possible. Cultural heritage of all the peoples and religions should be protected.

The presence of leaders of all three religions has made a memorable contribution to the deliberations of the Conference. The common element of upholding of peace and respect of human dignity was emphasized, and abuse of religion was cited as the cause of conflict.

Secularism to allow for women's activities in the society was stressed.

Importance of general principles for the migration in Europe Union was stressed, and decentralization in some countries of EU was introduced. European space will incorporate countries of the Balkan regions.

Importance of economic development was repeatedly stressed as well as the rule of law.

The following preamble to the European Constitution is a very pertinent statement to give a represent the mood that the participants all shared for the future of the West Balkan region

“Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, democracy, equality, freedom and the rule of law. Believing that Europe, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to continue along this path of civilisation, progress and prosperity, for the good of all its inhabitants, including the weakest and most deprived,

Convinced that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the People of Europe are determined to transcend their ancient divisions, and united in an ever closer fashion, to forge a common destiny,”

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all the participants for their dedication and contribution to the Conference. We are all of one mind in wishing for the peace and stability to be re-established in the region, so that people in the region can return to the European space in its rapidly advancing integration process. Once again, I should like to express our heartfelt gratitude to the Tokyo Club of Japan, the Government of Montenegro and Universal Peace Federation for their financial support as well to the Municipality of Belgrade for providing us this gorgeous setting for our Conference. Lastly, together with all of you, I would like to pay respect and appreciation for the most efficient translation. We owe to you a major part of the success of the Conference.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Takehiro Togo
Chairman of the Conference

CHAPTER I

THE BALKAN PROBLEMS
IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT



YASUSHI AKASHI

FORMER SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UN SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

GREETINGS AND OBSERVATION OF THE BALKANS IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

Mister Chairman,

As a member of the Steering Committee I am very happy to welcome you all to this International Conference. The ECPD seems to be able to even control the weather and we are blessed with such a perfect autumn weather. I hope that should not divert our attention from the proceedings in the next two days. I, myself, struggled for peace in this region in the period from 1994 to 1995 and even as compared to the last year, the atmosphere here in Belgrade seems to be more peaceful and even the way people walk in the street seems to be somehow more light-footed and happier. But, peace in the world, including the Balkans, is rather precarious. I come from Asia, where the peace is also precarious, and I think it is important for us to focus on the question of establishing more durable, more permanent peace in the world, focussing at this Conference particularly on the Balkans.

Mister Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to make a very brief presentation. The top subject is the Balkan problems in a global context. Since my association with the Balkans has become rather scarce these days, I will be talking more about a global context. I have just finished a book in the United Nations, which will come out next month, and in preparing this book I was deeply struck by the enormous changes which have taken place in the world, and also at the United Nations, as a reflection of the world, especially in the post cold war period, since 1990. And let me enumerate several of these changes: first, there is a decrease in the number of international conflicts and wars, and contrary, increase in the number of internal conflicts, or often times, inter-ethnic conflicts; this is very striking. Second, I was also struck, by the fact that the attachment to national sovereignty still ling us around, but it has been significantly modified by the new concept of the responsibility to protect: if necessary, in the case of major humanitarian disaster and if the government con-

cerned cannot, or is not willing to protect its people, the international community has the right and, indeed, the responsibility to protect such people. In other words, this is a much discussed notion of humanitarian intervention, and it is very interesting that the outcome document adopted last September at the World Summit at the United Nations Headquarters up-hilled this notion of the responsibility to protect. Third, the United Nations is, as such, a universal inter-governmental organization and it still remains above all else. But the role of non-state actors has vastly increased in recent two years. Non-state actors nuanced good and bad and I mean by “nuanced” its actors, entities other than governments, namely civil society, NGOs, multinational corporations, trade unions and the like. Among that non-state actors certainly we should include terrorist attacks, the kind that Sir James mentioned, and narcotics traffickers, traffickers of human beings, etc. Since state borders have been lowered, we see more and more activities of these non state actors. Fourth, I am very much impressed by human rights issues which have come as central concern of the international community. As you know, earlier this year, the United Nations created the Human Rights Council which has taken the place of the Human Rights Commission, which was a creation of the Economic and the Social Council. Now this new body, the Human Rights Council, is elected by the General Assembly itself, from countries which ostensibly are serious and more protective of human rights in their own countries. And the duration of the Human Rights Council is at least ten weeks a year, which is considerably longer than the duration of the predecessor body, the Human Rights Commission. But, human rights issues today still face many political problems and the United States for one, decide not to participate in the work of the Human Rights Council. The United States was not satisfied with the compromise reached on the nature of the Human Rights Council and decided to opt out, which I regret very much. At the same time, as our Chairman, Ambassador Togo has cogently stated this morning to us that human security has become a major raring call, making individual human beings rather than states, a central concern of the international community. Individuals, fears, their want, economic and social want, their needs and their rights, and consequently their capacity development have become an overriding concern to the United Nations. In the fifth place, I recall that the UN peace keeping was a major prevailing focus at the United Nations in the early 1990’s. But I see that nowadays it is not peace keeping, but peace building which is becoming a new focus. This is based on a very deep awareness that while the peacekeeping might be just a preserving a precarious ceasefire, a temporary peace, what

is needed is sustainable peace and stability in a post-conflict society. And, we learn from the reports of the World Bank that close to 50% of conflicts terminated tend to be renewed. But, post-conflict peace building can not be achieved unless we adopt more comprehensive, multi dimensional, much more lasting effort to rebuild not only the physical aspects of shattered society, building hospitals and schools, etc. But, we have to work harder in healing the wounds of heart and achieving high degree of mutual trust between individuals, groups and communities. Also, the whole question of governance, based on the rule of law, the separation of powers and accountable and transparent government has to be addressed more seriously and more systematically. This means that we have to discard the simplistic notion that democracy can somehow be realized by holding a few elections. And the outcome document of the global summit in September last year established to focus attention on this peace building, a new body called the Peace Building Commission. On the basis of these observations I am especially interested in the subject of this Conference, focussing on the Balkans. Since, as I was introduced, I was involved even in peace keeping in this region in mid-1990's, but more so, since coming from Asia, as a Japanese, I would like to tell you that we faced many similar issues in Asia, which are crying for help and clarifications. Just last week I attended a conference held in Tokyo, focussing on the analysis of Cambodia 15 years after a dramatic and successful peace keeping by the United Nations took place in that country. One of the conclusions of that conference was that yes, a semblance of peace and democracy has been attended in Cambodia, but that much remains to be accomplished. There are at least four serious issues, namely poverty, the gap between urban and rural areas, thirdly corruption, fourthly manifestations of some dictatorial tendencies in the government headed by Mr. Hung Seng. It is hard to have a conclusive answer as to the success or failure of the UN in Cambodia. An optimist might say that the bottle still has half whiskey; the pessimist might say that the bottle, already is half empty.

In Asia, there is another similarly successful peace keeping, which took place in East Timor. You might recall that in 1999 UN peace keeping was deployed in East Timor after disturbances of the referendum. And the UN took a long time to reduce its presence and only this year it was decided that the mission of the peace keeping force will be terminated. So, these examples from Asia show the fragility of the restored peace, the limitations of UN peace keeping and all of us in the global context face these problems. I do not have to give you the example of Afghanistan, which also seemingly restored peace under the presidency of Mr. Kar-

zai, but we see recrudescence of Taliban activities, especially in the south of that country. Therefore, it is clear that like in the Balkans, Asia, and more particularly, East Asia, where Japan is situated, faces many buffering questions of reconciliation among neighbouring countries, ethnic tolerance, eradicating the roots of conflict and building truly genuine, democratic, humanistic and peaceful societies. Therefore, I very much look forward to participating in this conference, to gain more insight into the question of reconciliation after the conflict has ended, and building societies based on true mutual confidence and trust. So, Mister Chairman, I will finish, I hope I did not go beyond twelve minutes, I look forward to discussion in the next two days.



SIR JAMES MANCHAM

PRESIDENT, GLOBAL PEACE COUNCIL,
FOUNDING PRESIDENT OF SEYCHELLES, SEYCHELLES

GREETINGS SPEECH

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, Your Excellences,

The first session is going to deal with the very important topic “Balkan problems in a global context”. Is see that on our list we have four distinguished speakers. As you like to be able to have some discretions on the theme human subject matter I would like to ask that each speaker speaks for a maximum of 12 minutes. So that we are left with enough time to be able to have discretions. Before I call the first speaker I believe I should share with you distinguished guests an experience which I had this week which indicate the complexity of the so the sort world in which we are now living in.

I was on my way to Korea to attend a conference on peace. In order to get to South Korea I had to travel via Paris from Seychelles to Seoul. I overnighted in Paris at the Western Hotel formally known as the Continental Hotel. Next morning, I went down to get a taxi to go to Charles de Gaulle. There was no taxi. So the doorman went to go and find a taxi for a gentleman who was waiting with a suitcase. So after 10 minutes, for this gentleman a taxi had arrived. I asked “do u mind if we share the taxi if your going to Charles de Gaulle?” He said “no at all”. So we got in the taxi. I said, “my name is James”, he said “I’m Jason”. He said, “James where are you heading for”? I said, “Jason I am heading for Seoul, Korea”. He said, “What are you going to do in Korea? I said, “I am going to attend a peace conference”. He said, “peace conference? Don’t you think you are wasting your time? Don’t you realize since the beginning of the world, we have done nothing but war”? So I told him, “my friend yes, but what I am dreading now is that the war we are talking about now is nuclear war. It would certainly send us to a new dimension”. He said, “James I think you got a point”. So the taxi carries on and he says, “I hope if you don’t mind if I can make a phone call to my office”. So he took his mobile and phoned. What was he discussing about? Now, he attended a conference on the marketing and sales of military satellites. And there he was talking to his boss about this success of having identified a representative of a coun-

try who interested to acquire what they were manufacturing. And at that moment, it dawned on me for the sin of our world. There are some men going to South Korea to discuss about peace and there are others who are heading to Washington D.C and in his mind is priority to sell more weapons of mass destruction!

Against this thought I would like to open up discussions on our subject today, “Balkan problems in a global village”. It is my pleasure to call on his Excellency, Yasushi Akashi, who as we know was for many years representative of the Secretary General of the UN in the Former Yugoslavia. This is a man who brings in depth knowledge of the roots of some of the problems in the area.

WEST BALKAN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 1989–2005

INTRODUCTION

I am speaking as an economist, with an inclination towards a quantitative-analytical approach to phenomena. I hold that in many respects economic phenomena have shaped the events in this region (and not only in it). Therefore, I will try in my short presentation to expound on some facts that were not given in the last year's presentation of this topic. I will concentrate on the difficulties encountered in the process of transition in the Western Balkans, since that is the topic of this conference.

1. WHERE WE WERE AND WHERE WE ARE NOW?

I do not wish my presentation to be long, so I will immediately move on to show movements in GDP in this region during the past 25 years (Table 1).

Table 1 Gross Domestic Product in the West Balkan Countries, 1980–2005 (Expressed in Terms of Purchasing Power Parity and Prices Of 1990)

Country	B&H	Croatia	Macedonia	Slovenia	Serbia & Montenegro	Former Yugoslavia	Albania
1980	16,840	35,040	7,310	21,270	50,610	131,058	6,270
1989	18,430	37,470	8,040	22,900	53,339	140,179	4,917
1995	7,933	24,023	5,819	20,978	24,590	83,343	7,301
2001	10,950	29,479	6,454	27,619	26,666	100,262	9,855
2005	13,220	35,470	7,221	31,783	32,015	119,709	11,650
Current prices ^A	9,460	30,949	5,905	34,397	33,196	113,908	
1980	4,115	7,640	4,090	11,820	5,340	6,063	2,347
1989	4,190	7,880	4,250	12,080	5,480	6,250	2,477
1995	2,364	5,392	2,930	10,987	2,311	3,729	2,256
2001	2,792	6,644*	3,154	13,843	2,497	4,376	2,807
2005	3,290	7,906	3,473	16,136	3,006	5,165	3,180
Current prices ^A	2,353	6,972	2,839	17,337	3,117	4,915	

A Gross Domestic Product (in US\$ million) Per Capita Gross Domestic Product (\$)

* Adjusted data, since there were more inhabitants according to the statistics.

^A At the current official exchange rate of national currency relative to US\$

Source: OECD – Development Centre Studies; Angus Maddison: *The World Economy, Paris 2003*.

The data for 1980-2001 are based on the calculations made by the OECD, under the guidance of Angus Maddison, and published in Paris in 2003. All data are expressed in terms of the purchasing power parity of GDP and prices in 1990, which were calculated in Paris by applying the Geary-Khamis method of multinational parities.

The year 2005 is also presented on the basis of the national data on the value of GDP, converted into dollars at the official rate. The source of this table was the study of transition made by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 2006.

The conclusions to be derived from Table 1 are unambiguous.

In 2005, GDP in the territory of the former Yugoslavia had index 91, thus being lower by 9% as compared to that 25 years ago! However, this average is the resultant of the divergent tendencies. Regional differences are enormous: Slovenia was the only country to increase its GDP – by 62%; Croatia succeeded in slightly increasing its GDP above the 1980 level only in 2005, while GDP for 2005 in all other ex-Yugoslav republics was below its levels in 1980 (B&H – 21%; Macedonia – 1%; Serbia & Montenegro – 36%). By contrast, Albania increased its GDP by 85%.

Differences are even greater when progress is measured by per capita GDP. Slovenia recorded a rise in the prosperity of its population from 1980 to 2005 (+37%) and so did Croatia (+3), while all other ex-Yugoslav republics recorded a decline (B&H – by 20%, Macedonia – by 15%, Serbia and Montenegro – by 43%, and the territory of the former Yugoslavia – by 15%). In 2005, per capita GDP in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was at its 1977 level (according to the data from the OECD study). In Albania this increase was significant and amounted to 35%.

When did this stagnation or a decline in economic activity begin in this region? The first column shows the chain index (the previous year = 100) and the second – the annual growth rate, so that it is relatively easy to identify the periods of stagnation and upturn.

Period	B&H	Croatia	Macedonia	Slovenia	Serbia & Montenegro	Former Yugoslavia	Albania
1980–1989	9.4	6.9	10.0	7.7	5.4	6.9	26.3
Growth rate, %	1.0	0.74	1.1	0.82	0.6	0.7	2.6
1989–1995	43.0	64.1	72.4	91.6	46.1	59.5	92.2
Growth rate, %	-12.0	-7.1	-5.2	-1.5	-11.5	-8.3	-1.4
1995–2001	138.0	122.3	110.9	131.7	108.4	120.3	135.0
Growth rate, %	5.5	3.4	1.7	4.7	1.4	3.1	5.1
2001–2005	120.7	120.3	111.9	115.1	120.1	119.4	118.2
Growth rate, %	4.7	4.7	2.8	3.6	4.7	4.5	4.3

The answer is clear: in the territory of the former Yugoslavia growth began to stagnate in the 1980s already, when its rate dropped to only 7%, thus being considerably lower than 5.7% in the period 1950-1980. During that decade, inflation was extremely high; foreign debt was serviced with great difficulty; the “even-odd” driving system was introduced; there were daily shortages of consumer goods (detergents, etc.). Thereafter, from 1989 to 2001, GDP in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was declining (-2.2% annually), so that its 2001 level was 76.5. After 2001, its annual growth was 4.5%. However, there are differences among the newly established states. Albania recorded different trends: from 1980 to 1989 it progressed at a relatively fast pace (2.6%); in the first phase of transition (1989-1995), it experienced a decline in economic activity, but since 1995 it has been rapidly developing.

Altogether, we are recording in this region a stagnating economy, which is unusual for the dynamic global economy in those decades characterized as the period of unprecedented progress in the history of mankind.

Table 2 TLE Level of Prosperity in the West Balkan Countries, 1980–2005 (Territory Of The Former Yugoslavia = 100)

Year	B&H	Croatia	Macedonia	Slovenia	Serbia & Montenegro	Albania
1980	68	126	67	195	88	38
1989	67	126	68	193	88	40
1995	63	145	79	295	62	60
2001	64	152	72	316	57	64
2005	64	153	67	312	58	61

The first conclusion that can be derived from these data is that the differences in the living conditions of the peoples living in this part of the Balkans (as shown by Table 2) increased. The level of prosperity in Slovenia is now three times higher than that in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, while during the 1980s its level of development was twice as high. Croatia’s level of prosperity is now (2005) above the territory’s average by 53% (as compared to 26% in 1980); Macedonia remained at its previous level (67%), while lagging was recorded in B&H and Serbia & Montenegro. Albania increased the prosperity of its population from an average 39% for the territory of the former Yugoslavia (in 1980) to 61% (in 2005).

There is no doubt that the increasing differences have implications for *human security and reconciliation* in the Western Balkans, which is the topic of this Conference. The demonstration effect, with the freer move-

ment of people, makes these differences constantly present in the consciousness of the citizens in that region. Television, the press and other mass media enhance the discontent of the citizens with their status.

However, these relative relations are not significant – they only reflect the circumstances in our West Balkan microcosms. The much more significant conclusion is that this region is lagging behind the world's progress, as shown by Table 3.

Table 3 The (Under)Development Level of the West Balkan Countries, 1980–2005 (Measured by the Purchasing Power of per capita GDP)

Year	Former Yugoslavia	B&H	Croatia	Macedonia	Slovenia	Serbia & Montenegro	Albania	Per capita GDP (US \$ of 1990 PPP)
<i>A. World = 100</i>								
1980	134	91	169	90	262	88	52	4,520
1989	122	82	153	83	235	88	48	5,140
1995	69	44	100	54	204	43	42	5,385
2001	72	46	110	52	229	41	46	6,049
2005*	77	79	117	51	239	45	47	6,750
<i>A. Western Europe** = 100</i>								
1980	46	31	58	31	90	41	18	13,197
1989	39	26	50	27	76	35	16	15,856
1995	22	14	32	17	65	14	13	16,860
2001	23	15	35	16	72	13	14	19,256
2005*	25	16	38	17	78	15	15	20,800

* Estimate.

** EU-15 + Switzerland and Norway.

This part of Europe was lagging behind the extremely dynamic world economy: during the past 25 years, GDP per capita in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was greater by one-third as compared to the world's average per capita GDP in 1980; in 1989, it was only 22% above the world's average, while in 1995 it declined below it by even 31%. Since then, this territory has slowly been returning to its former level, so that in 2005, as shown by the relevant data, it reached 77% of the world's per capita GDP. All newly established states lost their "race" with the world, which also applies to Slovenia and Albania that are developing more rapidly. This applies to the relation towards Western Europe's GDP, since Western Europe recorded faster growth of its per capita GDP from 1980 to 2005 than the world as a whole (because population growth there was lower!!¹)

¹ From 1980 to 2005, the world's GDP rose by 116% and that of Western Europe by 70%.

2. THE REASONS FOR THE OBSERVED TENDENCIES

What are the reasons for these disturbing tendencies in the Western Balkans?

There are certainly more of them. Devastation caused by war in the territory of Croatia and Bosnia, as well as Serbia certainly contributed to these tendencies to a significant extent. However, it seems to me, as an analyst-economist, that weaknesses in transition policy must not be disregarded. All European countries undergoing transition have significantly slowed down their growth, as shown by Table 4. The transition countries of Central Europe as well as Baltic countries produced relatively better results: from 1989 to 2005 their GDP increased by 33%. This means that the annual growth rate of GDP is 1.8%, which is considerably below the level recorded during the previous 30 years.² Consequently, the growth rate in that region was halved.

The results achieved by other former East-European economies are even less favorable. On the average, the countries of South Eastern Europe did not record any economic growth during the observed 16 years. Albania is an exception, while Romania and Croatia approached their 1989 levels in 2005. The situation is even more difficult in the states of the former Soviet Union. In 2005, their average GDP was still lower than in 1989 by one-sixth (whereby Moldova and Ukraine recorded the most pronounced downward tendencies, while Belarus made the greatest progress).

All this shows to economists that these unfavourable tendencies have the common denominator – weaknesses in the process of transition in this region, which were especially pronounced in the period 1989-1994, but persisted in some countries into the late 1990s. Since 2000, all those countries have been recording high growth rates, which points to the vitality of the newly established system that will hopefully enable these countries to gradually recover their previous position in the world economy.

Where are the weaknesses in the process of transition in this part of Europe? It is evident that they should not be sought in transition itself, since it enabled extremely high growth rates and economic progress in Eastern Asia (China and Vietnam) (Table 4).

It is evidently the question of the way of conducting the process of transition in this region. It was influenced by Polish economist Balcerowicz who, in the late 1980s, advanced the thesis about *big bang*, after which

² During the period 1950-1980, the GDP growth rates amounted to 3.5% in Czechoslovakia, 4.1% in Poland, 3.6% in Hungary and even 5.5% in Albania.

Table 4 The Growth of Real GDP in the Countries in Transition, 1989–2005

Country	Level (1989 = 100)		Average ^A annual GDP growth rate (%)	
	GDP	Per capita GDP ^A	1949–1999	2000–2005
<i>Central European and Baltic countries</i>				
Czech Republic	121	122	2.1	3.7
Estonia	130	145	3.8	7.7
Latvia	101	117	3.6	7.9
Lithuania	98	100	1.8	7.1
Hungary	129	136	3.2	4.3
Poland	148	146	5.8	3.2
Slovakia	127	123	4.7	4.4
Slovenia	132	124	4.7	3.6
Average ^B	133	134	-4.4	3.8
<i>Countries of South Eastern Europe</i>				
Albania	137	123	7.2	5.8
Bulgaria	100	115	-1.3	5.1
Croatia	100	101	4.5	4.2
Macedonia	88	80	1.2	1.9
Romania	105	107	0.5	4.9
Serbia & Montenegro	61	56	1.7	4.9
Average ^B	97	96	1.9	4.7
<i>Countries of the former Soviet Union</i>				
Belarus	123	121	0.6	7.2
Moldova	47	46	-7.7	6.3
Russia	88	92	-2.3	6.8
Ukraine	59	65	-8.4	7.4
Average ^B	87	92	-3.2	7.2
<i>Transition countries³</i>				
Average ^B	97	98	0.1	6.8

^A Per capita GDP and annual growth rates have been computed by the author on the basis of the original data.

^B This is the weighted average. Source: EBRD, *Transition Report Update*, London, October 2006.

the new, prosperous economy would emerge rapidly. It was also adopted by the IMF with its *big push*, so that the transition process was also conducted in such a way. The situation is best described by Nobel Prize Winner Joseph Stiglitz in his latest book *Making Globalization Work*. I will cite some excerpts from this book³ which refers to the situation in the Western Balkans.

³ See pp. 37-41 in his book, published by Allen Lane and Penguin, 2006.

“After the Berlin Wall fell, there was hope of democracy and economic prosperity throughout the former Soviet Union and its satellite states. Advisers from the West rushed to Eastern Europe to guide those countries through their transitions. Many believed, mistakenly, that ‘shock therapy’ was needed – that the transition to Western-style capitalism should take place overnight through rapid privatization and liberalization. Instantaneous price liberalization brought with it – predictably – hyperinflation. Tight monetary policy (high interest rates with little credit available) and fiscal austerity (tight budgets) were used to bring down the hyperinflation; they also brought down the economies, which slid into deep recessions and depressions. Meanwhile, rapid privatizations were giving away hundreds of billions of dollars of the countries’ most valuable assets, creating a new class of oligarchs who took money out of the country far faster than the inflow of billions that the IMF was pouring in as assistance. Capital markets were liberalized in the mistaken belief that money would be induced to come in. Instead, there was massive capital flight, including the famous purchase of the Chelsea football club and numerous country estates in the U.K. It was as if the advisers believed that opening a birdcage would encourage birds to fly into the cage, rather than encouraging the birds in the cage to fly out... When I was the chief economist of the World Bank, we had an intense debate about those privatizations. I was among those who worried that rapid privatizations not only generated lower revenue for governments desperately in need of money but undermined confidence in the market economy. Without appropriate laws concerning corporate governance, there might be massive theft of corporate assets by managers; there would be incentives to strip assets rather than to build wealth. I worried too about the huge inequality to which these privatizations could give rise. The other side said: Don’t worry, just privatize as rapidly as possible; the new owners will make sure that resources are well used and the economy will grow. Unfortunately, what happened was even worse than I had feared. Though the government had been told repeatedly by its advisers that privatization would lead to growth and investment, the outcome was disappointing: output fell by one-third.”

Great differences in economic performance between Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia have now resulted in the “withdrawal” of the advocates of *shock therapy* which – due to its fast pace and insensitivity to social issues – brought the justifiability of market economy and globalization into question in those countries. Some defenders of shock therapy (including well-known Jeffrey Sachs) explain this by the specifics of the East European and East Asian countries and their differences. They argue that it was

easier for China and Vietnam to implement their economic policies, because they were less developed agrarian countries. Criticizing such views, J. Stiglitz points out that such reasoning cannot be justified, because “development is itself difficult – success stories outside of East Asia are rare – and the defenders of shock therapy have never adequately explained why compounding two difficult problems, development and transition, should have made the task easier. Many of the less developed countries of the former Soviet bloc that followed their shock therapy advice fared as badly as Russia itself; the mainly agrarian economies of Mongolia and Moldova showed even greater decline. Those that fared better, like Kazakhstan, did so because of oil.”

It is evident that transition in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans failed to respect the legacy or voices of the great economists of the past. Let me only point out that a rapid transition confirmed Keynes’s view from the crisis year 1933:

“The economic transition of society is a thing to be accomplished slowly... The sacrifices and losses of transition will be vastly greater if the pace is forced... For it is of the nature of economic processes to be rooted in time. A rapid transition will involve so much pure destruction of wealth that the new state of affairs will be, at first, worse than the old, and the grand experiment will be discredited”.⁴

There have been few economists in this region with similar views and their words have not been listened to. Therefore, economists must – through a mutual dialogue, as well as a debate with the government – determine what steps are needed now so as to make up the losses incurred during the past 25 years and increase the welfare of the population. Naturally, there are many recommendations, beginning with a general view that further hastening with privatization will not produce the best results.

In my opinion, the first reason is that *laissez-faire* policy was not the most effective one in the case of economies in transition.⁵ Market fundamentalism, which was dominant in this region during the past fifteen or so years, did not produce the anticipated results, so that is necessary to rely on governments’ economic policies as a market corrector to a greater

⁴ J.M. Keynes: *National Self-Sufficiency*, originally published in *New Statesman and Nation*, 8 and 15 July 1933, reprinted in *Collected Writings*, Vol. 21, p. 245.

⁵ I presented an extensive paper on this topic at the 13th traditional conference of economists in Opatija, from 16 to 18 November 2005, entitled *Laissez-faire kao ekonomska politika Hrvatske?* (*Laissez-faire as the Croatian Economic Policy?*); published in the Proceedings “*Ekonomska politika Hrvatske u 2006*”, Zagreb 2005, pp. 1-65.

extent. It is not easy to find a balance between the spontaneous market laws in the globalised world and national economic policies. And where emphasis in these national policies should be placed? Is that concern over the ageing population, including pensions and medical services (where the situation in the Western Balkans is acute)? How to protect workers, consumers and the environment? It is evident that the balance of these aims changes both over time and from country to country, but there is no doubt that the implementation of such policies is increasingly more difficult under the conditions of globalization and convergence towards the European Union.

However, some aims are indisputable. One of them is the need for inclusion in international trade. Due to globalization, national economies are being increasingly permeated, which is primarily reflected in the fact that an increasing part of domestic output should be sold on world markets. Until 1989, all European countries in transition were developed according to the specific autarkic model, so that they did not export much in the past, as shown by the data in Table 5.

Table 5 Exports per capita (US\$)

Country	Exports per capita in US\$			
	1988	1996	2000	2004
B&H	391	/200/	278	258(a)
Croatia	587	1,034	1,035	1,806
Macedonia	314	/400/	648	658(a)
Slovenia	2,558	4,343	4,259	6,581(a)
Serbia & Montenegro	419	230	160	/240/(a)
Albania	/95/	/76/	75	123(a)
Bulgaria		654	618	1,005(a)
Romania	551	350	463	793(a)
Austria	4,093	7,178	7,892	13,512
Hungary	995	1,231	2,763	5,454
Poland	369	633	820	1,928
Slovakia	1,606	1,536	2,198	5,073
Ireland	5,308	13,037	20,095	26,430
Italy	2,225	4,373	4,157	6,011
Germany	4,428	6,401	6,695	11,022
Sweden	5,907	9,535	9,801	13,808
Switzerland	7,566	11,030	10,310	14,986
Hong Kong	11,255	28,070	28,485	31,709(a)
India	16	35	45	60(a)
China	43	124	160	337(a)
USA	1,316	2,318	2,769	2,795
WORLD	558	865	995	1,103(a)

(a) 2003.

In those countries, exports per capita are extremely low, especially in comparison with the countries having a similar size (such as Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and Ireland). The same applies to the Western Balkans. According to the first estimates for 2006, the exports from China, which is making great progress in its developmental efforts, will amount to nearly 700 dollars per capita, thus confirming its export performance from a recent period – doubling exports every three years!!

How to achieve this in the Western Balkans? The first recommendation is as follows: in the case of foreign direct investment (FDI) it is necessary to orient primarily to so-called greenfield investments – investments in new operations that will ensure exports. The competitiveness of the national industry should also be increased by investment incentives, which would be enabled primarily by appropriating a larger part of the proceeds from the sale of state enterprises for *credit* to potential exporters. It is also necessary to increase exports through trade among the West Balkan countries, which will be facilitated under the new CEFTA Agreement and will enable us to produce the results that made Slovenia increase its exports at a fast pace. Namely, Slovenia geared a significant part of its exports to the West Balkan markets and has a surplus in trade with this region.

Such policy is now conducted by Croatia, which stopped its one-time isolation from that region, as shown by the data in Table 6. The data on its trade with Serbia and Montenegro are especially instructive: the figures were multiplied during the observed period.

Table 6 Croatia's Trade with the Former Yugoslav Republics 1995–2005

COUNTRY		Average annual trade (in US\$ million)			
		1995–1997	1995–2000	2001–2003	2004–2005
B&H	Exports	527	565	719	1207
	Imports	70	118	175	451
	Balance	457	447	544	756
Macedonia	Exports	69	62	60	77
	Imports	37	54	68	131
	Balance	32	8	-8	-54
Serbia & Montenegro	Exports	7	50	172	343
	Imports	2	24	60	155
	Balance	5	26	112	188
Slovenia	Exports	675	455	455	658
	Imports	777	655	863	1218
	Balance	-102	-200	-408	-560

3. IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

Since the time for my presentation is running out, I cannot deal any longer with other economic policy measures, which are even more complex due to different conditions in the West Balkan countries. I will conclude with a *plea* for a more active exchange of our experiences gained in the process of transition so as to spur development.

Joseph Schumpeter, one of the greatest economists of the 20th century, pointed out that capital would be transformed through *creative destruction* during crises, when activities and industries would be revived and strengthened for global competition. During the crisis faced by countries in transition, it seems that emphasis was placed primarily on the second part of this syntagm (“destruction”), while *creativity* was disregarded. The time has come for addressing this issue by using energy, assets and policy as much as possible!

Finally, this region should plan out its future in globalization processes, which are making gigantic strides in that respect. Only the countries that succeed in adjusting to those new phenomena can count on the possibility of overcoming their unenviable legacy over the past 25 years. Can we succeed despite scepticism displayed by Nobel Price Winner J. Stiglitz⁶? That also depends on us in many respects!

⁶ For much of the world, globalization as it has been managed seems like a pact with the devil. A few people in the country become wealthier; GDP statistics, for what they are worth, look better, but ways of life and values are threatened. For some parts of the world the gains are even more tenuous, the costs more palpable. Closer integration into the global economy has brought greater volatility and insecurity, and more inequality. It has even threatened fundamental values. This is not how it has to be. We can make globalization work, not just for the rich and powerful but for all people, including those in the poorest countries. The task will be long and arduous. We have already waited far too long. The time to begin is now.” J. Stiglitz: *Making Globalization Work*, p. 292. “... We have become economically interdependent more quickly than we have learned how to live together peacefully. Though the bonds that economic globalization forges – both the mutual interdependence that it implies and the greater understanding that arises from daily interactions – are powerful force for peace, by themselves they are not enough, and without peace, there cannot be commerce. Once before, a century ago, the turmoil of war set back the pace of globalization; it would take more than half a century for globalization (as measured, for instance, by global trade relative to global GDP) to resume where it had left off. Once before, at the end of World War I, the United States, already the world’s strongest country, turned its back on multilateralism when it walked away from the League of Nations, the international institution created to help ensure global peace. The Bush Administration, too, having previously announced its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and major agreements designed to contain the arms race, also walked away from the UN when it went to war in Iraq with a preemptive attack in violation of international law”. *Ibid.*, p. 291.

AMBASSADOR DR. WOLFGANG WOLTE

AUSTRIAN SOCIETY FOR EUROPEAN POLITICS

MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, VIENNA, AUSTRIA

FURTHER BUILDING EUROPEAN UNION AND THE BALKAN COUNTRIES

Mr. Chairman,

Dr. Ostojic,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

European public opinion towards the European Union and its activities is, at present, characterized by doubts, critical comments and, in some cases, outright rejection. Fortunately, few are those who have expressed the wish for their countries to abandon the Union. Whatever the case may be, these critical observations must not be ignored.

Of course, it can hardly be denied that the European Union has not always lived up to expectations regarding the problems of unemployment, job creation, the perceived threats of globalisation, eurocratic interventions in questions that might more usefully be decided on a local/regional/national level – to mention just a few of the points repeatedly discussed in the media. (Although some of these problems fall, at least primarily, within the realm of national competence.).

The (hopefully only temporary) rejection of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe by the French and the Dutch voters have sent a shockwave through institutions and member states. It is conveniently being forgotten that the majority of member states, on the legal basis of referenda and/or parliamentary decisions, have already ratified this future-oriented document. It represents, by necessity, a compromise, and, by all standards, an excellent one.

The European Union needs a new constitutional framework. The Treaty of Nice, which is in force, can in the long run not suffice. The new constitution encompasses all provisions which are necessary to guide the union into the future. Above all, it contains the prerequisites for managing coming accessions. The enlargement of the Union cannot and should not be stopped. Deepening, in other words making the Union more efficient and effective, must run in parallel, as it was the case in the past, though with varying degrees of acceleration and intensity.

In spite of partly legitimate doubts as to the proper functioning of the European decision-making process in an enlarged Union, daily work goes on in Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg.

From the German EU-presidency in the first semester of 2007 we can expect a series of initiatives which will demonstrate the width of European activities, and the full engagement of our German friends.

It cannot be said often enough: the most important – and positive – achievement of the European Union in the past ten years is undoubtedly the enlargement through the accession of ten Central and Eastern European countries. To our surprise, this historic increase in the membership and the integration of these countries in the mainstream of European deliberations and action have proved to be less difficult and smoother than originally feared. All forecasts of an imminent collapse in the decision-making process, with the representatives of 25 countries around the table, have failed to materialise.

And on the 1st of January 2007, we will welcome Bulgaria and Romania in our midst.

Once more: work has gone on in many areas that are scarcely in the limelight of public opinion. A closer look reveals the large number of issues on the agenda and their impact on our daily lives.

All this cannot hide the fact that in the new member states problems still exist which will have to be aggressively addressed. What counts, however, is the determination to remedy the situation, in close cooperation with the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice and with the engagement of other Member States.

Attention is now focused on the West-Balkan region. It is therefore of particular significance that the present conference of the European Center for Peace and Development is devoted to the, admittedly, complex and difficult situation in this part of Europe. All political endeavours to chart a course for Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina call for concrete measures and reactions on a “human” level. Without a human dimension of overcoming the burdens of the past and reconciliation between ethnic groups, political action will not be successful. The topic of this year’s conference is, consequently, particularly well chosen: “National Reconciliation, Ethnic and Religious Tolerance in the Balkan”.

Let us recall that it was the firm determination of European statesmen after the end of the Second World War, to seek reconciliation and truly revolutionary new forms of cooperation between the enemies of yesterday. Bold and courageous initiatives were supported by the overwhelm-

ing majority of European citizens. Violence and the use of military force were banned as a means to settle international disputes. At the same time without, the readiness to frequently accept compromises between often conflicting national interests, all good intentions would be doomed to failure.

The European Union is willing and able to help the countries Balkan on their way into the future. The “European perspective” has been repeatedly stressed. Stability and Association agreements are being negotiated. Austria, for one, and for obvious reasons, will do everything it can to help in this process. It is also clear, however, that the main responsibility for getting ready for eventual membership lies squarely with the countries concerned.

It is highly significant that Japan is prepared to extend a helping hand along the way, emphasizing and signalling its international dimension. We all assembled here in Belgrade are convinced that the activities of the European Center for Peace and Development and its concentration on the subjects of human security and reconciliation are an important contribution to everything that is being done, economically, politically, socially, on practically all levels in today’s Europe.

VALENTIN YAKUSHIK

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF "KIEV-MOHYLA ACADEMY" UKRAINE

ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRUCTURING OF INTER-REGIONAL AND INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS: CONFRONTING TYPES OF SOLUTIONS

In the context of the present analysis, "administrative restructuring" is regarded as the process leading to at least one of the following three results: (1) a change in the political and legal status of particular administrative entities within a state; (2) significant corrections of the boundaries between the existing administrative entities; (3) the creation of the new administrative (e.g. autonomous) entities, or the dissolution or loss of the old (traditional) ones.

The present analysis is not just a purely theoretical exercise; rather, it is an attempt to present some typologies, which are relevant and important for identifying and listing the existing and possible confronting approaches (some of them being latent) to solving the acute inter-ethnic and inter-regional conflicts in the Western Balkans and, in particular, in Kosovo and Metohija (although not only there, but possibly also in Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia–Herzegovina). Keeping in mind mostly the process of further restructuring of the ex-Yugoslav territory (and concentrating on the related topical issues), some relevant and useful experiences of other regions will be presented, and some conclusions can be drawn from other countries facing the problems of separatism and irredentism, or at least the extreme forms of decentralisation, bordering on fragmentation.

Probably for the first time in history, in the contemporary world (in the 21st century), even the weakest and helpless states (which sometimes lack the vital capacity) are guaranteed their political independence (if they already possess it) and territorial integrity, and are legally and politically protected against separatism, irredentism and unwanted foreign occupation or attacks. To lose this lucky historical chance, it is necessary either to make extremely serious and, sometimes, even fatal mistakes in internal politics, or utterly misunderstand the essence and the degree or level of power relations in the contemporary world and confront oneself (in a very risky way) with the currently irresistible world's core forces. Unlucky losers often fall into some kind of trap (either a natural historical trap, or

the one prepared by skilful internal or external political and cultural opponents), thus victimising themselves.

In the contemporary world, there is a natural process of attraction to the currently more successful geopolitical entities (the centres of world regionalisation), but also (to some extent) to the kin cultural regions. These realities had a visible effect on the process of breaking up of several multicultural entities which, at some point, failed to adjust to the contemporary realities (Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Somalia, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Serbia, etc.).

The decision relating to certain administrative restructuring in a country may result from:

- 1) The decision of the legitimate, or de facto administering, dominant outside authority (e.g. the patrician of British India, or Palestine under the British mandate; radical administrative changes in Bosnia–Herzegovina after the achievement of the Dayton Accords; contemporary Kosovo and Metohija);
- 2) The chaos created by the break-up of a traditional power structure in the entire country, or in a certain one part of it (e.g. Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Somalia);
- 3) Intervention by the neighbouring countries (e.g. Kashmir; Cyprus);
- 4) The success of a separatist movement supported by the neighbouring nations (separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan; Nagorno-Karabakh; Abkhazia; South Osetia);
 - a. The targeted action of the power which exercised its sovereignty over a particular administrative entity in the past, but was unable to continue to do that in full (e.g. the actions of France vis-à-vis Mayotte, or British actions vis-à-vis the Chagos Archipelago);
 - b. Forceful reintegration (e.g. reintegration of the Serb Krajina into Croatia, unification of Yemen);
 - c. Peaceful, negotiated separation (the dissolution of the USSR and independence of 15 ex-Soviet republics in 1991; independence of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993), or vice versa – negotiated reunification (e.g. German reunification; Gaguzia's reintegration into Moldova; the return of Hong Kong and Macao to China); or
- 5) A combination of several types of the above mentioned actions, etc.

If we take the present situation in Kosovo and Metohija as an example, what kind of major political-administrative processes can be observed there – clearcut, vivid, or latent? They are as follows:

- 1) Forceful establishment of an international protectorate;
- 2) Separatism, secessionism (as to the entire administrative entity);
- 3) Irredentism (usually disclaimed and ignored, tacit, latent, and delayed as to its possible implementation);
- 4) De facto partition of the entity into two different zones controlled (or, at least, populated) by each of the two ethnic communities (under supervision of the international forces);
- 5) Gradual expansion of one zone due to ethnic cleansing (the expulsion of the original population), seizure of property etc.;
- 6) Creation of enclaves (some of them being almost without the population, but preserving the highest historical and general symbolic value for one of the confronting communities).

The most important and usually available approaches to a comprehensive solution to defining Kosovo's future status are formulated on the basis of the following: (1) "the option of Kosovo Albanians who seek full independence"; (2) Serbia's position, which persistently dismisses the possibility of independence and "has declared the formula "more than autonomy and less than independence"..."; and (3) the position of "many unofficial and opinion-making international resources" opting for Kosovo's "conditional independence".⁷ In fact, the third approach is a variation of the first one, which anticipates only somewhat delayed yet full implementation. Thus, the list of the presented approaches clearly introduces the choice between two possible types of status for Kosovo Serbs living in their historical territory.

The first type of status – allows the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija to become an ethnic minority in an uncertain environment, under a constant threat from the notorious effects of "democratic tyranny" by the ethnic majority which is obviously lacking (in its own majority) the culture of pluralism and tolerance. All this, irrespective of the possible sincere (albeit rather unrealistic – due to the peculiarities of the given situation) wishes and hopes of some liberal-democratic elites aimed at creating a

⁷ *Paskal Milo*, *The Conclusion of Kosovo Status – Contribution for Peace and Stability in the Western Balkans*. In: *National and Inter-Ethnic Reconciliation and Religious Tolerance in the Western Balkans*. Proceedings of the ECPD International Symposium. Belgrade, October 28-29, 2005. Editors: Takehiro Togo and Negoslav P. Ostojic. Belgrade: European Center for Peace and Development of the University for Peace established by the United Nations, 2006, p. 42.

pluralistic multicultural democracy in the independent Kosovo. It also assumes that Serbian historical heritage in Kosovo and the remaining ethnic Serbs will be safe under the “security and protection” offered by the successors and co-religionaries of UCK radical forces.

The second type of status – preserving the elements of the Serbian state’s sovereign control over the territory of Kosovo and Metohija (probably with a varying degree of intensity in different districts or zones), sharing this control with the international forces representing the institutions of the international protectorate authorities, as well as with local ethnic Albanian authorities.

Both approaches seem to be quite dubious as to whether they will bring real peace and reconciliation. Even the deeply-rooted intrinsic hopes connected with the inclusion of that region in the European Union cannot “dissolve” the basic inherent conflict.

There is certainly enough absorption capacity of the European Union so as to admit the small West Balkan national entities, and there is still a relatively high level of the EU commitment (made especially after the 1999 events and during the 1990s, in general). So, there is a chance for the effective application of a kind of the “Puerto-Rican model”⁸ of development in different small states in this region. But this does not exclude a strong element of naivety in the hopes that EU membership will “dissolve” the administrative and ethnic problems of the hatred-torn region (particularly in Kosovo, but not only in it). The situation being similar to that in Northern Ireland shows some specific, inherent logic, dissimilar to the logic of European integration.

Are there any other proposed, viable approaches to solving the basic conflict in Kosovo and around it, which will be able to decrease tensions and give more promising prospects to all ethnic and religions communities involved? Certainly, there are. But before mentioning one of them, let us review the “internal” obstacles to taking the approaches that may bring a real compromise and limit the destructive aspirations to the establishment of some kind of new local hegemony.

There are obviously at least three such major obstacles: (a) unrealistic Serbian nationalism rejecting “further loss of the national territory”, (b) arrogant Albanian nationalism demanding further national humiliation of Serbia and Serbs and (c) some vested geo-strategic interests profiting from the absence of peace and stability in the region.

⁸ *Michael Manley*, Jamaica. *Struggle in the Periphery*. London: Third World Media Ltd., Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative Society Ltd., 1982, p. 28-38, 42, 50, 92, 149, 186.

Irrespective of the provision of a comprehensive international support to Kosovo Albanians, Serbian (anti-separatist) position is quite strong due to the internationally acknowledged principle of state sovereignty. Theoretically, the available ways for legitimising the secession of Kosovo Albanians from Serbia are as follows:

- (a) To put the “devastated loser” “on the knees” (like Pakistan in 1973, when Bangladesh was created, or Ethiopia in 1991, when Eritrea became independent). But, this is obviously not the case now (in 2006) with Serbia. Although there is no way for Serbia to fight for the integrity of its territory “physically”, there are both a basic internal consensus and strong popular will in Serbia that one should not succumb to external pressures (the situation being somewhat similar to the dominant political spirit in Georgia and Azerbaijan vis-à-vis the breakaway separatist regions).
- (b) To “buy off” the population of the “loser” by some attractive and alleviating promises, which might somehow “sweeten the bitter pill” of national humiliation – like in Russia in 1991 – by promising it to become a “natural part of the civilized world”, to start real cooperation with the prosperous nations, and introduce and guarantee democracy and an effective market economy, as well as to point to the advantages of getting rid of the burden of subsidising the depressed and stagnating regions. For Serbia such alleviation can be linked to the promise of easier and speedy accession to the EU.
- (c) To bring in realism and limit the ambitions of each side in an inter-ethnic conflict (like in conflict-solving efforts taken by Israelis and Palestinians during the Oslo negotiations, or in the current process of negotiations on solving an ethnic conflict in Cyprus; or within the Dayton process in Bosnia–Herzegovina), and (inter alia) deciding on the appropriate “demarcation” of various zones of control, and creating a relatively effective “umbrella” coordinating structures for maintaining the relations between those zones.

In legal terms, the strategic ability of Kosovo Albanians to influence the “final solution” (Kosovo’s future status) is rather limited. They are not even an “unrecognised state”, just an “international protectorate” with an uncertain status. And there is a legitimate right of the international community and the official sovereign authority (Serbia) to impose on them a general framework for a negotiated and agreed conflict-solving, including the re-definition of the present and future zones within Kosovo (includ-

ing the status of each of them). By contrast, nobody has such a legitimate right to impose the final decision on Serbia.

Those exerting pressure on Serbia can attain their goals only if the Serbian authorities agree to this pressure. And it is clear that the Serbian nation will hardly allow that. Meanwhile, the Kosovo Albanian nation has only a consultative word to say when the international community exerts pressure on the Kosovo self-government structures. In addition to Kosovo's almost total dependence on the aid of the international community (both at present and in the future), the Kosovo Albanian political elite is so eager to upgrade the status of its institutions – all that means that the Albanian community in Kosovo will have to be quite flexible in accepting the final compromise.

So, what is basically needed at the moment is to change Serbia's official and general national position so as to become more realistic (based on the real strategic interests of the Serbian nation and the Southern Slavic people in general), and promote this new position in the international arena, showing Serbia's readiness for a sound, comprehensive compromise with Kosovo Albanians (as Israelis have done vis-à-vis Palestinians at some point, and as Cypriot Greeks will do vis-à-vis the unrecognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus).

As for the envisaged formal and de facto ties between the two clearly defined (ethnic communities') zones in the future, there are several types of possible solutions:

- (a) With the prospects for mutual (albeit predominantly detached and separate) coexistence within a federal or confederal arrangement under one national (state) “umbrella” (like currently in Bosnia–Herzegovina, and probably, in the nearest future, in the reunited Cyprus);
- (b) With an active involvement of the neighbouring kin countries (like the current situation in Northern Ireland after the recent comprehensive peace arrangements in which the Republic of Ireland is strongly involved; in the case of Kosovo, it might assume the involvement of Serbia and Albania);
- (c) With the prospects for maintaining a number of joint infrastructure facilities, but existing as two separate entities (like Israeli–Palestinian coexistence in the future, as is predominantly viewed in Israel today);
- (d) Splitting the territory (along the ethnic lines) between the countries representing the kin nations (in the case of Kosovo, it may

be based on Serbia's proposal to Albania; and if Albania rejects it, it may be enacted by the decision of the Serbian sovereign authority as a step-by-step programme anticipating the further negotiations between Serbia and the international protectorate authorities.

There are the following major aspects (components) of this issue in its specific territorial, practical communicational and legal (normative) dimensions to be clearly defined (on an unbiased, fair, historically, culturally and demographically proven basis):

- (1) The borders between the two zones (between the two ethnic communities), and the safe protection of these borders;
- (2) The legal administrative status of each zone, and the type of relations to be maintained between these two zones and with the neighbouring kin countries;
- (3) Compensation for the expropriated property, or the property taken in some other unfair and/or illegal way;
- (4) Freedom and safety of communications between, and access to and from, the created and recognised enclaves or exclaves;
- (5) Special security arrangements (including the limits on the allowed and deployed military forces and armaments, international security forces or military observers, etc.).

What basically matters now (in 2006 and in the future) for Serbia and Serbs, who do not wish to become the citizens of Albanian-dominated Kosovo (whatever status Kosovo acquires), is not whether Serbia can again exercise sovereign control over the whole of Kosovo and Metohija. This is already impossible. What really matters is the guarantees for the national and human rights of Kosovo Serbs and the preservation of Serbian (and Christian Orthodox, in general) historical heritage in that territory and "physically" located there. All the rest can be regarded as the remnants of the old "imperial" past, most of which are already just a part of history, have already gone and continue their existence only in the imagination of unrealistic nationalists.

The promising, safe and prosperous future (for all parties involved) cannot be connected with pressing into an unwanted (by both sides), forced "cohabitation" of the already separated national entities (the ethnic communities in Kosovo), which are not strategically oriented towards a common future but, rather, towards separation and the distinctly separate paths of development. Why not let the historical "divorce" happen in the most painless, smooth and institutional way?

In fact, in the current circumstances, it does not matter at all for the local Serbs and the neighbouring Serbia if there will be (at some point in the future) the “reunification” of Kosovo with Albania (like in 1941 under Italian occupation), or if there will be two Albanian states (Albania proper and Kosovo), like some cultural and political forces interpret the existence of Romania and Moldova as being “two Romanian states” with the widespread current practice of granting Romanian citizenship to the citizens of Moldova if they, or their ancestors, were born or lived in the territories administered by Romania from 1918 to 1940.

When making their mind and bringing the final decision on the future of Kosovo and Metohija, Serbia and Serbs, in general, have an important international mission. There are obviously at stake not only strategic national interests of various states (both those being relatively small and those being very big and very influential, including the superpowers) and not only the future of ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians, but the important patterns of problem-solving. In fact, the key archetypes are at stake. And dealing with them requires a wise, well thought-out and balanced approach, clear strategic humanistic vision and even audacity.

Like Ukraine which, in the 1990s, brought a courageous historical decision (although viewed by some nationalistic politicians as controversial) and got rid of all nuclear weapons on its territory and any attempt to become a member of the “nuclear military club”,⁹ Serbia and Serbs (with the intellectual and administrative elites having the great potential), with an outstanding international experience and the worldwide strategic vision, can be expected to show that strategic vision vis-à-vis the current Kosovo crisis.

Serbia is capable of working out and proposing a valid compromise, as well as of firmly defending the basic values of its strategic vision, thus guaranteeing a fair, unbiased, systemic and comprehensive implementation of a real compromise decision vis-à-vis all parties involved. This is the only way in which it will be possible to guarantee a stable and long-lasting peace and sustainable development in the Western Balkans. A well thought-out and planned comprehensive final solution for Kosovo can (and probably has to) anticipate some interim, transitional stages, but a “suspended solution” (when the communities and political structures basically remain in a kind of limbo, with many hidden “time-bombs” of various types) cannot be regarded as being fair and strategically effective.

⁹ Ukraine: *The Search for a National Identity* / Edited by Sharon L. Wolchik and Volodymyr Zvylyanich. Lanham; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000, p. 24-25, 71, 77-78.

YVES-RASTIMIR NEDELJKOVIĆ, PH.D.

PROFESSOR, ECPD UPUN

PEACE EDUCATION BY UNITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ABILITIES, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

- BASED ON THE ANTHROPOLOGY, HISTORY OF MORALITY AND CULTURES -

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

It is my sincere wish that, after this Conference, we continue our relentless efforts towards developing the culture of human rights and peace increasingly more systematically, bearing in mind the role of the university. I hope that this will be so, because the limited time frame requires a concise presentation of our views, whereby we risk omitting something. On the other hand, it is a real challenge to present the basic, “prime” ideas in a relatively concise manner.

The view I present here aspires towards such education for peace and development as will proceed from the **logic of the unity of human rights, abilities, duties and responsibilities**. This logic is also used as an unavoidable paradigm of systematic and comprehensive education, whose aim is to create conditions for peace and free development of every individual, as well as of human society as a whole. However, the modern world of man, which is, I would say, greatly upset by contradictions and which abounds in diverse cultures of the past and the present and an infinite number of their variations, has found itself on the threshold of accelerated development of a strong and unavoidable, globalize civilisation, whose outline (and shadows) can only be sensed. And haven't we been warned on time by the magnificent, ancient Biblical metaphor about Babylon?

I hold that the results of continuously bringing together and inspirationally intertwining the key categories of diverse cultures and one civilisation, refracting in the spectrum of human rights and duties to be performed, will determine, on an increasing scale, the distinctive qualities of man's social and economic being in the whole of nature, and exert a decisive influence on the trends of human development, on the fate of our posterity... After all, the entire history of human consciousness, both in secular and religious forms of its manifestation in society has also been, from the very beginning, the history of *moral conscience as the basic fac-*

tor in the duty of choosing correctly between good and evil, between greater good or lesser evil.

It seems that on the threshold of new humanism, transformed by comprehensive ecological knowledge of one's own "microcosm", human consciousness, with **moral conscience** in its essence, is reaching out increasingly more openly and clearly for interfering and universal yet analogous modalities in nature. However, this aspiration is confronted with a global threat which is, despite numerous ineffective warnings, posed by the inconceivable technological powers, placed at the disposal of alienated, perverted and diabolic inhumanity, which could only be sensed in ancient times and are now clearly visible to all. We do not feel better after learning that this skyrocketing power of penetrating into the roots of creation (and, thus, of destruction) of nature itself, poses an irresistible challenge to the innocent and immature human child that wishes to "play" the Creator. We are faced with the greatest dilemmas about man's destiny concealed by the unambiguities and one-sidedness of modern science, as well as by the shadows of ancient and modern myths on the other world, nature, society and man. Therefore, it seems that we have no other choice but to reconsider the long history of resistance to the destruction of man's unique material and spiritual consciousness and conscience. The quality and steadiness of moral conscience of modern man amidst magnificent, yet frightening technological powers, are **tempting** the unity of his rights and duties to the utmost.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY

It is probably that all began on this Balkan soil with the ancient Delphic and Socrates' message: "Get to know yourself" (*γνωθ σεαυτον*), as man's basic logic assumption of self-knowledge, whose moral essence contains the call, the request, the duty of presence of alert and active conscience. On this occasion, we could paste it on the wall of this room. As one of the basic categories of applied philosophy, the very idea of human duties has been developing as (both logical and moral) consciousness of "what one should do and in what manner" in order to achieve specified aims. It seems that this laid a foundation for a simple rule that: *Direct and indirect, collective or institutional human rights develop in proportion to the performance of individual, collective or institutional duties.*

It is held in the history of European philosophy that one of the first to deal with the question of duty as the *kathécontá* (*καθηκοντα*) was Zeno

of Citium in the 5th century B.C. It is important to note that the Stoics, while dealing with this notion, developed a perception that it as something that exceeds the bounds of human actions, thus involving all living beings. Plato's and Aristotle's pursuits were concentrated primarily on human soul, knowledge, experience and memory. Thus, it seems that the first to single out the notion of consciousness and conscience were the Stoics, Seneca and Cicero. Of special interest is Cicero's thesis (today: an ecological paradigm!), according to which the rationality of human duties stems from acting in harmony with nature and not from human interests. The Neo-Platonist was already making a distinction between conscious and unconscious. It was St. Augustine who bridged many previous and future centuries by emphasizing his perception of consciousness as "the centre of universal truth", and by identifying the notion of good with man's performance of duties in harmony with his species. The European medieval theory of duty is almost inseparable from the theology of morale, although it relies systematically upon Aristotle's assumptions in practical philosophy.

In the age of Descartes' rationalism, consciousness was not differentiated from reason. However, this was opposed by Malebranche's perception of consciousness as a feeling rather than as knowledge. In Spinoza's view, consciousness is insufficient and confused knowledge, while Leibnitz holds that it transcends the perception of natural phenomena and reaches the very essence of human soul. Thus, we come to the gigantic strides of German classical philosophy, culminating with George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel who introduced the abstract notion "absolute mind", which many found hard to comprehend.

What followed was the outburst of natural and social sciences in the 19th and 20th centuries, with the end of which philosophy seems not to be their constituent part any more. And with the end of "modern times" there emerges the already above mentioned global threat posed by a blind technological and social manipulation with everything, including man's consciousness. The lead in this threat is taken by quasi scientific, specialized "fools", new servants of the ruling economic, political, technological and ideological power, whose consciousness seems to have definitely lost its moral conscience.

Our metaphor of the *fountain* of human rights and duties expresses the entire intertwining, boiling and unrest of agitated and insecure social consciousness in our time and space, in the turmoil of which its human essence – *conscience* seems to be *hardly recognizable*. However, the logic and morale of the humanistic unity of rights and duties are the *conditio*

sine qua non, that is to say an indispensable condition. Therefore, being faced, on a daily basis, with a discrepancy between the increasing technological and other powers, and all aspects of humanity, as well as disastrous gaps in the personal and social conscience of the powerful, we must wonder both about global and regional and micro conditions for survival. The study of the problems arising from all this represents the theme which keeps recurring throughout the history of human thought about oneself, about others and about nature.

Thus, on the threshold of the “post-modern” age, we are faced with an uncompromising demand of that “torch of the microcosm” under the light of which we should perceive the ecological aspects of the material-energy and spiritual human being, in whose essence contradictory principles are intertwined: the sources of creation sensed from time immemorial and a danger of total destruction.


EDUCATION FOR HUMANITY IN THE CULTURE OF PEACE THROUGH THE UNITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ABILITIES, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

We live in the time when the international community is concerned with the issue of human rights and their realization. These rights are protected, while bearing in mind different living conditions of every individual, thus assuming national and global dimensions. I do not feel doubt about the essential value of human rights, as well as about an effort to achieve them. However, even Aristotle’s ethics reminds us of the simple logic of another, complementary, inseparable and equally important element of the reality of human existence, such as *human duties*. So, *human duties* are essential elements in keeping the *necessary balance* while aiming for full respect for the struggle for human rights. In studying the history of human culture, we can observe the relationship between human rights and duties based on a level of abilities and accepted responsibility, as four inseparable and mutually interdependent human strongholds. If this relationship is neglected, free development of man is impossible, which leads the human race into a catastrophe. The interdependence of human rights, abilities duties and responsibilities can best be observed on a daily basis in simple social and pedagogic work on child’s and youth guidance.

This starts a specific “circle” that may “begin” with any human subject: from child to parent, through family or different forms of community organization, to national and international factors. Education systems

throughout the world, which educate the future highly qualified technical and humanistic intelligentsia, are faced in crucial periods of crisis with incapacity to exercise humanistic control over enormous technological and economic powers. This means that they have numerous problems and tasks relating to the development of an educational system for peace and tolerance, which will be based on a paradigmatic tetralogy of human rights, abilities, duties and responsibilities. These tetralogy we represent by a such scheme:

THETRALOGY OF FOUR HUMAN STRONGHOLDS¹⁰:



PRINCIPLES OF THETRALOGY OF HUMAN STRONGHOLDS

- a. Here selected four human strongholds are universal.
- b. They are inseparable, and mutually conditioned.
- c. They are part of all levels in humankind development.
- d. They dynamically participate in all mankind relations.
- e. They are the basis of every kinds of social balance.
- f. They express common strongholds of human work, culture, metha-ethic of morality, and spirituality.
- g. These strongholds are built by: man's consciousness and conscience, his choices and actions.

¹⁰ © Prof. Yves-Rastimir Nedelkovitch: all rights reserved.

THE PROCESS OF CONSCIOUSNESS-CONSCIENCE RAISING

Determining the social dynamics of a group of individuals who are compelled to share interests and aims, proceeds from their “self-recognition” in solidarity arising from *mutual rights, abilities, duties and responsibilities*. Thus, from a “potentially” (self-conscious and conscience) group, communities develop into an “emerging” one and then into an “organized”, genuine community that will act in a synchronized manner, more or less successfully, according to its development needs. This process is proportionate to the consciousness-conscience rising of individuals within a group with respect to the factors of their individual and collective rights and duties, which link them accepting the truth that they are dependent on each other. The determination of common living conditions by an organization, which sets the limits of rights and duties, strengthens the integrity of community by revealing the “group identity” shared by all. What is at stake here is also linked to culture, since it produces an identification picture, which also includes all elements of a given social and natural environment in time and space.

Proceeding from the ideas grounded in classical German philosophy from I. Kant to G.W.F. Hegel, the process of consciousness-raising in the works of K. Marx and his followers has been extended to class theory according to which, say, the class of the oppressed gains (self-consciousness) through the process of consciousness-raising and turns from the class “by itself”, with its subjectivity, into the class “in itself”. Class consciousness anticipates the knowledge/understanding of the notion of class, but it is not transmitted automatically. It is raised by and through action in social reality itself. However, raising the consciousness and the conscience of individual (relative) identity in the totality of the existence and essence of widely varied social entities is based on the reality of numerous variations of their form, ranging from family to local microcosm. In that sense, both class consciousness and similar aspects of social consciousness resemble blurred visions full of abstractions.

Hence there is such a diversity of ideological and political depravities and abuses. The consciousness of something that is common to a group of individuals (ranging from the family to a local or broader community), something that forms part of shared destiny, the destiny of group identity, cannot be raised without informing people about that which will be shared with others as an essential prerequisite for their survival; about mutual duties and rights which are indispensable for their survival in given natural and social conditions. Impartial information, which is expected

to develop the sense of group identity, will be more accessible upon identification of the interests, values and common needs and problems of the population or a social class, in addition to possible social partners, as well as potential or current allies and opponents. Transition from one level or content of social and political consciousness/conscience to the other is neither mechanical nor linear.

According to Paolo Freire, consciousness-raising rests upon three basic concepts: man, knowledge and culture. **Man** is always the potential subject of his own life. In that sense, self-preservation is regarded as one of man's initial and universal duties to himself. Naturally, as a "social being", man can achieve this aim only if he lives in a community and observes its rights and duties. Therefore, he must free himself from everything that is poisoning his existence "by itself". As a collective being, man is the subject of history. His distinctive quality is ability to keep himself at a distance from himself as an object of research, from his environment and, as pointed out at the very beginning, to analyze himself. By definition, man is a political being. **Knowledge** enables the rejection of formal knowledge in favour of new models of gaining knowledge through action, proceeding from man's basic needs, and an analysis of their experienced, empirical reality (freeing themselves from "customary", conservative education. **Culture** consists of a more or less harmonious structure of responses developed by a given group or nation according to the challenges of their environment, that is, according to the prevailing conditions for their inclusion, while at the same time transforming them.

THE SET OF ELEMENTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS/CONSCIENCE RISING

The work on raising human **conscience**, such a significant social and pedagogic element, is based on the set of interconnected elements and during their provision people move. The following elements are worth mentioning:

- Self-consciousness/conscience raising with respect to oneself, one's situation and the **right** to develop the best **abilities** to fulfil **duties** effect some changes, which anticipates having the motivation to search for a change, and to be **responsible** for it;
- Consciousness/conscience raising with respect to common aspects of some problem: when others are in a similar situation or have a similar experience;

- Consciousness/conscience raising with respect to the possibility of joint action and the powers developed through joint efforts in relation to an individual; people begin to assess the costs and benefits of their participation in a joint local action from their viewpoint and that of the local community;
- Consciousness/conscience raising with respect to the political nature of decisions taken by the local administration relating to incomes, possibilities and the division of power;
- Conscious/conscientious consideration of the way in which the interests and preoccupations of a group are closely related to the interests and preoccupations of another group, administration, settlement, city;
- Conscious/conscientious dealing with general social and economic problems, as well as engaging in regional, national and international politics;
- Conscious/conscientious approach to the world, which surpasses a simple interest in gaining knowledge about what is happening in it; it is the question of a critical approach to one's own situation and to that of one's kinsmen, as well as an analysis of the division of (natural and public) wealth, prospects for advancement and social power, etc.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO CONSCIOUSNESS – CONSCIENCE RISING CONCERNING THE OBSERVANCE OF A GIVEN SYSTEM OF RIGHTS, ABILITIES, DUTIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Modern thought about consciousness-conscience rising has developed several methodological approaches, among which I wish to point to the following:

- a. Acquiring literacy/consciousness raising – which involves not only the mastery of reading and writing, but also the mastery of reading so as to enable decryption, that is, a critical perception and decoding, as well as the mastery of reading (transformation), which will be an authentic expression of acquired knowledge and personal experience in one's environment, or of a given society. The first stage consists in developing the vocabulary of a given group. The second stage consists in bringing up general themes or, in other words, the study of human

thought about reality and man's actions relating to it. This operation, which is termed "decoding", proceeds from reality which is then analyzed, thus enabling a shift from a specific, local situation to general and global reality.

- b. Consciousness/conscience raising survey – which anticipates research on conditions for the survival of social groups so as to make them conscious of the obstacles to their progress and mobilize themselves for action against them. It is developed by these same groups which, thus, change their status of passive objects into that of collaborators in research, whereby animators provide only methodological support. Research conducted within these groups includes not only the testing of analytical hypotheses against the problems in a given situation. It also involves the determination of possible actions by which one or more problems of the people in question can be solved. Their consciousness is raised by elaborating the theme and then the "subject-problem" of the survey, translating it into the answers to the questions from the questionnaire or those asked during an interview so as to confirm the hypotheses.
- c. Consciousness-raising action – which is inspired by the practice and views of Saul Alinsky and Paulo Fereira. It encourages "propelling events" which (as a challenge) mobilize population for reconsideration of its position, **its own involvement**. It is the question of concerted (group) action by which some social tension is brought to light, thus prompting the social forces to take a stand; the attention of an unconscious/no conscientious community is aroused; some "unused possibility" or "unusual way" are revealed; (obstacles of unwarranted) bans are revealed; bans are identified, in addition to demythologizing (values), proceeding from the power of conflict of symbols; creating a new situation; transforming confused national solidarity into a union (of people linked by concerted action). In view of its significance, such an undertaking requires systematic and (politically) very careful tactical training of the steering core of a group of people having different qualities, led by the persons enjoying such a reputation that the group can be engaged to deal with the most difficult social, economic and political problems of their environment and time.

CYBERNETIC WORLD (CYBER WORLD) AS POLITICS OF THE WORST

Today, it is necessary to bring consciousness and conscience face to face, in a systematic way, with mistaken notion about exclusively technological prosperity and righteousness of the new order of human rights in all areas of man's creative endeavour. In that sense, the contribution of Paul Virilio¹¹ in the book of his conversations with Philippe Pestit¹² is especially interesting. He points to four interrelated complexes of major, mythological disguised mistaken notions about the technological "progress" of today's world. These are:

Transformation from the 19th century industrial revolution to the age of informatics at the close of the 20th century, which raises the question about the relationship between the speed of change and political power, as well as about a wrong idea that these real-time technologies, can contribute to the advancement of democracy.

The emergence of a tremendous problem relating to the means that should be used to surpass Babylonian conurbation, "the grave of nations" and create such a habitat once again in which our social body (and "spirit") will recover, within the scope of a humanistic ecological concept, an appropriate private and public space that will stimulate new and more subtle forms and contents of interpersonal relationships.

We cannot run away from a possible devastating disaster by being inactive and keeping quiet. It is regarded quite a long time as an "inverse miracle", the last "detector" which enables us to appraise the "flaws of progress".

What is the war waged in real time? Since when has the atmosphere been "filled" with satellite communications and control systems? What is the future of war when a catastrophe is not always imminent and it is time to reconquer the planet and rethink its new look.

The vision of the world is changing and public space is becoming a public picture (made almost beforehand), which we get through photo-

¹¹ Paul Virilio (1931) is a typical representative of restless and inquisitive French intellectuals belonging to the middle generation that keeps raising the questions on the sense of "great values", which did not help solving any major social problem of humanity. Thus, it takes a critical approach to the mythology of modern technological "progress". The publisher stresses the significance of Paul Virilio as one of those rarely brave who stand guard against the dangers of a cybernetic revolution and support the rebelling against the fantasies of virtual (artificial) democracy. He is the author who points clearly to moral, political and cultural consequences of the "cyber world" as the result of world-time acceleration. (Y-R.N.)

¹² Philippe Pestit, contemporary French philosopher and journalist.

graphs, film and television. Do they, who produce consciously such a picture, have any conscience and how it looks like? How can one prevent the evening ritual “televisionally controlled” formation of the consciousness of a large number of half-educated people, feeling tired of everything? And the field on which increasingly more severe, modern economic, social, political and other battles which are fought, is becoming increasingly more sensitive and more vulnerable in an “innocent” perception of the “world on the screen”, which guarantees to us a timely prediction of dangers, that is, information about everything that is endangering us, thus becoming an essential element of a more tranquil experience of the permanent waves of dangers, which are continuously breaking on us, while at the same time assuring us of the reliability of the system taking care of our safety and so on.

With its frightening power of chain multiplication, the information-based contraction of time and space, as the essence of an amazing progress and success of modern technology, requires an appropriate technical culture, as was the culture of art. Unfortunately, technical culture has not been developed and its global impact is still the privilege and “property” of elite environments. It would probably be necessary to take a critical approach to the development and accessibility of the art of technical sciences so as to distinguish the attitudes towards technology and secure humanistic domination over it. Therefore, I hold that only an exhaustive and accessible critical review can contribute to the progress of the powerful global technological culture.

However, something is going on behind technological and information “globalization”, something that Foucault analyzed in connection with the 18th century: *the grand closing*. This grand closing is before us. It is found in the absence of geographic space and a break necessary for communication, which is an essential element of man’s freedom. In contrast to his basic freedoms, such as the freedom to move, man has found himself paradoxically blocked by speeds and the fact that he does not have to move at all.

The insularity of the world began manifesting itself so abruptly as though we shall experience its end once again, very soon. Not the end of an apocalyptic world, but the world as something that is finite. “The time of a finite world is beginning”, says Paul Virilio. Today, it represents the space of finite time which is beginning. A dramatic feature of this insularity, says Paul Virilio¹³ⁱⁱⁱ, is the fact that young people cannot conquer

¹³ⁱⁱⁱ Paul Virilio, op. cit.

the world any more. It is painful even to think about such insularity with respect to the coming generations. The needs and possibilities for resisting the prevalence of the impact of this tendency are some of the crucial questions of our consciousness and conscience. Thus, due to the “globalization” of urban space, the centre is not the centre of the city any more; instead, some cities have become the centre of the world. On the periphery and in the centre of the city, the cities-peripheries are substituted for the global city-“village”. Parallel to this metropolitanization, underway is the creation of the hyper centre, the mega city, a gigantic virtual city which is the result of telecommunications urbanization and which is “created on electronic highways”.

The danger of a chain and uncontrolled disaster is concealed behind “technological and scientific progress”. We are increasingly less exposed to the risk of a local and precisely located disaster, as opposed to a global one which may not hit the whole country, but will certainly affect the majority of those persons who, as the users of specified technology, lead a comfortable life, which is directly and heavily dependent on its *impeccability*. It seems that we have forgotten the message which was left to us by, say, great Mahatma Gandhi that “In the true sense of the word, civilisation **does not consist in the multiplication of needs but in their conscious limitation**. This is the only way to get to know true fortune and place ourselves *more easily at the disposal to others*”.¹⁴

In describing the unusual dimension of a relationship “two worlds”, one which is technologically advanced between and the other which is extremely underdeveloped, P. Virilio cites an authentic, fantastic television story, transmitted at such an amazing speed that time and space are condensed. It is about a group of Iranian soldiers who surrendered to the American “drone” (remote-control reconnaissance aircraft), being aware that the powerful air force and missile systems behind its EYE can erase them from the face of the earth in a jiffy. Thus, they tried to “induce mercy” in it, by laying down their arms in front of it. It seems that, on the threshold of undreamed-of miracles of the “electronic era”, we are witnessing the materialization of an ancient idea about the all-seeing divine eye before which man can only fall into a prone position and beg for mercy...

Thus, the already massive telecontrol has suddenly appeared as modern, omnipotent, mercilessly impartial (for the disobedient) and threatening (with unavoidable punishment) “eye”. The functioning of the world

¹⁴ Mahatma Gandhi, in: Nirmal Kumar Bose ed., *Selections from Gandhi* (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad, 1948), p. 39.

of human rights and duties under such conditions has been depicted by many (negative) utopias.

After more than 2 centuries of “human rights era” we are in front of necessity of such global ethics paradigms that they obviously includes abilities, duties and responsibilities as inseparable part of man’s personal and social morality. During the last decade of just passed century it whose published in “A Comparison on Global Ethics Proposals”: many documents and activities of the UN Agencies and Commission of the non-governmental organizations. They are giving a basis for ethical answer to the condition of humanity that is trying to found a system of universal values and understandings the complex of human rights, abilities, obligations and responsibilities. These proposals shows that today the political activity, the emergence of humanity culture, and the ecological crisis call for global ethics.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONSCIENCE TOWARDS UNITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ABILITIES, DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS CRITERIA FOR MAN’S RIPENESS

Under the influence of the increasing threat of technological and global dehumanization, we are witnessing a specific divinization *of the human*, linked to the events of a higher order: the birth of a planned and free family and modern lovers who enter into the most valuable social relationship which is not based on tradition, but on the feelings and appeal of the chosen one. In his book on “Man-God or the Meaning of Life”, Luc Ferry¹⁵ points out that the One-Time “vertical” transcendences, such as God, Fatherland and Revolution, are being increasingly challenged by the “horizontal” transcendence belonging to ordinary people. Does this suppression of conscience, which enables a differentiation between good and evil in this world, create Man whose consciousness is definitely concerned with the rights themselves, thus soothing conscience as the **source of one’s sense of duty**? The most recent contradictions provide evidence of this: humanitarian-style bioethics presents man who shapes autonomously the one-time inconceivable sanctities almost without any moral dilemmas. If man has simply decided to discard the “fruit of the tree of knowledge” as the curse of the unattainable, painful differentiation between good and evil, the question that imposes itself here is associated with the (im) pos-

¹⁵ Luc Ferry, *L’homme-Dieu, ou le Sens de la vie*, (Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle, Paris 1996), p. 250.

sibility of the wisdom of such a synthesis of his consciousness and laic spirituality, which would be able to substitute conscience!

The question of conscience is always facing us with the rhetoric of harsh duties and slogans, such as: “You should, therefore you can!” and the like. This perennial warring rigorism, as pointed out by Luc Ferry,¹⁶ is followed closely by the logic of individualism and contest, consumption and good fortune or, in other words, the existence of authenticity and closeness with oneself, which was antiphrastically termed “ethics”. And the aims, such as: “taking care about oneself”, one’s own well-being and the well-being of one’s kinsmen, enthusiastic competition, pursuit of physical and psychological comfort, have substituted the ancient demand for self-sacrifice by eroding one’s feeling of radical dependence on the Divine or the Nation. Therefore, it seems as if – in the face of the crazy world of “cyber” consumption – the flood of lay ethicists, in that sunset of our conscience and duties, points to the imperative of a thorough reconsideration of the prevailing development trends.

The use of conscience in appraising one’s own actions from the aspect of harmony between the realization of one’s rights and the performance of one’s duties, anticipates spiritual life in which, like in an “inner dialogue”, the subject of man’s “self”, **conscious** of some action, is faced with **conscience** as a specific spiritual subject of man’s humanity, being more or less capable of an impartial moral evaluation of one’s own, another’s and joint actions.

Humanistic and technical intelligentsia, as well as the countless masses of people from all social strata in Europe and throughout the world are evidently wondering about fall or return, the rebirth of ethics, moral progress or the immersion of humanity in individualism and endless consumption, in the whirlpool of manipulation with bare rights and similar. The time ahead of us is the time which requires systematic research, revised education of generations from the elementary to university level, the time of dissemination of both scientific and popular information and a debate on what the modern culture of the unity of human rights and duties, or what the emerging one is announcing. In view of the growing and dramatic of this time of great change, I hold that one cannot stop (nor will he be capable to stop) searching for new or just sensed, yet possible qualities of humanity and conscience, which can meet the demands of man’s radically changed influence on both human and natural community which is within his reach.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 167.

DAMIR KUKIĆ

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF TUZLA, B&H

THE BALKANS: FROM HERE TO THE PAST

At the beginning of 2006, it seemed that the processes in the Balkans were conducted in the right direction. Everything pointed to the further progress and normalization of the situation in this region and its convergence towards the EU. Such favourable trends suggested that the interested parties would finally be closer to the solution of Kosovo's final status, that Croatia would make considerable progress in its negotiations with the EU, that Serbia and Montenegro would join the NATO's Partnership for Peace and that Macedonia would get a chance to begin the negotiations about its membership in the EU. It was also expected that Bosnia and Herzegovina would make visible progress, including specifically the arrest of the war crime suspects, police reform, constitutional changes and negotiations about the Stabilization and Association Agreement.

THE FIGHT FOR THE TERRITORIES

However, despite such expectations, the end of 2006 is not bringing any optimistic news, especially with respect to the countries of former Yugoslavia (Western Balkans). Although the separation of Serbia and Montenegro did not cause any greater political conflict, the opinion prevails that some old problems have remained the same. So, despite Prime Minister Koštunica's promises that General Ratko Mladić would be arrested before the autumn, Serbia has remained a big debtor towards the international community and its own citizens, since the negotiations about its inclusion in the EU have been suspended.

Nevertheless, Kosovo has remained the greatest problem in the region. Its final status will depend on several factors and one of the most important is the influence and position of the international community. The Serbian authorities have initiated the adoption of the new Constitution stipulating that Kosovo is a constituent part of Serbia. According to

some interpretations, this will be “just a symbolic declaration without legal significance for anyone in the world except for Serbia itself.”¹⁷

However, the author concludes that the mentioned formulation and its observance will also have considerable consequences: “This legal norm can be observed only in one way: as the decision about the suspension of all political and legal relations with all those in the world who recognize the independence of Kosovo. In short, the observance of such a norm would be equal to the decision about the country’s self-isolation.”¹⁸ For Serbia itself this would mean its return to the past when this state, the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was under the sanctions imposed by the international community.

The Kosovo issue also appears in some other context, which also reminds us of some negative events in the past. Namely, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not change more significantly after the general elections. In essence, the winners are again those political forces whose political programmes are based exclusively on the national attributes. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this implies the implementation of the mono-national criterion and the principle of collective imagination, which does not hesitate to grossly violate the human rights and freedoms of other ethnic groups.

Suffice it to pay attention to the rhetoric of two politicians who won a considerable number of votes and who distinguished themselves at the latest Bosnia-Herzegovina elections – Haris Silajdžić and Milorad Dodik. Their election campaigns were following the logic of the opposing national groups. So, Haris Silajdžić, the leader of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, was promising the creation of a unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina (without the Republic of Srpska), while Milorad Dodik, the leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), was announcing a referendum on the secession of the Republic of Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

These and similar messages are actually the copy of “great” nationalistic messages from the country’s recent past, which resulted in a protracted war. The results of the elections have shown that – despite its bad policy, which failed to bring any progress in the negotiations with the EU, serious problems in the economic sector, including a large number of unemployed persons – Bosnia and Herzegovina still has the government

¹⁷ Nenad Dimitrijević (2006), *Rodoljupci pišu Ustav*. The article was published in the journal *Feral Tribune*, RH, 22 September 2006, pp. 29-30.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

which is divided along the national lines and whose view of the country's political future is still based on a feudal division of the territory.

This is how analyst Nerzuk Ćurak commented the results of the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina: "They are disastrous, because the elections have also shown that, within the Dayton matrix of our life, nationalism simply has a comparative advantage over any other political option... And the situation is such that the results of these elections will generate new crises and we will not be able to concentrate on our daily life. The politicians will concern themselves only with the governmental system, whether there is a need for the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the like."¹⁹

Such political talks will only return Bosnia and Herzegovina to the past and halt any progress in the process of association and its admission to the EU. What is especially interesting is an artificial linkage established between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo within political and public communications. Namely, according to some interpretations, Kosovo's independence might *provoke* a referendum on the secession of the Republic of Srpska.

Therefore, the "threats" or "promises", which were made by the SNSD leader during his election campaign and referred to the possible secession of the Republic of Srpska, are potentially very significant for solving the problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, in a broader sense, such rhetoric is seriously affecting the country's fragile interethnic reconciliation and achieved degree of tolerance. Therefore, after the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU Council found it necessary to emphasize that "the EU supports the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina"²⁰

In that context, Hanes Swoboda, a long-time deputy to the European Parliament, sent the message to Milorad Dodik that he would "destroy any future for Bosnian Serbs if he does not give up such a crazy idea"²¹ and "informed Belgrade that it would aggravate its path to the EU still further if it continues to support the destructive elements in Bosnia and Herzegovina."²² But, what especially arouses concern is that Bosnia and Herzegovina has lost its chance to negotiate about the Stabilization and Association Agreement, which means that the ideas about the country's stability and admission to the EU – are still unrealistic.

¹⁹ Interview with Nerzuk Ćurak made by Senad Pećanin, "Silajdžić i Dodik su dva oka u glavi", *Dani B&H*, 6 October 2006, pp. 12-15.

²⁰ Augustin Palokaj, "Balkan: regija razočarenja i prekršenih obećanja ne pronalazi izlaz", *Jutarnji list*, RH, 7/8 October 2006, pp. 36-37.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

THE ECONOMY IN SHAMBLES

The Republic of Croatia has no such problems as Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, this former Yugoslav republic also failed to improve its position more significantly in 2006. This will be especially true if the statement of the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso, turns out to be true as well. Namely, he stated that after the admission of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, the further EU enlargement should be suspended until the settlement of the issue of its Constitution.

If this comes true, the door of the EU will also be closed for Croatia, at least for a certain period. However, this does not have to be Croatia's greatest problem, since its modernization encounters various difficulties on a daily basis, including specifically corruption, which is seriously eroding its political and economic sectors. According to the official data on the simplicity of doing business in it, Croatia holds the 124th place on the list of 175 countries. At the same time, it holds the 170th place on the list of 175 countries according to the transparency and duration of its licence issuing process.²³

Corruption is also present in large measure in other former Yugoslav republics. This also applies to the youngest state in the region – Montenegro, in which corruption developed much before its independence. The inadequate privatization process, which enabled the sale and distribution of valuable property in various ways (frequently illegal and unreasonable from an economic viewpoint), corruption and a rise in unemployment got all these West Balkan countries into a very difficult situation.

The EU's idea to transform the Balkans into an economic region has its advantages, especially if one considers the effects of its realization: "The underlying reason for the European Commission's initiative for the formation of a regional free trade area is the view that it will contribute to political stability. The aim is not only economic. Stability and security are the two basic aims of the region and economic development is just the means for achieving them."²⁴

Consequently, the Balkans, as an economic region, should provide scope for the establishment of relations which can also promote other forms of cooperation – in politics, culture, science and sports. On the

²³ According to the statement of Zorislav Antun Petrović, President of Transparency International Croatia, published in *Feral Tribune*, RH, 6 October 2006, p. 20.

²⁴ Jasna Jelisić's interview with Vladimir Gligorov, "BiH mora donijeti odluku hoće li s Evropom ili sa Srbijom", *Dani*, B&H, 6 October 2006, pp. 35-37.

other hand, such a region would also be more interesting for investors, since their initiatives would cover a broader market with the potentially stronger consumer base. As for the economic status of Bosnia and Herzegovina within this region, it is very important to agree on the general parameters of fiscal and monetary policies at the regional level.

After trade liberalization, Bosnia and Herzegovina reduced its deficit in trade with the EU, but it increased in trade with Serbia and Croatia. Therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina is interested in the formation of the Balkan economic zone in accordance with the agreed rules and parameters. This is also important, because Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot depreciate the value of its currency due to the Currency Board, whose role is still extremely significant for the country's stability.

Namely, the Currency Board is a monetary policy instrument which ensures the observance of one rule on the issue of currency: the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina must ensure that the amount of printed (issued) money never exceeds the value of the country's foreign currency reserves. The function of the Currency Board in a country like Bosnia and Herzegovina is very important, because it has several fiscal centres (budgets) which, under a political directive, can affect the entire monetary system and cause inflation.

Bosnia and Herzegovina has very bad politicians and the politics which is not rational and strategically thought-out. This is reflected not only in the mentioned empty, nationalistic rhetoric about its governmental system (which sometimes resembles a Sisyphean task), but also in its economy. The irrational sale of domestic firms, banking system controlled by foreign partners, rise in unemployment and a decline in the standard of living are only some indicators of the poor state of the national economy.

Direct evidence of how inadequate political moves can affect the standard of living of the population is also the adoption of a flat VAT rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such a move not only increased the inflation rate from 2 per cent to 7 per cent, but also endangered a great number of people (since the prices of basic foodstuffs, drugs, print media and books also rose by 17 per cent). In view of the fact that the average pay in Bosnia and Herzegovina (in both entities) is about 250 euros and that the unemployment rate is 44%²⁵, it is clear that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is almost disastrous.

²⁵ Sefer Halilović, the leader of the opposition Bosnian Patriotic Party (BPS), uses the data according to which – if such an employment trend continues – Bosnia and Herzegovina will reach its 1991 level of employment in 365 years; *Dani*, B&H, 20 September 2006, pp. 13-15.

PRESSURE ON THE MEDIA

In the (post)modern period, mass media are also very important. Suffice it to remember the reactions triggered by the publishing of the cartoons portraying Muhammad in some European print media. The debates about those cartoons have shown the importance of the media in the establishment/suspension of communications between different cultures and religious, and how far we are from establishing tolerant relations at a global level.

Something similar also happened after the speech of Pope Benedict XVI at the University of Regensburg in September 2006. The media carried the excerpts from his speech, including some which aroused the great anger of Muslims throughout the world. The Pope's additional explanations, new debates and interpretations have pointed to the need for a global dialogue. The whole event has also demonstrated the power of mass media in modern public communications.

Like journalists, mass media must also observe the professional and ethnical standards, including specifically those which are essential for the building of interethnic confidence and the promotion of tolerance, and stipulate the avoidance of discrimination, disinformation and the spread of hate language.²⁶ All these methods are used by the media and journalists when they do not behave ethically and serve as the propaganda instruments of some political and ideological centres of power.

The latest analyses of the media contents in the Balkans show that the hate language has been significantly reduced.²⁷ However, there is still a danger of ideologization of the media, that is, their instrumentalization by some political and economic centres. It is also evident that the media follow the logic of a global commercialization of the media space, so that profits at all cost have become a priority for some media.

Superficiality and sensationalism, kitsch contents and crime stories have become the major elements of the media contents, which sometimes serve the information and photographs abounding in victims and blood. They often exaggerate and cover conflicts, accidents and human tragedies in an irresponsible and unethical way, resembling Murdoch's maxim that

²⁶ For more detail see Aleksandar Mitić's exhaustive analysis, "The Role of the Media in Promoting Ethnic and Religious Reconciliation: Lessons, Warnings, and Tips from the Journalist Perspectives", Proceedings of the ECPD International Symposium, Belgrade, 28-29 October 2005, pp. 183-190.

²⁷ Group of authors (2005): *Medijska spoticanja u vremenu tranzicije (Albanija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Hrvatska, Makedonija, Srbija i Crna Gora)*, Sarajevo, Media plan Institute.

the most profitable genres are those which contain “blood, sex, violence, crime, political scandals, wars, disasters, terrorism...”²⁸

Some examples show that there is still no atmosphere for free and professional media in the Balkans. So, like some politicians in the past, Haris Silajdžić, the leader of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, requested publicly from the Director-General of RTV FB&H to sanction the editor of the TV political magazine *60 Minutes*, because he gave a negative commentary on the success of this politician at the last elections.

The reports released by the SEEMO (South East Europe Media Organization) also point to some attempts at threatening journalists and forcing them to write with a dose of self-censorship. So, in its reports of 11 May, 30 August and 26 August 2006, the SEEMO registered the following cases:

- On 13 July, Jelena Antić, Ruma correspondent for the daily *Dnevnik*, was prevented from attending a press conference on the orders of the President of the Municipality;
- At the beginning of August, Slavko Savić, director of the local TV Kuršumljija, was given a four-month conditional prison sentence for libel, although the information broadcast by his station was correct;
- On 13 August, Dušanka Novaković, correspondent for the daily *Kurir*, was threatened over the phone by a priest of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who was dissatisfied with her writing;
- Ad Van Denderen, a Dutch photographer, was beaten by five unknown men on a beach near Split while taking photographs. He was seriously injured and had to seek medical treatment in a hospital;
- Drago Hedl, editor of *Feral Tribune*, received a death threat on 9 May; he said that this threat followed his publishing of a series of articles about the killing of Serbs in the region of Osijek;
- On 25 July, Kristina Tešija, a journalist for Nova TV, was verbally and physically attacked by the Mayor of Novalja;
- Enis Velju, reporter from the Kosovo daily *Lajm*, was assaulted by a security member of the Kosovo Assembly while being on a professional assignment.

²⁸ Vreg, France (1991), *Demokratsko komuniciranje: prilog pluralističkoj paradigmi u komunikacijskoj nauci*. Sarajevo, National and University Library of B&H, Faculty of Political Science, p. 313.

These cases are not the only ones, but they point directly to the extent to which the work of the media and journalists in the Balkans is still difficult and exposed to pressure. Such a situation has a direct influence on the democratization of the whole society and, thus, on the degree of tolerance and confidence among different national and religious groups. In addition, such a non-democratic context diminishes the educational role of the media in informing the public about conflicts and models for their peaceful settlement in a high-quality and responsible way.

Finally, it can be stated that the Balkan region and, in particular, the countries of former Yugoslavia, have not yet made a decisive step towards the European integration processes, which would be conclusive evidence of their progress. Interethnic and religious reconciliation, as well as the promotion of tolerant relations have not become the priority issues in the Western Balkans. Instead, these issues are still burdened by xenophobic political projects, whose aims are determined by national and collective interests.

So far, insistence on the national categories has not produced any significant results. On the contrary, it is only generating mistrust and fear of the Other and Different, which is, unfortunately, a realistic basis for the reawakening of old hatreds and conflicts. This constant return to the past is burdening the Balkan countries not only in a political sense, but also in an economic, cultural and educational one, thus making them a specific European enclave – in a negative context.

It is evident that this return to the past is slowing down the admission of the West Balkan countries to the EU or, in other words, it is delaying their modernization and transformation into lawful and democratic states. Thus, this region must make an effort to build more dialogues and promote cooperation, if it wishes to solve its problems and turn to the future when, hopefully, the Balkan region will speak and think how to abolish the mutual borders.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Debre, Režis (2000), *Uvod u mediologiju*, Belgrade, Clio.

Vreg, France (1991), *Demokratsko komuniciranje: Prilog pluralističkoj paradigmi u komunikacijskoj nauci*, Sarajevo, B&H National and University Library, and Faculty of Political Science.

Thompson Mark (1995), *Kovanje rata*, Zagreb, Article 19, International Centre.

Korni, Daniel (2000), *Etika informisanja*, Belgrade, Clio.

Group of authors (2005), *Medijska spoticanja u vremenu tranzicije* (Albanija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Hrvatska, Makedonija, Srbina i Crna Gora), Sarajevo, Media plan Institute.

Bodrijar, Žan (1998), *Savršen zločin*, Belgrade, Circulus.

Velikonja, Mitja (1996), *Masade duha: razpotja sodobnih mitologiji*, Ljubljana, Znanstveno in publicistično središče.

Monitoring Report (2005), *Television across Europe: Regulation, Policy and Independence*, OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE/EU MONITORING AND ADVOCACY PROGRAM.

DR PAVLE B. BUBANJA

PROFESSOR, FACULTY OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF NIŠ,

PEACE IS THE NEW IDEA OF THE HUMAN WORLD

For from the least of them even unto the greatest of them every one is given the covetousness; and from the prophet even unto the priest every one dealeth falsely.

They have healed also the hurt of the daughter of my people slightly, saying, Peace, peace; when there is no peace.

From the Book of the Prophet Jeremiah 6:13-14 (Bible)

This second greatest visionary prophet described vividly the events taking place in 609-598 B.C. His compatriots **hated him, laughed at him and despised him**. Jeremiah was uttering his prophecies during the most tragic period of Jewish history. Otherwise, he spent most of his life in his native village of Anathoth. His compatriots wanted his soul, because he advocated **peace, harmony and friendship among people**. After hearing Jeremiah's prophecies, Pashur, the priest and chief governor in the house of the Lord, smote Jeremiah and put him in the stocks. After being released, he **continued to prophecy** that the Lord would give all Judah into the hands of the Babylonians, who would carry them captive into Babylon and **slay them** with the sword. His prophecies turned out to be true. Can the author somehow associate these few lines with the current state of religious tolerance in the Balkans? At least when interethnic reconciliation and **religious tolerance** in the "mountainous Balkans" are in question.

The greatest thinkers and ideas of all time have taught us, and are still teaching us, that war and peace have almost made friends, thus becoming a conceptual pair and continuing their "cohabitation" throughout the history of mankind, written by them exclusively as the **history of wars**.

It is difficult to live in that earthly and heavenly realm of all geniuses and become a little more refined than we otherwise are. Do we have enough strength, will, knowledge and courage so as to break away from the historical, logical and axiological standards, which treat war and peace as a historically conceptual pair, thus **blocking** our cognitive abilities to adopt some **new standards and visionary ideas, taking away peace** out

of the grip of the standardized conceptual pair **and thinking** of it as **the new idea of the human world**. In our opinion, we are entitled to it and **time cannot take it from us**, unless it deprives us of all other cognitive powers and prerogatives.

In our opinion, such an idea makes our lives meaningful, since we are increasingly losing the incentives for a more revolutionary approach at the time which does not respect anything. The philosophical and religious concepts of peace, according to which **peace can be understood** in a traditional and retrograde way, have become obsolete. Is there, for example, more peace among all peoples and states today than in the time of the great prophet Jeremiah? This cannot be answered with certainty.

Many competent people hold that so-called modern peace-makers are just average persons and that there are no geniuses – mythical personages any more.

It can be said almost with certainty that it is not noble to glorify oneself in the earthly circumstances. That is also contrary to good education and upbringing, “when all the world lies in evil”, because the **new understanding of peace implies a historical call for the humanization of knowledge** and all human potentials, which are included in the notion of talents of the human race. Our philosophical, theological and legal education requires that our modest intellectual and moral standards regard peace as a **historically new ontological**, gnoseological and axiological category in the system of human knowledge and thinking which would, together with other peace-makers, make a modest contribution to our civilisation and culture of peace, to some **beginnings of the history** of peace laid on the **new foundation**. In our opinion, the technology of wisdom, art and humanity has reached the level of a struggle of man’s genius, showing resolve to **penetrate** the mysteriousness of the ladderlike process of peace, as stated at this renowned world meeting in October 2005.

The new understanding of peace, based on an insight into the world of its mysteriousness, would anticipate understanding, **one’s** revival, control over the powers of evil and the possibility of their taming and degradation.

It will be possible to speak about the rising of man only through this new understanding of the world of peace, when one will observe how the dreams about a better life are gradually turning into a new world. We believe that all religions of the world, including the Balkans, can do much for that ideal, so that our belief can gain strength which will be more vivid than any myth about peace or other ideals of the human world.

What do we consider to be essential for addressing the peace issue in such a way?

So far, the peace issue has not always been addressed in an adequate way. Thus, the extremely important notion of peace has been placed next to war. This was done not only in the past, but also today, when the socio-political, socio-economic, cultural, civilisation, spiritual and eschatological reasons are essentially different.

The essentially different treatment of peace and its separation from war do not imply stepping into an earthly paradise. It is simply a question of the need to place the peace issue in the context of the value system that befits it. One must also bear in mind, for example, that peace is inseparable from the notion of love and even more so from the notion of earthly life's joys.

The emergence of the **thought of peace** in the world and in the light of human history represents – whether we want to admit that or not – the *sui generis* turning point in the drama relating to the notion of **evolution**, as well as in the system of man's spirituality. It remains unclear why the human spirit, mind or thought does not concern itself with the essence of peace as the system of earthly life's joys. It would be rather correct and encouraging should it be evaluated as an adventure of man's reasoning. Consequently, such an adventure will make sense and will achieve its aim only if the human race or, better said, its best minds concern themselves with the issue of peace as the value system, which includes many questions that are not associated with war and its definition by St Augustine, Hobbes... That would be an epoch-making theme for philosophers and scholars. And what we can say about reflections on peace in the systems of the world's major monotheistic religions, both announced and natural, which are based on peace as the connective yet crucial notion when it is the question of teachings, a journey from one world to another, or matching life's ideals with the flows that we call the life cycle.

NEW IDEAS REQUIRE A NEW WAY OF THINKING. Addressing the issue of peace anticipates an authentic and radically different way of thinking that will shift away from the so-called time of **confusion**, which generates conflicts, rifts and discord. To this end, it is first necessary to settle the state of one's thoughts, one's family and one's mind but, **naturally, if that is possible**. Only in that case, it will be possible to influence the human world with one's thoughts.

THE VALUE SYSTEM FOR A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF PEACE. The moral, philosophical, religious and scientific systems are too abundant to be used as the parameters of some specific life's situations.

There will be no peace until they become the cornerstone of life's cross-roads and be laid on peace-making foundations.

The whole world which, according to biblical principles, "lies in evil" must be improved in the style of Confucian philosophy with the elements of the Christian doctrine, philosophy and religion. According to Confucius, one should return good with good and evil with justice. His disciple Mencius says: "Man differs from lower animals only by a little; most men throw that little away." He also says that the greatest fortune of a people would be **to keep ignorant persons from public office and secure their wisest men to rule them.** Much of the aforementioned is a moral axiom and a postulate in the relations among peoples and states.

A sound moral and political philosophy anticipates intensive cooperation among civilisations so as to establish the methods, tasks and meanings relating to the new interpretation of peace as the major challenge to our greatest intellectual and vital potentials, based on European and world's philosophical, political and religious thoughts.

SOME BASIC QUESTIONS FOR THE HUMAN WORLD BEING OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE SPREADING OF THE IDEALS OF PEACE AND UNDERSTANDING AMONG PEOPLES AND STATES

Question number one. Did the modern peoples found some kind of Peace Academy as a more lasting educational institution for the generations that would be brought up in the spirit of the best ideas developed in the science, religion, philosophy and traditions of specified peoples and states. I do not know.

Question number two. Did the modern peoples and states make any new breakthrough in the hidden wisdom of the ordinary people being the best in interpreting the achievements of the generations and traditions of the specified peoples. Considering the current situation, I doubt something like that. However, I still believe in the **new revelations of the world of peace for all men and all peoples,** as well as in limitless intelligence on the paths of our lives.

Question number three. We hold that the hitherto philosophical systems, the systems of the world's religions and worlds of arts give a historical chance to our generations to carry out – in the innermost thoughts and buried ideals of the world and man – one *sui generis* **Copernican revolution in the separation of peace from war and its inclusion in the world of universal ideas in a new way,** while at the same time adding the notions of survival, health, no-war, **man, life** and the like to war.

Question number four. Jacob's ladder, mentioned in the Bible, provides, symbolically, the possibility of elaborating the **steps leading** to the

world of **reconciliation, on the path to peace**. It is clear that **reconciliation**, said in the language of religion, philosophy, law or culturology, does not guarantee peace automatically. The human world must **learn how to learn peace and understanding** as the basic preconditions for a more humane life and its continuation. Is there something like that? I cannot give a positive answer.

Question number five. Can one **expect the *sui generis* Copernican revolution in the separation of peace from war** in the world of humanity, the world of revolutionary shift in the issue of peace? This can happen, but there is still nothing in sight.

Question number six. All **concerns over man** fade before the correct statement that Earth can remain without man under the impact of negative energies generated by the human world. This is the basic fact which is defeating us, the ordinary people, in the existential sense of the word, although that is difficult to understand. The fear of such globalization or, in other words, the globalization of fear is the first determinant of encouraging or discouraging the world of optimism in human lives.

Question number seven. Is it possible (highly unlikely today) that only one man with the intellectual faculties of Voltaire, Giordano Bruno, Rousseau, Kant, God-man Jesus Christ, Buddha, Mohammad or Confucius – incites man's thought to intellectual and spiritual creativity in the world of peace for all people. It is possible, but the wings of hatred in the human world must be clipped.

Question number eight. How can one halt the thwarting of hopes in the human world and stir up hopes once again? The deposits made by the world of hatred, sinfulness and arrogance, the world without any moral norms and axioms are very heavy. We hold that it is necessary to use large amounts of so-called positive energies so as to enable the world of peace to defeat the world of evil in which the human world is otherwise abounding. Many tendencies in today's world are **thwarting the hopes** in a better, more beautiful and more just world. By dispelling these hopes, the world of optimism will vanish, but we hope that such an act against man will not be allowed.

Question number nine. In order to secure peace all over the world, Earth and its inhabitants must make a large inventory of all important notions in their history and tradition, as well as in their systems of thinking so as to identify the notions that constitute the basic links to the world of civilisations, which announce some better times with a human face. This would be also a revolutionary step toward peace and **man**. This "traveling" idea has not reached the world of universality in a **genuine** way,

since it has been neutralized by the history of mankind as the history of wars. Is there still room for the Lyncurgian philosophy of man who holds that the Europeans fortify their borders by building massive and expensive walls, whereby attention is focused on production, the building of big walls and war machinery. How different from the patterns of thought in the past! When Lyncurgus was advised to build large walls around Sparta, he answered: “The strongest walls of Sparta **are her sons**”. Is it possible to use this fragment so as to place an **ordinary man in the centre** of the great ideas in the service of peace as a genuinely **new world**, due to which we **claim that the idea of peace is a genuinely new idea of the human world?**

Question number ten. Economy and peace. For the most part, the modern economy is not in the service of new relations and ideas for the world of peace and for the journey of the idea of peace to the desired world. The modern economy, law, politics and theology, for a good part, are not in the service of the great and proclaimed principles on which they are based. The great and extremely important **idea of serving** has not found its most adequate place in the world of humanity. The idea of **servng** is suffering heavy defeats among all peoples, in all civilisations and all cultures. Erich Fromm said correctly that it is more important **to have than to be!** In economic science, law, politics, philosophy and religion, such a principle has prevailed (but not definitely!) in international relations and among peoples. The progress of the human spirit has been proclaimed an inadequate philosophical and moral category. International law and international morality have almost been defeated and are “defended” by those witnessing the world of violence and moral subjugation at all levels – vertically and horizontally.

The modern economy also participated in Socrates’ departure from this world in the most dramatic way – **the man committed a suicide!** Why? He realized that Confucius’ and his principle could not be applied in the human world and that good would not be returned with good and evil with justice. Is there still room for the philosophy of **love in the human world?** We believe that there is and that it has good prospects. Like other philosophies and religions, Christian philosophy also preaches on love as the force that is not diminishing with use but, on the contrary, is increasing, which is not the case with other “goods” in a market-economy world. I am confident that the human world has not resolved such an enigma, the enigma of serving instead of ruling. Among other things, this is where the key to a new openness and new challenges should be sought.

Consequently, the idea of peace, as presented here, is a relatively **new idea** for man. This is the idea of stirring up the hope in better days for **man and the human race**.

Question number eleven. Is it possible, through education for peace and tolerance in the human world, the world of civil rights and liberties, to generate the global innovation – the ministry of peace in all countries? This will be possible only if the peoples agree that all treaties they conclude should have moral, legal and political weight and be binding upon them, which would be mutually controlled. This cannot be achieved by satanizing peoples and states. Who is doing that? Only the one who is Satan. After all, in the theological vocabulary there is no other definition for satanization!

Finally, the word **obrazovanje** (education), according to experts, is derived from the word **obraz** (honour). Therefore, it is necessary to address the issue of peace as teaching about doing something honourable before the present and future generations. Peace provides a basis for showing respect for the entire human world and each man. Without the Copernican revolution in the world of new interpretations and contemplations, there is no world of peace. It is highly unlikely that the idea of good, which is needed for the understanding, control and respect of each man in the human world, can be a genuine inhabitant of all states and, thus, the Western Balkans, the Balkan region or the whole world as one big family of peoples and states.

SRĐAN CVIJIĆ, PH.D.

EXPERT, STABILITY PACT FOR SEE

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STABILITY PACT FOR SEE IN THE RECONCILIATION PROCESSES IN THE SEE REGION

- Since the formation of the SP SEE (in Sarajevo 1999) SP has been active in supporting the processes of reconciliation within the SEE region. The very mandate of the SP (regional cooperation) in its very important part, deals with the issue of reconciliation. SP is a unique experiment of long term conflict prevention strategy in the world. The example of the SP is being considered in other areas of the world, Caucasus etc.
- Out of the three Working Tables of the SP, most directly covering the issue of reconciliation is the Working Table I (Democracy). Reconciliation and regional cooperation are fundamental pillars of the democratization of the region.
- WT I is a direct way of engaging in the regional reconciliation processes. Having said that other working tables II (Economy) and III (Security) indirectly deal with this issue (Reconciliation through the creation of the common economic market-Unity Through Compromise).
- Every section of the WT I is engaged in the “business” of reconciliation. It is important to point out the core objective Fostering and Building Human Capital, Parliamentary Cooperation Task Force and Local Democracy and Cross Border Cooperation Task Force.
- It is difficult to measure the success of the SP in this field, due to the general difficulty of measuring factors such as reconciliation, democratization etc. The success in these fields is only measurable in the long term perspective. Looking back at the 1999, when the last war in the destructive saga of “second Balkan wars” ended, SP managed to support the movement towards a significant improvement in the field of reconciliation of the WB.
- Today, we bring together parliamentarians from the region to meet regularly within the framework of our Parliamentary Cooperation Task Force. It is in itself a tremendous achievement that parliamentarians of the countries that have a track record of hostile

relations, meet together make joint conclusions, declarations, discuss issues of strategic importance for the future of the region etc. Similar forums exist between the governments of SEE countries. We have a number of regional initiatives where one SEE country provides financial resources for the functioning of the secretariat, whereas the management and employees of the initiative come from different SEE countries (e.g. Education Reform Initiative for SEE). Moreover, Brussels secretariat is becoming Balkans in small, slowly transforming into a joint multilateral organism with a common purpose and goal, which is unambiguously Euro-Atlantic integration of the countries of the region.

- SP does not work only on the high political level. We bring together representatives of the SEE civil society in our LODE CBC Task Force. We support the work of regional civil society reconciliation initiatives such as the Association of Multi-Ethnic Cities of SEE, Citizens Pact for SEE etc.
- SP recognises the importance of collective memory for the creation of political identities. History proved to be a fundamental element both in provoking conflicts within the SEE region but it can also play a crucial role in the reconciliation of the region. In this way WT I of the SP is supporting the Joint History Workbooks Project of the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation of SEE.
- SP SEE is not directly engaged into the work on the establishment of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in the region and likewise its mandate does not allow it to be directly involved in the operation of the national courts dealing with war crimes as well as to deal with the operation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. This, however, does not mean SP does not monitor the processes in these fields and tries to influence the governments of SEE states to progress in this field.

JEFFREY LEVETT

NATIONAL SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, ATHENS, GREECE
PRESIDENT, ECPD EXECUTIVE BOARD, BELGRADE

HEALTH WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF HUMAN SECURITY²⁹

INTRODUCTION

Globalization is creating opportunities for wealth and prosperity, but at the cost of a world more polarized by differences in life's circumstances and opportunities and to a general background of chaos and turbulence as the operational context of complex contemporary society. In the Balkans and as a result of social, economic and political upheavals there is a growing vulnerability for a large portion of its peoples and an unsettling polarity prevails. Consequently, good Governance with the invigoration of democratic institutions should take a top priority with any government. This should be the operative principle in the Balkans where the historical backdrop is that of centuries of ethnic conflict and uneasy coexistence, periodic economic transients and social disruptions and crumbling empires and new world orders. The contemporary status is emergent from the collapse of the Soviet empire, followed by so called economic "transition", as well as ethnic cleansing and interventions from without. The overall change has precipitated enlarged societal polarization across the region and within each state. It has been exacerbated by the weakness of states and aggravated by difficulties to create and enforce rules within a democratic context. Rising insecurity with health disturbance compared with Europe are serious outcomes. This dark divide is a threat to both regional and European stability. In Soviet times, basic social security and minimum low-tech health care were provided to all. The population was also protected from external violence and it was considered safe from the virulence of "imperialistic bugs".

The World Health Organization and the Council of Europe have both called attention to the growth of population vulnerability and declining health status over the past fifteen years. Together with the Stability

²⁹ Draft document prepared for use only within the ECPD International Conference "Human Security & Reconciliation"

Pact [SP]³⁰ they have targeted specific improvements within a framework of social cohesion. With respect to health they have set in motion a set of specific programmes relating to country issues and priorities, for example infectious disease control with respect to Albania, mental health B&H and nutrition, Serbia. In the Dubrovnik Pledge the regional Ministers of Health affirmed their resolve to reduce population vulnerability while the Skopje Declaration the Public Health Network of SEE [PH-SEE Network] highlighted a resolve to use public health in all efforts at vulnerability reduction. Prerequisites to gain optimization are the cultivation of tolerance and reconciliation among the Balkan peoples, capacity building of regional institutions and related design of special studies in post-conflict development, health diplomacy and human security. Human security as defined by the UN as one umbrella under which development can be orchestrated. One institution holding promise to make a positive contribution to improvements in the Balkans is the ECPD, Belgrade. Currently its capacity is being boosted by its engagement in some of the aforementioned issues, including the organisation of this conference.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE ECPD

ECPD's aim is to contribute to an internally emerging post-conflict vision for the Balkan region while cultivating a rational contribution from the international community. The expected outcome will be a growth of regional integration through development of human security, prosperity and peace from inside. It should be noted though that regional integration is considered a risk by many. As already noted a prerequisite for any developmental umbrella is the cultivation of tolerance and reconciliation. This is the starting point for the activities of the ECPD, which is supported by Japan. This is not a hand wringing conference but a search for development emphasising the three essential capabilities for human progress for each and every Balkan person, namely, to lead a long and healthy life, be knowledgeable, and to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living. On a personal note I would say that this conference is a positive attribute for Serbia that somehow defies its usual external image.

The road the Balkans must travel to reduce inequity and aspire to tolerance and reconciliation is long and especially so since the major sources

³⁰ The Stability Pact for South East-Europe was signed in Cologne [1999] in response to the EU's call to adopt a comprehensive platform for stability and development in the region.

of the Balkan conflicts are still very much present. On the other hand anything that upgrades the quality of life is a positive stimulant to human security. On the bright side we have the fact that ordinary people are now communicating and reconnecting across political and geographical boundaries; on the greyer side we have a region that contains a more and more isolated Serbia “branded” by the international community and with the Serbs themselves feeling rejected and excluded. Recently, Montenegro took the path of self-determined independence while Kosovo now is in the “hands” of the international community and will most probably “secede” from Serbia. My perspective is that too much haste will be detrimental. For the purpose of tolerance and reconciliation it is important that Serbia not be a total loser, for if brought to its knees regional destabilization is quite possible. One result reflecting Serbia’s concerns is that the government has announced that it is looking for a marketing company to repackage the country in order to “rebrand” it in a different image. Whether rebranding is an appropriate approach or not, what is vitally important is that Serbia is earmarked by the international community for a process of reassimilation and reculturalisation with Europe while preserving its own uniqueness. Serbia and the Balkans deserve of much greater consideration from the outside world.

HEALTH THREATS IN THE EMERGING BALKANS

In addition to the existing threats to environmental and human security, several new risks have emerged from the east, which were insignificant a decade ago. The recent spread of infectious diseases and the increasing use of illicit drugs are among these emerging threats. During the last decade and external to the Balkan border the level of mortality from different types of infectious diseases has almost doubled. Although many infectious diseases, especially among children, have been successfully mitigated, others such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, diphtheria, and syphilis have increased. Avian influenza is yet another threat. Substance abusers treated in medical institutions have multiplied several-fold. Consequently, there is growing pressure to ensure adequate cross border sanitary shielding since health problems on one side can mean serious problems on the other. Two examples of these negative effects include the break down of public health measures or the development of resistance to antibiotics by pathogens as in the case of TB. It should be borne in mind that children from poor families anywhere have more illness than affluent ones and this

disparity impairs education and contributes to polarization at the expense of human security. Well-selected health care spending on aid may be the best aid to deal with health threats. However, relatively inexpensive practices are often difficult to obtain.

THE EMERGENT BALKANS

The Balkans are major cross-roads between north and south, east of west and a place where continents come together or separate. It is to some, the historical and cultural birthplace of Europe; to others a dark continent; and yet to others it is an inconsistent and contradictory space. For me it is a region of great divergence and convergence. On the one hand it is rich in history, while on the other, it is a region where various forms of conflict are never far removed from the surface, which can be potentiated or come into play usually with overlapping foreign intervention. It is not without reason that the Balkans ominously or not are sometimes referred to, as the “first and last Europe”. These dark contrasts are both a threat to the region and to Europe while the implicit cultural diversity, rich history and geographical location offer strengths from which opportunity can emerge.

It is a region with a long history of underdevelopment made recently worse by war (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo). It a region recovering from the effects of economic sanctions, political upheavals, radioactive and chemical fallout (Chernobyl, Kosovo), socio-economic disaster (Albania) and earthquakes (Turkey and Greece). The war in Kosovo came at the tail end of the United Nations International Decade for Disaster Reduction while the region had to deal with an added ecological catastrophe resulting from a significant cyanide spill in Romania at the very beginning of the new millennium. The contemporary pattern of disease (1990-2006) is a complex blend of a repetitious past, the diseases of development and the consequences of significant socio-economic upheaval after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In addition all too significant are the problems and issues relating to movement, of populations of refugees and displaced persons and groups with war induced disability as well as mental disturbance. Reform health strategy is grappling with complex problems of appropriate financing, reinforcement of primary health care and recovery from humanitarian disaster.

While market mechanisms promoted by international financial institutions have penetrated the health systems, they have proved no panacea. The ongoing transition away from a centralized economy to a free

market model has neither improved population health nor reduced the health deficit differential between the Balkans and Europe. On the contrary they have compromised social and economic development. Refugee movements and trans-border health issues are now more significant. Resources for health are limited; mortality and morbidity have exacerbated; indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality or planned activities for health promotion lag those of the rest of Europe. Malnutrition coupled with declining health-care, have reduced standards of health and preventable diseases have started to re-emerge. There is a growth in both the prevalence and intensity of poverty, which have distinctive elements appropriate for a policy approach based on human security. By definition the “referent object” of human security is the individual or community, rather than the state that is it is focussed on people and structured around their daily life, which distinguishes human security from national security. Given however, the complex interrelationships between violence, development and governance much research on human security policy is necessary.

The threats to human security in the Balkans are complex and include pollution, vulnerability to natural disasters, economic decline, low levels of investment and project implementation, poverty, low incomes, unemployment, declining health, poverty, corruption. Policy goals for human security have to match this complexity and require a mix of ecological, economic, social, political, and cultural actions. It is especially important to establish early warning systems in each country with regional integration that can predict or prevent crises and deal rapidly with those that do arise. It will be necessary to develop an appropriate set of indicators to monitor trends in human security. Given however, the fragile social and economic conditions in the region, people are likely to remain vulnerable for some years to come.

HUMAN SECURITY

Human security is a relatively new and a disputed concept, which in its broadest formulation is equivalent to human well-being. Far better known is human insecurity. Its antecedents can be traced back to the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva in 1863 and to the UN Charter. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions created obligations for states to defend the security of peoples everywhere. However in the 20th century human security has

been trampled on and people have died as a result of the actions of their own government so that human security and national security have become mutually incompatible. The result is that national security can be a threat to human security. By threat are included physical violence, hunger, disease and pollution and can involve the denial of the most basic of human needs. Two points to bear in mind are that endemic hunger and disease have a greater toll than armed conflict terrorism and other forms of criminal violence but during armed conflict civilians are at greater risk than military personnel. Human security is closely related to human development and well-being and can be defined as 'safety from such chronic threats as repression, oppression, hunger, disease, and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life'. [See Global Human Development Report 1994.] It can be best achieved by investing in the health, education and human capabilities of people. [For a comparative analysis of human development in South-East Europe, see Appendix 1, and Human Development Report for Europe and the CIS "Transition", UNDP/RBEC 1999].

MY FOUR POINTS

In addressing the complex issues of *reconciliation* and *tolerance* our aim I think should be to make life more *meaningful* in its myriad ways for the peoples of the Balkans. It must be orchestrated within its own regional context, cultures, and concepts of social wellbeing and within the *European family*. This means I think encouragement of *social inclusion* of all groups and promotion of the enormous *cultural capital* of the region within a framework of appropriate *socio-economic development*. Reconciliation means bringing together peoples who have been divided and where mutual hostility exists. It is undertaken to a background of trust destroyed, increased polarization and significant poverty. In the absence of *human security* or in the presence of *population vulnerability* or when disaster strikes *health disturbance* is the result.

My first point underscores the fact that we are dealing with complex issues and interrelated phenomena for which we have no generally accepted definitions [e.g. development/quality of life] or for which the definition is narrow [e.g. poverty on one euro a day] or for which correlations between entities are either weak or not conclusively established [deprivation and violence/poverty and vulnerability/] or for which given concepts may be diametrically polarized [armed struggle and terrorism].

My second point is one of faith, namely, that the truth will out slowly if scholars with goodwill explore, search and research reality by careful scholarship. We as scholars are interested in scholarly answers to questions about tragic events and humanitarian disaster in the Balkans and with a deep interest in both an accurate portrayal of yesterday's and today's reality. We also have a deep and vested interest in the region's future within the context of human security. One way of framing our efforts is by placing them within the umbrella of human security strengthening which ties us to the platform of the UN Commission on Human Security and gives emphasis to the ECPD as an institution originally sparked by the UN U of P. One major constraint to our work is that we are dealing with a complex and messy world with the tools of fuzzy logic. The tools of science are necessary but insufficient.

My third point is that the language of health is perhaps the only cross-border, cross-culture lingua franca in the region. Public health is a catalyst for peace and an integral factor for socio-economic development. While powerfully political, it has a perceptive appeal of neutrality and can be used as an instrument of foreign policy and the fostering of international relations. Health is a linchpin for both human security and socio-economic development. Health development can help a traumatized nation and with its common context can serve a whole region.

Finally, it is important to make use of the good offices of the UN and WHO, the CoE and the SP as well as already available tools and if necessary reshape and refine them such as the HDI, IHI and health data. Early warning systems and special indicators must also be developed to monitor trends in human security

Like any index system, the IHI provides an "indication" of levels of human insecurity, and how these levels may change over time. There are interesting questions that can be explored regarding data quality and reliability, the definition of human security, and the numbers and types of indicators used. Traditional perspectives on security have been seen in terms of neutralizing military threats to the territorial integrity and political independence of the state. More recent approaches emphasize the need to expand the traditional conception to include so-called non-conventional threats coming from resource scarcity, rapid population growth, human rights abuse, and infectious disease outbreaks, environmental degradation, ozone depletion, global warming, water pollution, soil degradation and the loss of biodiversity. It is now accepted that environmental stress, often the result of global environmental change, coupled with increasingly vulnerable societies, may contribute to insecurity and even conflict.

”Human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. Anything which degrades their quality of life – demographic pressures, diminished access to or stock of resources, and so on – is a security threat. Conversely, “Human security, in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human – and, therefore, national security.” Water quality has been regarded as the prime indicator of health and well-being, as it plays a crucial role in determining the cause and transmission of disease water is a significant route for disease transmission.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS

In the development of policies and action plans the health sector must be considered because of its advocacy role in mediating the relations between health, environment, and sustainable development. A much stronger partnership between the health sector and other sectors is required for successful reduction of health threats arising from poor environmental conditions. The threat of TB has been enhanced by its association with HIV/AIDS and the emergence of multi-drug resistant. Measles is often associated with diarrhoeal diseases, as well as pneumonia and malnutrition.

In the study of natural hazards, vulnerability is defined generally as the potential for loss and is divided between biophysical vulnerability, which can refer to the potential for loss from natural hazards, environmental variability and change, and social vulnerability, which refers to social and institutional capacities that determine susceptibility to, and the ability to cope with, hazards. In these considerations we are venturing into disaster management and public health and the damage precipitated by a catastrophic event. In restricting damage to that of health disturbance which is the sum of mortality and morbidity over time, we are dealing with hazard, the risk of the hazard for an event and the management function of society.

POVERTY AND HEALTH

Poverty and ill-health are intertwined. Poor countries tend to have worse health outcomes than developed countries. The association between poverty is a two way one: illness or high fertility have a substantial impact on the household income, and can cause a falling below the poverty line. Ill-health is often associated with increased health care costs. The other side of the coin shows that poverty also causes ill-health. Poor people are thus caught in a vicious circle: poverty breeds ill-health and ill-health maintains poverty. Those living in extreme poverty typically lack access to safe drinking water, decent housing, adequate sanitation, sufficient food, education, professional health care, transportation, safe and secure employment, and health information. People living in absolute poverty are five times more likely to die before reaching the age of five, and twice more likely to die between ages 15 and 59, than non-poor. In sub-Saharan Africa a relatively small number of diseases and conditions are responsible for the most of the world's health deficit: HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB, maternal and childhood diseases, tobacco-related illnesses, all aggravated by malnutrition. They account for 14 million deaths per year in population under 60 years of age and for 16 million deaths per year among all age groups. HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB are worsening. In some areas the high incidence of malaria is associated with reduced economic growth of 1% per year. 50% of the population lives in absolute poverty risk of maternal mortality is dramatic: one in 12, compared to one in 400 in Europe.

REFERENCES

- Levett J. Kyriopoulos J., Public health in the Balkan region, *European Journal of Public Health*, 2006
- Levett J. et al., Disaster Management as a Tool in Solidarity Building, 14th World Congress on Disaster and Emergency Medicine Edinburgh 2005
- Levett J., Public Health and Balkan Health: An Interregional Dialogue *Internet JPHE* (2005)
- Levett J., Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Loud Clang of the Leper's Bell, 44(6):674-680, *CRJ* 2003
- Levett J., Contributing to Balkan Public Health: A School for Skopje, *CMJ* 2002
- Donev D., Laaser U., Levett J., Declaration of Skopje: Public Health, Peace & Human Rights, *CMJ*, 2001

Cutter S., Vulnerability to environmental hazards. 20, 529-539. Progress in Human Geography, 1996

For a comparative analysis of human development in South-East Europe, see Appendix 1, and Human Development Report for Europe and the CIS "Transition" UNDP/RBEC 1999. Global Human Development Report 1994

The CEPS Working Document No. 131: A system for post war South East Europe can be found at: www.ceps.be Document WHO/EHA/00.01.

Arya Neil, Healing Our Planet: Physicians and Global Security 44(2):139-147, CMJ 2003

Levett J. An overview of socio-economic disaster and theoretical perspective. The Balkan World. In: Health Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe. Proceedings of the FICOSSER Research Meeting; 1998 Oct 2-3; Velingrad, Bulgaria. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IGNIS, National Centre for Health System Management; 1999. p. 93-5.

Levett J. An assessment of socio-economic disaster: a SEE perspective. In: Kyriopoulos J, editor. Proceedings of the 5th FICOSSER (Federation for International Cooperation of Health Services and Systems Research Centers) General Conference; 2002 June 12-14; Chersonissos (Heraklion), Crete, Greece. Athens: Exandas Publishers; 2002. p. 126-8.

Levett J. Public health preparedness in relation to disasters. In: Earthquakes and People's Health. Proceedings of a WHO Symposium; 1997 Jan 27-30; Kobe, Japan. Kobe: WHO Center for Health Development; 1997. p.244-51. Ullman, 1983; Renner, 1989; Westing, 1989)

Levett J., A Public Health Curriculum for Peace IJPHE 2001


ANNEXES

I Cycle of violence

A. Interpersonal or domestic violence

B. Civil strife and war

(According to Dr. J. Santa Barbara)



II Human security in South-East Europe after the Kosovo war

(an impressionistic view of the human security situation in these countries, based on assessments by contributors from each country, Special Report commissioned by UNDP Human Security in South-East Europe).


1 = low level; 2 = middle level; 3 = high level;

↑ improving trend

↓ deteriorating trend

Country	POLITICAL SECURITY	ECONOMIC SECURITY	OVERAL HUMAN SECURITY
Albania	1↑	1↑	1↑
Bosnia & Herzegovina	1↑	1	1
Bulgaria	2↑	2	2
Croatia	2	2	2
FYR Macedonia	2↓	2↓	2↓
Montenegro	1	2↓	2↓
Romania	2	2↓	2
Serbia	1↓	1↓	1↓

III Index of Human Insecurity (IHI) The figure below depicts the strong relationship between the IHI and the HDI. The HDI is a simple index comprising three indicators: level of economic development (GDP per capita), longevity (life expectancy), and level of education (literacy rates). Simple correlation indicates that there is a strong relationship between the HDI and the IHI. The scatter diagram suggests an underlying sigmoidal relationship between the two indices, which implies that a significant increase in human security may occur with only small increases in development. In countries at the low end of the development scale, a measure like the IHI may be much more meaningful when looking for indicators of sustainability or quality of life. The IHI may discriminate better than the HDI at the lower end of the development scale.



IV The Case of Mother Russia

Experts assessing environmental insecurity in Russia agree that the most important threats are: • the declining quality of drinking water; • radioactive waste/pollution; • air pollution in major cities and industrial centers; • household waste disposal; • toxic waste disposal; and • industrial accidents. The lack of a high-quality freshwater supply tops the national environmental agenda, surpassing such 'hot' issues as the storage and treatment of radioactive waste. Most surface freshwater does not meet existing quality standards: only 15% of the total is thoroughly purified; 28% is untreated. Half of the population drinks water that does not meet sanitary requirements. Poor-quality drinking water directly endangers human health, as high levels of bacteriological pollution result in the spread of infectious diseases, such as hepatitis A. Air pollution also directly affects human health. In 185 cities, where about 40% of the country's total population resides, air pollution levels exceed existing standards. While there was a reduction in air pollution from stationary sources in the 1990s, pollution levels are increasing due to the rapidly growing number of automobiles. The deterioration of human health is directly linked to environmental destabilization, which in turn negatively affects human security. Today, Russia ranks only 51st in the world for the average life expectancy. One alarming symptom of human insecurity is depopulation, which has been increasing since the early 1990s. In recent years, the population has declined annually by nearly one million. A low birth rate characteristic of many developed nations is not the only factor contributing to the population decline. Increased mortality rates are also a major factor in Russia's depopulation; it ranks first among developed countries on the mortality index.

V UNDP composite indicators of poverty

Human Development Index (HDI)	Life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, education enrolment, GDP per capita.
Human Poverty Index HPI – 1 (Developing countries)	People not expected to survive beyond the age of 40 years, illiteracy, access to safe water, and access to health services, underweight children.
Human Poverty Index HPI – 2 (Developed countries)	People not expected to survive beyond the age of 60 years, population below mean income, long term unemployment
Gender related development index	As HDI, adjusted for gender differences

Source: *Human Development Report, 1998.*

VI HDI ranking in selected European countries

Country	1994		1995		1994		1995	
	HDI value	HDI rank	Real GDP per capita (PPS\$)	Real GDP per capita (PPS\$) rank minus HDI rank	HDI value	HDI rank	Real GDP per capita (PPS\$)	Real GDP per capita (PPS\$) rank minus HDI rank
Canada	0,96	1	21,459	7	0,96	1	21,916	10
Finland	0,937	8	17,417	15	0,942	6	18,547	17
Albania	0,655	102	2,788	4	0,656	105	2,853	3
Bulgaria	0,78	69	4,533	9	0,789	67	4,604	8
FYR Macedonia	0,748	80	3,965	5	0,749	80	4,058	3
Moldova	0,612	110	1,576	28	0,61	113	1,547	23
Romania	0,748	79	4,073	3	0,767	74	4,431	4
Slovenia	0,886	35	10,404	3	0,887	37	10,594	1

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 1997–1998.

VII Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

MDGs were set by world leaders in 2000 at the Millennium Summit, when UN reaffirmed its commitment to work toward a world in which sustaining development and eliminating poverty would have highest priority. The Millennium Declaration committed 189 governments to work towards poverty eradication. The MDGs represent the commitment of governments from around the world to create an enabling environment for poverty reduction. At international level the Millennium Development Goals provide global targets against which governments and aid donors can measure the progress towards the ultimate goal of poverty eradication. All 8 MDGs comprise health related targets.

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger – Target 1: reduce the proportion of people living on less than US\$ 1 a day to half the 1990 level by 2015. **Target 2:** reduce the proportion of people who suffer from hunger by half the 1990 level by 2015.

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education – Target 3: ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women – Target 4: eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015.

Goal 4: Reduce child mortality – **Target 5:** reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate.

Goal 5: Improve maternal health – **Target 6:** reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases – **Target 7:** have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS. **Target 8:** have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.

Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability – **Target 9:** integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the losses of environmental resources.

Goal 8. Build a global partnership for development: to help poor countries eradicate poverty, hunger, and premature death will require a new global partnership for development based on stronger policies and good governance.


VIII World Bank strategy

The World Development Report 2000/2001 proposes a strategy in three directions

- Promoting opportunity. Lack of material opportunities such as jobs, credits, roads, electricity, markets, schools, sanitation, drinking water, and health services are direct causes of poverty. Overall General economic growth is crucial for generating opportunity, so is its quality. Market reforms may be of essential importance, but reforms need to reflect local institutional and structural conditions. Enhancing equity is a prerequisite for reducing poverty.
- Facilitating empowerment. Public actions responsible for the needs of poor people depend on interaction of political, social and other institutional processes. Access to market opportunities and to public sector services is often strongly influenced by state and social institutions, which must be accountable to poor people.
- Enhancing security. Reducing vulnerability to economic shocks, natural disasters, ill-health, disability, and personal violence is an intrinsic part of enhancing well-being and encourages investment in human capital and in higher-risk, higher-return activities.

Any comprehensive strategy to reduce poverty has to be based on a comprehensive analysis that identifies the nature and evolution of poverty, the profile of those in poverty and all the contributing factors. A realistic prioritization of the goals has to consider complementary and compatible policy tools. Since they are the main beneficiaries of these activities participation of the affected population is essential.

VIV Management function and Vulnerability



	Referent Object	Key Values	Nature of Threats	Agents of Insecurity
Kofi Annan	Individual	“Economic, development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law”	Internal violence, nuclear weapons, mass destruction, repression, “gross abuses of human rights, the large-scale displacement of civilian populations, international terrorism, the AIDS pandemic, drug and arms trafficking and environmental disasters”	States, individual, nature, environment

SAMIR BANOOB

PROFESSOR, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, USA

THE HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION

Historically, the philosophy and concerns about human rights (HR) are associated with the development of mankind and civilisation. Almost all religions and believes adopted certain rights for individuals and equality among people, even at times of slavery and invasive wars. The recent history records declarations and laws to protect man from humiliation, suffering or discrimination. This usually followed major incidents of atrocities and massive violations of basic rights and struggles for justice.

The model of “Magna Carta”, the Great Charter, is an Example of how rulers formalized certain established concepts of equality and justice upon demand. In 1215, King John of England was forced to sign this charter that emphasized rights, including the right of free citizens to own and inherit property, freedom from excessive taxation, equality before the law and freedom of the church from governmental interference. This was reached as a concession by the king to limit his power and correct arbitrary behaviours as demanded by the barons.(1) The 18th century witnessed two major revolutions, the independence of the United States in 1776 and the French revolution in 1789. Both revolutions were associated with major declarations of human rights. In addition, philosophers in Europe such as Thomas Paine, John Mill and hennery David paved the way for HR international advocates like Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King to develop their philosophy of non violent resistance to aggressive governments(2)

Perhaps the most comprehensive and global human rights standards were founded by “*The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*” adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, as the corner stone for its foundation at that time. These clear rights were adopted after long sufferings by communities and nations during World War II including violence, killing, torture, destruction and massacres such as the Holocaust, atomic bombing and other war horrors. The declaration is composed of 30 articles, describing rights that appear to be basic, fundamental and most logical. Yet preserving these rights is still the dream

of humanity and human rights' advocates. Its justification was described in the preamble of the declaration by stating "*Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,*"

While the first article of the declaration emphasizes that human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights who should act towards each other in a spirit of brotherhood, the second article specifies equality without distinction of any kind such as "*race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.*" Perhaps the simplest yet most frequently violated right is the one described in article 3 "*Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person*" Article 8, acknowledging that violations happen, states "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted to him by the constitution or law". Article 25, most applicable during peace or complex emergencies and disasters, presents the right for "a standard of living adequate for health and wellbeing for himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care". The declaration continues to describe other basic rights including:

- Justice, impartial trials and equal protection of the law
- Privacy, freedom of movement including leaving the country, asylum or changing nationality.
- Marriage and family formation.
- Freedom of religion, thought, opinion and expression, and peaceful assembly
- Taking part in government in person or through elected representatives.
- Equal access to public service.
- Owning property, social security, fundamental education
- Special care of motherhood and childhood and equal child protection.
- Work, rest, leisure, equal pay and protection against unemployment.

The declaration at the end emphasized the duties of everyone to the community, and the use of rights with limitations determined by the law in respect for the rights and freedom for others.

This declaration, as great as it appears, remains without teeth in most situations. The General assembly proclaimed it as "A common standard

of achievement for all peoples and all nations” assuming that its recognition and enforcement is the duty of the state. (3) At the same time, most constitutions and laws emphasize these rights or comparable rights yet its violations are so frequent, especially when committed at a large scale by the state authorities or during conflicts and complex emergencies, i.e.

“Situations affecting large civilian populations including wars or civil strife, food shortages and population displacement resulting in significant excess morality” (4)

These situations mostly result from armed conflicts or natural disasters.

Because of the severity of violations of human rights during wars and political conflicts, and the generality of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations introduced and adopted a series of other laws, covenants and treaties, especially the International Humanitarian Law, 1949 Geneva Convention and the two additional Protocols of 1977 that determine special human rights during times of wars and armed conflicts. This includes prisoners of war, banning the use of certain weapons and minimizing the impact on non-combatants and civilians.

It is then clear that human rights are not limited to security and protection from violence, or it is freedom of speech and movement, but it extends beyond that to ensure healthy and welfare living including work, leisure, education, healthy standard of living, special care for mothers and children and other aspects of happy enjoyable life.

HOW AND WHY HUMAN RIGHTS ARE MORE VIOLATED

Other than natural disasters, human rights are violated intentionally or collaterally in a variety of ways. The most frequent factors are those that lead to violence within countries imposed by the governing or occupying authority, armed conflicts between groups of citizens, or wars between neighbouring countries. A new type of violence and armed conflicts appeared recently which involves attacks or intervention by major powers that assume the responsibility of enforcing the international law, with or without authorization, protecting human rights or defending its own security by pre-emptive strikes. The current and future situations may be more compounded by the emergence of international movements of groups of extremists and terrorists that has no country to defend or to be attacked, and no government to negotiate with. Escalation of such conflicts, paralleled with the recent violations of the treaty for non-proliferation of nu-

clear arms is most alarming. The globe may be now placed at an edge of real destruction and catastrophe, unless the global community unites to face this grave danger. Perhaps a good description of this situation is the statement by Alfred Einstein “*I know, not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones*”. (5)

The 20 TH Century is known to be the savviest century in human history with two major world wars that killed 32 millions then 62 millions respectively, involving grave humiliation of communities and destruction of national infrastructures around the world. It was estimated that more than 191 millions were killed in the top 25 wars that took place during this century. The global community then, and before its recovery from WW II, was driven into a growing cold war that lead to many regional and national armed conflicts. Later, the rising hope for universal peace after the end of the cold war in the early 1990’s is proved to be a wishful dream. The number of significant military conflicts reached 22 to 54 incidents of armed conflicts per year during the period 1989-2003, and the pattern seems to continue or to escalate (6), (7)

The nature and patterns of these armed conflicts changed progressively in the recent decades to be:

- More within countries or across the borders than among countries.
- The majority of such conflicts occur in less developing countries, i.e. the most needy with poor populations already exposed to multiple risks.
- The majority of casualties, about 80-90%, are among civilians, contrary to the past trend of 60%. For example, during WWII, civilian casualties were 37 millions out of total 62 casualties.(7)
- Dramatic destruction of national infrastructure and civilian properties
- More massive displacement of populations, whether internally displaced in the country (IDP) or as refugees in foreign countries.
- Long durations or recurrent flare – up of episodes of conflicts without arriving at terminal solutions, even including defeat or surrender of one party.
- On the positive side, there is more involvement by the international community in peace keeping and humanitarian assistance. Yet this usually arrives when it is probably too late or less effective.

These new patterns of armed conflicts are more seriously affecting human beings by causing more violations of their basic rights.

MAJOR IMPACTS OF VIOLATIONS

A. Health Impacts

Health status of individuals, families and communities suffer the gravest impacts of wars and armed conflicts, knowing that “*Health is the state of physical, mental and social well being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity*”. (World Health Organization Charter, 1948). People affected suffer from the 5 D’s: Death, Disability, Disease, Discomfort and Distress. These sufferings occur either, as direct consequences during the emergencies, or indirect impacts after conflicts due to multiple factors associated with mass dislocation, poverty, food shortage, unsafe environment, violence in shelters and camps, and failure of the debilitated local health systems or facilities to treat infectious diseases especially children, and existing chronic diseases especially in the elderly population. The accuracy of mortality statistics is usually questionable due to poor information systems, under reporting and sometimes over reporting, depending on the reliability and possible bias of the reporting party. The most difficult estimates are those related to the indirect causes of death after the conflicts although in the last ten years, some improved methods for measuring these deaths has greatly improved. Table 1 presents a sample of estimates that appear to have credibility. However, any debate about its accuracy will not change the conclusion.

Table 1: Estimates of Deaths in Select Armed Conflicts

Conflict/ war	No. of deaths
Major 25 major wars, 20 th century	191 millions
World War I	37 millions
World War II	62 millions
Democratic Republic of Congo	3.3 millions
West Darfur, Sudan	1 million
Rwanda	800,000
Mozambique, 1986-87	100,000
Yugoslav wars 1991-2002	200,000
Iraq– Iran 1980-1988	500,000
Iraq – Collision forces, 2003-2006	200,000*
Lebanon, 2006	15,000*

Source: World Health Organization, *World Health Report on Violence and Health, 2000* (8)

*Latest figures on Iraq and Lebanon were published recently in the media. A recent estimate in Iraq is 650,000

The morbidity and disability impacts of wars are summarized in Table 2. Massive dislocation of people as internally displace persons within the country or as refugees in neighbouring countries creates more mortalities, morbidities and disabilities due to:

- Unsafe evacuation or difficult transportation
- Adverse housing and poor shelters' conditions
- Unsanitary water supply, food and sanitation
- Food shortage, hunger and famines
- Increased crimes and assaults including torture and rape
- Poverty, unemployment and loss of property
- Mental disorders, including suicidal behaviours, depression and or anxiety and post traumatic stress disorders
- Failure of the local health systems to provide adequate care due to disabled or destructed facilities, shortage of equipment, pharmaceuticals, vaccines and supplies, and shortage of health providers due to deaths, injuries or transfer to military operations

Table 2: Indirect Major Impacts on Health (Post conflicts)

Mortality	Disability	Morbidity
Main Causes		
- Infectious diseases	- Neglected war injuries	- Complications of chronic diseases
- Chronic diseases	- Violence/injuries	- Complications
- Chronic diseases	- Vector born dis. of war injuries	- Water born dis.
- Violence / injuries	- Food born dis.	- Malnutrition/Starvation
- HIV/ AIDS (rape)	- Reproductive disorders	- Mental health problems

In most situations, internally displaced persons and refugees suffer from these post conflict effects for prolonged periods. Human displacement can continue for years and sometimes for ever. The estimated number of refugees alone was about 6 millions in 1980 that reached about 12 millions in 2003 including 3 millions Palestinians, 2.5 millions Afghans, 2.0 million Iraqis and between 300,000–600,000 from Burma, Congo, Liberia, Burundi and Angola. The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the number of *Population of Concern to the Commission* at the end of 2005 to be about 20.5 millions. These represent only those individuals under the U.N sponsorship (9)

	No. in millions
Refugees	8.4
Internally displaced Persons (IDP)	6.6
Returned refugees	1.2
Returned IDP	0.5
Asylum seekers	0.8
Stateless persons	2.0
Others	1.0
Total	20.5

B. Economic Impacts

Wars and armed conflicts deplete national resources, where major resources are shifted from human development to military expenditures and war operations, leading to more violations of basic human rights. This is particularly true for developing and less developing countries that are suffering from poverty and scarce resources, poor health conditions, inadequate health services, higher population increase, and above all, major involvement in armed conflicts that lead to higher military spending. The world military expenditure increased by 23% during the period 1995-2004, and by an annual increase of 6% in the last four years. Countries in North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East had the biggest share of this increase. (Table 3) To illustrate how military expenditure affects spending on human services such as health, Table 4 compares these expenditures and some health indicators in select industrial countries with countries of the west Balkan region. While industrial countries are spending between 8-16% of their GNP on health, most of these countries spend 1-3% of the GNP on armaments and defence. Similarly, during 2003, military spending in North Korea was 33.9%, Mali 15%, Saudi Arabia 13% and Ethiopia 12% of their GNP. Some of these countries spend less than 2% of their GNP on health.

Global military expenditure reached US \$1,083 billions in 2005 as compared to US \$ 950 billions in 2003. As a global target for world development, the United Nations developed eight Millennium Development Goals that establish the basis for national and international plans. The first goal calls for eliminating severe poverty and hunger, and the price tag to halve this poverty by the year 2015 is \$ 19 billions. This is 1.7% of global military spending in 2005. It was also estimated that “less than 19 days of global military expenditure is all it would take to meet the additional

cost of providing access to food, clean water and safe sewers, basic health care, reproductive health care for women and basic education for everyone around the world. (14,15)

Table 3: World and Regional Military Expenditures Increase, 1995–2004

REGION	% INCREASE	REGION	% INCREASE
Central Asia	+ 73	North America	+ 34
Africa, North	+ 65	Central/ East Europe	+ 22
Middle East	+ 40	West Europe	+ 4
Sub Saharan Africa	+ 29	The World	+ 23

Source: Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI) (10).

Table 4: Basic health indicators, health and military spending

Country	GNP (\$)/ Capita*1	Health as % of GNP*2	Health % private*3	Military as % of GDP	> 5 mortality/ 1000	Life ex.p. AR birth	
						Male	Female
Industrial:							
– Switzerland	34,621	11.2	42	1	5	78	83
– France	22,753	9.7	23	2.56	5	76	84
– Germany	21,764	10.4	21	1.38	5	76	82
– Japan	33,520	8	22	1	5	78	85
– USA	36,562	15.4	55	3.2	9	71	76
Balkans:							
– Albania	1,349	6.1	61	1.49	21	69	75
– B&H	1,300	9.2	50	4.5	17	69	75
– Bulgaria	1,834	7.4	47	NA	15	69	75
– Croatia	587	7.3	19	2.39	7	71	78
– Macedonia	1,755	6.8	15	6	12	69	75
– Serbia & Montenegro	1,184	8.1	27	4.8	14	70	75
– Slovenia	10,400	5.9	19	1.7	5	70	78
– Greece	11,477	9.5	47	4.9	6	76	81

Sources: (11), (12), (13).

Notes: *1-GNP / capita in US \$, estimates of 2003 (11)

*2-Total Health expenditures, public and private including out-of-pocket

*3-Percentage of the private share of health spending (non-governmental)

Data for Health expenditures are for 2002, for child mortality and life expectancy are for 2003 (12)

Data on defence spending as related to the Gross Domestic product (GDP), estimates for 2003 – 2004(13)

Table 5 presents the military expenditures of the west Balkan countries that reached more than \$ 3 billions in 2005 as compared to \$2.5 billions in 2003. If reconciliation, acceptance and tolerance of ethnic and

religious differences are achieved leading to a reduction in military spending by 50% in these countries, it is a saving of \$ 1.5 billion every year. This is more than adequate to establish and maintain regional and national projects of reforming health systems, universal health coverage and prevention and control of AIDS/HIV, substance dependence, hypertension, diabetes and cancer – the major killers of populations in these countries. (14, 15)

*Table 5: military expenditures in the Balkan, 2005**

	US\$ million
– Albania	57
– Bosnia & Herzegovina	146
– Bulgaria	706
– Croatia	620
– Macedonia	200
– Serbia & Montenegro	785
– Slovenia	593
TOTAL	3,107

Source: Center for Arms control and non-proliferation (14).

**Figures for Albania and Macedonia are for 2003.*

STRATEGIES FOR PRESERVING HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Peace and Reconciliation:

It is obvious that the radical solution for preserving human rights for life, security and freedom is to positively establish peace and to eliminate or transform the underlying factors for political conflicts. The West Balkan region learned the lesson of human suffering and economic disruptions the hard way. Peace making, naturalization of relations and aggressive public education are vital tools to ensure ethnic and religious tolerance and acceptance. National and regional plans for human rights education and changing attitudes and behaviours should be implemented by the educational institutions, the media and civil societies. It is essential at this stage to conduct research and analysis on the deep roots of attitudes and behaviours of individuals and of ethnic groups that lead to these conflicts. This is scientifically more productive than ignoring it or “putting it behind backs”

Unsolved problems need to be handled bilaterally, collectively or through third parties by mutual agreements or arbitration. Negative impacts of suffering, dislocation and property losses need to be remedied as an effective tool of healing and transforming conflicts into peaceful ac-

ceptance and tolerance. The current situation of declaring independence of new states can be positively used to serve the purpose of reconciliation since most ethnic groups are now geographically separated in their new independent states, and their relation with each other is mutually determined on the basis of equality, partnership, and membership in the Global and the European communities. Conflict resolution should always be a ready tool to peacefully handle any future disputes. This can happen through the normal diplomatic ties, civil societies, professional associations, or a third international party as the last resort.

B. Developmental Reconciliation:

This is a proven tool of reconciliation and tolerance as it was implemented after WWII. The result is obvious, where recovery from the sad memories of the war was mainly achieved by engaging all parties into economic development agreements and projects that continued to develop until it established the European Union and beyond. Similarly, the relations between the US and Japan, Russia and South Korea are established on strong economic basis after intensive political conflicts.

The global community, especially the EC, US, Japan and the UN agencies should lead this effort by maximizing the planning and implementation of regional projects in multiple counties. These projects should receive a higher priority in funding over individual country projects. International donors should adopt this approach and resist isolation or individualistic attitudes that push towards country-by-country project although this is usually preferred by traditional administrators since individual country projects can be planned and controlled more simply and effectively.

As a model from the health field, almost all the Balkan nations need to cooperate in the field of health development collectively since their health needs are similar, and where cooperation and coordination, or even integration of certain regional health projects is needed. This is most effective for groups of countries for the scale of economy, and since sharing of experiences provides significant gains by learning from success and mistakes.

The following are examples of priority regional health projects to be considered.

These are projects that almost every country in the region is trying to develop on its own while facing challenges of limited national and donor funding:

- Reforming health systems to create successful models of public-private partnership, alternatives of health financing and universal health insurance.
- Strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of health services through health management training and preparation of trained leaders and managers of health programs and institutions.
- Reforming medical education and training of family practitioners that can respond to the community future needs.
- Conducting joint research on major priority problems in health systems and medical care.
- Strengthening long term care to cope with the rising volume of elderly populations in the region that promotes better functional and healthy life and reduces institutionalization.
- Sharing of costly health resources that may be difficult to afford by one country such as advanced medical referral centers for sub specialties or reference laboratories and research centers (15).

C. Human Rights Advocacy and Observation:

Observation and monitoring of adherence to human rights declarations and regulations is the key factor for its protection. Similarly, observation and adherence to international treaties and agreements is an essential tool for primary prevention of any future violence or political conflicts. Industrial communities are advanced in this respect, where the guardians for human rights are strong civil society advocates, professional associations and specialized human rights organizations. The newly independent Balkan states can learn these lessons through study of these human rights movements and activities as well as forming regional human rights organizations in the Balkans, and joining forces with international groups especially at this time of globalization and free global information.

This activity is new for the region, where advocacy to human rights was often considered, as in many countries to date, an antagonism to authorities. Many corrective decisions are made in the Western world as compromise in the face of strong demand and informed public opinions created by HR advocates. Authorities and elected representatives may be affected by interest groups and their strong financial lobbying power. Therefore civil society advocates and volunteers, supported by the media, can be a strong effective tool that can shape public opinions. These individuals, grouped in organizations, focus on the humanitarian issues and not political, ideological or religious activism. Professional associations are also good environments for forming such HR movements since

they can act regardless of ideology and partisanship. Also groups who are not interested in political parties or partisanship and are disinterested in the political games, or religious individuals who are not fanatics are good candidates for HR advocacy.

International networking with such groups is also a positive aspect of globalization that can protect developing and middle income countries from unjust applications of the World Trade Treaty.

CONCLUSION

- Human suffering as a result of complex emergencies, whether natural or man made, creates severe violations of the established human rights.
- Human rights can only be enjoyed and fulfilled in an atmosphere and environment of PEACE, DEMOCRACY AND PROSPERITY. It is then the duty of governments and the global community to promote such environment, and to enforce the observance and adherence to fundamental human rights
- Violations of human rights by individuals, groups of individuals, or national or foreign authorities should be legally investigated, violators prosecuted and negative impacts remedied.
- Peace, reconciliation, and conflict resolution are the effective tools for establishing the strong basis for HR.
- Strategies for preserving HR in the Balkan region should involve:
 - Reconciliation, tolerance, and acceptance through HR education and behavioural changes.
 - Developmental reconciliation by engaging the region into joint developmental programs and projects.
 - Strengthening advocacy for HR and building national and regional capacity through networking with global movements of civil societies to monitor violations and ensure the protection of HR.

In 2005, in a report entitled “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and human Rights for All”, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Anan, urging governments to act, and civil societies to actively participate, states: (16)

“We have it in our power to pass on to our children a brighter inheritance than that bequeathed to any previous generation. We can halve global poverty and halt the spread of major known diseases in the next 10

years. We can reduce the prevalence of violent conflict and terrorism. We can increase respect for human dignity in every land. And we can forge a set of updated international institutions to help humanity achieve these noble goals. If we act boldly—and if we act together—we can make people everywhere more secure, more prosperous and better able to enjoy their fundamental human rights”

REFERENCES

- (1) Magna Carta, www.bl.uk/treasures/magnacarta/basic.html.
 - (2) Human Rights Web, “Short History on Human rights” <http://www.hrweb.org/html>.
 - (3) United Nations, “Fifteenth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948-1998”, <http://www.un.org/overview/rights.html>.
- Toole M., Waldman R., Zwi A.; “Complex Emergencies”, International Public Health: Diseases, Programs, systems and Policies, Pub. Jones & Bartlett 2nd Edition, Boston, MA 2006, 446-451.
- Human Rights Web, Introduction to Human Rights Movement, <http://www.hrweb.org/info.html>.
- Wallenstein P. Sollenberg M; “Armed Conflict 1989-1999, Journal of Peace Research, 36(5), 1999, 593-606.
- Toole M., Waldman R., Zwi A., “Complex emergencies”, International Public Health: Diseases, Programs, Systems and Policies, Pub. Jones & Bartlett, 2nd Edition, Boston MA 2006, 455-461.
- World Health Organization, “Collective Violence”, World Report on Violence and Health, WHO, Geneva 2000, 215-239.
- UN High Commission for Refugees, “Refugees statistics” <http://www.unhcr.org>.
- (10) Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute, “World and Regional Military Expenditure” SIPRI Year Book 2005 Stockholm 2005, tables A, BA1&BA3.
 - (11) Countries of the World, “Gross National Product Per capita, www.student-softheworld.info.
 - (12) CIA World Book, “Military Expenditures” nationmaster.com.
 - (13) World Health Organization, Office of Europe, “Basic Health Indicators in the European Regional Office” World Health Report, Copenhagen, 2005.
 - (14) Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, “Military Expenditures” <http://www.armscontrolcenter.org>.
 - (15) Banoob S., “The Role of Health Development in Improving Welfare and Reconciliation of Communities”, Proceedings of the International Symposium on national and Inter-Ethnic Reconciliation and Religious Tolerance in the Western Balkans, Pub: European Center for Peace and Development, Belgrade, 2006.
- Anan, Kofi, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All” Report to the General Assembly, UN, New York 2005.

CHAPTER II

EXPERIENCES OF
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES IN
RECONCILIATION
AND TOLERANCE

PROF. DR CHARLES INGRAO

PROFESSOR, PURDUE UNIVERSITY, INDIANA, USA

DEMOCRACY & DISSOLUTION: THE CASE OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

In October 1998, I had the occasion to meet in Pale with Dr. Ljiljana Karadžić, the formidable wife and political partner of the wartime leader of the Bosnian Serb Republic. Midway through five hours of discussion, she paused for a moment to lament that she and her husband Radovan “had thought that we could go straight from communism to democracy, but we were wrong”. Of course, these expectations were shared by many. The fall of the Soviet Union had been attended by great optimism that, after a century of totalitarianism, war and genocide, the world would finally be safe for democracy. Pundits like Dennis Fukuyama even predicted that the post-Cold War generation had reached the “end of history” insofar as the future would no longer record the contentious competition between authoritarianism and pluralism; instead, “history” would presumably consist of little more than the unremarkable pursuit of knowledge, wealth, and human happiness.

Instead, the “democratization” process was quickly overshadowed by the acrimonious, and sometimes violent dissolution of multiethnic societies throughout the formerly communist eastern half of Europe. Although the dissolution of Yugoslavia has many known causes, one that has been overlooked is a general failure to understand what constitutes “democracy”. In most of the world – and certainly within the newly “democratic” states of Central and Eastern Europe – the word implies the sovereignty of the people, as expressed by free elections and, perhaps, a free press. Indeed, this prescription also enjoys currency among those western and international officials who instinctively regard free, fully democratic elections as a panacea for the newly independent countries of the post-communist world. Alas, such a simple definition has repeatedly paved the way for conflict by establishing the tyranny of the majority, followed by a chain reaction of revolt and secession by ever smaller groups of “threatened” minorities.

This was certainly the fate of Yugoslavia. With good reason Slobodan Milošević interpreted his election to the Serbian presidency as a mandate to reassert the will of the Republic’s majority against the privileged autonomy of

its Albanian, Hungarian and other minorities. The ensuing accretion in Serbian power within the Yugoslav presidency prompted Slovenia and Croatia to loosen or break their ties with the federation. By the beginning of 1991, the impending secession and independence of Croatia inspired considerable apprehension among ethnic Serbs. Many interpreted President Franjo Tuđman's abrasive rhetoric and preemptory reductions in the number of ethnic Serb police and other government officials as a harbinger future oppression, if not outright genocide. At the same time, the governments of Bosnia and Macedonia concluded that the departure of six million Croats and Slovenes would give Serbs an outright majority in what was left of Yugoslavia. Rather than reside in a demographically unbalanced "Serboslavia" they too chose secession and independence. The same process then repeated itself at the regional level, first with the violent secession of Croatia's and Bosnia's Serbs, then with Albanian insurrections against Serbia's and Macedonia's Slavic majorities and, most recently, with the peaceful secession of Montenegro. Despite the fall of Milošević and the establishment of "democracy" in every corner of former Yugoslavia, all but one of its republics and both of its provinces house at least one minority that aspires to secede.

Forestalling this sobering process of democratization and dissolution, whether in former Yugoslavia or elsewhere in an increasingly multiethnic world, demands that "democracy" be fortified with additional attributes besides the simplistic resort to free elections and majority rule. Most of what is missing from this uncomplicated, but wholly inadequate definition derives from western European values that have evolved over time, but which can be traced to the evolution of the modern state and the ethical values of the 18th-century Enlightenment. One important attribute that can be traced all the way back to ancient times and is often cited by statebuilding NGOs and diplomats is the *rule of law*.

Certainly, the Serbia of Slobodan Milošević was not governed by faithful adherence to the rule of law. Nor did ethnic minorities in the other republics have much confidence in its application, particularly when their interests were pitted against those of the majority, "state-forming nationality". But the law must also be applied with *equity* by a government staffed by *professional administrative and judicial officials*, without which there will remain the uncertainty and fear that impelled so many rebellious and secessionist ethnic minorities in former Yugoslavia.

A second key attribute is a *shared national identity* which, to exist, must be based on a common *citizenship* that justifies and protects all citizens equally, regardless of coexisting cultural or sectarian markers. Ideally speaking, this common identity is fostered by a *shared historical narrative*

that celebrates the contribution of all groups, not just that of a single, “state-forming” nation. Notwithstanding the persistent mantra of “brotherhood and unity,” the great majority of Yugoslavs sustained an identity based on ethnic markers and mutually exclusive, proprietary histories that prevented them from coalescing into a single nation with a common purpose. Hence the dismal defeat of the universally respected Ante Marković in Yugoslavia’s national elections, as voters shunned his Reform Party and the Social Democrats to elect the standard bearers of their own ethnic or national group.

A third, requisite value is respect for the *rights of the individual*, to the point that it mandates *toleration and acceptance* of diversity, even though certain groups may be subject to prevailing stereotypes and extra-legal patterns of discrimination or preference. Indeed, in the most stable democracies, the majority accepts as the price of its electoral preeminence the need not merely to passively tolerate, but to actively *accommodate* special pleading by the minorities in its midst, even when it involves the granting of considerations not strictly mandated by law or the principles of equity. Such forbearance by the majority stems from the recognition that a certain degree of interethnic tension and fear will always exist within a diverse society, but that it can be kept below the surface of everyday life by the protection afforded by the rule of law and by the goodwill generated by voluntary accommodation.

Of course, the acceptance and accommodation of diversity also extends to the right to express different, even unpopular views. But even popular beliefs must meet standards of criticism that are informed by a pervasive scepticism and rational thinking. Much of the violence committed in Croatia (1991), Bosnia (1992), and Kosovo (2004) stemmed from the credulity of people who accepted uncritically media myths spun by nationalist “industries of hate.” Moreover, the enthusiasm with which peoples of all nationalities dismembered the Yugoslav Federation suggest a dearth of rational analysis – except perhaps for the Slovenes, who readily recognized that their self-interest lay outside the federation; for all of Yugoslavia’s other nations, which consciously forewent the obvious economic, cultural and political advantages that it offered, the “democratization” process yielded for e a harvest of death, displacement, destruction and the prospects of survival in a failed state.

All of which is not to say that the peoples newly emerging states or the policymakers who run them have learned from the experience of former Yugoslavia – or from other countries that once comprised by the multiethnic Habsburg, Tsarist and Ottoman empires. Certainly the path to democratization in Iraq would suggest otherwise.

YUGO-NOSTALGIA – FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMATIQUE OF WEST BALKANS³¹

I. MISSING DIMENSIONS

Past, present and future challenges and problems that concern “The Western Balkans” – now used to denote the former republics of the SFR of Yugoslavia that have emerged as sovereign states from this country’s break-up – cannot be fully understood unless analyzed within the broader context of world politics and with appropriate recognition of Yugoslavia’s post-World War II role and place in the global arena.

Yet when this complex and controversial problématique is discussed in scholarly literature, the geo-political perspective is seldom given the importance and attention it deserves. The role of exogenous actors and forces is usually denied or ignored among significant factors of this country’s violent disintegration. This dimension is also mostly absent in clichés and standardized explanations used in the mainstream policy discourse, or conveyed to the broad public, especially via the media.

As regards Yugoslavia, the dominant analysis, both in the Western Balkans and internationally, is generally negative and tends to belittle its record and experience. The country is treated as a deviation and a failed state, to be blamed for its own predicament and deserving to be relegated to the dustbin of history.

The above two closely interrelated blind spots in analysis, public perception, and debate, are not accidental. Yugoslavia was meant to be forgotten, while how and why it was eventually consumed by its internal conflicts had to be understood in a given, prescribed manner. A resulting explanation, imposed by the currently dominant unipolar, global power configuration, is a reflection of political preferences, ideological orientation and framework of analysis that the new geo-political reality projects and seeks to impose worldwide, including the European theatre and its

³¹ Elaborated on the basis of the author’s remarks at the Conference “Human Security and Reconciliation” organized by the European Centre for Peace and Development, Belgrade, 27-28 October 2006, these preliminary ruminations are dedicated to “Yugo-nostalgics” anywhere.

specific West Balkan context. The choreography, control and management of analysis, knowledge, facts and information applied in the case of Yugoslavia was an early instance of a significant dimension of unipolarity and globalization, that of systematic configuration of public discourse and shaping of the world public opinion by the global power centres of the North.

A fuller understanding of the situation in this highly exposed and coveted strategic crossroads is called for. A holistic approach to Yugoslavia's vanishing, and to what has taken place since then would be welcomed by many in the Western Balkans. It would also be appreciated internationally, especially in developing countries where Yugoslavia enjoyed respect. Many in these countries felt affinity with Yugoslavia. They remain dissatisfied and skeptical of official truths and prevailing analyses available internationally, which emanate almost exclusively from the northern sources and reflect the official policy line and outlook of key developed countries, focusing selectively on domestic factors, failings and culprits.

The trajectory of Yugoslavia, starting with 1941, needs to be seen and explained from a global perspective. Yugoslavia played a role in North-South and East-West conflicts. It was a socialist country and a developing country. Its saga needs to be analyzed in the context of its quest for development, including its efforts to evolve a specific nationally derived model. It strived to maintain its sovereignty and dignity, and to participate and play a role in management of world affairs. This is an aspiration common to the overwhelming majority of humankind living in developing countries, which are affected by and vitally dependent on the external environment. They have been and continue to be kept at bay, excluded and dominated, some for centuries, by those able and willing, in pursuit of national interests, to project their political, economic, military, financial and cultural power, beyond their own borders and often worldwide.

The story of Yugoslavia's fall with the appropriate emphasis on the role of external factors and forces, including the fomenting of domestic conflicts and the ultimate debacle, is of wider significance. It concerns the nature of the evolving global order, how it is managed and will be managed, and by whom. It is of particular relevance for the countries of the South.

This story is also of significance for the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, efforts at their reconciliation, and their cooperation. Each of them has been served a different, selective and self-serving version of the turn of events, much like in the classic Japanese film *Rashomon*. In spite of differences, the nationalist variants that are dominant today have one thing

in common, that of being hostile to post World War II Yugoslavia, ideologically adverse to what it stood for, dismissive of its achievements and record, and assigning to it the blame for what happened.

The West Balkan peoples have been under the influence and often entrapped by nationalist rhetoric, atavism and mythology, by local patriotism and chauvinism, and by events or characteristics specific to their parochial settings. They have also been exposed to and swayed by the tenets of neo-liberal globalization and promises of a wonderland awaiting them just around the corner through the so-called transition. They generally have inadequate grasp of and cannot assess critically the larger picture and how it relates to the events in their former country and indeed to their own lives today. Incomplete or skewed knowledge makes it easier to channel local political discourse and public opinion in a manner that sustains divisions, tension and mistrust and undermines efforts at rebuilding links and renewing cooperation.

A broader analysis would be beneficial especially to younger generations that have grown up in the post-Yugoslavia period characterized by efforts to erase from collective memory anything positive about this country, whose ghost continues to be seen as politically menacing by the new establishments.³² Brought up the new environment, the young people have little awareness and knowledge of Yugoslavia and of its place in the global system. They are mostly exposed to its negative and one-sided portrayals that ignore or discredit its significance and distort its record, while emphasizing issues that serve nationalist purposes and goals and/or demonstrate the superiority of the new order and state of affairs.

The above-described gaps in analysis, public perception and knowledge should be recognized and gradually filled. These general remarks are an initial attempt to contribute to this objective by drawing attention to

³² In many West Balkan circles, Yugoslavia is treated almost as a dirty word. One who expresses a positive opinion about it is derided as suffering from “Yugo-nostalgia”. Being a “Yugo-nostalgic” implies a traitor in nationalistically charged local settings; or it denotes a left-winger or a “communist”, today considered as a political crime or completely “depassé” by those who promote or have converted to the now-dominant faith and world order. Such an Orwellian method of labeling, which is common in the local political culture, is used to intimidate, discredit politically and put on a defensive those who may have something good to say about Yugoslavia, what it represented and stood for. It is functional for expunging from policy and public discourse anything positive having to do with the Yugoslav socialist past, and preventing consideration of its relevance and applicability in the present situation and for dealing with current and future challenges. Indeed, the many ills that have resulted from wars, sanctions, break-up of the country, forced structural adjustments and radical transition therapies are often attributed to Yugoslavia as being the cause.

some elements and interrelationships that are seldom given prominence in the currently dominant mainstream explanations. They offer an additional perspective and a different angle on the recent Yugoslav saga, by linking it with the broader, global context. This note is not meant to tell a story or deal with events, places or actors. Rather, it deals with the big picture and tries to contribute to piecing together the puzzle and widening the conceptual and analytical framework used to study, explain and understand this complex, and for many highly emotional and controversial problematique.

II. YUGOSLAVIA'S ROLE RECALLED

It needs to be recalled that Yugoslavia had an important place and role in the post-World War II global order, beyond its real power and economic weight. Its political orientation, policies that it advocated and what it stood for under its then leadership were of more than local significance and had an appeal beyond its borders. It showed that ideas, principles and objectives of universal value matter and can endow even a small country with a degree of moral and political influence, and visibility in the international arena.

Among the elements that accounted for Yugoslavia's relevance and image that it projected were the following:

- The uprising in 1941, followed by the epic National Liberation War (the only militarily significant home-grown resistance during World War II in the occupied Europe) against the superior and dominant Nazi and Fascist aggressors (who, it might be recalled, broke up and carved the country among themselves, some of their local collaborators and also some neighbouring countries, and actively fomented inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts). The National Liberation War, which was accompanied with nation-building and a social revolution, served as a reference to many at the beginning of the age of liberation movements, popular rebellions and armed struggle against colonial powers in the Third World;
- "Brotherhood and unity" and solidarity, as the underlying principles of a multicultural, multiethnic, secular federation founded on the equality of the six constituent republics, which replaced the pre-war monarchy and unitary state, were of interest to the newly emerging countries, many of which also consisted of a patchwork of national and ethnic groups and faced the challenges of statehood and nation-building following their liberation from colonial rule;

- In the post-war period, fundamental socio-economic reforms, a system change, national mobilization and domestic self-reliance in rebuilding and lifting out of underdevelopment a predominantly agricultural country and launching its society and natural resources-based economy onto a path of industrialization, transformation and modernization of the agriculture, and infra-structural development, as well as providing wide strata of the population with secure livelihoods, employment, social services, social benefits and education, all appealed to the countries facing the challenges of independence, nation-building, development and modernization;
- In 1948, and later on, its resistance and standing up to hegemonic designs of one super-power to dominate it, including through threats of a military invasion, to turn it into a marionette and determine its national politics and choices, and more generally its refusal in the period that followed to be drawn into military alliances or bloc politics and become a client-state or satellite of anyone, endowed it with a global standing and respect, planting one of the early seeds of the policy of non-alignment;
- Its playing a major role in inspiring, establishing and making functional the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, both of which embody the shared, collective aspirations of the developing countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, thrust it into an active and prominent position in the world arena. Over the years it came to be perceived as one of the leading proponents of the Third World struggle for: economic and political independence; territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs; influence and role in the multilateral arena; placing the development at the centre of global concerns; changing the inequitable structures and processes of the dominant world order. It also worked for a strong Organization of the United Nations, based on democratic participation/representation of the member-states and multilateralism, serving both as a global ramparts against hegemony, unilateralism and militarism of the powerful, as well as the institutional platform to bolster the influence and power of the small, weak and marginalized majority of its member states in quest for a new international economic and political order and change of the global structural status quo that in more ways than one remained rooted in the age of power politics, colonialism and imperialism;

- A pioneering, home-grown search for an alternative socio-economic model of development, including direct, popular participation and citizens' role in socio-economic decision-making – as a basic human right – through workers' self-management and novel forms of social ownership in economy, differing from traditional forms of private and/or state ownership, as well as decentralization and devolution of state functions to the local level. Some of these efforts attracted more than academic attention.

However, these very traits that accounted for Yugoslavia's relevance and influence during decades were also seen by some as a challenge, including to the global system and structures under their control. These traits were openly disapproved and belittled in the world arena with the changes brought about by the ascendance of neo-liberal globalization, dominance by the political right, and the major geo-political shifts at the end of the Cold War, including the collapse of the Eastern bloc and of its challenge to the world system, all accompanied and underpinned by a new, politically and ideologically correct, global "party line", propagated in public discourse, and diffused via media, learning and educational systems.³³ Locally, in West Balkans, the newly emerging political forces had little sympathy for the orientation of their ex-country, and in their desire to be fully in tune with the new outlook, did their best to distance the new states issued out of Yugoslavia from those aspects that made their former country of relevance in the global context, and to refashion collective thinking and memory.

III. YUGOSLAVIA AS A MICROCOSM

Yugoslavia was a developing country. It represented a microcosm, a global crossroads of sorts, where, in a relatively small geographic space, a broad range of problems, challenges and conflicts that concern the contemporary world, and figure centrally on the global UN agenda, were manifested and converged.

It straddled the interface between the East and the West, between the North and the South, and between development and underdevelopment. It was also a rather unique sector on the European continent where civilisational, religion, language, cultural, and ethnic differences and conflicts

³³ For an analysis of the nature and mechanisms of "global intellectual hegemony", see my article "Global Intellectual Hegemony and the International Development Agenda", in UNESCO's *International Social Science Journal*, No. 166, December 2000, pp. 447-456.

intertwined and coexisted in a challenging historical and geographic environment. Its regions ranged from those that were relatively highly developed to those that were underdeveloped and where patriarchal lifestyles still prevailed, with North-South divides within the country often superimposed and coinciding with other divisions.

Thus what transpired in Yugoslavia and has continued to affect West Balkans in the period since can also be seen as acting out some of the main challenges that are of planetary significance and relevance.

Yugoslavia was not merely another “trouble spot”, an unsuccessful economic and social development model, or indeed a failed “experiment” in nation-building and modernization. It was also a window into the many challenges and fractures that affect the contemporary world, in particular the pursuit of geopolitics of dominance and expansion, the troubled relations between the North and the South, the so-called “clash of civilisations”, as well as the tensions between market economy and society, and controversies regarding the role of the state and global governance.

Its crisis, and how it was dealt with, was a prelude to and a testing range for happenings elsewhere soon thereafter under the aegis of the new unipolar world order and rising unilateralism and hegemony of power. It foretold the possibility of conflicts and processes involving similar problems and controversies that led to spiraling violence and took this country apart occurring not only in vulnerable countries and regions but also at the global level.

What happens in developing countries is subject to influence and interference (uninvited or invited) by outside forces and powers, from near and from afar, today even more than in the past. With the globe as a playing field, most of the time such intrusion is not inspired by the best interest of those who live in a given geographic location. Nor is it guided by some higher values and public good motives that are of interest to the world community or are embodied in the UN Charter and other instruments of international public law, noble-sounding and skillfully packaged public declarations to this effect notwithstanding. Rather, selfish interests and the global objectives of the dominant powers inspire such interference. It has become systematic and pervasive, and affects all spheres of governance and of political, economic, social and cultural life of those many countries that are exposed and at the receiving end.

In a world of unipolarity this exposure to dominant powers has greatly intensified. It is bolstered by concepts, usually first articulated by North think-tanks and intellectuals backing up their countries’ global strategies and ambitions. Such concepts as “end of sovereignty”, “preventive war”, or

the “duty to intervene” are then anointed with legitimacy, often with the help of international commissions and through the United Nations, and are used selectively, especially against the weaker indocile states, that have no one to turn to for support in what is by definition a highly lopsided match.

Indeed, the dominant powers, relying on their global reach that extends into all spheres of life and existence, now claim for themselves the right to defend and protect their interests against threats anywhere – real, imaginary, fabricated or provoked – by unilateral use of force, and by any means, including military, retaliation, sanctions and all types of pressures. The room for maneuver and policy choice of developing countries in both domestic and foreign affairs has therefore shrunk markedly. Furthermore, the neo-liberal globalization process, in combination with a missionary drive by all means available, including military force, to spread “democratization” worldwide, both with a “one-size-fits-all” prescriptions and their mechanistic, often forced, dogmatic transplantation, has multiplied and diversified points of pressure and direct interference in developing countries and contributed to their vulnerability and growing dependence.

Yugoslavia, in a sense, served as a “guinea pig”, or a laboratory, where initial application and testing of given strategies and policies took place. These were not effectively contested and the world public opinion got used or resigned to them as a fact of life in a unipolar world, including a dismantling and disappearance of what used to be an important country, combined with “regime” and system change. A precedent was created and the door was opened for their application elsewhere, including by targeting countries for destabilization and fragmentation.

IV. YUGOSLAVIA UNWANTED

SFR Yugoslavia, what it symbolized and its actions were not necessarily to the liking of the Western powers, and the country was considered as irksome, in particular by their conservative establishment. After all, it was openly challenging the dominant system, power structure and underlying paradigms. Its influence among developing countries was not necessarily appreciated. However, though the country was seen as being in the “opposite” or “enemy” camp and was de facto exposed to continuing pressures, at the same time it was tolerated and given support, being that it was considered of strategic value in the broader context of the Cold War and the global confrontation between the two superpowers and their respective camps.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union on the horizon, it was no longer necessary to sympathize with or support, or indeed tolerate Yugoslavia in its socialist variant. As the marked political shift to the right in key developed countries and the ascendant neo-liberal globalization restored some of the premises of the earlier historical epochs – premises that had been challenged in the post-World War II period, including by the East bloc and by the rise of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism and the struggle of the newly independent nations of the South for autochthonous development, for sovereignty over their natural resources, and for political and economic independence – the so-called “Yugoslav road”, up to then praised in contrast with the rigid system and restrictions on individual freedoms prevailing in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, could now be dismissed and the country openly challenged, as part of overall Cold War victory and regional settling of accounts.

Thus, three important external elements of Yugoslavia’s stability were no more. First, the collapsing USSR removed a critical geo-political prop on which the country had relied. Secondly, the implosion of the centrally-planned socio-economic model in the Eastern bloc and the worldwide spread of neo-liberal globalization, also pulled the rug from under Yugoslavia’s efforts to evolve ways that would combine and reconcile the market with the social and political objectives that it espoused as a socialist country. Thirdly, the West was no longer interested strategically in the country and in providing it with support.

By then, Yugoslavia was neck-deep in its internal development cum governance crisis, which began to spiral out of control with the onset of the 1980s. The notion and concept of Yugoslavia, embodied in the SFR Yugoslavia, was deprived of meaningful external support and allies that could have helped the country to weather this critical stage, when it was experiencing multiple internal crises. Pressures mounted from strong, well-organized centrifugal forces, acting both from within and without, often in a tacit or even open alliance with one another with the common objective of deconstructing Yugoslavia, denying the value of its basic principles and its viability as a state.

The smouldering nationalisms were stoked and erupted with vengeance once admitted into the public arena. Nationalist agendas, including irredentist claims, emerged as the main mobilizing force, sidelining other political groupings and effectively neutralizing those citizens that continued to endorse values and goals that inspired the National Liberation War and were embodied in the constitutive documents and programmes adopted in 1943 on which post-World War II Yugoslavia rested. The use of media and

TV for expression of nationalist and religious invective and intolerance, and the nascent multiparty system and elections decentralized to the level of republics, could not but add to tensions in a traditionally volatile political environment, having little experience with tolerant democratic discourse.³⁴

The events that engulfed Yugoslavia were also a counter-revolution, restoration of the capitalist-bourgeois social order and regime change, and turning back the historical clock. In a manner, they were a delayed episode of World War II and the rewrite of its conclusion in the Balkans, with the Western Allies now supporting the agenda of the political successors of those who belonged to the Axis camp, while turning against their National Liberation War allies and their legacy embodied in SFR Yugoslavia. This was in part a reflection of the shift to the right embodied in global geopolitical changes. It was also a reflection of the traditional political and ideological affinity of the West for the domestic forces that were allied with the Axis on the losing side in Yugoslavia in World War II.

The irony is that the erupting nationalisms brought together the otherwise incompatible bedfellows, from both the right and the left, with the latter prioritizing nationalist over their broader political agenda. Thus, there was no organized, effective countrywide resistance of progressive social forces to nationalisms and disintegration of Yugoslavia. Those on the left, who did not jump on the nationalist bandwagons in their respective republics, were fragmented, without effective organization, theoretically disarmed and politically disunited, and prostrate vis-à-vis resurgent reactionary, often extremist chauvinist nationalisms, now allied with the rising tide of global capitalism and the instant prosperity for all that it was supposed to bring. As a result and vis-à-vis combined nationalism, globalization and transition tide, to the present day, the left has no effective voice or presence on the post-Yugoslav scene.

One is thus led to observe that it is the progressive political orientation that provided the foundations and a vision needed to maintain Yugoslavia. The global shift to the right, and its multiple consequences thus undermined both the external and the domestic pillars of country's stability.

³⁴ The intellectual and spiritual responsibility for the right wing nationalist populism that swept these lands, and was mostly articulated by politicians, was never properly determined or dealt with. It involved religious institutions and distinguished personalities from public life and intelligentsia, often writers, poets, academicians, who all excelled in generating incendiary concepts and formulations that, in both written or spoken form, could mobilize and inspire the plebs, including those directly involved in perpetrating war crimes. This indirect and insidious, yet the highly influential role of intellectuals and religious institutions persists, is not effectively challenged and is widespread given unlimited public expression.

Indeed, one of the reasons why Yugoslavia managed to thrive in peace and be relatively stable during almost five decades was precisely that it did not have to make a deeply divisive geopolitical choice for its many peoples, namely of jumping into the lap of the Western camp, or into the bear hug of the Soviet bloc, and by its, so to say, belonging to the world by pursuing the non-alignment policy and maintaining a safe distance from the global powers. Today, this choice, which now appears in the form of Christian (“civilized” and “democratic”) West and Orthodox (“pagan” and “authoritarian”) East – now both solidly capitalist – continues as a source of conflict in some of the new states themselves. Yugoslavia also managed to do well thanks to its efforts not to fall into the free market or centrally planned modes of economic and social organization, and by trying to steer a middle course, thus buffering highly divisive ideological conflicts, social strife and the political volatility that these issues and choices generate domestically, as is the case today.

Both of the above underlying, overlapping dilemmas by erupting into the open and becoming a matter of political choice, only added impetus to the nationalist agendas and tensions, which could not be contained or managed by a weak and disoriented central federal authority.

Yugoslavia’s domestic problems and conflicts, failures and oversights, structural dilemmas of the federation and strategic errors made over the decades, including well-intentioned reforms that were taken advantage of and hijacked by the forces of disintegration, and indeed personalities and leaders involved, have been amply described and debated. **However, the domestic factors, while a “necessary” condition, were not by themselves a “sufficient” condition for the demise of the country. The external factors and environment played a critical role as well. The two in combination made up the “necessary and sufficient” conditions that accounted for Yugoslavia’s break-up.** This fundamental fact has been downplayed, or denied, especially by the foreign actors that were directly and deeply involved in the tragedy that befell this country.

The factors of general character related to external environment included: the external-debt crisis and the destabilizing structural adjustments that sapped the country’s economic strength and reflected unfavourably on the standards of living and the predisposition of the common people and gave rise to multiple acute feuds among constituent republics and autonomous provinces over macro-economic policies and how to divide the shrinking pie; as well as geopolitical changes sweeping the planet, including the changing dominant political and economic outlook and balance of power.

The manner in which Yugoslavia's acute difficulties and problems, which extended over a period of years before the final break-up, were approached and dealt with by the international community, namely the key powers, their attitudes, hidden agendas and calculations, were also an important exogenous factor in the crisis.

Most importantly and centrally, however, had the key Western powers assumed a firm position regarding the imperative need to maintain the country's territorial integrity and not encouraged and allowed secession, or taken sides of and favoured some nationalisms against others instead of defending Yugoslavia, the violent break-up of the country could have been avoided, the subsequent wars would not have been taken place, and the pending transition and democratization processes managed more purposefully and made less traumatic.

A positive and constructive approach by the international community and insistence on a gradual resolution of the accumulated problems within Yugoslavia as a single state would have spared the country and many of its peoples the tragedies that befell them because of the break-up and the wars that resulted. And it would have made it possible for the country to resume economic growth and development in a common – possibly modified – framework, including eventually by joining the European Union, which was on the horizon.

But it was probably wishful to think that such a positive approach could have materialized. There was no genuine international effort or interest among key players to help channel domestic problems in the direction of a peaceful resolution within the framework of one country. Rather, the raging conflicts were an opportunity to exercise on the European soil the emerging doctrine of humanitarian interventionism or “ingercence”, which has been also referred to, somewhat less kindly, as “humanitarian imperialism”.

The events in Yugoslavia were the harbinger of the nascent unipolar new world order, of unilateralism and interventionism in projection and exercise of power, of double standards applied by the dominant actors, and of the erosion of some basic principles of the UN Charter. Fateful decisions affecting others were taken by the leaders of the dominant powers, often lightly and based on mistaken, falsified or tendentious analyses, and ignoring or overlooking the consequences, including in human lives.

Openly, or less so, some of the important international players had cast their preference with and given open political, spiritual, material and even military support to some nationalist groups, their agendas, including

plans for secession from the common state, a repeat of sorts of the World War II scenario in these latitudes.

Others did not show their cards, or were content to see the ongoing processes continue, while reiterating in public the need to maintain the integrity of the country. Still others traded away this declared support and agreed to bless its dismemberment in exchange for bilateral economic concessions in the context of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. A mechanistic application of democratic instrumentalities and a legalistic approach to highly conflictive issues in complex environments under the impulse of foreign powers only aggravated the situation.

Under the gloss of positive rhetoric, with a good deal of arm wringing and the convenient excuse of *les jeux sont faits*, the key powers and others were looking forward to the post-conflict period. Regaining control of the fragmented economic and political space in this geo-politically strategic region was a welcome prospect and an unstated objective. Their influence was assured via sponsorship of the emerging, weak mini-states, which were sure to be eager and indeed had no other option but to seek their support and fall into their embrace.

The situation was somewhat reminiscent of the earlier epochs, especially the pre- and World War I times, when the major players engaged in the carving up of countries and willful interventionism, a pattern of behaviour that was more difficult to pursue while the bipolar situation after World War II lasted, and with the UN and its Charter playing an important role.

Yugoslavia's break-up and dismemberment was going to be, as it eventually turned out, an important side benefit of the Cold War victory for the Western powers, including régime and socio-economic system change. Yet, this was achieved at a very high and unnecessary local cost – in human life and personal tragedy of mostly innocent and helpless people, in physical destruction, especially at the very centre of the country where the contending reactionary nationalisms, animated to a significant degree by the three religions and their political allies, intertwined and pressed on with mutually incompatible claims, including territorial ones, in a difficult situation of negative economic growth and development, and all taking place in an overarching context of contending ideological paradigms.

It meant that these powers could move in now as peace-makers, to intercede between the antagonistic groups, and eventually as direct participants in the conflicts and in determining their outcomes. This, incidentally, served a useful purpose not only of testing new weapons and systems, but also to establish a solid foothold in this up-to-then off-limits,

carefully guarded “non-aligned” Third World space in the midst of Europe and to modify the geopolitical map.

It also meant regaining full access to these lands, in a region they considered and treated traditionally until the end of World War II as their own backyard and sphere of influence, and to its many natural and strategic resources. And it meant that after many decades this geographical space would be once more fully open to the economic, political, military, cultural and religious presence and domination by exogenous powers and forces, some with a long and questionable history of previous involvement locally, including through war, territorial conquest and occupation, and with influential segments of their publics still holding revanchist grudges and territorial claims.

Only lip service was paid to the need to maintain Yugoslavia as a single country and no significant player from the North took its side, while the UN General Assembly, representing the collectivity of nations, was quiescent and marginalized. An important UN member country was simply written off, this in itself being a major violation of the UN Charter and international law. Its viability as a state was denied.³⁵ Once disintegration processes and verbal aggressions and physical hostilities between key actors had reached an advanced stage, a legal rationale for a state in dissolution was elaborated by a commission of distinguished legal experts at the request of the European Community, to provide a justification for Yugoslavia’s dismemberment and help make it a fait accompli. Indeed, this

³⁵ Western academics, who have largely dominated the scholarship on Yugoslavia, have produced a good deal of intellectual ammunition as to why Yugoslavia was an artificial (Wilsonian) creation and not a viable state, had no reason to exist and should be broken up, as if to ease the conscience of the political circles for their actions, or absence of action. For decades, these arguments were hardly present in the mainstream academic literature, except among the far-right and Cold Warrior academics. These ideas emerged from the woodwork and were catapulted into the front line by the changing political environment and the ascendance to power of the right of the centre political forces in the North. It is interesting that this argumentation was made consistently by the nationalist immigrant groups, and their religious institutions, which sided with the Axis during World War II. In the post-War period as diaspora in exile, they were nurtured and financed by key Western powers and their secret services, as their ideological and political allies who were awaiting for their promised moment to come. In fact, they were an important *realpolitik* instrument used in the Cold War struggle, where pitting of nationalisms and religions against each other and the break-up and division of Yugoslavia, much as was done by the Axis powers during World War II, was an important strategic option. (Funding by proxy the spread of fundamentalist Islam in 1980s that affected parts of Yugoslavia was part and parcel of a broader strategy of a similar nature.) Thus, the very construct of Yugoslavia that was forged through the resistance and war against the Axis powers was in fact targeted and besieged throughout the post World War II period.

report was de facto the basis for the internationally pronounced death sentence for SFR Yugoslavia that was read out at a Hague Conference in the autumn of 1991, a sentence which, given the nature of the country and the events that had already taken place, could not result in a “velvety”, negotiated divorce, as was done in the case of Czechoslovakia or indeed the USSR.

Symptomatically, nothing was done by the international community to recognize publicly the existence, and even less so to give material, political and moral support to those millions of Yugoslavia’s voiceless citizens who were or felt Yugoslav (many of whom could not or did not wish to be boxed into a single ethnic or religious category), were supportive of the community of South Slav peoples and wanted Yugoslavia to continue and survive, were opposed to nationalist forces and right-wing agendas that these expounded and fratricidal conflicts that were bound to follow, and were for peace and against war most of all. This, possibly one of the largest “national” categories and a binding tissue of the country was deliberately ignored. Its importance was belittled and numbers minimized (as was done by nationalists within the country who fully agreed with one another on this matter). Its political and human rights were denied while, at the same time, democratic entitlements, including the secession rights of different national groups were proclaimed, encouraged and supported.

Siding with nationalist forces of disintegration was not accidental or new. The proven and familiar *divide et impera* strategy, which had wrought tragedy and disarray in this vulnerable part of the world on a number of occasions in the recent, and more distant past, was once more openly at work. Traditional strife, historical grudges and feuds among the locals, and the volatile and confrontational political culture fired up by the democratization process were once again exploited by the major players for advancing their own goals and interests.

The global media, with notable involvement of PR companies, were used and coordinated in support of this strategy, to secure acceptance by the world public opinion of the “story”, based on custom-made analyses and explanations, and to keep the UN membership quiet, especially the NAM which normally espouses the principles of national sovereignty and inviolability of territorial integrity of UN member-states, and non-interference in domestic affairs.³⁶

³⁶ NAM could not adopt a collective stand on this complex matter that gave rise to many dilemmas for its large and diverse membership. In the end, it did not utter a word about the disintegration and sacrifice of one of its founding and important members. This was due inter alia

The task was made much easier thanks to globalization of media control and use and manipulation of information as a weapon, making it possible to diffuse and market a scripted story – which by being the only story becomes the story that wins – including by using analyses, information and even carefully chosen and edited photos and other visual and audio materials generated and orchestrated by the same sources in the North.

It was back to the “Balkans” *de novo*. The “Balkanization” syndrome of global ill-repute – bottled up for decades and wishfully declared to have been overcome once and for all – was unleashed again. It rebounded with vengeance on the wings of “democratization” and multiparty politics. The proven incendiary methods – including moral and physical harassment, killing and violence, all of which were widely publicized – and nationalist demonology, to which an angry, disoriented and increasingly divided and insecure population was exposed, or sucked into willy-nilly, bore their bitter, familiar fruits.

The big players rushed into the policy vacuum and filled the fragmented institutional space resulting from the break-up of SFR Yugoslavia. They were now jockeying for positions of influence and dominance in the framework of peace-keeping and conflict prevention, pursuing those accused of war crimes and meting justice to war criminals, teaching “governance”, “democracy” and “market” in their “mission civilisatrice” in this frontier region, liberalizing, privatizing and reforming local economies according to the Washington consensus blueprint, creating conditions friendly to foreign investment, and consolidating their own positions and influence.

The new independent states born out of Yugoslavia’s break-up found themselves simultaneously in a situation of developing countries (external debt, structural adjustment programmes and weakening of the state), transition economies (major socio-economic changes, political democratization, shock therapies, massive privatization and dismantling of the public sector) and war-torn societies (dislocation of economies, physical and social destruction, ethnic and religious hatred and conflict).

All three conditions implied deep social, economic and political perturbations, rapid and forced changes, and for the overwhelming majority

to the religious dimension of the internal Yugoslav conflict, which caused a division between members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and other developing countries in NAM. Only a few isolated voices, mostly from Africa and countries with multiethnic composition, recognized the deeper implications of the unfolding Yugoslav story and its potential ramifications for countries of the South.

of population a significant drop in living standards that had already been stationary for years. The new states had to internalize, but from a position of weakness and with no questions allowed, the neo-liberal globalization orthodoxy prescribed by the global power centre. They were supplicants to join Europe but found themselves at the very end of the queue, while only a few years earlier Yugoslavia already had an established place and was by far the best prepared of all potential candidate countries to join the Union. And they had to face a modified geo-political order, with an eastwardly expanding Western military alliance coveting their territories, one into whose sphere of influence they were now firmly entangled and whose protection and patronage they had to seek, or simply accept.

Thus, the country and its peoples that once prided themselves of a significant degree of independence in all spheres of life and national and international policy, slipped backwards into a historically familiar, inferior and subservient condition of client-states or satellites ("partners" or "allies" in double speak), indeed protectorates, quite similar to those of many developing countries that had been colonies of the North or continue to be trapped in spheres of influence of developed countries, and of late their global "defense" system. Today, rather similar to the pre-World War II period, they have willy-nilly to accept a direct and indirect, but always overwhelming presence of key Western powers in their national policy space, dependence for development on foreign aid, capital and direct investment, and a NATO military umbrella for defense.

V. TWO DECADES LATER: A BALANCE SHEET NEEDED

Two decades have passed since Yugoslavia began to crack under the mounting tide of local nationalisms, the weight of its internal problems, failings and contradictions, its unsuccessful efforts to cope with an adverse international economic environment, as well as under pressures and hostile and/or friendly interventions by external actors. Today, there is a need for a balance sheet and assessment.

The question also needs to be posed whether the breakup of Yugoslavia was functional and whether better outcomes for all concerned could have been obtained without human, material, social and economic sacrifices and costs that were incurred because of its dissolution.

Indeed, in every area of political, social and economic life, including the highly prized membership in EU, much more could have been achieved through a peaceful process and cooperation, however difficult

and complex this may have been. Inter alia, one would have avoided war, aggression, and great loss of human life, rise of nationalisms and related hate agendas that poison and mortgage the future, a massive destruction and dislocation of society and economy, a two-decades-long interruption of the development process, economic and social crises, and historical and socio-political retrogression brought about by the break-up of Yugoslavia. It would have also preserved an important and influential country, that played a role regionally and on the global scene, and that would have been in a better position and on more equal terms to cope with the challenges of transition and pressures than are today the states that resulted from its disintegration.

One of the original underlying causes of the break-up was the desire to ascertain and secure their full sovereignty by some constituent members of the federation. However, with the new states eventually becoming members of the European Union, for them this in some ways implies reconstitution of the old Yugoslav space in a broader EU framework (which, incidentally, bears some similarity with the premises of the Yugoslav federation). Joining the Union also means that the states issued out of Yugoslavia will have to accept a myriad new requirements, including limits on their national sovereignty, emanating and administered from Brussels.

This will happen, moreover, in a situation where they will find themselves individually at the very tail end of the group of EU member-states in terms of bargaining power, political and economic importance, and influence. Had Yugoslavia survived, its constituent republics, as a collectivity, would have been in a better position to bargain and with an important head start and experience would have been probably the first to join EU among the candidate states.

Was the dismantling of Yugoslavia and the related happenings beneficial and for whom?

In the geo-political sense, the Western powers and their military arm embodied in NATO, which is now being upgraded and retooled for an expanding, global role, are the obvious and major beneficiaries. In addition to helping open up a new chapter in conduct of international relations by providing ideological justification for and legitimizing militarism and use of force, an important, strategic part of Europe's real-estate, the traditional gateway to Asia, where land routes to the Middle East and beyond merge and pass, has come under their influence and control, economically, politically, militarily and culturally. Instead of being a neutral peace-zone free of foreign military presence, West Balkans is becoming part of the front line of the expanding Western military bloc and alliance, with the likeli-

hood, given unlimited access and transit and military bases already on the ground or to be yet erected, of nuclear and other sophisticated weaponry being introduced in the region.

Undoubtedly, advances are in progress or have been made, and have been amply publicized, e.g. beneficial and necessary reforms in given spheres of political life, democratization of political process, governance and management, introduction of certain aspects of Western consumer society, including wider choice of consumer and luxury goods, availability of foreign-bank credits and services, some improvements and modernization in services and infrastructure, and greater simplicity of dealing with problems in newly autonomous smaller state entities, without having to negotiate and argue, as they had to earlier, with other republics or with the Yugoslav federation. However, most of these could and would have been achieved in the framework of Yugoslavia anyway, better and possibly sooner, and without the massive collateral damage to society, social order and economy caused by the war and turmoil, and international sanctions which impacted in a number of profound and negative ways much of the country.

In the symbolic and emotional sphere, the six states and six capitals, with all the trappings that go along with sovereignty, represent for many a supreme achievement and fulfillment of centuries-old dreams that compensates for all the hardships experienced and losses incurred. The local politicians, bureaucrats and administration officials, who were catapulted into governments of the newly sovereign states that gained international recognition, no doubt enjoy and cherish their own new status and importance.

Multiparty system has livened up and diversified the political process and discourse and has enabled many interest groups and political groupings to form their parties and thus identify and advance their political agendas and specific interests.

A limited stratum of population, in particular those involved in business and financial activities, as well as a number of enterprising individuals with the skills, temperament and character (often with few scruples and with rather flexible moral and ethical standards) required in situations of transition, social turmoil, and “free for all” competition, have seen their positions improve markedly, with some acquiring virtually overnight significant material wealth and key societal positions of influence as an emerging “new (capitalist or businessmen) class” of entrepreneurs, managers, and investors that has filled part of the vacuum created by the dismantling of the public sector and weakening of the state.

While the pluses of the balance sheet have been amply publicized, the negative side is not given adequate attention; especially from the per-

spective of the Western Balkans, or ex-Yugoslavia as an integrated region, and from the point of view of the common citizenry, who represent the overwhelming majority of people living there, who have borne the brunt of events and changes and have not participated in sharing tangible benefits generated by the new situation.

Many advances achieved during decades of effort to be self-reliant, develop, modernize and industrialize were judged as failure and pronounced as an inappropriate way to develop, a goal which, it was argued, could be best achieved by becoming “European” and moving into the Western camp. The structural adjustments were done at a very high cost, with important development advances, social progress and acquisitions being reversed or given up, often on spurious or ideological grounds and usually unaware of or ignoring practical lessons from other countries that have applied similar prescriptions.

Trying hard to become a member of the “high society” from a position of weakness and/or ignorance, often an underlying inferiority complex, and eagerness to transform automatically and overnight through an uncritical and quasi-religious embracing of the neo-liberal globalization prescriptions and the often savage transition process of privatization and introduction of radical free market economy, has brought about far-reaching, abrupt social transformations and change. These have affected unfavourably large strata of population, in particular the working classes, those in public administration, educational and health services and in general in the public sector, as well as pensioners; have accentuated social conflict, instability and individual insecurity; and have undermined the strength, diversity and resilience of national economies, intensifying their dependence on outside factors and capital.

It is revealing to draw an illustrative checklist, rather a laundry list of items that could be included on the debit side of the ledger, representing costs and losses and structural retrogression that the Western Balkans and its peoples have experienced as a result of disappearance of Yugoslavia and of the conflicts and wars that ensued, in tandem with the exogenous pressures and demands that the emerging mini-states had to face in the broader context of neo-liberal globalization and transition, which coincided in time with the break-up of the country.³⁷ With one possible

³⁷ Many of the points on this checklist would have occurred anyway even had Yugoslavia’s integrity been preserved, and are a result of neo-liberal globalization and the nature of the transition process in the former centrally-planned economies. However, Yugoslavia, as a single country, would have been in a better position to manage the changes and steer the transition, a task for

exception³⁸, they have had to confront these challenges from positions of weakness, in situations of economic crisis and internal strife and disunity, without alternative views or a clear development project, and with little or no bargaining power. A checklist follows:

- War and destruction, hundreds of thousands killed, wounded, ethnically cleansed, exiled as displaced persons or refugees, coupled with massive property, social and personal losses and countless family and individual tragedies, and a collective shock for most of a sudden disappearance of one's own country;
- Traumatic two-decades-long interruption of development process and the resulting regression of economies, societies and living standards, degradation of infrastructure, with major social transformations, growing unemployment, loss of livelihoods, personal and job insecurity, and in a number of ways a declining quality of life;
- The emergence of new political and economic elites and oligarchies, often with links to organized crime, strongly influencing political parties, governments and economies;
- A forced privatization process, providing opportunities for corruption and enrichment of some and for massive transfer of public goods and public space into domestic and foreign private hands, concentration of economic power and wealth in few individuals and families (the so-called “tycoonization”) and acquisition or grab by them of economic and social goods, including land, which had belonged to and were created by the community³⁹;

which it was much better prepared and positioned than its East European neighbours.

³⁸ The most successful and advanced new state has also been one that has carefully managed the transition process, did not go to IMF and did not follow blindly and automatically the Washington consensus prescriptions. It has also attempted to maintain some continuity with Yugoslavia and did not jettison every bit of its legacy, leading a major international newspaper to note wryly that it “clings to Communist past”. *International Herald Tribune*, 29 March 2007.

³⁹ This alienation of what used to be public goods is an especially sensitive issue for people who used to work in and helped create and build many of these enterprises over the decades, considering them as “their own” for de facto and de jure they belonged to them being in the social sector. To see these fruits of their effort and work suddenly disappear in a puff of smoke and/or wind up in the hands of new private owners, sometimes issued from their own midst, who acquire these enterprises at a minimal cost and often fire-sale prices, is a traumatic experience for these working people and is considered as grand theft and plunder. The feeling of betrayal is further accentuated when they are engaged to work in the same enterprises, with major erosion of social benefits, loss of rights, and seeing that the profits end up with the owners and investors. The realities and rules of the neo-liberal market economy model are difficult to get used to after many years of being themselves involved directly in management and in distribution of such benefits, and the sense of being exploited is rife.

- Immiseration and widespread impoverishment, pronounced in particular among workers and pensioners and those who have lost employment, where bare existence and survival have become the preoccupation; manifestations of urban poverty similar to those in Third World countries, including the appearance of soup kitchens and homeless; revival of classic forms of exploitation of working people by domestic and foreign capital; marked stratification and polarization of society; generalized insecurity, loss of decent livelihood and social dignity; massive job cuts in government, public services, industry and economy; growing unemployment, especially among the young;
- Marginalization of labour and its no longer enjoying an influential and respected position it used to have in society, and generalized rolling-back of social and political advances and achievements, including the sense of egalitarianism and participation, made during the previous decades;
- Takeover of banking and of critical industries by foreign interests, accompanied by disappearance of national productive capacities and capabilities, including in a number of key and strategic economic domains and basic industries, given the vulnerability of local enterprises, many first brought to insolvency, in conditions of newly opened markets;
- Erosion of social security entitlements, weakening of health and educational systems and their privatization, and reduced accessibility for common people of modest means to quality medical and educational services which have to be paid for;
- Weakening or virtual disappearance of autonomous national defence capacity;
- Increase of organized crime, including trafficking in humans and narcotics, and emergence of corruption as a way of life and survival and an inherent aspect of the new political and social order and market economy;
- The ascendance of reactionary fundamentalisms, nationalist hatred and intolerance and the revival, rehabilitation and legitimization of nationalist, fascist and right-wing ideologies and arguments of hate and ethnic supremacy that were defeated in World War II, whose influence is helped by their participation in the political process and access to press and media in general;
- Demographic decline in a situation of economic and social crises and growing social insecurity, in part as a consequence of politi-

- cal-system change that brought about erosion of rights and social entitlements of mother and child, including closing of free facilities for daycare which facilitated working mothers' raising their families;
- Massive emigration of skilled strata of population and brain drain of talented people and of highly-qualified professional cadres, fuelled by the now widespread desire of the young to leave their countries when reaching adulthood and seek opportunities elsewhere, and by the high demand for them in some developed countries, including through organized recruitment of the university graduates;
 - Internal disunity and fragmentation, accentuated by multi-party politics that intensify and sustain nationalist tensions and conflict, corrosive rhetoric, populism and the continued strength of extremist nationalist agendas feeding on a volatile, inexperienced, poorly informed, and often ignorant electorate;
 - Young generations that have been taught religious, national, and ethnic intolerance or hatred in their families and schools, and by peer groups, media, literature, arts and religious institutions, an outlook and basic attitude unlikely to change later in life, thus creating a permanent residual pool for right-wing nationalist forces and for sustaining "Balkanization";
 - Abandoning of the non-aligned status and neutrality and pending incorporation into the defensive/offensive Western military alliance with global aims and objectives, establishment of foreign military and naval bases, the right to unlimited passage and immunity for foreign troops on the soil of new states;
 - The rise to positions of political influence and societal pre-eminence of reactionary religions, which flaunt religious and nationalist symbols knowing fully well that these carry a historical legacy and contribute to nationalist divisions and tensions especially in sensitive areas, their impact on society, and their growing role and influence in state and national affairs, including as bastions of nationalism that continue to encourage subtly or openly chauvinism, divisions, suspicions, differentiation and strife, thus continuously reproducing situations that assure and sustain their roles and political and economic power, detract from processes of conciliation and undermine secularization, both of which are necessary for peace and cooperation in these lands;

- Costly reconfiguring of national economies of new states, no longer able to rely on the larger Yugoslav economic and geographic space, and serious imbalances in different spheres of economy (e.g. energy supply, importation of consumer goods, balance of payments), lack of sufficiently large national markets for domestic products and services, selling off of national capital goods and natural assets, including valuable real estate along the Adriatic Coast (which has become a favoured destination for speculative investment, including laundered funds) at very low, give away prices relative to their real and especially potential value, often to offset the balance of payments deficit and to service growing external debt;
- Multiplication of national borders, which originally were administrative borders of the republics within the same state, has created many practical problems and irrational situations, in addition to attendant costs and difficulties in travel, communication, shared natural resource management, administration, etc;
- Submission of government and administration, and political parties, to instruction and direction by major powers, including through their local representatives, some of whom feel entitled to interfere, including openly and publicly in local affairs, political processes and economic decisions, and appointments to key government posts;
- Growing dependence of economy on foreign direct investment, whose preferences and availability often determine the direction and nature of national development;
- Increasing influence of foreign money and investors in economy, finance, monetary spheres, political posture and orientation and even administrative policy, with them having assumed control of large swathes of strategic sectors of economy, in particular banking and communications, industry, energy and mining, a situation perceived by many locals as one of being (re)colonized;
- Military aggression and unilateral war by NATO against the rump Yugoslavia, as yet another opportunity in the Western Balkans to test advanced weapons systems and strategies, including remote-control military capabilities, dropping several tens of thousands of bombs including depleted uranium ones with long term health and environmental consequences, causing serious social trauma for the population, economic damage to infrastructure and loss of life, in a continuing process of crumbing and dismembering of the

- former Yugoslav space and population, as well as setting a precedent for future actions of the kind, soon after applied in Iraq;
- Selective justice and use of double standards in international tribunals dealing with war crimes, run and stage managed by the Western countries, yet without reference to or recognition of the key roles, responsibility and accountability of these same countries and their leaders in the break-up of the country and in the events that occurred and continue to affect the Western Balkans;
 - In an effort to be identified as “Europeans” and as belonging to the Western camp, deliberate distancing from and severing of links with the South, G77 and NAM (except for one new state with close ties with Islamic developing countries), and the resulting erosion and loss of political capital and economic credibility and access to markets that had been enjoyed by Yugoslavia in the developing countries (including the rising economies of China and India), where its experts, civil engineering, technology transfer and exports were welcomed, established and appreciated;
 - Loss of reputation, prestige and influence that Yugoslavia enjoyed in the world arena, where the successor states’ image is poor, in part because of events, actions and behaviour of the 1990s and also because of their explicit efforts to distance themselves from Yugoslavia’s heritage.⁴⁰ Their roles on the global stage and in the UN are marginal now and they are often seen to fall into the category of “banana republics”, having little or nothing of general interest or value to offer or say and with no political weight. They sport their religious and nationalist symbols, often loaded with dubious historical heritage, aspire to the status that Yugoslavia enjoyed while trying to promote their narrow national objectives and interests, as best as they can, including by attempting to bolster their image as good pupils of the new age and attractiveness to foreign capital and tourists by use of PR companies and through placing ads on global TV and in major international newspapers;

⁴⁰ The distancing from the National Liberation War, probably the most significant and glorious page in the history of peoples of Yugoslavia, and an open attack on its legacy by the resurgent ultra-right World War II nationalist movements is an instance of this. It made it difficult to mark the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II and victory over Nazism and Fascism in the Western Balkans. This anniversary passed mostly as a nonevent, or was openly snubbed, yet Yugoslavia was one of the victors along side with the Allies.

- Ascendance of personal and group interests, disregard for societal standards, spread of individualism, crass materialism and survival of the fittest mentality, the erosion of solidarity and social cohesion, and the loss of ethical values, creeping corruption into all spheres of life and activity, weakening of morality and a widespread impression that everything and everyone is for sale in a market economy, where everything goes and those who know how to cope and have money fare the best, while honest and hard work and education do not pay and are for the naïve and stupid;
- Denial of cultural diversity, pluralism and coexistence in a traditionally multicultural space, which has severely shrunk and has been parceled up in an artificial manner;
- Reemergence of a class society, with its negative, often disastrous impacts on the impoverished, weak and marginal strata that still account for an overwhelming majority of the population, and unlearning of social equality and the return of servility of yesteryear in social relationships.

This enumeration of “minuses” should also refer to the broader, international context.

The destruction of Yugoslavia was not merely a loss of a unique multicultural country, of great and varied natural beauty, and meeting point and a crossroads of civilisations.

It was also loss of a country which had provided a degree of stability in this sensitive region, where so many interests and influences intertwine and collide, reawakened and gave renewed legitimacy to old demons and opened a Pandora’s box creating in West Balkans an area of chronic turbulence and instability, confrontation, including between “civilisations”, massive military presence of foreign powers and *sub rosa* competition between them for influence, issues that remain unresolved and thus continue to threaten peace, and indeed a terrain suitable for conflict between the superpower and the former superpower. This represented a reversal of an important geo-strategic consolidation of a volatile region that was achieved in World War II, and a setback for the conduct and direction of international relations, with major possible repercussions for the future and for regional and world peace.

The fact that post World War II Yugoslavia is no longer present on the global scene, no doubt, is felt in the United Nations, and represents a loss for the Group of 77 and NAM which were deprived of one of their

active and influential members, with a solid diplomatic service that could hold its own at all levels of discourse and negotiations in international affairs.⁴¹

The traits and goals that Yugoslavia used to embody and project in the international arena have been wiped clean off the official and public slate in West Balkans. This is a loss, for this country represented a source of values and experiences that are of relevance in evolving an alternative development model, as well as an international system and cooperation, including South-South cooperation and North-South relations, based on solidarity and genuine partnership, on equality rather than continuing domination, exploitation and conflict that characterizes the existing order.

Such an approach to international cooperation – which was markedly absent in how the Yugoslavia’s crisis was handled – is needed to prevent conflicts and growing fractures rooted in continuing and deepening global inequalities, inequities and divisions, accentuated by neo-liberal globalization, preeminence of naked power and militarism, revived imperialism and global expansionism of the newly assertive North in the post-Cold War period (now often referred to as “Global Cold War”). The risk for world peace is that much greater as this drive, currently spearheaded by the superpower, is explicitly inspired by the “neo-con” intellectual analysis, agenda and vision, coupled with fundamentalist, often apocalyptic missionary zeal, which includes rolling back social and political advances made during the 20th century, including the UN Charter. This narrow, parochial vision, emanating from a tiny conclave of “intellects” in direct service of those holding decision-making levers and of the huge “industrial-military complex”, becomes a planetary threat when a country in question is a superpower wielding its military, intelligence, capital, economic, technological, and communications might, and relying on “military Keynesianism” as an economic model and engine for sustaining national economic growth and for global dominion.⁴²

⁴¹ Interestingly, the academic/political analyses challenging the reason for and continuing existence of Yugoslavia coincided in time with similar challenges to the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as to UNCTAD, UNIDO and some of the UN regional economic commissions. This was not a mere coincidence, as such and similar initiatives are part of the same mindset and strategic vision that all have their origins in the same intellectual nursery.

⁴² On this subject see a recent article by Chalmers Johnson, “Republic or Empire”, January 2007 issue of *Harper’s Magazine*, also posted on Internet (www.harpers.org/RepublicOrEmpire.htm). See also by the same author *Nemesis, The Last Days of the American Republic*, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2006.

The above approach is also needed to respond to and counter political and religious right-wing fundamentalisms that are ascendant on the world scene, and are used to foment domestic and international conflicts (especially in natural-resources rich, strategic areas). These in turn provide the pretext for intervention (direct or by proxy), legitimize militarism and a permanent war-based economy relying for political support on a security-fixated society and an increasingly disoriented, jittery and anxious citizenry, deploying security networks, military bases and offensive capabilities that span the globe, and able to intervene anywhere and police the planet thanks to advanced S&T military applications, including in outer space.

In drawing a balance sheet, it needs also to be recalled that what took place in Yugoslavia, and following its break-up, created precedents for application elsewhere by the newly dominant global power configuration, one openly committed to instituting the “order” in world affairs unilaterally and on its own terms.

The Yugoslavia with the West Balkan events was also the forerunner of developments on the world scene that in a number of ways also embody a contemporary version of paradigms, worldviews, strategies and conceptual frameworks seen and applied in earlier historical epochs, including during the decades that led to World War I. They mark a resurrection of *realpolitik* and arrogance of unchecked power exercised by the concert of self-appointed nations, mutual deal-making and trading with human lives, resources and territories belonging to other countries and their populations, including their very existence and destinies. A “commodification” of countries as merchandise to be acquired, traded away and exchanged has reemerged as an element of the unipolar world order.

In this context a historical judgment of their responsibility awaits the key North players who had a direct role in the break-up of Yugoslavia, and/or who did not want to play a proactive role and prevent its break-up, even though this was within their collective power.⁴³

It is this forced break-up of the country that made possible and led to the wars. War itself is a crime against humanity, for it brings about death,

⁴³ “We Europeans have a special responsibility for what happens in the Balkans. In 1991, we failed to prevent the outbreak of wars and atrocities in the heart of Europe.” This sentence, an explicit, public confirmation of the above argument, comes from two European leaders who were familiar with and closely involved in the events, Giuliano Amato and Richard von Weizsacker, in their article “Give negotiations another chance”, *International Herald Tribune*, 29 March 2007.

violence, destruction, suffering and misery. Without a war, war crimes are not possible. In the case of Yugoslavia, the many war crimes perpetrated against individuals and civil populations, crimes endemic to the behaviour of nationalist right-wing forces in wartime in these regions, and that already took place during World War II were unavoidable and became possible once the wars broke out. The repeat of such unfortunate events could have been easily foretold.

It remains an unfinished task for the international community to focus more inclusively on responsibilities for the outbreak of wars, the original sin and the fundamental crime – a mega or structural war crime at the macro level – and to fill the missing blanks in the Yugoslavia story. The issue of war crimes, tangible, “petty” crimes at the micro-level, that took place and were made possible only once the crisis was allowed or made to escalate out of control and the armed conflicts and wars were unleashed, can today be approached in an historically objective and comprehensive manner only if the collective war crime of the major countries involved, i.e. that of contributing to and/or allowing the wars to happen, is also recognized and responsibilities determined.

VI. PIECING TOGETHER THE YUGO-BALKANS NEIGHBOURHOOD

An English saying goes that it is too late to cry over spilled milk (or beans). One also hears the argument, made emphatically by nationalists, by many who are disillusioned or discouraged by the events and mood in these lands, or by those from abroad who favoured the demise and dismemberment of Yugoslavia that, like Humpty Dumpty who fell off the wall, it is impossible to bring back the Yugo-Balkans following the events that swept this area in the 1990s and the processes that have taken place since.

However, it is neither too late nor unrealistic to start purposefully rebuilding and recreating this space. The West Balkan region is and remains a geographic, economic, socio-cultural, historical and environmental entity. The peoples inhabiting this area will inevitably have to continue to live together, coexist, cooperate and share as they did in the past. Indeed, their improved economic, social and individual wellbeing will depend on such cooperation. This is a reality that no one can escape, much as some may wish or try to do so, including by continuing to erect artificial barriers that separate – material, administrative, cultural, language, conceptual. These efforts are at odds with the mainstream processes taking place in Europe, Europe that these same wall-builders are trying to join and become part of.

Nor is it too late to revive, as appropriate and in contemporary forms, the best of what Yugoslavia stood for and aspired to. Indeed a situation may be maturing to open a new chapter and begin with efforts in this positive direction.

A few years back and in a very short period, benefiting from and harnessing for their purposes the global economic and political changes, given political forces and actors were successful in destroying the precious base of living together for 45 years of the post-World War II period, reversing the time machine back to the old fashioned Balkans and in reviving “Balkanization” in its most pejorative and tragic forms. This was done with the participation or assent of the then political leaders who were in power and who were supposed to protect the legacy of a country forged through the four years of armed struggle of all Yugoslav peoples during World War II. It was achieved through a vitriolic, divisive political discourse, and manipulation of public opinion by appealing systematically and in a premeditated manner to basic instincts, fears and hatreds widespread among common people. Revival of the ghosts from the past, manufacturing “consensus”, stage-managing events, falsification and exaggeration, were part of a massive brainwash perpetrated through the media and especially TV, with vital assistance from important segments of nationalistically oriented personalities from public life, who provided the intellectual and emotional fodder for the impending disaster.

The above was done in a situation of grave domestic economic and social crisis, and global geopolitical turmoil and discontinuity. Would it not be feasible to try to reverse the situation, this time by fast-forwarding the time machine, and by reeducating and reshaping public opinion, with particular emphasis on channeling the young and upcoming generations in a positive direction, benefiting from improved local and external conditions, and the lessons learned?

Were “de-Balkanization” to become the new, politically correct and desirable outlook for the whole West Balkans region, properly explained and argued, sponsored and tangibly supported by the international community and directed at the public opinion and especially the common people, it is probable that it would be eventually embraced and followed by the majority of the population that is tired after decades of antagonisms, negative rhetoric and invective, and many of whom, according to various public opinion surveys miss their former country and the quality of life that it offered. It should be recalled that while *homo balcanicus* is supposedly vindictive and responds to violence and perceived injustice aggressively or defensively, he is also known for responding with gener-

osity, kindness and forgiveness to solidarity, good will and friendliness. Moreover, he is known for political caution and adaptability – taught by bitter experience over the centuries – and thus likely to follow the “new” line were it to become an officially sanctioned one.

No doubt, the entrenched reactionary nationalisms and chauvinisms, and the institutions and vociferous political forces that support and thrive on account of these, would put up stiff resistance in the name of “democracy”, and would be reluctant to yield the positions of power and influence they have acquired in society and public life. However, once their messages to the population are countered with a different vision, and divisive and confrontational language and arguments, especially in media, textbooks and school curricula is delegitimized, it would be a matter of time before they are put on a defensive and in due course marginalized.

Various forms of mutually beneficial economic cooperation⁴⁴, secularism as an overarching value to neutralize divisive effects of local religions, cultural obscurantism and rising fundamentalisms, and creating channels of communication and opportunities for contact, including at the level of individuals and of local communities, would be essential.⁴⁵

Some Western media, which are in the habit of reporting only about divisions and conflicts, have published lately sporadic articles on links among the populations (music, books, theatre, TV programmes, films, trade, etc.). This lukewarm acknowledgment of the existence of the Yugoslav space⁴⁶ should be welcomed, for this neighbourhood continues to exist and live in spite of the new frontiers and artificial divisions.

⁴⁴ Admittedly, this is a sensitive issue given that some forms of investment and economic expansion by actors from within the region can be perceived as “neo-colonialist” in intent, especially when the investment flows from a more developed to a less-developed West Balkans state. The situation is aggravated by the very nature of the economic model where maximum advantage is sought by the investors, and profit justifies any behaviour, giving rise to a sense of inequity and being exploited which in turn generates political conflict and nationalist resentment. “Buy domestic” and calls for boycott of goods imported from other West Balkan states are also becoming fashionable (somewhat similar to what happened in the final phases of the Yugoslav Federation).

⁴⁵ Given the importance of visual communication, this should include setting up a common, independent TV channel for the whole region to offer a unifying bridge-building vision and message. Its programmes would be dedicated to reconciliation and cooperation between the West Balkans people of, overcoming animosity and prejudices, and helping mobilize individual citizens and public opinion in this direction.

⁴⁶ Symptomatically, the existence of the Yugo space is fully recognized when it comes to its negative aspects exemplified by the thriving cross-border crime syndicates. Here memory of Yugoslavia is honoured by allowing a reference to it by using the term “Yugo-mafia”, thus perpetuating another negative association with the former state. It would be more correct to

This recognition should be elevated into a formal one, to be backed by a sustained effort through the media to advocate (or “sell” which is more in tune with the market economy) the idea of a common space and community. A new positive outlook among the general public in all of the Western Balkans should be formed by shifting the focus to and maximizing what unites the new states and their populations, to what their commonalities and shared interests in their diversity are, and to show that ethnic and religious identities are not threatened by cooperation and links between populations.

The discourse, agenda, analyses and basic premises on which the official outlooks rest will need to be changed. As well, the Cold-War and traditional *divide et impera*, revanchist and domination approaches to the Western Balkans – which continue to be actively pursued, especially by the centre and right-leaning political, economic, military and security establishments in the West (the underlying geopolitical tensions with Russia figuring prominently in their strategic calculus) – should be challenged and phased out.

One character trait that was common to the history of all peoples that lived in Yugoslavia is their aspiration and struggle for autonomy and independence. Significant setbacks vis-à-vis the outside world had been experienced in this quest. The challenge now is to rebuild sufficient and respectable policy space for autonomous policies, action and thinking. This is not a mission impossible. It can be pursued successfully through mutual cooperation, a common agenda, as an association of states and peoples that have issued out of Yugoslavia.

Rebuilding the old Yugoslav space will become easier and possible in the framework of EU, where the remaining states will be eventually admitted, ideally at the same time and as part of the same package. The progressive political forces that are influential in some key EU member-countries should link up with progressive political forces in the Western Balkans – where at present the left remains marginal and has little or no political importance on the local political scene – and lead this effort, for it is primarily the progressive political outlook that accommodates such vision and cooperation.

call it “post-Yugo mafia”, as de facto there was no mafia or organized crime during Yugoslavia and crime rates in general were extremely low. Mafia and crime was distinctly a product of the breakdown of the country and society, the wars, loss of livelihoods, and the transition and change of the socio-economic system.

Rebuilding this space, however, is not exclusively a local or Northern affair. It is also a matter of general, global interest, for at its root it has to do with the continuing challenges of development and North-South (and also East-West) relations that extend beyond the European Union, NATO and the Western Balkans. It is thus of special interest to the developing countries and to the economies in transition. It should be pursued therefore also in the universal framework and under the authority of the democratic, global forum of the United Nations. UN's mission is to promote peace, development, international cooperation, democratization of the world society, and as a priority to deal with and remove multiple structural and other underlying causes of conflicts and tensions that endanger peace and burden the international community and peoples of the world. These same issues were at the heart of the Yugoslavia's family drama.

The world community, represented by the United Nations General Assembly, could declare a "UN decade for rebuilding the West Balkans neighbourhood", as one of its global peace-building and development initiatives, of symbolic value and strategic and practical importance. Elaborating the content of and implementing such a decade could become a truly innovative, political and practical "development and peace" undertaking oriented to the future and 21st century, with involvement and participation of all countries and their peoples.

The UN General Assembly could request the developed countries to redirect some or most of massive resources that are spent on military and policing objectives in some areas to the strategy for the region as a whole. Some resources would be earmarked for building physical and other bridges; facilitating, channeling and broadening cooperation; reviving and diversifying links between the new states, including by establishing common region-wide premier institutions of higher and specialized learning for educating new generations of professionals that will lead and guide their countries into the future.

While hoping for this to happen, there are signs that some of those same exogenous actors and forces that contributed to the dismantling of Yugoslavia, having achieved most of their goals of regional geopolitical control and socio-economic system and regime change, are now moving in the direction of reassembling the pieces again.

Thus, de facto, they are tacitly recognizing that much like the European Community and now the Union provide solutions to Europe's historical and current problems, Yugoslavia provided solutions to the many problems and challenges that continue to haunt the mountainous lands and plains of the Western Balkans, problems which instead of being managed and overcome,

have been aggravated and revived by its dissolution. Thus, once in EU, and when the local, anachronistic nationalisms are tempered in the broader setting provided by the Union, the former Yugoslav republics may realize that they continue to have a lot in common and that they will need to cooperate very closely and depend on each other again.⁴⁷

VII. YUGOSLAVIA AND THE CHALLENGES OF 21ST CENTURY

The post-World War II socialist Yugoslavia made a mark on the world scene. Its contribution to progressive ideas and praxis is of lasting value and importance. As already noted above, together with other developing countries it worked for democratization of international relations, it struggled against imperialism, domination, and hegemony of political, military and economic power, and defended peace, and principles of non-interference in domestic affairs and non-aggression. It sought national political and economic independence for weaker member states of the international community, and a voice and role for them through collective and national self-reliance. And it tried to evolve its own people-centred development path, by empowering and giving a role and dignity to working people in their daily lives and work, and by providing them with existential security in a multi-cultural, progressive social and political environment.

While Yugoslavia is no more, and its successor states led by new elites and classes have largely dissociated themselves from most of these objectives, these retain their transcendental political value, relevance and appeal in the world political arena, in particular for the countries of the South. And although serious setbacks have been registered in all of these domains during the recent period, most have been amply vindicated by the events since Yugoslavia's break-up, globally and within the Western Balkans, and have been reaffirmed as the shared aspirations of billions of people living in the South, and also in the North.

These aspirations underpin a progressive vision embodied in the United Nations – both its Charter and the six decades of its work. Unfortunately, UN is under continuous pressure and siege by the forces that

⁴⁷ An interesting issue for EU when and if the remaining states join it has to do with the cost of translation and interpretation. Four of the potential candidates now claim to have their own different language, which would multiply by four the cost of translation and interpretation of what linguistically are merely variants of the same language. Given the pronounced language paranoia in political, cultural and religious circles and the use of language for political purposes and for nationalist differentiation and mobilization, it remains to be seen whether the bottom line and administrative reasoning will prevail in the decision taken by the EU.

wish to turn it into an instrument of convenience under their control, working in support of the systemic status quo, and serving them to promote their national and global interests and positions. The latter includes controlling an unstable and restive multitude of countries and peoples in a globalizing world, whom they perceive as a challenge and threat to their Western, Judeo-Christian civilisation citadel and wish to keep at a safe distance *ante portas*, using all the necessary means and methods in a new configuration which is often referred to as “global apartheid”.⁴⁸

The above is also one of the underlying reasons for continuing and intensifying North-South conflict and confrontation, taking place in what often assumes an air of a global class struggle, involving control of and access to vital natural resources and the environment in general, and distribution and sharing of the benefits and results of work of billions of people, as well as of costs and liabilities of contemporary civilisation which are felt worldwide. And it has been at the root of events that brought about the end of Yugoslavia and of the processes that take place in the context of today’s Western Balkans.

This is why the lessons of the events in Yugoslavia also require awareness and fresh analysis. Such analysis, including revisiting theory and practice of non-alignment in a unipolar world where countries are experiencing tremendous pressures to “align” themselves, is of special importance for developing countries of the South that are likely to experience similar situations.⁴⁹ It is also of importance for multilateral action and deriving basic principles through the United Nations for future responses to crises, including for preempting conflicts and use of force by dealing with underlying causes and promoting equal and equitable forms of cooperation. Failing this, global powers will be sanctioned to continue to act unilaterally and pursue their vision, strategies and interests, including through economic and military aggression and policing the world under different pretexts and in the name of laudable goals, whether democracy, market or humanity, while they remain above the law and untouchable.

⁴⁸ In fact, one of the traditional and continuing misfortunes of West Balkans is that some of its constituent elements are perceived or declared as belonging on the outside of the dividing line, drawn by a papal edict in the Middle Ages, while others belong within the ramparts of the Western civilisation.

⁴⁹ One of the conceptual building blocs of the new world order is the so-called “end of sovereignty”. Given the power realities, it applies essentially to weak and targeted countries, wide open to interventions by those major countries with power. The latter, however, consider their own sovereignty as absolutely sacred and inviolable and are ready to protect it by all means at their disposal, including by waging war.

Today, these continuing, interconnected conflicts and tensions between the North and the South are in the open in different domains of human activity and in the multilateral arena. These issues subsume the very nature and direction of globalization, as an overarching, systemic issue, as well as: rising global poverty and deepening chasm between rich and poor, between privileged and marginalized; international trade, finance and investment; intellectual property; transnational corporations; nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; disarmament, including nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; energy and control of natural resources; biodiversity and climate change; control of global media and messages; human health and access to medicines; definition of human rights; management of Internet; roles of and decision-making in international organizations; financing of UN; use of global commons; global public goods; demilitarization of outer space; and so on.

These conflicts cannot be dealt with and even less resolved by sheer power, policing of the globe, worldwide military deployment, and continued domination by the North of world politics and economy (including via its giant corporations and financial institutions that span the globe), and of the South. Nor can they be dealt with through transnational cooperation of local elites and classes. The democratizing mission by the North, including by mechanistic transposition of a model of governance and socio-economic structures, is obviously not an answer and all too often leads to divisions, major social and economic perturbations, and internecine conflicts within developing countries, making them vulnerable to external intervention and domination. In this instance also, the Yugoslavia story has something useful to teach.

Tackling these issues through unity of purpose of the overwhelming majority of world peoples who live in developing countries gives hope for a different world and a different world order.

This order should be democratic and equitable. It should be freed of North-conceptualized ideological/theoretical constructs designed to maintain the systemic status quo and of the hegemonic realpolitik that applies them in practice, which in turn leads to serious crises, instability and dangers for the humankind. It should be guided by a progressive paradigm or worldview, which can be elaborated and built on the basis of the work and achievements recorded in the framework of the United Nations. This is essential for dealing with the major global challenges on the UN and the international community's agenda at the start of the 21st century, namely: a world free of war; overcoming global poverty and underdevelopment; institutionalizing democratic and equitable global governance,

including global regimes for public good and disciplines for transnational corporations and capital; bringing about sustainable development and corresponding patterns of production, lifestyles and consumption worldwide; and harnessing science and technology potential in the service of global public interest peace and development.

Post-World War II Yugoslavia, during its short but rather remarkable historical journey, through its efforts, experiences and example has contributed its own share to the awareness that such better world is needed and is possible, and to the struggle to turn it into a reality. This unfinished struggle continues worldwide.

PROFESSOR DR SVETOZAR LIVADA

ACADEMICIAN, PROFESSOR UNIVERSITY OF ZAGREB, CROATIA

THE NEGATION AND DESECRATION OF THE VICTIM

While studying the nature of the civil war in Yugoslavia since 1990, I have observed numerous phenomena of a planned, legalized and unpunished crime. While analyzing them in my book *Etničko čišćenje – ozakonjeni zločin stoljeća* (Ethnic Cleansing – The Legalized Crime of the Century), which is being printed, I have devoted special attention to the negation and desecration of the other's victim, which I wish to present.

Our former elite, being incapable of settling the crisis through a dialogue, agreed only on waging an undeclared civil war for the division of the territory, plundering of goods and the installation of the new elite. To that end, they offered ethnic homogenization under the slogan: "The other is hell!", thus inaugurating ethnobanditry on a massive scale. Genuine pogrom.

Hysterical hatred and the fabrication of our history and all truths about ourselves on the perpetration of the most horrible crimes after World War II, which had such proportions that a great number of one-time descent people participated in them without showing any repentance.

However, many of them do not know that we entered the civil war with 800,000 mixed families and their 7,000,000 descendants. If we also take into account their collateral relatives, it turns out that more than half of the population was related either directly or indirectly, but we still committed dreadful atrocities to each other. However, in a civil war there are no rules. In Vukovar, for example, 7,000 families, out of 10,000, were mixed. The crimes against the people, superstructure and institutions are well known. Even the wounded were massacred.

It is estimated that, in the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia, 160,000 persons were killed, while at the same time having over 100,000 disabled veterans and 300,000 orphans registered. At one moment, 4,500,000 people were expelled from their homes. Five thousand topo-

⁵⁰ Should we, like Jews, respect the dignity of innocent holocaust victims, identifying them by name, place, date and way of their martyrdom, and honour their memory, we would be civilized.

nyms were razed to the ground. Thousands of monuments were destroyed, while some places suffered a complete culturocide. The Sarajevo and Paracr libraries were destroyed and so were more than a thousand places of worship of all religions. Some landmarks were also destroyed: Hajrudin's Bridge in Mostar, the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka, historical museum of ZAVNOH in Topusko, etc. In short, there was plenty of victims; concentration camps were kept; mass graves appeared; the superstructure, institutions and monuments suffered heavy destruction; the entire regions with their rural and urban settlements were destroyed. However, there is practically no criminal anywhere if it were not for the coercion by the International Tribunal in The Hague.

Intellectual criminals, war forgers and direct criminals have established themselves in the systems of our banana statelets; they pass laws, protect criminals (read – themselves) and the process of reconciliation continues like an unfinished war. The other's victims are negated! They have been divided into "ours" and "yours", and we manipulate with "our" victims. We also hide, honour, glorify and protect "our" criminals, while at the same time denouncing other peoples. That is the negation and desecration of the other's victim as the most drastic form of moral degradation of an individual, a group, a state and a society. I conclude – let the state collapse if it cannot survive, but we must do our best so as to preserve the people, institutions and society. By describing the desecration of the victims, I wish to illustrate the situation in the Republic of Croatia, although I know for sure that the war matrix was the same everywhere, because we are the same in all respects, no matter what we think of ourselves. Our deeds speak to the contrary.

The negation and desecration of the victim is an antihuman act! A crime! Disgusting! That is to be condemned. The reflection of man's most basic instincts. Irrational revenge. Revenge! Barbarity! Its consequences are multifaceted, because they negate both the victims and their perpetrators as human beings. They destroy man's dignity even in death. That is an irrational triumph of the stronger – a herd. Remember that the tyranny of the stronger marked our civil war of 1990. The innocent victims were so helpless that they could not defend their lives, let alone the dignity of death. And there was no act of brutality towards the victims which was not committed.⁵¹ Naturally, except cannibalism. Probably just because we

⁵¹ While observing, investigating and testifying about the methods of killing old people in the war at the end of the 20th century, I found out the following: "Old men were killed individually, in a group, or collectively, by beating, shooting, slaughtering, hanging, strangling, burning,

moved away evolutionally from it. Due to such barbarity, man was often negated as a social being.

In Croatia this phenomenon has been persisting too long, both among the Serbs and Croats, as a “stabilizer”, or the negation of the other.⁵² In this respect, we are like identical twins, especially in finding pleasure in revenge, in neglecting, negating and desecrating the other’s victims.

It is humiliating to listen how the Croats are a genocidal people, because such a horrible accusation is historically unfounded. It is an anti-biological statement that a whole people can be genocide. It denies the historical truth about the antifascism in Croatia.⁵³ However, racism and extremism as well as the negation of the other by some individuals and groups in the name of nationalism have been tolerated in Croatia for a long time. I must emphasize that only the prelates of the South Slavic religious communities failed to condemn fascism or the fascists from their ranks, although sixty years have already passed since the victory over fascism. That is scandalous (see fra. Marko Oršolić: *Zlodusima nasuprot – Religija kao nacionalsocijalizam*, Adamič d.o.o, Rijeka 2006, especially the introduction and the first few pages⁵⁴).

One foreign anthropologist has tried to convince me that this persistence on revenge and the negation of the other are a defence mechanism of the Croats, because they are stupidly accused of being genocidal. I do not accept that, because I could assure myself that the same thing was done by the Serbs in Croatia and elsewhere. Everything depended on the circumstances and indoctrination with crime. After all, Serbia itself is the hostage of its criminals.⁵⁵ The lament of some Croats over the fate and martyrdom of their compatriots in an attempt to make it a credo is just the copy of

sinking, crucifixion, raping, beheading, mutilation, desecration of the bodies, forcing them to commit a suicide, stabbing, throwing them into a fire, cutting them into pieces, etc”. For more detail see my book bearing the same name, p. 47.

⁵² In a way, almost all newly established states have become the hostages of their own politics, that is, their war crime suspects or indicted before the International Tribunal in The Hague.

⁵³ I bore witness to the killing of many Croats from my generation in the struggle against fascism. My all classmates were killed in the most brutal way. The martyrdom of the Ribar family, Baković sisters, Anka Butorac, Nada Dimić and thousands of other known and unknown persons refute the blasphemous statement about the genocidal nature of Croats.

⁵⁴ I recommend to everyone, especially to believers, to read Dr Djuro Zatezalo’s book *Radio sam obični svoj kovački seljački posao*, SKD Prosvjeta, Zagreb, 2006.

⁵⁵ Insofar as crimes are concerned, our ethnicities do not differ at all. They all kept concentration camps and tortured and desecrated the victims. They all negate the other’s victims, while at the same time manipulating with theirs.

some Serbian myths and credos. One who knows human history just a little cannot find that any people fared in such a way in 14,000 wars recorded in history! Xenophobia in Croatia, where all national minorities were reduced to one-third in this war and no one was punished, is the expression of a dangerous precedent, especially if it persists as a “political option” and if some institutions, media and intellectual criminals – although they are not intellectuals nor can be regarded as such – continue to denounce the other.⁵⁶

While compiling the selective bibliography of intellectual criminals, I have revealed that many of them, both the Serbs and Croats, have established themselves in the social system. That is a dangerous vice.

When I read in the pre-edited English version of Franjo Tuđman’s book *Bespuće* (Wastelands), on page 164, that genocide is useful for rectifying one’s history, I went to the American Ambassador and said: “This is your negotiating partner!” I told him what I had read and pointed to some facts. I also told him that Croatia now has the *ministry for ethnic cleansing*. The Ambassador was amazed and immediately contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The acceptance of one people to have the father of the nation at the end of the 20th century is disastrous!

One foreign cynic called this a prehistoric act – “the proclamation of one’s own mothers whores”.⁵⁷

In his memoirs, the last American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, historian Warren Zimmerman, described the intellectual and cognitive faculties of Franjo Tuđman as being below a mediocre teacher. Unfortunately, the followers of the “criminal venture” could not comprehend that, because a rightist is not an intellectual – he believes in power, force, money, army, war. So, Croatia suddenly became a “regional power”. Believing in war, our rightists recommend the cruiser *Petar Krešimir* for the Bay of Piran; they give precedence to their own interests and selfishness above man. They cannot understand what a common good is because, in essence, they are anti-men. Being narrow-minded, they cannot become men or citizens. “Oedipus has not yet arrived here!” (Kangrga). When writing a

⁵⁶ There is no reconciliation without the responsible institutional reconciliation. Unfortunately, we are so close and institutionally so far from each other that we negate the other’s institutions and culture, thus breaking the cultural circle with our neighbours.

⁵⁷ What some individuals, media, institutions and groups were doing, saying and publishing while forging the war is scandalous. Unfortunately, they are still doing this and go unpunished.

commentary on the racial laws in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) after World War II, in the 1950s, I compared them with the German ones. The manuscript was taken away from me and I was told that for both the Serbs and Croats in Croatia “it still early for this”. I was embarrassed by this statement, because despite such a notorious crime we remained a prehistorical people. However, I must mention a few facts which are typical of rightists. They are the “smugglers of their own lives”, they are conservative, reactionary, forgers, plagiarists, liars, unscrupulous, cruel, disloyal to themselves and others, corruptive, mythomaniacs, intriguants of the Shakespearan type; nationalists, chauvinists, racists, sadists, fascists and tyrants of all sorts are recruited from among them. Not one historical misdeed is strange to them, since “their mace is law” and “the dagger is the most illustrious weapon”.⁵⁸

I was against the trial to Stepinac, not because I thought that he was not guilty, because he will not become a saint as long as there is Israel. After all, he did not become a righteous man either! But, because Pope Pius XII, his superior, was not tried. After all, in the case of Stepinac’s beatification, they did not want to derogate the trial as being political or publish the indictment. When the Tomac-Blažević manuscript was published, “I looked for a read thread”; there were some rumours about the renewal of the trial, but I refused to produce the processed documents stating that I would not do that until Pope Pius XII was tried.

The racial laws in the NDH and their implementation imposed the ideology of hatred on the ruling elite, which still persists. After all, the syntagm that “a Croat cannot commit a crime in a liberation war” is a pure derivative of racism. It still persists and is revived every day “in the morning service, the kuna, the nomenclature of new titles and the pestilence of intellectual production”, which *Feral Tribune* calls, in each issue, “mental darkness”, unpunished extremism and nationalism, racism and crime.

I do not agree with the opinion that the Croatian judiciary is incompetent. All judges have regularly completed their education. It has become ideologically incapacitated in the name of nationalism, religion and state, it is ideologically corrupt. This is why the negation of the other’s victims has been legalized. The judiciary is neither professional nor ethnical. It does

⁵⁸ The ideology of hatred, summarized in the syntagm: “You have deprived us of war, but not of hatred”, prolongs the war by other means. Therefore, this unfinished reconciliation continues. “The framework for hatred” is being refinely stabilized! We cannot get rid of the remnants of fascism without strict denazification laws!

not respect the facts, expert's opinions or witnesses. It does not apply its own laws and norms. So, for example, 15 persons indicted for the most serious crimes stand trial while free. The most striking examples are the cases of Hrastov, Glavaš and some others. It is farcical to wait for Suljić to die. It is also farcical to hear that Hrastov is an officer, a honorary citizen of Karlovac and an active officer of the Ministry of the Interior... And what Glavaš is saying in public! He is laughing at the truth, the legal system and the whole society. That's scandalous! In this way, the victims are killed again in the name of the state which does not deny the right to the indicted to kill their victims once again and negate them. Our public was not shocked by the statement of the commander of the Jasenovac concentration camp, Šakić, that he "would do that again".

Our prelates cannot go to Jasenovac although 60 years have passed since the war!⁵⁹ The state obstructs the extradition of Rojnica, Ašner and Rajhl-Kir's murderers. Vera Solar's pain over her killed daughter did not get to the hearts of our officials and legal institutions. And only in Sisak there are more than 640 such cases which have not been processed. And what to say about "Lora", "Pavilion 22", Split, Šibenik, Zadar, Pakračka poljana, Osijek, to mention only the most serious, yet unpunished crimes. All this is the repeated killing of the victims without punishment or repentance. Isn't this a shameless negation of the victim? Some 3,000 monuments to antifascism, including the sculptures of our greatest artists, whose models are exhibited in the world's galleries, were destroyed; the negation of thousands of known and unknown martyrs' graves has massive proportions. What we have here is the negation of the victim, as well as the memory of the people and creative artists. This is the crime committed by an unlawful state. The formation of the *Zaklada* (Foundation) for the defence of the chivalrous generals indicted for the most serious war crimes is the height of absurdity. It shows that the state and its institutions have deliberately forgotten that one-third of their own country stands behind that crime – the "war-devastated country, ethnic cleansing, destruction of historic heritage, including 1,500 toponyms. The negation of the Serbs has triumphed, so that history will ask the Croats one day what their Taliban compatriots had done to the Serbs, as it is now asking the Americans what they have done to their Indians".

⁵⁹ Gospić Bishop Bogović laments that he would go to Jasenovac "should he be given a chance". Why he does not go to Jadovno, the second largest death camp in the NDH. During 132 days of its existence, several thousand Serbs, Jews and Roma were brutally killed. Among them there were 72 Orthodox priests, including 2 bishops.

While investigating the destroyed toponyms, I have revealed that there are 1,800 killed and 3,700 disappeared Serbs, whose names cannot be found on any search or exhumation list. That is a threatening negation of the victim. If Nikola Tesla has no right to the live toponym of his hometown of Smiljan, as well as to the monument to his fallen relatives and neighbours, then the question that imposes itself here is – who has? Here we have a farsical commemoration to one of the builders of the civilisation and, at the same time, the negation of this great man.⁶⁰ If the Serbs in Serbia have no right to the public monument to antifascism, which symbolizes the leaders of antifascism and about 340,000 Serbs killed in the NDH, then the question that imposes itself here is – what will be the height of absurdity in negating the victim? Consequently, we recognize the continuity of the state which has evolved from the antifascist movement, while at the same time negating the martyrs, their graveyards and monuments. I must emphasize that there would be no Croatian state in this form without antifascism. At the same time, antifascism in Croatia would not evolve without Serbs or persist in that form without Serbian logistic support and martyrdom.⁶¹ I often wonder where the anti-civilisational negation of others leads to, since nobody expresses shame in public, repents, or feels uneasy about such immorality. This will have long-term political, moral and historical consequences.

While conducting research on the culturocide, I have been acquainted with the negation denial of our own cultural heritage from the oldest times up to the present. The *Minister of Anticulture*, who even has an art gallery, did not consider it appropriate to answer the appeal of over 40 cultural workers for sanctioning the culturocide. The Speaker of the Parliament, who holds all indulgence titles and is a member of the Pen Club, did not answer either. Nor did the public prosecutor whose professional duty is to do that. The current editor of the encyclopaedia participated in hushing up the destruction of 40,000 sets of the Leksikografski zavod

⁶⁰ After the withdrawal of the Turks, Smiljan was populated both by the Croats and Serbs. They fought against fascism with the same fervour in the ranks of the National Liberation Army. The monument to the victims, including Nikola Tesla's relatives, had been erected, but it was completely destroyed when the "campus" was built. We can only congratulate for such a negation of the genuine martyrs antifascists, including Nikola Tesla's relatives.

⁶¹ I have found out that only among the Serbs 19% of the people in some regions joined the antifascist resistance movement. I also became a partisan at the age of 13, because that was the only way to survive. And just in the regions of massive resistance (Slunj, Vojnić, Vrginmost), over 80% of the people that remained after the Operation Storm was killed, while the largest toponym, Vrginmost, was renamed "Gvozd".

encyclopaedia; isn't that an example of the negation of one's own cultural heritage? We are going to Europe, but Europe will not come here for a long time due to such a negation of the other and our own culture without punishment.

If you think that I condemn the Croats, the State and its institutions in my lament, then you are wrong and I'll repeat that a hundred times!!! For me the victims have no nationality and ethnicity. We are of the same stock! I felt that in my own veins. The tyranny of the stronger is still triumphing in our formerly joint territory. At all places, the numerical minorities from the same social environments were singled out, ghettoized and reduced. Therefore, there is no difference between Vukovar and Srebrenica, Ahmići and Medački džep, Keraterm and Markale, the village of Račak and Škabrnja, etc.

Consequently, the fate of these victims, the fate of over 160,000 families which lost their members is identical. The Zec, Krivokuća, Rajhl-Kir and many other known and unknown families are the victims of the same war matrix. One's own victims are still emphasized, while those of the other are negated and neglected. The ruling elites do not recognize that we are of the same stock. Ethnic cleansing is still based on the fact that someone else's property is preferred to hatred towards other ethnic groups. In essence, every war is a crime but a civil war is the crime of crimes. One who does not condemn it and who negates the victims should not go unpunished. Such a person has defeated himself as a human being. If the state stands behind such an act, then it is based on crime and cannot be constituted in a civilized way and be accepted by the world. Therefore, it is high time that we ask ourselves, both individually and collectively, what we did to prevent the war and when the war broke out what everyone was doing during the war. In the opposite, there will be no individual or group catharsis, or genuine reconciliation, forgiveness and repentance, not to mention the normalization of life in this territory. If we wait that "time heals all wounds" and do nothing in an organized and institutional way, we will not be forgiven by the present and future generations.

Only in our nationalistic environments the protected witnesses are killed and nobody is punished, or are threatened (like Levar and Hedl); only here the victims can be desecrated, persecuted and negated in their graves and in commemorations. Here the "whistlers" are persecuted and threatened.

One renowned publicist compiled the statistical data from the media about the unpunished cases of fraud, plundering and extortion in the Republic of Croatia, whose value exceeds the annual budget of the state,

isn't that absurd? The robbery of the century could go unpunished only here, although we have been biologically affected. The so-called digressive death rate of pensioners shows that they die 3.5 years earlier, as compared to the same generations, due to the lost property in war and the legalized seizure of their current earnings. Therefore, they say rightfully that our mafia has its state. Zec and Bagarić can prosper and sleep peacefully with government's assistance, although they had driven the Požega District into bankruptcy. Due to the conspiracy of mediocre persons we are being entropically ruined, because those in power are ignorant, but they know how to lie, steal and cheat, while those being competent cannot do anything, since they have been excluded. In our case, science is not a judge to itself. The founding of the *Zaklada* for the defence of the most serious crimes before the international tribunal, whose supremacy we recognize, is a classical moral debacle before the whole world.⁶² Failing to condemn the erasing of the memory, culturocide, destruction of the toponymy and onomastics in one's own territory and taking away the homeland from one's own citizens are also the crimes against one's own people and history. The proposal to change the Square of the French Republic, which was named after the revolution that marked the greatest turnabout of the civilisation, and call it after the spiritual leader who is indicted by the international tribunal for a "criminal venture" is a moral absurdity in the eyes of the whole world. Every war, its victims and destruction are reviewed, only here the historical truth and confrontation with one's own reality are avoided. Do we really wish that others write our history? Isn't the centralization of the state a complete negation of the province? Croatia has been historically regionalized, but Zagreb has practically become Croatia, because the distances of other parts are shocking. That is the final crescendo of the negation of the great majority of its people with unforeseen consequences. That is where the negation of man and his victims leads to when a mediocre ruling elite conspires against its own people.

⁶² They can found thousands of such institutions and thousands of the "friends of the Hague Tribunal" committees, erect monuments to Tuđman up to the sky, name all squares in Croatia after him and call Croatia "Tuđmania", but the historical facts about his misdeeds cannot be changed and erased (rascism, advocacy of genocide, ethnic cleansing, reduction of all minorities to one-third, massacre of the Serbs, war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, concentration camps, privatization, that is, plundering through the country's tycoonization and de-industrialization, etc.).

MIROSLAV JOVANOVIĆ

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY NOVI SAD, SERBIA

EXPERT, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, GENEVA

SERBIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION HOW MUCH DOES THE EUROPEAN UNION NEED SERBIA AND HOW MUCH DOES SERBIA NEED THE EUROPEAN UNION?

1. INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) and Serbia's accession to this international organization in a relatively more distant future are linked, in the eyes of the Serbian public, to numerous expectations, dilemmas, misunderstanding, fears, joys and periodical manipulations. The topic is important, broad and complex, so that there is a need for the basic and understandable explanations.

While in Serbia, this topic is one of the most important and high on the government's agenda. In the EU and its member countries, it attracts almost no attention and is not a priority issue. Simply, the EU is concerned with much more important issues, such as its future constitutional system, security, unemployment, immigration, demographic problem (population ageing), monetary union, preservation of the single market and adjustment to the EU enlargement eastwards.

After this short introduction to the advantages and problems relating to Serbia's potential accession to the EU, I will turn my attention to the following issues: geopolitical conditions for accession to the EU, legislation and functioning of the EU, as well as its budget. Thereafter, I will deal with the effects of integration, the EU's interest in Serbia and Serbia's interest in the EU. Finally, I will present some of my conclusions.

2. GEOPOLITICS

Geopolitics is primarily a study of how the geographical location of a country determines and influences its political events. Geopolitics has three basic principles:

- Countries make decisions primarily in their national interest.

- Political events have a transitional effect. At times, this effect can be changed relatively “easily” and rapidly.⁶³
- Long-term friendships, lasting alliances, long-term (brotherly?) understanding and eternal gratitude among countries and in international relations do not exist. They never existed over a long term. There is only the policy pursued in the national interest. However, the mentioned interest can also be easily changed, depending on a given situation.

In that sense, the Serbian Government must explain to the people what EU membership implies in an understandable and concise way. What it brings to the country and its inhabitants and when. Also, how much it will cost in terms of money, efforts and time.

Every political decision must be primarily concerned with the well-being of one’s own country and people. Naturally, the well-being of countries also plays a role, but one’s own country always comes first. This is clearly demonstrated and pursued by each EU member country, especially if it is big. The profit and the price that should be paid for most items associated with accession to the EU can be estimated in terms of money and time. That must be presented to the people in an understandable way. For example: how much each item costs if converted into the monthly pension fund, the number of kilometres of highway or flood control embankment...

One must always keep in mind that not everything in life and reality can and should be measured in terms of money and market. This refers especially to the country’s membership in the EU. There are many other gains, benefits, rights and obligations which do not pass through money flows. But, the financial moment is of utmost significance and must be found “at the table”. Ask Britain, the Scandinavian countries, Poland, Germany or any other EU member country about this, for example. And when everything becomes clear, let the people decide about such an important issue for our country.

3. ACCESSION REQUIREMENTS

There are several official and compulsory requirements that a country must meet so as to joining the EU. They are as follows:

⁶³ This refers to a country’s socio-political system and, sometimes, to its borders. Let us recall the relatively fast changes of the system in the Eastern bloc countries during the early 1990s. Or to the fast progress of the quisling regimes during World War II.

- The country must be located in Europe.
- It must be democratic and based on the rule of law.
- It must have a market economy which functions and can adhere to the strict EU rules on market competition.
- The country must adopt and implement the *acquis communautaire*.

In addition, the EU must have a good will and capacity to admit a new member country.

The EU can interpret the accession requirements very broadly and that is what it is doing. A country wishing to join a certain “club” must adopt its rules. One high EU official from Brussels has recently said for *The Economist*: “When a country files an application for accession to the EU, it becomes our slave”.⁶⁴ This means that in the accession negotiations with a country, the EU officials can act at their discretion to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the political moment, requirements and needs.

Regardless of their nice words of support and understanding, the EU and its member countries were actually brutal towards Serbia and will be even more brutal in the future.⁶⁵ The EU asked a lot from Serbia and is still asking a lot. Often rightfully. The question that imposes itself here

⁶⁴ *The Economist*, “Outgrowing the Union”, A Survey of EU, 25 September 2004, p. 9.

⁶⁵ When in 2005, in the FYR Macedonia, the Bishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Jovan, was imprisoned, the EU against this act, albeit mildly and hardly noticeably, considering it to be inappropriate and unjustified. In other words, the EU still expressed its protest. Imagine what would happen if someone in Serbia sent a bishop or a Muslim priest to prison! What a protest and pressure this would cause the EU! When, for example, some tipsy persons start a quarrel and say a few rude words to each other, or somebody even slaps somebody, the European Parliament, the OSCE and the EU often react immediately, since such an event might be the result of an interethnic conflict. Serbia must be disciplined right away. And when a massive and well organized revolt breaks out in Kosovo and Metohija, and all non-Albanians are assaulted, while fire is set to 30 churches and monasteries, which happened, say, on 17 and 18 March 2004 (19 murders, 600 destroyed houses and 4,000 expelled persons), in the presence of numerous and well equipped NATO troops, then... At the same time, let us recall 11 March 2001, when the Taliban in Afghanistan destroyed two huge statues of Buddha despite great international diplomatic pressure. After such an unreasonable destruction of the mentioned religious objects, there was a big fuss in the media all over the world. Such a fuss and political pressure throughout the world were not observed when the Christian shrines from the 14th and 15th centuries in Kosovo and Metohija were destroyed. We will soon be acquainted with the views of the EU and its member countries on the final status of Kosovo and Metohija. Regardless of the position of the EU and other major actors on the international political scene, the effect will be the same as the fall of a glass vase from a great height: the bang will be the strongest at the place where the vase fell, but its broken glass can hurt the surroundings, in a broad arch.

is what has been given to Serbia in return? Serbia has already done a lot and is still doing a lot so as to “fit” into the EU’s flows and meet its requirements (dictate). The pills on that road have been very bitter, but even more bitter and more unpleasant ones are waiting for us soon. There is no doubt. Regardless of what Serbia is doing to come closer to the EU, its accession to the EU is “slipping out”. An increasing number of the EU member countries as well as candidate countries are introducing entry visas for Serbian citizens. And it is something our citizens see, because it affects them directly and, thus, exerts influence on their lives and the formation of public opinion. The announced easing of the visa requirements for students, citizens regards as the still wider opening of the door to the brain drain from Serbia. Many students are granted visas so and so. Most Serbian citizens do not see or feel the EU’s financial and other assistance. Various nice stories, promises, regional agreements, positive studies, tapping of our officials on the shoulder and the like are still far from our citizens, who are also voters. This is often disregarded and forgotten.

The citizens of Serbia, especially the Serbs, often harbour suspicions about the “interference” of the international factor. Since 1990, whenever the international factor “interfered”, the Serbs have turned out to be losers, both in a practical and geographical (spatial) sense. The Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina fought for the creation of the Republic of Srpska, which was internationally recognized as a constituent part of that state. Over time, under international pressure, everything has been practically (but not formally) annihilated, thawed and centralized. Let us recall, if we can, only one case since 1990 that the Serbs have got something in a practical and geographical (spatial) sense and that the international factor has been present?⁶⁶

The EU has very wide discretionary powers to select the country it wants to be its member, as well as how and when. From now on, each new candidate country must be accepted by all EU member countries with no exception. Some countries can also do that by expressing their views at a national referendum, but the result of the latter can often be very uncertain.

⁶⁶ When, in 2005, the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, was killed, the “international community” set up the commission for investigation and truth about his assassination. Such an international commission was not set up when the Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Đinđić, was assassinated although he was in power and was accepted and praised as a great friend of the Western democratic world. Why that same “international community” failed to set up the commission for investigation and truth about his assassination? Is it because something unpleasant and shocking might surface?

4. ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE

The Acquis communautaire is the total body of the current EU laws, legal norms and practices. It is estimated that its written part has about 80,000 pages.⁶⁷ In Brussels, new laws are adopted every day. On the average, more than 2,000 annually. There are some who call this system “fax democracy”: each day, the capitals of the EU member countries receive from Brussels “work orders” that must be executed in their countries. The EU member countries from Central and Eastern Europe remember similar “orders” from the Soviet Union until the late 1980s.

The bulk of the acquis regulates the functioning of the EU single market. These regulations are very comprehensive. But, that is not all. In the spirit of the acquis there are also the unwritten political culture and code of conduct. This means that significance is attached to political honour and morality. If an elected politician – especially if he holds a high or higher public function – does something wrong (during or before his term and that it surfaces), his or her political career will be finished. Naturally, this also depends on the nature of “sin” (whether a minister has a love affair, whether someone was spending his or government money on his affair, whether that was going on during or after working hours...). But, there is no mercy towards those who had any connection with the people involved in human and drug trafficking, or those who received bribes. Such persons do not enjoy any moral credibility and public confidence any more and are absolutely unacceptable. If such politicians have any honour, they will resign by themselves and later one, as ordinary citizens, they will take legal action in an attempt to clear their name. It would be worthwhile to screen some Serbian politicians.

Only the implementation of the part of the acquis which deals with environmental protection (320 legal acts) in 10 countries that joined the EU in May 2004, requires the amount of €110 billion.⁶⁸ But, you must bear in mind that this is only one of the many dimensions of the acquis. The other ones cover agriculture, trade, technical and other standards, trans-

⁶⁷ The acquis also has an unwritten part, which is implied and concerns honour, responsibility and seriousness. For example, if a minister resigns, he really resigns and acts accordingly. He remains a minister in resignation and performs only the most pressing tasks until the appointment of a new minister. He does not appear often in public in that period nor does he take any big steps concerning the affairs of the state. This must also be learned by Serbian Ministers, although that is rather difficult. Power is a strong and efficient opium which cannot be abandoned so rapidly and easily.

⁶⁸ *The European Voice*, 28 March 2003, p. 14.

port, statistics, goods labelling, consumer protection, etc. The Amsterdam window cleaners have recently been furious, because it has turned out that their ladders are too long, so that they do not comply with the EU industrial safety standards.⁶⁹

The EU provides financial support to the candidate countries. The countries that joined the EU in 2004 received €45 billion in the period 2000-2006. Apart from this major assistance (Agenda 2000 programme). They also received few billions through various “mini” programmes. Nevertheless, the implementation of the *acquis* is very expensive. The approved amount of €45 billion and additional several billions from other EU sources are not sufficient. The countries must find those additional funds by themselves: through loans, cuts in certain expenditures, redistribution of existing funds, etc.

The *acquis* must be implemented in each EU member country since, for example, if a factory, which emits poisonous gases, fails to install specified expensive filters, it will have (1) lower production costs relative to those which have installed them and (2) will, thus, affect market competition. That is not permissible on the single EU market. There are exceptions, but they are not very frequent. They are applicable only to those countries which already are the EU members. For example, Britain is neither in the Schengen zone nor in the eurozone. The EU candidate countries must adopt and implement the *acquis* in full. There are no negotiations about that. The EU issues a “work order” that must be executed. The only issue that can be negotiated is the duration of the adjustment period and financial assistance.

By adopting and implementing the *acquis*, a country will gain various benefits. Insofar as the production of goods and services, trade, health and environmental protection are concerned, they include as follows:

- Access to the results of enormous research work in which the third country did not invest anything;
- Product standardization: if someone wishes to export to the EU, then the goods must comply with the EU standards, otherwise the company cannot trade with the EU.

5. ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS

The accession negotiations last until the EU is satisfied with the economic, political and general state of the candidate country. As for the duration of

69 *The Economist*, “Outgrowing the Union”, A Survey of EU, 25 September 2004, p. 15.

these negotiations and the implementation of what has been agreed in the country prior to its accession, experience has shown that these negotiations can last about six years. For example, the Czech Republic negotiated with the EU from 1998 to 2003. Slovakia did not satisfy the EU requirements like the Czech Republic and started its negotiations with the EU in 2000. However, both countries finished their negotiations at the same time and joined the EU in 2004. Latvia and Lithuania also joined the EU according to this “summary” procedure.

There are also precedents for the accelerated negotiation and accession to the EU according to the “summary” procedure. However, one should not forget that there are also precedents for an “extended” procedure. Despite all plans, wishes and good will, the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EU was “delayed” two years. It is predicted that the EU negotiations with Turkey will last about ten years.

One should bear in mind that when a country becomes a full member of the EU, it requires a certain adjustment period. For example, the citizens of the EU member countries from Central and Eastern Europe can travel freely to all EU countries, but will be able to take up employment legally only from 2011 onwards, not before. Only Britain, Ireland and Sweden allow unlimited access to their labour markets to the citizens of the countries that joined the EU in 2004 from the moment of their accession. Other countries are slowly raising the barriers to their labour markets, while the probably most attractive ones (Germany, Austria and, to a degree, France) do not intend to open their labour markets to migrants from the Central and East European countries before 2011.

A candidate country must negotiate with the European Commission about its accession to the EU for years. When it meets all requirements, one EU member country can prevent its accession to the EU even after the completion of accession negotiations and the signing of the relevant agreement. So far, this has not happened, but the EU has been comprised by less decision-making countries. The agreement on the accession of a new country to the EU has now to be ratified by all (currently) 25 EU member countries.

The entire territory of a candidate country joins the EU. But, Cyprus joined the EU, although its northern part is still occupied by Turkey. In that part of Cyprus, the EU legislation is not applied. The occupation of Cyprus will be one of the major issues during Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU. The EU will request unambiguously that all Turkish occupying forces withdraw from the territory of Cyprus (as its full member).

In some future negotiations with Serbia, the EU may state that the national borders within the EU do not play a role due to the free movement of goods, labour, capital companies and entrepreneurship. Therefore, one of the accession requirements can be (not obligatorily) the requirement that Serbia “renounces” Kosovo and Metohija, or recognizes its (potential) independence. (The explanation can be as follows: Kosovo and Metohija is on its way to joining the EU). This can easily be a “silk cord” around Serbia’s neck. At the same time, the EU may (or may not) request, at its discretion, the territorial and administrative reorganization of Serbia (the Raška region, Vojvodina...) And where is the end to the EU requirements? Is the EU willing to give the final list of its particular (not general) requirements and conditions that Serbia must meet in advance? Or can this list be constantly changed by the EU. In that case, such territorial and administrative decisions are irreversible over a longer period. If Serbia fulfils all requirements set by the EU, what guarantees that Serbia will become its member?

Cyprus must reunify and that is understandable. As for Serbia and Kosovo and Metohija, the result will soon come out. If the national borders really do not play any role in the EU, the EU should explain whether and how Britain and Spain settled their border and territorial dispute over Gibraltar?

The EU interferes not only in the internal affairs of its candidate countries, but also in those of its member countries. So, for example, after Jörg Heider’s entry into the Austrian government in 2000, all other EU countries froze their relations with Austria, before the new government made any mistake. Since the EU interferes not only in the composition of its member countries’ governments, but also in the party leaderships (Heider), many of them in the EU wonder whether their national sovereignty should be transferred any further to the politically distant “Brussels bureaucracy”.

Another example. The constitution is the supreme legal act of a sovereign country. But, what happened in the former union of Serbia and Montenegro? Without “good offices” (as they say in a diplomatic language) of the High Representative of the European Union on Foreign Policy, Xavier Solana, there would be neither the “Constitutional Charter” nor its “Annex”, which were submitted to the two Parliaments only for formal “ratification”. Many ask themselves as to what happened with the democratic procedure and public debate about the most important legal act of a sovereign state? How can a handful of people adopt such an act behind the closed doors, while at the same time advocating openness and democracy?

6. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EU

The EU has a hybrid structure. There is no other international organization or state which functions in a similar way. To put it simply: the European Commission submits its proposal (without which there is no action) autonomously to the Council of Ministers, which decides on the proposal and, if necessary, make changes together with the European Parliament. The decision is returned to the Commission for enforcement. The European Council, which is comprised of the heads of state or government of 25 EU countries, adopts major political decisions and directions for the EU.⁷⁰

The European Commission is a unique body, since it is a proposer, enforcer, investigator, judge (in certain cases), jury and executor. All this at the same time. There is no clear, understandable and usual separation of powers into political, executive, investigative and judicial. The highest court in the EU is the European Court.

Democratic legitimacy is based on understandability. Nevertheless, this is not understandable to the average citizen and voter in the EU. Many speak about a “democratic deficit” in the EU. For most EU citizens, integration is an abstract inter-state project, something adopted by the political elites behind the back of the people. Such an example is the introduction of the euro. Or the EU enlargement eastwards. So far, few voters in the EU have had an opportunity to express their opinion about such an important issue at a referendum. One of the tangible benefits observed by the citizens is the disappearance of passport and customs control in their countries under the Schengen treaty.

The Eurobarometer, the EU institution which conducts surveys, is recording a decline in the public support to the “European project” among the EU member countries. This is also reflected in a steady decrease in the voter turnout at the elections for the European Parliament, which have been held at five-year intervals since 1979. In 2004, the voter turnout at these elections was only 45%. But, when the referendum for the adoption of the EU Constitution was in question, a record number of French citizens (70%), it turned out 55% said “no”. In this way, the French people expressed their discontent with the path taken by the EU and “punished” its political elite, part of which was taking an arrogant attitude toward the people, treating it like a consumer and not as a voter. The same thing happened in the Netherlands. Let us not forget that France and the Neth-

⁷⁰ The European Council (EU institution) should not be mixed with the Council of Europe, which is a separate institution and which will be dealt with elsewhere in the text.

erlands are the EU founding countries and that they were the major pace setters of the process of European integration during the past half a century.

The EU is not a unitary organization. There are several layers or rings within it. The formal layers in the EU include as follows:

- 12 countries that adopted the euro and other countries that did not;
- The countries that are in the Schengen zone and those which are not;
- The countries whose citizens have the full right to employment throughout the EU and those whose citizens still have no such right, and
- The countries that have full access to the agricultural fund and those are 15 “old” EU member countries. The new member countries from Central and Eastern Europe will gain full access to this fund as of 2013. Until then, they will receive funds on a piecemeal basis. But, it is very uncertain whether the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (together with its fund) will exist after 2013. There are views that this common policy should be abolished and the competence transferred to the member countries.

Informal layers:

- The French-German core of the EU, together with the Benelux countries, which have supported the deepening of integration into the EU.
- Britain, the Scandinavian countries and some “new” Eastern countries (Poland) are against the deepening of integration. Britain supports strongly a constant EU enlargement, wishing to dilute and weaken the French-German core in the EU.

The EU has its internal dynamics and development. The EU keeps changing and becoming different. This has been especially observed since the EU enlargement eastwards in 2004. The decision-making process within the EU changed earlier. At first, the EU was an organization in which the European Commission played a very important role. The Commission was making proposals and the member countries were deciding on the basis of that proposal (common decision-making method). Although such a method has formally remained in force, the actual situation is different. The common method has been replaced by the inter-state method. The present European Commission is only a shadow of the Commission which was led by Jacques Delors during the 1980s. This means that the

EU member countries play the leading role, while the European Commission has somehow been “pushed away”. In the EU, the power is actually in the hands of the member countries. At present, there are 25 of them, but their number will most likely increase soon.

7. THE EU BUDGET

The EU annual budget is about €100 billion. The member countries make payments into the EU budget according to a very complicated formula. Payments are made mostly in accordance with the country’s economic power. The EU budget is spent on agriculture – 50%, regional and social development – 30%, administration – 5% and other – 15%.

The EU budget is determined according to the plan, i.e. the Financial Perspective, which is made at seven-year intervals (in the EU there is also “central planning”, but nobody calls it like that). Its maximum level is 1.27% of the total GDP of all EU member countries. The countries that are net payers into the budget uphold the view that it should not exceed 1% of the EU’s total GDP. The European Commission proposed €1,000 billion for the Financial Perspective (the long-term EU budget) for the period 2007-2013. The difficult negotiations about the new financial perspective set the amount at (only) €82 billion. The EU is becoming increasingly less generous than in the past.

8. THE FIRST EFFECTS ON THE EU CANDIDATE COUNTRY

The economic and other effects on the candidate country are generated over a long term. However, the first visible economic effect on the candidate country include a rise in the prices of foodstuffs and real property. This was felt very much by the countries that joined the EU in 2004. The EU encourages agricultural production through guaranteed purchases at relatively high prices. This generates an adverse effect on the income of those with fixed earnings. At the same time, the prices of real property are increasing as well. Within the EU, there is general stability and it is expected that it will be maintained in the future as well. Therefore, the prices of real property begin to rise prior to a country’s full accession to the EU. Thereafter, the prices of real property can increase even by 30% relative to the period before the beginning of the EU accession negotiations.

Other clearly visible effects include the easing of visa requirements for students in other EU countries. The young take advantage of this benefit

on a mass scale. In addition, the vehicles causing environmental pollution are removed from traffic. There are no suffocating and hazardous emissions in the streets and roads. But, the door also begins to open for the influx of legal and, in particular, illegal immigrants and other desperate people from the underdeveloped world.

A country's accession to the EU encourages its economic growth. Such a development can increase its general welfare. But the effect of this growth on individuals depends on income distribution. This can be determined and felt only over a longer period. Many of them in Central and East European countries point to the income-based stratification of the population (a new "nomenclature" is being created). It is estimated that these countries need at least one generation (about 30 or so years) so as to reach the level of the average per capita income of the "old" 15 EU countries.⁷¹

EU membership is not necessary for a country's material wealth and economic progress. Switzerland and Norway have the highest per capita income in Europe and one of the highest in the world and are not EU members. These countries have special agreements on free trade in industrial products with the EU and that is sufficient for them. On a number of occasions, the citizens of these countries voted against their country's accession to the EU at a referendum.

One should bear in mind that EU membership is not the guarantee of economic security and progress. In Germany, the unemployment rate has been the highest since the 1930s. In France, 10% of its working-age population is unemployed and there are no prospects that the situation will improve in the foreseeable future. Some regard the EU enlargement eastwards as the accession of the countries which are the carriers of culture that is alien to "Europe", since these new member countries brought a system which is based on ultraliberal economic policy, low taxes, low wages and poor industrial safety. Others hold that just the competition based on lower taxes and social dumping is necessary to provide a new impetus to the EU economy.

The prospects for taking advantage of the positive economic effects from accession to the EU over a long term are very favourable, but not guaranteed. All countries that had joined the EU, especially the peripheral ones, have increased their economic growth over a long term. But, that is

⁷¹ Fisher, S., R. Sahay and C. Végh (1998). "How Far Is Eastern Europe from Brussels?", IMF Working Paper, WP/9/98/53, p. 28. Economic Commission for Europe (2002). Economic Survey of Europe 2002, No. 1. New York, United Nations, p. 183.

a long term. One should wait. Look at Ireland: from a relatively underdeveloped country, it has developed into the most dynamic EU member country. Greece has also developed, but not so successfully like Ireland.

In any case, the EU enlargement east in 2004 resulted in some visible fatigue, even allergy, vis-à-vis new EU enlargements.⁷² This is especially evident in France as well as in a certain number of other EU member countries. Both Germany and France are sending open signals and messages to the Balkan states have not yet embarked on the path to full negotiations on EU membership. So, Germany proposes special partnership with the EU, but not accession to it.⁷³ Let us recall that France and Germany are the founding countries of the EU and that their opinion and decision carry special weight in the EU. Consequently, the EU enlargements are possible in the future, but it will be much more difficult to accept them and implement them.⁷⁴

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have known that the EU is an organization that keeps changing. Nevertheless, their expectations have not been fulfilled. When they embarked on the path to accession to the EU in the early 1990s, the EU was a very generous organization which was supporting its underdeveloped regions. When the new countries joined the EU in 2004, they realized that the EU was very demanding with respect to the *acquis*, but not so generous as expected by its new members. It turns out that the Central and East European countries expected from their accession to the EU one thing and got something quite different. These countries got much, much less than they had expected:

- Expensive requirements relating to the implementation of the *acquis* have been strengthened.
- The budgetary funds have remained more or less the same, but are now distributed to 25 and not 15 countries like before.
- The new member countries will start to receive the resources from the agricultural fund, but according to a sliding scale, so that they will be equalized with the old EU member countries as late as 2013.

⁷² G. Parker and H. Simonian, “De Villepin Blames EU Malaise on Enlargement”, *Financial Times*, 27 January 2006; G. Parker and C. Condon, “Some Balkan States May Find EU’s Door Closed”, *Financial Times*, 7 April 2006; “In Praise of Enlargement”, *The Economist*, 30 September 2006.

⁷³ E. Krasniqi and M. Beunderman, “Merkel Moots ‘Privileged Partnership’ for Balkans”, EUobserver, 17 March 2006.

⁷⁴ The President of the European Commission, Barroso, said that “the era of the EU enlargement has come to an end” (D. Macshane, “Patronising Turkey Is a Dangerous Game for Europe”, *Financial Times*, 11 October 2006).

- The citizens of the new member countries can travel freely and without any limits throughout the EU, but how many citizens travel abroad on the average? Probably 5%. Others have no money.
- The citizens of the new member countries do not enjoy the full right to employment in the “old” EU member countries. Seasonal jobs are allowed like before, if there is demand for them. They will acquire the full right to employment as of 2001, since the “old” EU member countries (especially Germany, Austria and France) are afraid of mass immigration.⁷⁵ Britain,⁷⁶ Ireland and Sweden are the only countries that have immediately opened their labour markets to the migrants from the new EU member countries.

9. SERBIA’S ATTRACTIVENESS FOR THE EU

The EU is primarily interested in Serbia for two reasons: political stability and transport (including the related services). Let us recall that the formation of the EU began in 1952 (the European Coal and Steel Community) primarily with a view to preserving peace and freedom and to preventing wars (between France and Germany). Serbia lost a good part of its geopolitical significance, which it had during the past 150 years, mostly because the world changed. But, its geopolitical significance has now obtained a new dimension. All countries in Serbia’s neighbourhood can become EU members within a specified period. When this happens, Serbia can become a “black hole” on the map of Europe. Therefore, the EU is interested in Serbia’s membership as well. Someone can say that Switzerland is also a “black hole” on the map of Europe, but Serbia is not Switzerland.

Serbia’s economic power and market play a very little role in its potential accession to the EU. Its total economic “weight”, that is, its market, for the EU is probably equal to the “weight” of a little larger town in the “old” EU.

10. THE EU’S ATTRACTIVENESS FOR SERBIA

Serbia should join the EU so as to participate in the life of the family of stable and democratic European countries. Some argue that Serbia will

⁷⁵ Sinn, H. (2004), “EU Enlargement, Migration and the New Constitution”, CESifo Working Paper No. 1367, p. 17.

⁷⁶ In the period May 2004 – August 2006, 447,000 workers from Central and Eastern Europe (mostly from Poland) migrated officially to Britain and 427,000 obtained a working licence. This is 30 times as many migrants as Britain expected (H. Mahoney, “427,000 Migrate to UK since EU Enlargement”, *Euobserver*, 23 August 2006).

lose a part of its national sovereignty, but that may seem so only on the face of it. However, if Serbia wishes to trade with the EU, it must adopt and implement the *acquis communautaire*. Should it remain outside the EU, Serbia will have no influence on the creation of the *acquis*. Within the EU, Serbia will have a specified (small) influence. Within the EU, Serbia's sovereignty could be strengthened in certain areas. The major benefits to be gained by Serbia as a EU member country include as follows:

- Within the EU, Serbia will be forced to essentially improve its judiciary and government administration in general (in addition to reducing corruption). This can be one of the more significant benefits of its accession to the EU. Contracts will have to be executed. The courts will solve disputes and bring verdicts within a reasonable time. If, for example, someone is injured or incapacitated through someone else's guilt in a car accident, he can be sure that the court – in the case of taking legal action against the insurance company – will bring a decision within a reasonable time and that the injured party will be unambiguously compensated for the damage done.
- The fight against corruption and organized crime will be more intensive and more efficient.
- The country will get a certain chance to get rid of irresponsible, dubious, unhealthy and dangerous politicians, who conduct policies and make various unreasonable statements for without bearing any political, legal or moral responsibility.
- Serbia will have access to a guaranteed large and rich market for its products and services. At the same time, it will have to open its market for goods and services from the EU member countries. The prices of certain industrial products will fall, which will generate a favourable effect on consumers. Producers will be forced to improve their business performance and turn out products in demand on the EU market. In the opposite, they can go bankrupt. This can have favourable general effects on Serbia, but only over a longer term.
- Very strict competition rules on the EU market will limit and reduce the subsidies to inefficient enterprises (JAT Airways is the first candidate). Within the EU, such enterprises should recover within a shorter time period. In the opposite, they should be closed down so as not to disturb competition and relieve the society of these loss-making enterprises, which pose a constant, unnecessary bur-

den for the people and the state. The funds should be invested in profitable economic activities and not to be squandered.

- The monopolists' influence on the market will be reduced.
- Consumer protection will be improved.
- The enlarged, guaranteed and rich EU market will provide some prospects for higher investments in production (a rise in employment). At the same time, competition will remove inefficient enterprises from the Serbian market (a fall in employment).
- Certain minor regional and agricultural funds will be coming from the EU, but only in a longer run. However, the question that imposes itself here is whether the Common Agricultural Policy and other EU funds will exist after 2013.
- Environmental quality will be significantly improved.
- Students can study relatively easily in other EU member countries, or at least some of them.
- The marginal groups, such as homosexuals and lesbians, will increase their influence and enjoy better protection.⁷⁷ Such "protection" will probably be enjoyed by religious sects as well. Last but not least,
- Serbia's accession to the EU will contribute significantly to the improvement of human security and, thus, to internal stability in Serbia, as well as to peace and security in the region.

The question that also imposes itself is whether Serbia is asked anything with respect to its accession to the EU. Formally and legally yes, but practically very little. If the EU politicians decide to receive Serbia in its membership, this can be done by a very short procedure. Recall the case of Slovakia, or the other case concerning Serbia. Namely, the Council of Europe (Strasbourg) is an inter-state organization, which comprises exclusively democratic countries and supports primarily democracy, civil rights, freedom of the press, assembly and contract: the rule of law and the like. And there are the accession rules. The country that violates the rights advocated by the Council of Europe cannot become its members. That is clear. All EU member countries are also the members of the Council of Europe. And what happens? How these rules are applied in practice? The then union of Serbia and Montenegro was invited and admitted to full membership of the Council of Europe in March 2003. Let us remind

⁷⁷ This might also lead to the distribution of government funds to the mentioned groups. Here one should also bear in mind serious demographic problems. For years now, there have been more deaths than births in Serbia!

ourselves: that was the period of martial law and Operation Sablja (Sabre) in full swing, when the democratic rights in Serbia were suspended. The Council of Europe did not wait for the usual and expected “academic 15 minutes” for Operation Sablja to be finished and the suspended democratic rights to be returned, and then to admit Serbia and Montenegro to its membership. The democratic rights were “seized”, because lawyers, politicians and historians are still debating as to whether the imposition of martial law was legally valid.

11. THE FUTURE OF THE EU

In its near future, the EU will be weakened, while its future contents will be uncertain in a longer run. It was expected that the EU member countries would ratify the new Constitution of the EU by the end of 2006. France and the Netherlands said “no” at the referendum in 2005. In Britain, the sentiment of its citizens is against this constitution. In such circumstances, the issue of the EU constitution was set aside until 2009, while the interval will be the “period of contemplation”. In any case, the EU will continue to function according to the principles laid down under the Nice Agreement in 2001.

The country which fails to ratify the constitution may be requested to leave the EU (and have the status like Norway and Sweden – to be outside the EU). But something like that cannot be requested from France or the Netherlands. Whatever the outcome of the constitutional crisis in the EU, its future is stratified.

The EU initiated a very big and ambitious project, as was expressed in Lisbon in 2001. It is intended that the EU becomes “the most competitive economy in the world, whose economy is based on knowledge” within a period of 10 years. More than half of that period has passed, but there is no visible progress and, apart from the United States (and Japan), the new and very dynamic competitors have appeared (China).

The question that imposes itself here is which EU layer will be entered by the countries conducting the accession negotiations with the EU (Turkey and Croatia)? Britain is especially advocating a constant EU enlargement. This is ironical, because Britain is the least integrated country in the EU, since it is outside the eurozone and the Schengen treaty. Britain is most strongly supporting a constant EU enlargement (since it most likely wishes to dilute and weaken the EU), while at the same time avoiding payment of its part of the financial costs of such enlargement. This was best

evidenced at the end of 2005 when the EU budget for the period 2007-2013 was negotiated. The East and Central European countries that joined the EU in 2004 were encouraged by British support to their accession, but thereafter they were surprised and disappointed by Britain's unwillingness to support the EU budget, which would facilitate the adjustment of the new EU member countries. Some of them recalled the ancient story about Danayans bringing gifts and raised serious doubts about Britain's reliability as a partner over a longer term.⁷⁸

The fact remains that the future enlargement after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria will not be the EU's real priority. It still has the problem how to absorb 10 countries that joined it in 2004; it is also concerned with the constitutional crises and the state of monetary union as its most ambitious integration project. In addition, the accession negotiations with Turkey will be faced with a number of obstacles. Namely, there is the open resistance of some countries to the accession of this Muslim country to the EU. That is especially evident in France, Austria, Cyprus and Germany. A significant obstacle is also posed the view that Islam is a "political movement disguised as religion".⁷⁹ Simon Jenkins writes that we cannot open a newspaper, or turn on a radio or TV channel without learning about a conflict linked with Islam.⁸⁰ A great number of migrants from these countries to the EU wishes to select their adjustment to the new environment like from a "menu", but not to be integrated into the "European package".

Contrary to the fundamental and legally guaranteed principles about the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour within the EU, France and Spain are trying to block the purchases of domestic energy companies by firms from other EU member countries. Poland is trying to do the same thing, but in the field of banking. This new national protectionism may seriously affect the single EU market and bring almost half

⁷⁸ J. Cienski, G. Parket and J. Thornhill, "Friction with UK Causes Poland to Look for New Allies", *Financial Times*, 12 December 2005.

⁷⁹ Leading article: An End to Tolerance, *The Sunday Times*, 12 February 2006. There is an international organization of Muslim countries (Organization of the Islamic Conference), which represents the interests of over 50 member countries, and has its permanent delegation to the UN. It would be interesting to see the reaction of the "international community" to the establishment of the Organization of Orthodox Countries under the leadership of Russia (or Greece), or the founding of the Organization of Christian Countries that would represent its own interests within the UN.

⁸⁰ S. Jenkins, "Under Straw's Veil of Moderation a Fancy Piece of Political Footwork", *The Sunday Times*, 8 October 2006.

a century long economic integration into question.⁸¹ Has the EU become too broad and too deep? Are the large and strong EU member countries, such as: France, Spain and Poland, applying the basic geopolitical law that countries make decisions which are primarily in their national interest?

The EU is in a crisis which has several dimensions: its administrative and constitutional system; budget; incomplete economic, political, financial and migration adjustment to its eastward enlargement; the vision of its future; problems relating to its monetary union, to mention just a few.

Who could predict in 1980 how the world and Europe would look like in 1990? Even the enthusiasts from academic circles did not succeed in it. The first geopolitical law is that the countries always make decisions and take actions which are primarily in their national interest. The second general geopolitical law is that political reality changes frequently and easily. Therefore, the forecasts of the future which are longer than five years, for example, are prone to making very big mistakes.

Some states and alliances disintegrate (relatively rapidly) and new ones are formed. The existing alliances change their content and meaning. France, the founding country of the EU, or the European Economic Community as it was called in 1957, is losing a dose of interest in the EU, because after the EU enlargement eastwards it cannot project its national interests through the EU interests any more. The geopolitical environment in the EU changed significantly. The French and Dutch “no” to the EU constitution in 2005 was not the resistance of their citizens to the future EU, but was partly their resistance to what the EU already became. The EU is in a constitutional crisis and its constitutional future is uncertain.

The EU became and remained a distinctly stratified organization during the 1990s. Some predict it a bright future. Others compare its current state with that of the former Yugoslavia in 1988. Some also hold that the EU is moving towards a free trade area (somewhat deeper than the agreement on the free trade area concluded by the United States, Canada and Mexico).⁸² Some kind of stratified or probably “shortened” EU will certainly survive. As a very small country, Serbia should make an effort to adjust to the EU. It is late, but not too late to establish stronger and deeper relations with the EU.

⁸¹ G. Parker, “Barbed Response: How Europe Could Rent Asunder by Barricades to Business”, *Financial Times*, 22 March 2006.

⁸² Stratfor, “Europe’s New Trade Approach”, 18 September 2006.

12. CONCLUSION

The author presented his view on Serbia's accession to the EU a long time ago, in the article entitled "A Basis for Faster Thinking", which was published in *Ekonomska politika*, on 14 March 1988. The article was the product of his public lectures and presentations a year earlier. The author advocated the then Yugoslavia's submission of an application for the beginning of accession negotiations with the EU. At that time, the EU was a common market and generously provided the funds to its member countries for their underdeveloped regions. Had we then negotiated with the EU and acceded to it, which was possible at that time (let us remember the offer made by Gianni De Michelis and other officials), everything would have been easier, faster and cheaper, and we would have certainly avoided the war and the subsequent problems. At that time, the author was publicly supporting the country's accession to the EU. Let us remind ourselves that it was the period of one-party rule, so that the daily and professional press raised a hue and cry against this and other articles on this issue.

So far, nobody has presented or showed to this author any article in favour of our country's accession to the EU which was published before his. If someone said something about that issue, that was just a house or parlour talk. The author would like to know the forum of the Communist League in which today's great public advocates of Serbia's accession to the EU were in 1987-1988 and what they were publicly saying and publishing, if they had something to say about that issue.⁸³

The EU is now a single market and has a monetary union of 13 countries, while Serbia has become impoverished and backward. Its accession to the EU has been very aggravated, because the EU standards have become much stricter than in 1988 and the EU is much less willing and has much less available funds for assistance to underdeveloped regions than necessary. Romania and Bulgaria have signed the agreements on their accession to the EU, but new enlargements are not the EU's priority. Its priority is to solve its deep constitutional, administrative and political crisis.

At the time the EU was founded and later on, during the 1990s, the admission of new members was easier and the procedure was simpler.

⁸³ Some of them are now in various non-governmental organizations. Such citizens' groups were not elected by anyone at the elections. They are here to "promote" some specific interests. Some of these organizations deserve credit and should be respected (for health protection, environmental protection, etc.), while others are evidently the Trojan horses and janissaries. The public has the right to know who is paying such organizations, because that would elucidate the origin and orientation of their activities.

Yugoslavia missed that chance and Serbia is now in a much more difficult position. However, it should aspire to the general aims of the EU, while its officials must present a clear analysis to the domestic public:

- What will be obtained by the country's accession to the EU within a short, medium and long term and when?
- How much does it cost and what we will be deprived of over a short, medium and long term?
- What are the experiences of the countries that joined the EU in 2004? What can be learned from their experience? Are these countries happy and satisfied? The EU brought significant non-material and certain material improvements to these countries. However, the EU also caused certain social stresses. They are also reflected in the division of their societies and the instability of their governments (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic) during 2006. Poland, for example, is becoming increasingly more sceptic towards the EU and is unpredictable as regards its further integration.⁸⁴ The situation is similar in the Czech Republic.
- Why some EU member countries are turning to "economic nationalism" (or even protectionism) instead of accepting the further integration of their markets with the EU partners?⁸⁵

A great danger on the path to the EU is posed by the way in which it is presented or imposed on the people in Serbia. In a way, this is done in a neo-communist way. Until 1989, the guiding political idea in former Yugoslavia was communism. The red star has now been replaced with the EU's yellow one. Just as before they were looking askance at those disagreeing with the red star (to put it mildly), many of them now are looking at those who are against that (or repainted) yellow star.

The "belligerently" presented European integration of Serbia by many domestic politicians may only cause resistance by the people against the EU, especially because they were promised integration a long time ago. The government is making serious efforts on that path, but the people practically do not feel anything tangible and visible. Let us only recall the visa issue. Also, if Serbia joins the EU one day, it will be questionable to which "exter-

⁸⁴ Stratfor, "EU: Protectionism Versus Progress at the EU Summit", 23 March 2006; "Her Own Voice", *The Times*, 28 June 2006; "Last Days of Poland's EU Springtime?", *European Voice*, 8 June 2006, p. 7; J. Cienski and G. Parker, "Polish Purge of Pro-Europe Officials Prompts Fear", *Financial Times*, 25 July 2006.

⁸⁵ The examples include France, Spain, Poland and Italy with respect to banking and energy. (G. Parker, "EU States Failing to Open Single Market", *Financial Times*, 18 July 2006.

nal” ring it will be admitted. This must be clearly said and presented to the people in Serbia in advance but, unfortunately, that is not done.

The tactless, irresponsible and “easily promised speed” of Serbia’s accession to the EU until a certain year (in 2012), promised by some politicians in Serbia, and the benefits that will be gained from it, are not realistic. As we have already mentioned, small Serbia (in reality) is not asked much about those things.

One should give credit to a good part of politicians in Serbia, since they know a lot about politics. However, they know less about the economy, even less about the EU, nothing about its internal dynamics and even less about its future! That nobody knows. Nobody knows whether the EU will exist in 2012. Whether some political or economic tsunami will happen until then, and what its influence will be? (Energy crisis, contagious diseases, monetary shock, acts of terrorism, war, natural disasters, demographic crisis...). If the EU survives, what will be its content and form like? Will something like that be attractive for the member countries to remain in it? Will some of them leave it?⁸⁶ Let us recall the recent disintegration of various federal states in Europe (the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro), or military-political and economic alliances (the Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). And let us also recall the serious political “pledges” to the eternal allegiance to those states and alliances. And let us recall how all this past. Very fast (geopolitics).

Let us also have in mind that the future of some countries within the EU is uncertain. There are strong regional tendencies towards greater autonomy, or even independence. Let us only recall Belgium (its Flemish and Walloon parts), Spain (Catalonia and the Basque province), northern Italy, France (Corsica), Britain (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland).⁸⁷ Not to mention the Balkans, Near East, Africa or Asia (Sri Lanka, the

⁸⁶ Greenland, an autonomous Danish territory, left the EU after its referendum in 1985. Greenland held that it was in its interest to leave the EU. The great majority of general managers of British companies (1,000 were interviewed) supported the new negotiations about Britain’s participation in the EU. The interviewed hold that the Brussels’ burden on their business activities outweighs the benefits from their participation in the EU single market. These managers advocate the return of legislative law from Brussels to Britain (J. William, “Business Chiefs Say EU Rules Outweigh Benefits”, *Financial Times*, 16 October 2006). About the withdrawal of Britain from the EU it is also debated in its academic circles: P. Minford, V. Mahambare and E. Nowell (2005). **Should Britain Leave the EU?**, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.

⁸⁷ S. Jenkins, “We’d Be a More United Kingdom with an Independent Scotland”, *The Times*, 17 September 2006.

Philippines, Kashmir...). Will there be monetary union within the EU and whether the euro will still exist?⁸⁸ Will such a EU be acceptable, attractive and necessary to Serbia?

All this should be included in a public debate and decision-making.

There are enormous and attractive benefits from a country's accession to the EU. For Serbia, as a multiethnic, multireligious and multicultural political and social community, the greatest benefits are the creation of conditions for a faster and more successful improvement of interethnic relations and religious tolerance, as a vital prerequisite for peace and stability not only in Serbia, but also in the region. Preparations for a country's accession to the EU are associated with very high costs, risks and uncertainty. On this path, Serbia can offer, whether voluntarily or not, serious and irreversible things and rights over a long term, without a guarantee that it will join EU in the end. However, to remain outside the EU poses an even greater risk, uncertainty and danger. There are still more countries wishing to join the EU than those pondering (at present) whether to leave it. After all, it is the people that should decide about such an important step for our country, but its final decision must be based on good information. *Festina lente!* (Run slowly!)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Jovanović, M. (2004), "Eastern Enlargement of the EU: A Topsy-Turvy Endgame or Permanent Disillusionment", *Journal of Economic Integration*, Vol. 19, pp. 830-868.
- Jovanović, M. (2005), "Turkey in the European Union: Euthanasia or the Rejuvenation of Europe?", *Associazione Universitaria di Studi Europei (AUSE)*, Venice, July.
- Jovanović, M. (2006), *Evropska ekonomska integracija*, Belgrade, Faculty of Economics.

⁸⁸ J. Kay, "If Italy Thinks Unthinkable About the Eurozone", *Financial Times*, 12 September 2006. Since 2010, the generation born after World War II will begin to retire on a mass scale. This will exert great pressure on the national budgets of the countries in which pensions are state-guaranteed. It will be extremely difficult to maintain the arrangement within the eurozone about keeping the budget deficit up to 3% of GDP. There will be a reduction in the guaranteed pension obligations (this may cause mass protests), or a massive and undesirable "earthquake" within the eurozone (which probably can be predicted). Pay attention to the eurozone during the period 2010-2015. In addition, the countries being in the eurozone have a common monetary policy, but not a common fiscal one, which aggravates the functioning of the zone of monetary integration. Europe has many examples of the failed gold-backed monetary unions. The current monetary union is based (at present) on the strict promise of its member countries. But, that is just a promise. We will see what will happen in the case of the first, more serious crisis. The countries running the greatest risk in this respect are the Czech Republic, Greece, Cyprus, Hungary, Portugal and Slovenia (L. Kubusova, "Ageing Population Puts Six EU State Budgets at 'High Risk'", *Euobserver*, 12 October 2006).

MILA ALEČKOVIĆ-NIKOLIČ, PH.D.

SEDEP, PARIS, FRANCE

IN THE NAME OF EUROPE: WHAT ERRORS WERE MADE IN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION TAKEN IN THE BALKANS, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SERBIAN DIASPORA

We will address several problems faced by present-day Serbia, which prevent reconciliation among the Balkan peoples. To the extent the policy conducted by the Serbian government over a period of fifteen years was unfortunate, the position of the international community and Europe was often maladjusted to Balkan reality.

Let us begin by listing the errors made by the international community, in the name of democracy, that is, in an attempt to “solve the Balkan conflicts”:

1. Change of the subject;
2. Deliberate confusion over the regime and the people;
3. Emotional “Pavlovian reflex”, applied due to the ignorance, that is, the lack of ethno-psychological knowledge;
4. Suppression.

1. CHANGE OF THE SUBJECT

To penetrate the Peninsula, establish new military bases, plunder the wealth of the soil, use qualified yet low-paid work force, build the bridge to the new “silk road” after destroying the bridges on the Danube, continue to stir up ethnic conflicts, weaken Eastern Europe economically so as to become even more dependent, get hold of the wealth of the Caspian Lake and Central Asia... It seems as if we are in a book by **Zbigniew Brzezinski**:

Will this big “economic project”, which is contrary to the peaceful policy pursued by the United Nations, be now facilitated or aggravated?

During the past 15 years, the international community or, to be more exact, the powers which are called by that name, regarded the Serbs as the occupiers in the Balkans and Kosovo. If we exempt the groups of Albanians that moved in secretly, and if we bear in mind their migrations

to Germany and Turkey, the number of Albanians in Kosovo can be estimated at about 50 per cent of the population at a maximum (of which 3 per cent accounts for Catholics); 30 per cent accounts for “non-Serbs” and “non-Albanians” or, in other words, various ethnic groups (Roma, Aromanians, Vlachs, Goranci, ‘Egyptians’ and even Cherkeshians), who had good relations with Orthodox Serbs. The conclusion: the view that Albanians constitute 90 per cent of the population was wrong from the very beginning.

2. DELIBERATE CONFUSION OVER THE REGIME AND THE PEOPLE

The psychological action against Serbia as the aggressor in the last war was, despite the mobilization of large resources, poorly conducted: the change of the subject: deliberate (conscious) confusion over the cause and effect of the war; deliberate confusion (by the Allies) over the Serbian regime and the people; emotional Pavlovian reflex, applied with much ignorance and the lack of knowledge about the Balkan mentalities and, finally, psychological and historical suppression – the favourite 200 years old child of the continent or, in other words, all those earthly characteristics of psychological action, cherishing an aggressive approach and reflecting a big gap in knowledge and general culture at the end of the 20th century, brought about the disasters in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Cyprus, Somalia, the Great Lakes region in Africa, Nicaragua, Iraq and, recently, in Serbia, **despite the good will of the United Nations.**

Since the very beginning of the war in the Balkans and Kosovo, it was insisted on the effects of the conflict and not on its **causes**. Alas, to those who, in the wealth of their memory, have some knowledge about Kant’s theory, there is no need to explain why only the causes are important when one should speak about *guilt* and judge about it. Consequently, we know the main cause of a great part of that hypocritical war. According to General **Pierre-Marie Gallois**, that was the wish of the military-industrial complex of the world’s greatest power to penetrate the Peninsula; establish new military bases (like those in Grahovo in Bosnia, Krivolac in Macedonia and Bondstill in Kosovo); plunder the wealth of the region; exploit qualified yet low-paid work force; open the “bridge to the new Silk Road” by involving Turkey which is conveniently located between the Balkans and the Caucasus. Therefore, it is necessary to stir up ethnic conflicts with the help of corrupted local leaders, cut off the bridges on the Danube,

weaken Eastern Europe economically, thus making it increasingly more dependent, and stir up the manipulated groups against Russia. It is the question of getting hold of the riches of the Caspian Lake and Central Asia which, as we can see, is already underway. As for the last important aim – to take possession of the region rich in oil, gas and mines for one more century of life on Earth, General Gallois and some other morally pure persons have already written enough.

It is out of question that this wealth should not be exploited. But, this can only be done with the consent of those on whose territory it is located and not by groups of the world's predators, at the will of American parasitic national-capitalism. **That is the real cause, the real geopolitical context of wars in the Balkans.** The rest is derived from the bribability, ambitions and inability of local leaders.

Unfortunately, massacres in almost all parts of the former Yugoslav territory, Albanian irredentism, killed or abducted soldiers and civilians on all sides are only the tragic Consequences of this main two-faced Cause.

There is only one question that is now posed to the world's democracies and the United Nations: is one American life worth more than one Iraqi, Jordanian, Syrian, Serbian or Albanian life?

Deliberate confusion over the regime and the people resulted in the hypocrisy of the so-called punishment of the Serbian regime by destroying the cities, civilian targets and hospitals. On the other side, confusion over the Albanian people and UCK leaders was also a fatal error.

We can state today that no sooner had **Milošević** been deposed from power than the same pressure was tested by putting the blame on the new Serbian President and then exposing him to various pressures.

”If you are against multinational companies, you are a nationalist, that is, a fascist!, explained **Henri Gobard** in his *La guerre culturelle*. If you are against transnational or national-American capital and low-paid work force benefiting only the big business bourgeoisie, you are a nationalist! If you are against military bases in your country (France, for example, has no US base in its territory), you are a nationalist! If you are for the preservation of your language and against the deportation of foreign workers, if you dare to speak about your specificity, your culture, your identity – you are a nationalist! If you oppose the exploitation of mines in Kosovo by the Allies, that is because you are a nationalist! That goes no endlessly, concludes **Henri Gobard** in his book.

It should be noted that in the period from the arrival of the “forces of the international community”, the American and other ones, in Kosovo

up to 2000 (**only seven years** ago), about one thousand Serbs were killed and as many abducted. In one year, after 10 June 1999, that is, the arrival of the KFOR and UNMIK forces, 1027 persons were killed, of whom 902 were Serbs. Let us add 200 people killed by NATO bombings and 7000 wounded. The UN Resolution 1244 is not implemented. Ninety sacral buildings, Serbian churches and monasteries, were destroyed only in that period; drugs, prostitution, arms trafficking, trading in the icons stolen from the churches (it is estimated that there are about 10,000 of them) and, finally, trading in human organs removed from the dead as well as from the living (hence such a great number of abducted Serbs – about one thousand). In the words of Jacques Chirac, those are the moments or places “from which the Republic retreats”.

3. CAUSING THE EMOTIONAL PAVLOVIAN REFLEX DUE TO IGNORANCE OR THE LACK OF ETHNO-PSYCHIATRIC KNOWLEDGE

Let us say “Pavlovian” just here, because everything started with this Russian physician. **Skinner, Gatri, Bandura** and other American scientists (psychology of behaviour) have developed various psychological techniques of “social manipulation”, inspired by the genius of this Russian physician. Unfortunately, if one does not know the foundation of **Pavlov’s** theory, the results are logistic and human disasters, like in Iraq or in the former Yugoslavia. The modesty of all ethno-psychiatrists, who are familiar with the advantages of experiencing various psychological mentalities (**the legacy on the basis of which the United Nations was conceived and formed**), understands perfectly well why the analysts who knew (or did not know) that the Serbian people was in good relations with history, that it is proud and brave, with a certain instinct for territory (this is why it had its state in the early 8th century already) and why it did not react to the allegation that it was an “occupier”. It is evident that rhetoric was wrong.

The former Yugoslav triumvirate in power had the problems in carrying out necessary reforms due to a difficult economic situation after the ten-year period of war and embargo, 78 days of bombings of the infrastructure and increased corruption in its circles. Naturally, like always in history, on the eve of great political changes, the inability of the old structures becomes evident and the arrogance of bureaucrats, in addition to

their inability, causes disgust. The people endure the apathy of the disintegrating authorities and it is clearly felt that everything will fall apart.

The Serbs elected, as the leader of the “united opposition”, **Vojislav Koštunica**, a discrete and educated politician, capable analyst and a man of principle for whom, in 2000, the European and national values were the most important. Disgust, which I have just mentioned, refers actually to the question of Sense: who can be trusted in this corrupt and contaminated world, which could not, or did not want to prevent the burning of the cities and destruction of schools and hospitals, whereby only one authoritarian figure benefited from the misfortune of the people! Who could now be a judge in this region?

The national opposition and the parliamentary majority in Serbia were on the same line of defence against the NATO. That was a direct result of the unsuccessful psychological war in the Balkans.

4. SUPPRESSION

Since the time of the ancient Greeks it has been known that politics and morality are strictly separated and that they have different destinies. We also bear in mind that important elections will be held soon in several Western countries. And it has been known since **Tocqueville** already that democracy and a “tyranny of the majority” are necessary until they become self-destructive.

American officers forgot the bombing of Serbia after bombing Iraq. In a way, the **United Nations was betrayed**. Like in some other countries, from which they are leaving after an armed conflict, the most powerful ones are now creating a schizophrenic climate in Serbia, dividing it into two parts: the good and bad. This is again a fatal error and psychological inability to understand the mentality of the other, at the moment when Serbia needs peace and the whole Balkan region – stability.

Neither the Serbs nor *Albanian civilians* have forgotten the bombings. The Vietnam syndrome could really occur, because in most cases the success of self-suppression, as we are reminded in the clinical world of virtual reality, can be only relative. Short and artificial. That is the unavoidable destiny of every psychological illusion. Spinoza was right at least in one respect: one of God’s faces is certainly Nature.

Apart from cassette bombs and bombs containing depleted uranium, the NATO forces also used phosphorus and napalm in order to scorch the land and definitely destroy the spirit of sincere Americanophilism in the

Balkans. Such an outcome was already predicted by **Spengler**. This spirit will never be the same. By obeying the orders of the Pentagon, **despite the ideals of the United Nations**, the Western democracies excluded themselves in a way from the Balkan conflict (this error was not repeated in Iraq). Despite intellectuals, workers and students from our Serbian diaspora, who have been living in America and Western Europe for years, despite their wish to turn the page and begin the common Christian life again, despite the market and exchange needs, the feeling of bitterness will remain in their minds and in necessary cooperation in the future. Psychological suppression does not function in Balkan culture.

In the Balkans, the contemporary European is viewed as a “man of barter, trade and exchange, workshop and product.... a middleman, an interpreter of material horizontalism” (**Philippe Forget**, Gilles Polycarpe*). As a banker or, better said, a bourgeois. Close to the words: consumption, tax, invoice, violation, management, statement, confirmation, complaint, tax payer... Such a being does not receive visitors; it is not inspired; it does not communicate with the world, except by cell phone, computer screen or “single currency”.... It cannot be attributed a great moral or other depth and it is doubted that Salvation could come from it. But, we are also aware of the fact that we cannot be completely deprived of its products. (*“Les réseaux et l’infini”, *Economica*, Paris 1998).

How to Revive the Ideals of the United Nations and Reconciliation Among the Balkan Peoples?

Hoping that this is possible, one event is probably more than symbolic: in a NATO country, in Greece, on the square which is well known from all history textbooks, like in the unpoisoned time of the **ancient Athenians**, the economic wars at the end of the 20th century were condemned loudly and fearlessly by the free, unbridled, unbribable and morally straight world.

We predict what is now needed in the Balkans: the preservation of the civil peace and spiritual unity of our peoples; eradication of the corruption of the political classes; adequate channelling of the national sentiment; solving of the historical problem between Serbs and Albanians and the artificial problem between Serbs and Montenegrins, two branches of the same people. This is a big task before God. Faced with the persistent hypocrisy of the political world, one should not impatiently look for the justice of emotions, that is the weakness of the Balkan people.

We will also have to “remain cautious” about the abuse of democratic freedom, concealing the increasingly worse subordination of the people to

the forces of money and transnational companies, through the weakening of the peoples by stupidifying cultural productions.

What is also expected from us in the Balkans is the *ultima ratio* of the countries, reconstruction of cities and, naturally, request the removal of foreign military bases.

The fate of the Balkans still remains unpredictable. God sees the continuation but waits, as **Tolstoy** would say. This existential uncertainty is especially important for the region – the crossroads at which, at one time, the Great Schism divided the Christians, at which the conquering Islam was stopped, at which the cold war was blazing a trail; the dangerous crossroads are not only the key to the future of the Balkans, but also to the future of Europe and the rest of the world.

The continuity of history is only one of many interpretations. According to **Bachelard, Brunschwig or Kuhn**, couldn't we also mention jumps, shifts and returns?

We can state in conclusion that the history is returning before our eyes, but one should only have History so as to understand that and fight.

The Balkan population will live for a long time, despite the wars it has experienced. "Death does not exist, there are only migrations", said the Serbian author **Miloš Crnjanski**.

And reconciliation among the peoples will come slowly.

Let us quote Malraux that the era in which we live will be the era of the revival of the United Nations or it will not exist.

Mila Alečković Nikolić, Ph.D.

SEDEP

Paris-Belgrade

Professor of Anthropological and Clinical Psychology. She specialized at the High School of Science EHESS (Paris) and received her Ph.D. at the University of Sorbonne – The Concept of Subconscious in Modern Psychological Theories, before the commission consisting of the members who came from the Sorbonne, Heidelberg and Oxford.

Mila Alečković Nikolić also held the position of a scientific research fellow at the Institute for Criminological and Sociological Studies (Belgrade). She lectured in Lausanne, Moscow, Perpignan, Montreal, Paris, Thessalonica, Madrid, Biarritz, Prague, Tripoli, Benghazi, Liege, Beijing, Yerevan. She is the author of 60 scientific works, published in international specialized magazines. She is the author of the study, in French, "The Image of Lunacy in Slavic and Eastern Christian Tradition" and the

literary essays “Is there a Serbian Archetype”, “Kosovo – The Conquered Conqueror”, “Fear in Serbian Tradition”, “Serbs and Power”, “There is no Death, There Are Only Migrations”, as well as the book “Vous avez dit l’Europe?” (Who Speaks About Europe?), Psychology of Liberalism, The Idea of Justice and Serbian National Interest.

Mila Alečković Nikolić is politically active in the Serbian diaspora. She is the leader of the diaspora’s Social Serbian and European Gaulliste Movement (SEDEP), which she founded in France.

ABSTRACT:

The aim of the paper is to call attention to the axiological, psychological, historical and political aspects of the Balkan problem. The question is how to achieve the psychological comprehension of the historical Kosovo conflict through a geopolitical analysis. In the second part of the paper, the question is how to achieve political universality in the world of American reductionistic hegemony, with permanent economic wars through the instrumentalisation of Islam. The aim of our analysis is to present the geopolitical position of the Gaulliste circles all over the world and interpret the solution to the Balkan and Kosmet problems in the light of the new paradigm of multipolarity and the revival of the United Nations.

AZEM VLLASI

LAWYER AND EX-SENIOR POLITICIAN OF KOSOVO AND SFR JUGOSLAVIJA

SOLVING THE POLITICAL STATUS OF KOSOVO – AN IMPORTANT CONDITION FOR NORMALIZING THE ALBANIAN–SERBIAN RELATION IN THE BALKANS

Respected participants of the Conference, dear friends. Allow me firstly to thank the organizers of the Conference for their invitation and express my gratitude that today me and Mr. Behxhet Shala from the Human Rights Protection Council are present here from Kosovo.

The subject chosen for the discussion at this Conference is very beneficial, because it will take a long time here in these places that suffered one decade of terrible disputes, for us to commit to reconciliation, healing the war wounds, cooperation and turning to the future. Consequences of the latest tragic armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia are still visible and unhealed. The same thing is in Kosovo, especially in the Albanian-Serbian relations. It will take much time and efforts, to the aggressors but to the victims as well to remove these consequences and to restart the process of reconciliation. The special responsibility belongs to the aggressors to apologize to the victims and to show the commitment on compensating them, and clearly, sincerely to distance and condemn the politics that initiated these conflicts, while the victims need to find the force to forgive but not forget, to seek the justice and not revenge, to accept the hand of peace and not hate. It is important that this conference is being held in Belgrade from where an insane politics twenty years ago has started conflicts with many non-Serbian nations of the ex-Yugoslavia by offering a new politics of restructuring which except for them who offered was not acceptable for anyone, and at the end it was shown that it was harmful for the Serbian people as well. In this way the disintegration of Yugoslavia, together with the creation of new states from the federal units that the politics was endangering it was evident. Of course, the entire process would have been easier, shorter and bloodless if exactly in Belgrade as the centre of political rule in Serbia and Yugoslavia at the end of eighties and nineties would rule the people as in Prague and Moscow who peacefully, with a political responsibility and an agreement, have dis-

integrated the USSR and Czechoslovakia, instead of the people that have firstly amputated Kosovo from the SFRY in 1989-1990 and forcibly have put it under the state frame of Serbia, and then continued for 10 years without a success to keep it on that condition; they wanted to destroy or split in half Bosnia and Herzegovina; to take approximately 1/3 of the territory of Croatia. It is important that the citizens of Serbia by elections removed the bearer of that politics even though that happened after they have caused so many tragedies and lost on all fronts. It is also important that in Serbia there have been some internal reforms after that. But, new Serbia and its new ascendancy did not perform any necessary or convincing removal from that politics in relation to its neighbour-victims of that politics. The main bearers of the power and creators of the politics are yet prisoners of the politics that did not stop from territorial claims towards its neighbours, mainly toward Kosovo and Bosnia. That fact is the biggest obstruction in the process of reconciliation and cooperation. In the meanwhile that fact potentially represents the greatest danger for repetition of the conflict and tragedies.

Yugoslavia ended up as an unsuccessful project. The ones that wanted more for their Serbian people have dissipated it, and surely in harm of the others. The biggest victims of its disintegration ended the people that wanted protection from Serbian hegemony – Albanians and Bosnians. The drama of the disintegration of ex-Yugoslavia ends exactly where it began: in Kosovo.

Now the solution of Kosovo's status is in its final stage and it is sure that the ex- Federative Unit according to the Constitution of 1974 whose status has been violently infringed on 1989, will be a new independent state. That will have a great importance that Serbs and Albanians, after almost a century, turn their backs on the hard period of mutual confrontations and disputes exactly on the issue of Kosovo and start a path of reconciliation, built on trust and cooperation. It is very important for the Serbian people to prepare for what will happen, and not hold them in illusions that China and Russia will keep Kosovo under Serbia. After all what happened, especially in the past 20 years, and the non-existence of the Constitution of 1974 Yugoslavia that was the last and only possible state frame that the Albanians from this side of the border with Albania and the Serbs be in the same state, independence of Kosovo from Serbia is the only alternative. That is the imperative request of 95% of the citizens of Kosovo, majority of Albanians, but also of other ethnic communities, except 5% of Serbs. Albanians from Macedonia and Montenegro have consolidated their position in those states and they recognize them

as theirs. They participate in the political life of those states. Albania does not have an intention to change the borders along the ethnic lines. In this way, by the independence of Kosovo, important principles for peace in the Balkans will be created, for reconciliation and cooperation. Very soon it will be clear that Serbia has a tremendous benefit from liberating itself from the historical confusion named Kosovo and from the problems that it does not know and cannot solve for more than twenty years. Albanians will lose the fear of a possible tragic and afflictive continuity or repetition of history, and cooperation with Serbs and Serbia as neighbours and the neighbouring state the Albanians will be accepted by the need of mutual benefit. Albanians, as always a majority in Kosovo, regardless of the unhealed traumas from 1999, are clearly seeing that reconciliation and forgiveness are necessary and that it is a condition for Kosovo to join the European integrations. Kosovo, as a democratic and European state, will offer, without any hesitation, protection and equality to all citizens and also to the Serbs who live in Kosovo. We are aware that there is no democratic and justice state for anyone and even for the majority if exactly the majority is not ready and capable to offer protection and equality to all of its citizens regardless of their ethnical, religious and any other diversities. Serbia will always have the right to be interested and aspire for better conditions of Serbs in Kosovo, but also we should be interested for conditions of Albanians in Serbia. But the intentions that Kosovo Serbs are divided from the jurisdiction of Kosovo is a wrong attitude, which is exactly the example of Kosovo where Serbs produced bad results. Cultural and religious heritage in Kosovo that belongs to the Serbian people will be saved and protected as Kosovo's and Serb's and not as the heritage of the state of Serbia. There is a long tradition of religious tolerance and respect for holiness by all who live in the area of Kosovo.

For almost six centuries, when there were no international conventions, nor UNESCO nor Serbian power and state in Kosovo, Gracanica, Dečani, Pečka Patrijaršija and Leviška in Prizren were protected. Cultural and religious heritage should not be politicized; it cannot be used for political goals.

The propaganda spread by Serbia that Kosovo will be a criminal, terrorist and Islamic state is not good and it will not help reconciliation. It also hides the prejudices and a dose of racism toward Albanians. None of us is stating that Kosovo will be like Switzerland, Germany or Sweden, but surely it will not be a worse state than the states in our Balkan surroundings. If there is no other alternative, and obviously there is not, then it is in the interest of the entire Balkans, and especially Serbia to recognize the

Independence of Kosovo and support our efforts to create a normal state and not an invalid and defective half-state which can be harmful for our neighbours. It will be much better for the status of Kosovo Serbs the normal constitution and functioning of the state in Kosovo that will normally take the responsibility for their conditions and a normal life.

DRAGAN K. VUKČEVIĆ

ACADEMICIAN, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF PODGORICA, MONTENEGRO

FROM THE FORTRESS TO THE BRIDGE

*Only when they learn how to talk,
people will become equal.*

Theodore Zeldin

Reconciliation and tolerance are the words which entered late into the languages and consciousness of the Balkan societies, their peoples and states.

Developed at the crossroads of diverse worlds, those societies regarded their differences as something hostile and the other as their adversary for a long time. Enslaved by their ethnocentric consciousness, they were persistently building closed societies, looking at them as shelters and self-sufficient communities. Therefore, we can say metaphorically that they were building peculiar fortresses in which they felt more secure in the turbulent times in which they lived.

They had no foreboding that their insularity, to which one can resort from time to time, will turn against them and their development one day. While living in their social and spiritual fortresses, they were also developing siege mentality. In essence, this was the fear of the other which only contributed to their insularity still further.

Therefore, it is no wonder that the past of this dark corner of Europe was marked by wars, conflicts and hatred not only between the nations, but also between their religions, states and ethnic groups. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the Balkan region was at the crossroads of the diverse and frequently hostile worlds of the East and the West. Their centres were far from the Balkans, so that the whole region could be regarded as a **dual province** of the powerful worlds, on whose margins the Balkan societies were emerging and surviving.

Such a historical background provides a frame for the picture of the Montenegrin society and its state. This small area was the meeting point of the powerful worlds which shaped our history and mentality. The great civilisations, powerful religions, peoples and ethnic groups lived beside

each other. Their contacts resulted more frequently in conflicts than in cooperation, so that diversity was regarded as a misfortune and not as an advantage.

Such social relations also contributed to the development of militant mentality, whose specificity was the readiness to come into conflict and take revenge rather than to reach agreement and forgive. Under these antagonistic circumstances, the historical time, filled with fear and restlessness, was passing.

Naturally, there were also the cases of noble forgiveness, reconciliation and harmony. In our opinion, these cases should serve as an example how something different does not have to be hostile. In these examples, we see that sparkling from the darkness of the past which can light up the future. Such examples are the sparks that can contribute to national reconciliation and ethnic and religious tolerance in Montenegro.

To achieve this, it is necessary to meet several conditions. First, the citizens of Montenegro must realize that they do not have anyone who is closer to them than themselves. And that it is much more rewarding to change oneself than the world. **That turning toward oneself and those beside oneself** is a call for mutual acquaintance and understanding. That is also a call for accepting the other as he is, without losing one's identity.

In our opinion, the holders of that new consciousness in Montenegro can be young and educated people, in particular. Those who have surpassed the narrow limits of the national and confessional, and have understood that underneath all differences there is something that is universally human. Those **future elites** in the areas of culture, politics, science and economy must be recognized by the state of Montenegro as its most important investment. Namely, investing in the creation of those elites is another name for planning one's future.

The second condition for national reconciliation and ethnic and religious tolerance is the **building of institutions** under whose roofs those ideas will be realized. Historical experience has shown that only the ideas in an institutional form can survive. Therefore, the adoption of the most important legal act – the Constitution of Montenegro must affirm the principles of a civil and lawful state, human rights and national and religious tolerance or, more precisely, the principles on which the modern world is based.

That points to the fact that, in the coming period, Montenegro will have to take on a big and responsible assignment to plan its elites and build its institutions. One such institution, which can contribute to the idea to which this gathering is devoted, is the **School of Tolerance**. We

propose its founding **in Bar**, as the town characterized by interethnic and inter-religious coexistence, whose collective historical experience is a good example of how the mentioned principle is observed.

We hold that, according to the composition of its students and teaching staff, the School should be regional. The lectures should be organized after the end of the winter semester and at the end of the summer one. We believe that the relevant government bodies in Montenegro, as well as local government representatives in Bar will be interested in supporting such an institution. We propose that its work is managed by the Council consisting of renowned personages in the sphere of culture, science and politics.

In our opinion, this School would serve as a good example of mutual acquaintance and dialogue between the members of different Balkan societies, nations and ethnic and religious groups. To the extent this dialogue becomes the basic form of communication, the people will get to know each other more and will become closer.

After all, the members of the Balkan societies and their states have proved in their history that they know how to fight against each other. The time has come that they demonstrate their readiness and ability to talk to each other. This is the only way in which the fortress, mentioned at the beginning of this paper as an expression of siege mentality, can be transformed into the bridge spanning the two banks. Therefore, it seems to us that the transformation of the Balkan societies, their peoples and states from the fortress into the bridge is possible and realistic. A vital prerequisite is to respect all differences as well as one's identity. All this must be accompanied by a different philosophy of life, based on the principle that someone's misfortune cannot be the basis of someone's good fortune. This is the only way to develop the feeling of self-esteem and build the principle of equality. And the role of intellectuals is just to be among the first to recognize that principle and shape it.

MILOMIR MIHALJEVIĆ

ADVISER TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF MONTENEGRO

APPROACH OF THE MONTENEGRO TO THE RECONCILIATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Dear Mr Chairman,
Esteemed Participants,

It is a special honour for me to have an opportunity to address this distinguished gathering, which is devoted to the issues to which Montenegro attaches special importance. As the hosts of the June meeting of the Permanent International Study Group in Sveti Stefan, we welcome the organization of this Conference, regarding it as an important contribution to dealing with the issue of national and inter-ethnic reconciliation and religious tolerance in the Balkans.

The process of facing the truth and moral elevation, aimed at overcoming the consequences of the tragic conflicts in the Western Balkans during the 1990s and finding the ways to achieve reconciliation among their peoples and states, are of utmost significance for the region. Some of these efforts include the identification of the major obstacles on the path to inter-ethnic reconciliation and religious tolerance, as well as the adoption of specific measures for overcoming these obstacles, which deserves special attention and support. In this regard, the European Center for Peace and Development is making an exceptional contribution by organizing the meetings and studies, with the participation of experts from the neighbouring countries and well-known world universities, which are devoted to the question of overcoming the vestiges of the past in the Western Balkans.

The Montenegrin policy of peace, national and religious tolerance found its full expression at the time of the most serious crisis in the territory of the former common state. Despite very difficult conditions, Montenegro succeeded in preserving peace and strengthening the concept of multiethnic society, not to mention the reception of a great number of refugees and displaced persons who, at one moment, constituted one-fifth of the total population.

The renewal of statehood, which was achieved peacefully and in partnership with the international community or, more specifically, with the European Union, provides an opportunity for focussing on successful development in the future. It is the task of the government and the entire society to make the best possible use of the given circumstances and to mobilize the available resources so as to reach the broadest social consensus on the basic lines of future development.

Montenegro's long-term strategic commitment, like that of all other countries in the region, is to join the European and trans-Atlantic integration processes, as well as to become their full member.

To this end, the society must be organized in accordance with the European standards and be capable of getting included in the modern international trends, which implies the promotion of full cooperation and confidence building in the surroundings, first in the Western Balkans and then in the region of South-Eastern Europe. Experience has shown that, to be successful, the economy must be open and must cooperate with the countries in the region, because an integrated approach makes an area suitable for large foreign investments and the modernization of existing infrastructure and the development of new one.

Parallel to the strengthening of bilateral relations with the neighbouring and other countries of South-Eastern Europe, Montenegro is trying its best to contribute to the realization of regional initiatives and complex regional linkages. In order to overcome the vestiges of the past, strengthen regional stability and ensure accelerated growth, it is of utmost significance to reach the modern standards, which are reflected in economic freedoms, free mobility of people, goods, capital and services, and the joint struggle against international terrorism and organized crime, through mutual cooperation.

The countries of the Western Balkans have set full membership in the ongoing international and, in particular, regional integration processes as their strategic aim. The inclusion of the region in the European and trans-Atlantic structures will mean that the vision of a united Europe has come true, which is in the interest of the forces of peace, democracy and progress.

In the spirit of such a policy, Montenegro is ready to make a full contribution to the joint efforts.

NANO RUŽIN, PH.D.

AMBASSADOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA TO NATO

NATO AS THE ICONOGRAPHY OF TOLERANCE AND DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE RELIGIONS IN THE BALKANS – THE EXAMPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and communism in 1989, the iconography which had, for almost five decades, supported the paradigm of so-called “brotherhood and unity”, “the communitarity”, the “solidarity of ethnic and religious minorities with the majority nation”, also broke apart. Then the pioneers of the post-War Yugoslavia, Tito and Kardelj had already vanished from the stage, and the Federation fall disintegrated into few new states each with its own burden and political complexity.

The Republic of Macedonia started its path to independence living in an illusion that it had settled the inter-ethnic relations after the Broz’s model, which consisted in the formal participation of a part of the politically corrupted Albanian elite in the government, second, in indifferent co-existence of different ethnic and religious communities, and third, in the absence of Albanians in the budgetary institutions, lack of powers in the local government, lack of use of languages in the official use, lack of own university.

Given the lack of feeling of the Macedonian leaders for political balance and their indifference to the silent boycott of the Albanians, it was easy to envisage that after the Kosovo events in 1999 and, especially, the tension in the southern of Serbia, the crisis would spill over in 2001. In this period of difficult transition, Macedonian leadership and its Albanian coalition partners were not able politically nor militarily to prevent the crisis. The National Security Strategy, which was written with the outdated language, did not envisage internal armed conflict for the allegedly stable Inter-ethnic relations.

The Republic of Macedonia, as a PfP member received immediately after the outbreak of the crisis support from the NAC in its fight against “the extremist groups”. Nevertheless, when the spiral of the crisis showed the dangerous degradation, NATO, EU, OSCE and the Macedonian Gov-

ernment lead by President Trajkovski joined their efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. This way, the NATO Alliance, which in the eyes of the common citizen of the Balkans represented the personification of military power, thanks to the series of reforms and measures to strengthen the confidence between the confronted ethnicities and religions imposed itself as a factor of political agreement and reconciliation. However, unlike the experiences from Kosovo and B&H, the NATO Mission in Macedonia was more political in character, having in mind that it was a PfP member-state and an aspirant for NATO membership. The state had to preserve its sovereignty and integrity. For its part, the NATO limited itself to disarmament of the rebels, securing the hot spots of the crisis area and facilitating a dialogue between different political representatives. After putting the crisis under control, the Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed on 13 August 2001. Few missions of the Alliance followed to implement the crisis management with strange names like the Essential Harvest, whose aim was to collect and destroy weapons, then the Amber Fox and the Allied Harmony, which was finally replaced in 2003 by the EU Mission Concordia.

In this way, the NATO managed thanks to the crisis diplomacy and diplomatic means (backed by the existence of the robust military power of the Alliance, which clearly showed that it would not tolerate provocations and attack on its forces, or the EU and OSCE civil forces) provided to stabilize the security situation in the Republic of Macedonia together and with the assistance of the Macedonian forces. At the same time, the Ohrid Framework Agreement provided the basis for a new multi-ethnic model in the Balkans. This model proved to be more functional and more efficient than the Dayton model. Its basis was a strong decentralization, establishment of bi-linguality in the municipalities, where ethnic communities reach to 20% of the population, proportional representation of the ethnicities groups in the budgetary state institutions, establishment of the independent University in Albanian etc.

Although the whole drama of 2001 is more complex, allow me to stress few points:

The year 2001 is the turning point in the mind of the Macedonians as the year of great changes, similar to 1941, 1989 or, what for the USA represents 11 September 2001. It is the year when the image of mono-ethnicity of the Macedonian society was broken and when it became multiethnic, the year of beginning of reforms and changes to multi-ethnic society, the year when instead of security consumer, the Republic of Macedonia become security contributor. It is also the year when the Macedonians

started to understand the reasons for the revolt of the Albanians, It is the year when the reconciliation between ethnicities belonging to different religions reinstated, the year of reestablishment of the dialogue interrupted for some time. Finally, it is the year of the new beginning for the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Republic of Macedonia.

On this occasion, it is worth mentioning that NATO is being effecting as the iconography of the common values and goals, a paradigm, which the ethnic unites and religious communities. The best confirmation is the fact that in the name of NATO aspirations, the Republic of Macedonia carried out tremendous reforms, whose social and political price is very high, but the pro-Atlantic feeling of the population still reaches the record 88% of the whole population of the Republic of Macedonia.

TIHOMIR JOVANOVSKI, PH.D.

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY "CYRIL AND METHODIUS", SKOPJE, MACEDONIA

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE NATIONAL, INTER-ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS AND RECONCILIATIONS

Abstract

Since I am a professor of Economics and Finance and familiar very well with macroeconomic theory and politics, with this paper I'd like to present:

1. Some terminological questions: nation, national economy, national minorities i.e. ethnic groups and religious groups;
2. Economic and social aspects of conflicts (conflict determinants);
3. Economic and social of the reconciliations, tolerance and the mutual life and
4. An example: Macedonia

Key words:

Nation, economy, national economy, macro economy, micro economy, ethnic groups, social matters, social pyramids, recession, economical development, inter-ethnic tolerance, mutual life, Ohrid Framework Agreement.

INTRODUCTION

I was at the International Symposium with the topic "National and Inter-ethnic Reconciliation and Religious Tolerance in the Western Balkans", held in Belgrade on 28-29 October 2005, where I actively participated with my discussions. In my presentations I suggested that the program of the next Symposium should introduce the thematic area which would deal with the economic and social aspects of the national, inter-ethnic and religious conflicts and activities for their reconciliation.

Starting from that point, I've made an effort to create the title of my presentation at this Symposium.

At the beginning, as is usual, I'll set down some terms as I can directly set down the economic and social aspects of the national, inter-

ethnic and religious conflicts and later on about the efforts for economic and social policy that has to be oriented towards reconciliation, tolerance and mutual life.

In the economic lexicon, **Nation** is defined as “historically formed stable community of people, created on the basic of the mutual language, mutual territory, mutual economic life and economic connection and independence and mutual psychological constitution that are shown in the mutual culture”.⁸⁹

The term **national economy** denotes of the economy of one country, specific country, as contested to a narrowed, regional or local economy and a wider, international or world economy. In that sense, the national economy covers a larger number of local and regional economies (economy of most communes, many republics etc). The economy of the integrated countries covers larger number of a national economies while the world economy includes all national economies and their groups”.⁹⁰

In the mentioned lexicon , national minorities are certain groups of inhabitants of one state that identify themselves with the **ethnic-groups**.⁹¹

According to the religious belonging in the region, the **religious groups** are defined as members of the same confession mostly in a wider community (state), or in a community with other confessions, with other religious groups or communities.⁹²

After this short introduction, I'd like to start with the explanation of the determinants of the spread of national, inter-ethnic and religious conflicts.

The determinants can be political conflicts, when we speak about an authority or continuing of ruling or struggle for change of the borders (changing of the borders or making of ethnically pure communities or states) at the beginning, political conflicts are verbal and mostly manifested with blackmail, threatening and, later, with an open war. Political conflicts can also be caused by a very bad state of the national economy, by social consequences and social tension, first due to a bad economic situation in the country. In some countries, political conflicts emerge mostly as the result of the request for greater rights placed by some ethnic groups

⁸⁹ See: “Economic Lexicon”, “Savremena administracija” Belgrade 1975, p. 770

⁹⁰ IBBID, p. 772

⁹¹ IBBID, p. 340

⁹² See: “Small encyclopedia Prosveta”, Belgrade, p. 415

even if those ethnic groups already have greater rights than in other countries. Behind that motive there is mostly a hidden wish for the creation of a pure ethnic environment or at least the creation of federal state, federalization of the state i.e. its disintegration. Besides political conflicts, economic and social conflicts are also well known.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CONFLICTS

In every country (national economy) the following economic and social determinants can create a basis for the appearance of certain national, ethnic and religious conflicts:

- Characteristics of the economic system, systematic solutions of some essential questions from the area of reproduction, exchange, distribution and consumption;
- Solutions in the area of drafting and realization of macro economic policies (production policy, social policy, tax policy, customs policy, credit policy, foreign trade policy, transport policy, trade policy, development policy, regional policy etc);
- Realization of not implementation sufficiently developed macroeconomic policy, appearance of recession of the economy. The lower growth and development of the national economy than the possible or needed ones;
- Irregular and unjustified distribution of GNP at the macro-economic, micro-economic and regional levels;
- Speedy destabilization, speedy recession;
- A high inflation rate that destroys the economy and disrupts the social structure of the country;
- A high level of restrictiveness in the implementation of anti-inflationary and stabilizing macro-economic policy;
- Speedy disruption of the social pyramid in the national economy. In all the countries in transition, the middle class was soon destroyed and, instead bigger groups were created (than before), the rich who participate with of shares in the economy and according to that also share the profit. Also, the number of the poor is bigger and bigger;
- In some countries in transition the rate of unemployment is even higher than 30%;

- Also, in some countries in transition there is a bigger number of unemployed on the edge of poverty;
- The disordered social pyramid determines the social insecurity and instability, which can easily be transformed into political instability (strikes and demonstrations for economic and social rights);
- Social injustice can very easily become the basis for social, political and, sometimes, for national and inter-ethnic conflicts;
- In some countries in transition, economic, social and political tensions, as the result of the economic and social distortion of the national economies, were also used as the basis for conflicts of certain ethnic groups with a request for greater rights such as the use of the language, employment, rights based on ethnic belonging, managing rights and increasing of the ethnic rights.

Up to now I've been talking only about some economic and social determinants of the inter-ethnic and religious conflicts in some countries in transition that have so-called domestic (national) bases and influences.

Besides them there are also the so called foreign influences that determine the economic and social and political tensions, intolerance and conflicts. In all countries in transition, including the Balkan countries, at the time when one old (communist) system was abandoned and there was a step into a new system based on a market economy; when there was a passage from state ownership to private ownership, when basically the old "communist" economic subjects were liquidated, when there is a passage from the ideology of small and medium sized enterprises, when a huge number of workers are sacked as being redundant, who are left without any means and are morally defeated, the workers have to renovate and reconstruct their national economy under the conditions of globalization of the economic, social and financial relations in the world. It's also about the so called foreign determinants of the conflicts among some national economies (some nations), conflicts inside some nations in the national economy (states) and the so called inter-ethnic conflicts.

The mentioned conflicts are inter-planetary, because the determinants are inter-planetary. Those conflicts should be conquered in the framework of the state (national economies) with timely preparations for meeting the conditions for access to the global economy. Furthermore, every national economy is a whole for itself and, at same time, a part of the global (world) economy.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS, RECONCILIATION, TOLERANCE AND MUTUAL LIFE

Starting from the view that all countries in the Balkan, developing countries and, at same time, the countries in transition have been directed to realize the following tasks quicker and more efficient:

First, in the framework of their countries (national economy) they should restructure their economic system and macro economic policy on the basis of the logic and philosophy of the market economy. In that context they must prepare all the economic, political and social spheres and, out of the economic sphere, for a more intensive realization of the tasks (preconditions, criteria) for entering of those countries in the European Union.

Second, they must also prepare their national economy for integration in the international, global, economic, social, financial and monetary relations.

Third, more intensive mutual collaboration of the Balkan countries in the economic, social, financial, legal, political, defensive, educational and religious spheres. That will help a lot every country and collaboration will be useful because all Balkan countries, besides their own nations, have inter-ethnic and religious groups. Their mutual approach to solving the economic, financial, social, defensive questions and their wider collaboration can be a guarantee for tolerance, reconciliation and mutual life not only in certain countries but wider.

An example – The Republic of Macedonia

The Republic of Macedonia, like other countries on the Balkans, has the characteristics of a developing country in transition and a multi-ethnic country. As the result of its economic and social problems (the things that all other countries also have) and also as the result of the struggle for authority of the same group or party of the Albanian minority, there was a conflict in 2001. The largest number of the requests came from the economic and social sphere and they were also for the Macedonians, who were in the same or even worse situation. Speaking about the human rights of the Albanian minority, they are much greater than those which the Macedonian minority in Albania has. But with the adoption and signing of the Framework Agreement in Ohrid (Ohrid Framework Agreement) the foundations of the multi-ethnic Macedonia were established. Even the Albanians are a minority. The Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed by the leaders of the two biggest Macedonian parties (parties com-

prised of ethnic Macedonians), two parties of the Albanian minority and the President of the State.

The Ohrid Framework Agreement introduced the mechanism for a more efficient realization of the citizens' rights that belong to the minority community in almost every political area, health service, social service, public finance, administration, police, army, education, science, etc.

The major part of the Ohrid Framework Agreement obligations has been fulfilled. Changes in the Constitution of Republic of Macedonia were effected. The Preamble to the Constitution, where besides the Macedonian language and script, the language being used by more than 20% of the citizens and their script were adopted as official.

It introduced an adequate and fair presence of the citizens, who belong to all communities, into the bodies of government and in all public institutions and for the laws that are directly connected to culture, use of the language, education, personal documents and the use of the symbols. With that, the Republic of Macedonia is considered to be an example how to solve the inter-ethnic and inter-confession at questions, a unique example and model which can't be found in any other country in the Balkans and elsewhere.

A questionnaire was done in July 2006 by the Center for research and policy making on a representative sample of 1135 respondents. According to it, 84.2% of the citizens think that the main priority is the improvement of the economic situation. For 34.8% from the questionnaire the priority of the new Government should be the development of the country; for 32.6% the priority is employment and for 16.8% the priority is to reduce poverty.

Compared to with 2002, 45.6% of the respondents claimed that their standard is lower than before.

As it can be seen, the citizens of Republic of Macedonia are mostly occupied by economic and social issues. That was the reason I've written this. I believe that the situation in the rest of the Balkan countries and in the countries in transition is the same or very close to it.

PROGRESS IN NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN MACEDONIA

The Ohrid Framework Agreement continues to be a framework upon which the success in keeping peace and promoting reconciliation in the country is measured. What has been a failure is the economy. All of which makes it unsurprising that, in July, the electorate on 5 July 2006 turned against the Social Democrats. The new coalition government was approved by Parliament in August following the parliamentary elections held on 5 July 2006, which were largely peaceful and in accordance with the European commitments for democratic elections. The coalition includes the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) and Democratic Party of Albanians as its ethnic Albanian partner in the ruling government. The Democratic Union for Integration, the leading ethnic Albanian party in the July elections, refuses to recognize the authority of the new government, arguing that the government does not represent the will of the ethnic Albanian population by opting for the smaller Albanian party as its coalition partner. Although the government has a slim majority in the parliamentary, the exclusion of the largest Albanian party from the government, has stripped her from securing Badinter majority – meaning that a proposal can be accepted only if a majority of all members of the Parliament votes for it, as well as a majority of the representatives of the ethnic minorities in the Parliament – constraining the new government's ability to legislate as it needs opposition support in those areas where the Badinter principle applies. Thus, there is rising concern on the ability of the new government to manage the political agenda of the country.

The candidate status awarded to Macedonia has proven to be a positive contribution to reinforcing political stability in the country and it contributed a better conduct of the parliamentary elections of 5 July 2006. Moving beyond the candidate status and achieving the status of a state having accession talks with the EU, it is expected that a number of major conditions set by the EU are met by the country's authorities.

The EU integration requirements have set a broad policy agenda in the period following the elections. The beginning of negotiations is to be considered later, once the country has reached sufficient degree of compliance with the membership criteria. The earlier candidate status decision was based on the substantial progress made in completing the legislative framework related to the Ohrid Framework Agreement as well as the progress made in implementing its provisions. In this context, it is worth considering the decentralization process, part of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, as a quality level in measuring the success of the country in promoting ethnic reconciliation in the country.

THE CASE OF DECENTRALIZATION

As for the meeting here in Belgrade, Macedonia is in the wake of the first anniversary of the start of the decentralization process. More than a year has passed since 1 July 2005 when it marked the beginning of a very complex and major reform process the country has experienced since its independence. The importance of the first anniversary of the decentralization process comes the critical era when the country is on the eve of starting with the second phase of the decentralization process when new fiscal and budgetary resources will be transferred from the central government to the responsibilities of local self-government units. Also, it is the period when the country is closely monitored by the EU institutions for its ability in being able to start with the accession talks.

The changes seen in the cities around the country during the last twelve or so months offer a very good opportunity for the review of the hitherto results of Macedonia's decentralization project. Various municipalities have shown a remarkable change from the start of the decentralization process, scale of change not seen in the modern history of the country's municipalities.

It is its active decentralization agenda undertaken with the turn of the century that has brought the country at the forefront of the major international policy discussions on the value of devolving wider responsibilities to the local self-government units.

The signature of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in August 2001, bringing in the first place an end to the inter-ethnic incidents that occurred in the first part of 2001, and later becoming a symbol of change and a basis for wider structural reforms in the country, established a strategic vision on how to proceed with the decentralization as one of the

major democratic projects of Macedonia in the new millennium. The perspective of EU membership offered with the Thessaloniki Summit of June 2003 and at other subsequent EU summits, gave a reaching philosophical underpinning to the country's decentralization process: that the decentralization is a European value to which Macedonia as a potential member aspires to associate itself with.

The project of the decentralization started to be realized through putting in place necessary constitutional and legal bases. Laws were changed, new ones adopted, including the adoption of the Laws on Self-Government, on Financing the Units of Local Self-Government and on Territorial Organization of the Local Self-Government, amendments to the Constitution (Articles 114-117), and the adoption of or amendment to a number of other sectoral laws. With this new legal framework and other subsequent legislative and regulatory acts, the Government, albeit with a lack of strong willingness on the part of the Ministry of Finance as a line ministry, with major responsibilities in the area of decentralization, provided necessary ownership and leadership to the process. Encouraged also by the complementary EU and other donor assistance to the decentralization process, the Government brought together the major units of the government bureaucracy in planning and implementing necessary actions for the functioning of the process. Provided leadership and ownership by the Government to the process has proven to be sufficient in holding the momentum of reform and change.

The new system of decentralization contains large sectoral and financial devolvement from the central government to local government units that is set to transform the system of local and central government relationships in the country. The areas where municipal competences have legally been assigned, but not yet as a whole decentralized include communal services, urban and rural planning, local economic development, culture, education, environment, social welfare and child protection, health care, fire protection and crisis management, sports and recreation.

The earlier system of sharing the responsibilities and financial resources among the central and local governments coupled with the weak municipal leaderships in fulfilling the promises laid down in the legislation, imposed unsustainable situation where for a number of years no adequate investments were made to municipal infrastructures and other needs of the local self-governments leading to the worsening of the then already existing sound economic and social structures.

This system that predominated throughout much of 1990s and early 2000s, paralyzed much of Macedonia. But constitutional and other the

legal reforms undertaken since the adoption of the Law on Local Self-Government in 2002 have attempted to promote the decentralization in order to move the country into line with European standards of governance. In the new system, the municipalities enjoy a general power of competence. They are able to raise their own taxes, levy fees and borrow. They receive central government budget transfers and share various taxes with the central government including the personal income and value added taxes. They have control over their own budget, administration, property and cooperate with each other in delivering services or improving the infrastructure.

In sum, in the new system, the municipalities are entitled to decisively break with the centralized excesses of the 1990s and early 2000s and they are vested with the appropriate authority and resources needed to fulfil their tasks. With both authorities and resources, the municipalities are credited to deliver the local services properly and effectively. Earlier, centrally provided services currently are being provided through local institutions, closer to the residents of the municipalities. The staff and service of earlier central and currently local institutions, in principle, has not changed. What has changed is the administrative layer from central to local level providing more legitimacy to municipal authorities and resources to carry communal and other required services.

The change witnessed has brought new optimism first to the local residents, and second, to the country as a whole. For instance, Gostivar's newly elected municipal leadership, having strong local and political backing, with its rigorous actions, brought a sweeping change to the city's economic and social life. It was its initial actions in cleaning the city's streets coupled with the removal of illegal buildings and other facilities, and later followed up by other major actions, mainly in the infrastructure, brought a breakthrough in the functioning of the decentralization system in the town.

Looking at the so far record, Macedonia's model of decentralization, particularly in those municipalities that have shown success, consists of the following main process. It is critical to have a qualified leadership with strong backing from local population. Leaders with clear electoral majorities and strong governmental and donor support provide sustained momentum for change and reform.

With the undertaken changes, a new basis has been established that has set a new stage in the local governance system of Macedonia. What remains now as a challenge for the country is providing a continuous reform environment in order to build upon earlier decentralization success-

es. With all its advantages and disadvantages, challenges and opportunities, the decentralization project of Macedonia has proven to be a tool for democratization, stabilization and European integration of the country. The right of citizens to participate in the political, economic, social, and cultural life of their country can only be fully realized via localization of the decision-making and services. Despite the fact that Macedonia's municipalities are not yet equipped sufficiently, the overall change in this regard has become a critical ingredient driving democratic consolidation. The initiative has established incentives in turning municipalities into socially just, politically participatory, economically productive, and culturally vibrant towns. The story, while far from finished, illustrates how deliberate state policies promoting the powers of municipalities can become an impetus for democratization and stabilization and grassroots political participation in multiethnic societies such as Macedonia.

VJEKOSLAV DOMLJAN, PH.D.

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF SARAJEVO, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

ABANDONING THE 1965 REFORM

*“The greatest tragedy is not the brutality of the evil people,
but rather the silence of the good people”.*

(Martin Luther King, Jr.)

The institutional setup of Yugoslavia was administratively complex, fiscally expensive, economically unsustainable and politically ineffective. It could not provide effective governance throughout its territory, and the equitable distribution of public goods. At the end, the central authorities were characterised by a complete loss of legitimacy and a complete loss of governing effectiveness in all or significant parts of their territory.

Over time, Yugoslavia gradually acquired leaders without visions who promoted exhausting political and social dynamics (centre vs. constitutional units). The leaders did not even think about the necessity of conducting deep, structural reforms aimed at radical changes of institutional setup let alone about harmonizing deep political, economic and legal reforms, what should have been their crucial task.

Due to urbanisation deficit (the industrialisation had much higher speed than the urbanisation) and income deficit Yugoslavia had poorly organised civil society and faced democracy deficit. There were poor pressures from below to establish the necessary structures and conditions for institutional development and conducting proper policies.

According to the Mill-Keynes-Friedman paradigm there is a possibility of rapid recovery of output after war. According to the paradigm the shock of destruction forces rebuilding and by doing so countries can take advantage of the use of the newest technology. Referring primarily to the generalised experience of the reconstruction of Germany and Japan, Friedman asserts that physical destruction of capital is the fastest way to achieve growth (Wolf, 1993).

However, in contrast to homogenous national communities – like Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria – the countries that had the highest average rates of growth between 1948-1960 (Pelinka, 1994) – Yugoslavia was

a heterogeneous commonwealth of nations who were involved in fighting not other nations but primarily each other. That bad influence of the past – amplified by poor economic results in 1960s – contributed to a great extent establishing society with “a plural monocultural form” (Sen, 2006), which was introduced with legal (constitutional) reforms over 1970s. Coupled with the constantly growing inefficiency of economy – which was not driven neither by electoral competition between political parties nor by domestic business cycles – it caused the end of Yugoslavia.

1. BIG AND WEAK STATE

The so-called model of a flawed state, as explained in Italian literature about a century ago, is very appropriate in analysing the role of the state in Yugoslavia. According to that theory, there is a rule of rotating elites that follow minority interests. The public sector does not function for citizens but for elites. It does not serve the small and many but the big and few.

Rotating élites (which, in the case of Yugoslavia, read clans) following their minority interests based their uncontrolled power upon the repressive apparatus (the army and the police), the control of the TV stations and other key media, and networks set up under the rule of the Communist party.

Individuals who used public institutions for reaching their own clan's benefits were very appreciated in contrast to those willing to work for general aims. As a consequence there was the framework for non-implementing legal rules and unwillingness for changing the situation. Clans found it more profitable to fight for division of the even shrinking pie, rather than working to increase its size. Enormous amounts of resources were being shifted to clans. It was obvious that some members of ruling clans and the pyramidal circles around them made a fortune. But policies aimed at benefiting small minorities are extremely harmful to the rebuilding of the economy and the society, tending to destroying Yugoslavia.

The public sector was huge and flabby. It was huge (complicated multi-level of rule, a lot of state and parastate institutions) since it employed too many people; spent too many resources (relatively high expenditure on pensions, health services, housing subsidies, high interests on external public debts, etc) and had too many functions. It was flabby since it did not complete tasks that it normally should. It was leading to higher and higher taxes, finally to inflation tax, becoming the big barrier to sustainable economic growth. The country could not be competitive, and as such, burdened with high ethnonational and social tensions, hardly vital.

2. ECONOMY WITHOUT TURBULENCE

The mechanism of coordination of the command economy in former Communist countries was of the *étatist* (administrative or bureaucratic) mechanism. The *étatist* mechanism had two forms: the direct *étatist* mechanism, which was found in all East European countries except Former Yugoslavia, and the indirect *étatist* mechanism which was found in Yugoslavia.

The *étatist* mechanism in Yugoslavia became inefficient still in the middle of 1960s, even a mini reform was introduced in 1961. It was obvious that was necessary to increase the turbulence of the economy by promoting fast and easy entry and exit of firms. This approach based on mass entrepreneurship is the organic and sustainable way of building up the business sector as the key motor of the economy (and key actor on demand side of justice).

However, the trail of introducing the “market socialism” lasted for three years ending up fully in 1968. Instead of establishing an entrepreneurial society, Yugoslavia actually set up the polycentric system of indirect *étatist* control. Instead of having an explosion of entrepreneurship, it got trapped into an implosion of nationalism. Bad economic results were not eliminated by letting the energy of numerous entrepreneurs become operational (through establishing small firms by returnees from abroad, or establishing family run small hotels at the Adriatic sea to host millions of foreign tourists) but were instrumental to asking for a scapegoat. Frustrated people from some constitutional units directed their energy toward the centre since it was collecting and distributing key resources (foreign exchanges, money supply). So, the year of 1968 was the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia. Institutions required for an effective market economy were not put in place but the *étatist* control was just made polycentric. Abandoning the market reform, Yugoslavia actually started self-destroying (Domljan, 1991).

Without mass entrepreneurship it is not possible to reallocate resources and restructure companies. In such conditions, reallocating resources and restructuring companies practised over three reform years (1965-68) caused that unemployment replaced underemployment. When all companies suffered from underemployment, which amounted for 30 to 50 percent of workforce, the only solution was in establishing new companies. Simply stated, the recipe was to establish as many new businesses as available capital allows. Only new companies could absorb high underemployment and mass unemployment. Transformation of the economy could only occur through establishing new businesses.

Entrepreneurship and liquidation are two sides of one coin – entry to and exit from economic activity. Liquidation did not exist in the Yugoslav economy. Liquidation could not be implemented in an environment where both legal and economic standard rules were not observed. However, without fast bankruptcy and liquidation, there is no economic restructuring and resource redirecting from less to more productive industries and businesses. Without adequate entrepreneurship and higher workforce mobility, bankruptcy was not possible. However, the crises in developed markets showed that bankruptcies, even mass ones, are not of key importance. Entrepreneurship is the key, it leads forward; bankruptcy is a remedy, a punishment for failure.

Manufacturing production in Yugoslavia was overdeveloped in comparison to other kinds of production. It was organised in huge firms, some of which employed more than 50,000 people. The economy had one industrial wing – large-scale enterprises (LSEs) – hypertrophied and the second one – SMEs – atrophied, since official policies, in the best communist tradition, favoured LSEs. In contrast, neighbouring South European market economies are micro-dominant. Consequently, a double étatist gap in the economy appeared, i.e. the SME sector and the service sector.

Economic problems (high unemployment, foreign debts, inflation etc.) in Yugoslavia were caused in root by abandoning the 1965 market reform, and worsened by an inefficient response to international events (changes in foreign demand for Yugoslavia's goods and services and in its terms of trade, due to two oil shocks, and changes in the supply of foreign capital to finance Yugoslav imports and investment).

The survival of the inefficient Yugoslav étatist economy should be assigned to the strong inflows of resources from other sectors. From 1945 to the early 1960s resources came from the small private and peasant agriculture and foreign aid. From the early 1960s to the end of Yugoslavia resources came from remittances. They were topped up with foreign loans since the early 1970s to 1980 (when Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia had special access to Western loans). Over 1980s inflation tax practised. Yugoslavia started with taking away resources from peasants (villages) and ended up with taking away resources from citizens (cities). Still now unresolved issue of so called frozen saving accounts witnesses how severely the state undermined the economic and human security of its citizens. The state was not a proper night guardian, as asked by classical scholars, but quite opposite.

3. NO SUPPORT FOR COMPROMISE AND UNITY

Yugoslavia was criss-crossed by the fault lines running from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Adriatic. These fault lines separated three civilisations and converged in Yugoslavia. Along those cultural faults lines many stresses existed for a long time. Similar to geological faults, the East-West fault line has existed since the ninth century. The European-Islamic fault line has existed since the 14th century. Both have been the scene of frequent eruptions.

Yugoslavia was located at the intersection of the Western European (Catholic and Protestant), the Eastern European (Orthodox), and the Islamic (Muslim) civilisations. The country served as a flashpoint many different times. These deep-rooted conflicts have had the character of a “zero-sum game” with high stakes, in which each side becomes convinced that they can only win at the expense of the other. As in other parts of the world, the deep-rooted rivalry in Yugoslavia caused a strong decline in support for compromise and unity.

The ideological pendulum swung in Yugoslavia from a point dangerously far on the right, as seen at the pre- and over the Second World War, to dangerously far on the left after that war. Or more precisely the “absolutism of particularity” was replaced by the “absolutism of the common”, or ethno-national balkanization practiced over the Second World War was replaced with Communist internationalism. However, this Communist glue failed to reflect accurately the two important aspirations of Yugoslavs: national unity and ethnic identity.

Building up a different society and a different economy in Yugoslavia was a very difficult task. Such a society and economy was not built up according to any blueprint, except for a very short period of time (1945-48), when it was based upon direct étatist mechanism as seen in the former Soviet Union. However, the Yugoslav way was a process governed more by preserving the leading role of Communist elites than by rational choice and well-prepared design.

Ethnonational elites in Yugoslavia were primarily interested in institutions they may have under their own control, ruling over territories where their own ethnicity is a majority. Ruling over several distinct constituent units: six republics and two provinces, posed a greater challenge for Yugoslav leaders.

However, just as there were centrifugal forces pulling Yugoslavia apart, there had also been centripetal forces pulling it together. On the one hand, differences between Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Montenegrins,

etc. become more acute; on the other hand, internal conflicts were moderated through a combination of rules to deal with inter-regional trade, united action in conducting international trade and central-state level institutions to deal with international institutions.

A well-known saying Thomas L. Friedman cites in his book “The Lexus and the Olive Tree”, that the geniuses established the USA, so that even idiots could govern it (Friedman, 1991) was not applicable to Yugoslavia. Yugoslav leaders, particularly those from 1980s, were not as much interested in the welfare of Yugoslavs.

REFERENCES

- Domljan Vjekoslav. 1991. Konceptije ekonomske politike. Sarajevo: IDP “Udzbenici, prirucnici i didakticka sredstava.*
- Friedman L. Thomas. 1999. The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. New York: Farrar, Straus Giroux.*
- Pelinka Anton. 1994. “The Austrian Social Partnership”. In *Economic Transformations in East and Central Europe – Legacies from the Past and Policies for the Future.* Edited by David F. Good. London and New York: Routledge.
- Sen Amartya. 2006. Multiculturalism: an unfolding tragedy of two confusions. *Financial Times*, Aug 21, 2006
- Wolf C. Holgger. 1993. “The Lucky Miracle: Germany 1945-1951”. In *Postwar Economic Reconstruction and Lessons for the East Today.* Edited by R. Dornbusch, W. Nölling, and R. Layard. London and Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

PETER BAS-BACKER, PH.D.

SENIOR DEPUTY HIGH REPRESENTATIVE, OHR, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

RECONCILIATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

In the first place I would like to commend the organizers to bring us here together on this crucial subject. I am grateful and honoured to be invited as well.

There is no magic formula for rebuilding a country that experienced a war as brutal and violent as the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And we sometimes tend to forget how brutal it really was. More than 100,000 people were killed. Nearly half the pre-war population was put to flight. Women and girls were serially raped as a matter of policy. Men and boys were held in concentration camps where they were starved and tortured. People lost everything in the war – their houses, jobs, money, futures and self-respect. Yet today, victims, perpetrators and those who just watched are often living next door to one another again, thanks to the relative success of what, rather insensitively and inaccurately, we term “minority return”.

Reconciliation, however, is actually the key to the problem, and rebuilding trust among peoples of different national identities and faiths is the only lasting way to create sustainable peace and stability in a war-torn country. In an effort to define reconciliation, we might say that it is a complicated, but very powerful concept designed to address both the emotional bases and after effects of conflicts – and to promote understanding, healing and forgiveness. As such, reconciliation requires four things: Truth, Justice and forgiveness and Peace. For peace you need also absence of fear, which is still present in B&H and was misused in the last elections.

Let us start with the most important ingredient – Justice.

Reconciliation in B&H has primarily involved attempts to provide out justice to the perpetrators and victims of war crimes. Holding individuals who have committed war crimes to account is, of course, a prerequisite for reconciliation. To be even more specific, there can be no reconciliation with out justice and the primacy of justice cannot be avoided or replaced by anything else.

The Hague Tribunal has had the key role thus far, demonstrating to the world that international criminal justice is possible. The success of the Tribunal in prosecuting war crimes over the past thirteen years has sent a clear message to future war criminals and victims alike that the international community is committed both to preventing and, when that fails, to punishing such crimes.

The path-breaking success of the ICTY has been compromised, however, by the failure thus far of responsible governments and the international community to apprehend six high-level fugitives, above all Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. As was pointed out by ICTY President Fausto Pocar in his report to the UN General Assembly on 9 October, “The Tribunal must not close its doors before these accused are brought to justice. Otherwise, the message and legacy of the Tribunal that the international community will not tolerate serious violations of international humanitarian law will be thwarted. [...] The capacity of the Tribunal to complete its mandate [...] hinges significantly upon the cooperation of all states now, specifically those in the region, in apprehending these fugitives to stand trial. Regrettably, the authorities of Serbia have failed to achieve any progress in locating, arresting and surrendering Ratko Mladic to the International Tribunal, despite a number of promises made and the passing of several deadlines.”

Here in Belgrade today, I believe this message needs to be sent out once again to both the authorities and general public.

As long ago as October 2000, the International Crisis Group explained the risk to peace and stability in the region if the most notorious war crimes indictees were to appear to enjoy any sort of impunity: “The failure to arrest Karadzic himself has sent a message to his wartime colleagues and political successors that they can obstruct return, actively work against Dayton implementation, exploit nationalist sentiments, and remain untouchable. [...] It is naive to hope for reconciliation in B&H as long as it is general knowledge that known war criminals still fill! Important positions in authorities and public institutions. [...] It also undermines seriously Bosnia’s chance for building central institutions, generating self-sustainable economic growth and achieving the political transformation necessary to complete the process of integration with the rest of Europe.” Although there has been notable progress in building both central institutions and public support for cooperation with the ICTY in B&H since this report was published, the fact that Karadzic and Mladic remain at large continues to impede post-war reconciliation as much as it affronts any sense that justice has been or is being done.

Bearing in mind that, after the closure of the ICTY, the bulk of war crimes cases will be left to domestic courts, it is now crucially important to enhance the judicial and prosecutorial capacity of national jurisdictions. In B&H alone we estimate that there are some 13,000 potential indictees. These may be relatively “small fish” in ICTY terms, but they are very big indeed as far as their victims are concerned. It is thus essential that domestic courts in former Yugoslavia not only continue and complete the mission of the Hague Tribunal, but also that they bring the process back home. That would make a crucial contribution to stability and reconciliation in the region, but only if these national trials uphold the highest standards of due process.

Let us now turn to the second essential! Aspect of reconciliation – Truth. There is an urgent need to establish the truth in Bosnia. No other concept has been so grossly misused in B&H; and no other ideal has been so flagrantly betrayed. Only when political manipulation of three or more separate versions of the “truth” stops, when victims and their suffering are not used for political purposes anymore, can there be any restoration of confidence and trust, any reduction of tensions and suspicions, and any re-establishment of tolerance amongst the peoples of B&H.

There are different ways of “working on truth”. Some institutions and renowned individuals advocate the establishment of a “truth commission”, as an institutionalized and systematized method of ascertains the truth. In my view, any effort aimed at discovering and establishing the truth represents progress.

In this context I would particularly like to commend those projects dealing with truth and reconciliation through the organization of various discussion forums, workshops and research projects. Collectively, these gatherings, seminars and the publications they produce allow all “sides” to tell their stories, exchange their views, and share their emotions. And there is a very great need for many thousands of people to have the opportunity to relate their experiences from the last war, to have them recorded and stored for posterity and, thereby, to pass through some sort of catharsis and to find their own form of peace.

Although such exercises are painful, they can offer a form of “psychotherapy” for all parties involved. They allow an insight into the actions, fears and motives of the “others”, and thus represent an effective way of fighting hatred and intolerance. Without such “purification” there is a serious risk that the accumulated grievances, bitterness and guilt of both individuals and national groups will be transformed into personal and historical myths – myths of unique suffering or exceptional valour that

will make any sort of neighbourly coexistence in this part of the world impossible.

All efforts aimed at establishing a frame for peace in Bosnia will eventually fail if they are not supplemented by efforts undertaken by individual citizens to promote reconciliation. There are numerous NGOs in B&H that work on repairing the social and emotional damage caused by the war. Their work includes things like identity building, trauma healing and cross-couture dialogue. Dialogue is particularly important in this context because it can stop former enemies from continuing to dehumanize each other and, eventually, help them to live and work together again,

It also seems important to me to point to a simple truth that is not simple at all. There may be only one “truth” in the sense that certain things happened and can be proved to have happened. These are the so-called facts of history on which people can agree. But their meaning can be and usually is very different, depending upon who is doing the interpretation.

Writing history, as the great Dutch historian Pieter Geyl famously observed, is “argument without end.” A multinational state like B&H is as condemned to have different historical narratives as it is to have complicated power-sharing arrangements in its governance. It can have no single, official! historical truth – and certainly not yet one that could explain and reconcile the divergent “truths” of the 1992-95 war. But it can and must have a common context in which historical argument can take place.

Establishing the “facts” themselves would represent a huge contribution towards creating this common context. And this is what the ICTY, domestic war crimes prosecutions, truth commissions, memoirs by participants and, now, a burgeoning body of academic research will make happen. In fact, it is happening already, as the Republika Srpska commission into the Srebrenica genocide demonstrated last year and as the newly established commission investigating the fates of civilian war victims in Sarajevo may demonstrate next year. This process will take generations, but every effort invested in determine the facts also contributes to eventual reconciliation – and yields enormous benefits for sustainable peace and stability in the meantime-In the long run, of course, justice and truth are both mutually dependent and reinforcing. But justice must come first if the wounds and traumas of war are to be healed. Peace is necessary for Justice and Truth to be found, which in tum may lead to forgiveness.

It is important to underline, however, that the process of reconciliation has to be embraced by local people. It is the citizens of B&H who need to find sufficient courage and deploy the requisite expertise to face up to the enormity of evil and suffering that characterized the war. That,

of course, does not absolve us foreigners from confronting our own parts in the tragedy — as has been demonstrated by the several official inquiries into the fall of Srebrenica. Nonetheless, future efforts to build confidence and tolerance will depend largely on the engagement and commitment of domestic protagonists. International assistance and support will still be welcome, but under local ownership.

What might happen if we neglect the need for reconciliation? Somewhere I came across a very interesting thesis about the “traumatized” society. As we know, trauma is a common result of war. It can be caused by intense fear, pain or loss. It cannot necessarily be healed by time, as trauma survivors can sometimes become frozen, unable to heal and move on. Just like individuals, entire societies can become traumatized in terms of “freezing the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ morality”, thus making it very difficult to achieve any real reconciliation. Indeed, one factor that contributed to the awful intensity of the wars of Yugoslav succession was that a good many people imagined they were taking up where their fathers or grandfathers had left off in 1945 or, for that matter, in 1389. Trauma that is frozen rather than cured or expunged can all too easily come back to haunt or even destroy a country. The peoples of former Yugoslavia still have an opportunity to avoid that fate this time round.

Finally, I would like to conclude my speech with some remarks about the real chances and possible illusions (or delusions) related to the process of reconciliation.

Reconciliation in B&H and in the Balkans is no utopian dream. Nor is it a mission impossible. Nobody can convince me of that. There is always a way of forgiving and making your peace with others following even the most devastating of wars. It has happened many times before. Despite the popular, pernicious and almost wholly wrong argument during the war that this is a region of “ancient ethnic hatreds”, there is no reason why the Western Balkans should be an exception to this human capacity to create happy endings.

In order to make reconciliation possible, however, we but in particular local political civil society and religious leaders have to work on it actively and persistently. We have to work much harder than we did during the first decade of peace. Precious time was lost. It can even be argued, in the case of B&H, that the gulf separating its constituent peoples widened rather than closed after the war. But it is still not too late – if we start now.

In my view, there are two related illusions (or delusions) that we need to be careful about. The first is the belief that reconciliation is “not all that

important” in the overall scheme of peace implementation. Hold elections, get the economy right, fix the constitution and all will be well. Alas, it doesn’t work that way, as we have discovered to our cost else where. The other illusion is that post-conflict reconciliation, given sufficient time, will happen miraculously by itself. Let me emphasize again, however, that reconciliation and renewed trust among national communities requires conscious commitment and hard work. The passage of time can help, but it can also freeze enmities as well as traumas. A buoyant economy can help as well, but it can also stimulate intense conflict over the division of the spoils. In short, there is no indirect or automatic route to national reconciliation. It must be actively sought and struggled for if this or any other region is to enjoy lasting peace and stability.

ROBERT DONIA, PH.D.

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, USA

RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION IN BOSNIA AND KOSOVO: EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS

(In this paper, I use the name “Bosnia” as shorthand for the polity “Bosnia and Herzegovina” and the English language term “Kosovo” to refer to the territory called “Kosovo and Metohija” by Serbs and “Kosova” by Albanians.)

We live in an era of proliferating states and growing demands for autonomy and independence from ever smaller political entities. The phenomenon expanded rapidly with the fall of communism in the early 1990s, when three states – the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia – broke into their component parts along republic lines. With the benefit of hindsight, we may marvel that the breakups of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in the early 1990s were relatively peaceful, with violence in the latter largely limited to Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniestria and later in Chechnya. Yugoslavia’s bloody collapse, to use the title of Christopher Bennett’s excellent book on the subject, was the major violent exception to the largely peaceful birth of post-socialism and passing of Marxist-Leninism in the states of Eurasian land mass.

In such a superheated and rapidly changing political environment, “reconciliation” looms as a daunting challenge for those who wish either to construct or reconstruct societies that are genuinely multiethnic, cooperative, and tolerant of minorities and migrants. In most cases, just the opposite has been happening: Those who achieve the sovereignty, autonomy, or independence they seek have become famous for abusing minorities in their new polities as much or more than they were abused by others. The makers of some new states seem more intent on retaliation and revenge than in building a new, functioning polity and have treated those associated with their former parent as surrogates for their oppressors rather than equal citizens. In some states, that policy has emerged only after some years. Of late we have witnessed precursors of possible further oppression of former neighbors in Russia (against Georgians in particular, through expelling hundreds of them), Serbia (against non-Serbs, by putting them

constitutionally in the same position as did the Bosnian Serb Constitution of 1992), and Kosovo (in attacking and expelling vestigial urban Serb communities in March 2004). These developments are chilling, but they are merely the latest manifestation of the barriers to reconciliation and reintegration in the region.

Revanchism has triumphed despite hundreds of experiments and projects in reintegration and reconciliation in Southeast Europe in the past 15 years, principally conducted in areas under international mandate in Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. These have been noble endeavors, typically endowed with substantial resources and staffed both by well-paid international civil servants and by volunteers from NGOs. But we need to face reality: One may find a few instances of individual reconciliation, but everywhere in the post-conflict lands of the former Yugoslavia, reintegration efforts have failed. The few instances of success have proven short-lived. This bleak conclusion is in stark contract to hundreds of claims and assertions by leaders of the many organizations, bureaus, agencies, and agents with a vested interest in succeeding. The international aid process has created an entire new class of propagandists with the mission of demonstrating success to satisfy their donors and fellow do-gooders. In listening to them, we risk maintaining hope and sustaining ongoing endeavors when we should be recognizing failure and conducting a thorough reexamination of the premises and practices of the reintegration and reconciliation processes.

In my work on the history of the city of Sarajevo and of Bosnia, I found instances in several different historical periods of Sarajevans and Bosnians successfully working and living together. These times of positive intergroup relations had one thing in common: They occurred while the participants were working to achieve a well-articulated shared goal. I have found no instance prior to the late twentieth century people seeking integration or reconciliation *for its own sake*. The very notion that people would engage in a formal process of reconciliation, with the goal of either agreeing on matters or learning to tolerate one another's diverse views, seems to be of recent origin, dating to about the time that the notion of "civil society" was pioneered in the mid twentieth century. Like civil society, reconciliation must endure to be meaningful, and both have proven difficult to establish in polities where they have no historical tradition. It may be that integration or reintegration, and reconciliation may more readily be achieved when subordinated to a shared vision, commitment, and hard work toward a common goal – be it achieving economic better-

ment; building a village, town, or state; or creating better opportunities for the next generation.

“Reconciliation” comes in many forms. Many of us equate “reintegration” with “reconciliation,” when in fact the two are different phenomenon. Reconciliation is a prerequisite for reintegration, but can also be achieved among individuals as well as entire groups. People may live separately from one another but still be “reconciled” if their contacts with members of other groups, however infrequent, are mutually satisfactory and if they live in a political and social system that does not favor one over the other. But few, if any, such political systems exist in the region, so people living “beside one another” in Bosnia and Kosovo today are not reconciled in any meaningful sense. The lion and the lamb are not reconciled simply because they inhabit adjacent cages at the zoo.

To illustrate the enormous challenges to be overcome on the road to reintegration, consider the case of Kozluk, a local commune (*mjesna zajednica*) in the Municipality of Zvornik. Kozluk had a mixed, majority Bosniak population until April 1992, when its Bosniak inhabitants were driven from their homes by Serb forces. In 2001, Bosniaks began to return to Kozluk, led by a charismatic, dynamic local politician, Fadil Bajramović, and aided by international agencies. When I visited Kozluk in 2005, Bajramović had just finished hosting several meetings in which Serb officials of Zvornik Municipality had met with returnees for the purpose of coordinating efforts to improve the commune’s municipal infrastructure services such as electricity, sewage treatment, water, and street lighting. In other words, Bajramović was working to reintegrate Kozluk and its residents into the Republic of Srpska and into Bosnia. A hundred yards down the road from Kozluk is a working plant of the mineral water bottling company, Vitenka. It was privatized before returns began in 2001. A successful enterprise, it employs 150 people, but none of the employees are Bosniaks. Bajramović told me he is not expecting or asking Vitenka to fire Serb workers and replace them with Bosniaks. But he has proposed to Vitenka’s managers that they exploit their well-known brand name to increase sales by bottling soft drinks and other beverages at the plant. This, he hopes, will create additional job opportunities in the village, providing employment for Bosniaks and Serbs alike. But in the meantime, Kozluk faces the nearly universal dilemma of prospective returnee communities in Bosnia and Kosovo: There are no jobs to lure working-age returnees back to their former homes.

The case of Kozluk highlights the dilemmas raised by reintegration and reconciliation projects. It is atypical in that a key local leader of the

returnee community has a vision, a common goal toward which both the dominant group and the local minority community could strive. Economic growth would benefit both Serbs and Bosniaks, but the realization of that goal depends utterly on the new statemakers of Republic of Srpska and of a local enterprise: Will they choose to preserve the mono-ethnic structure of their enterprise at the expense of embracing growth opportunities, thereby following the trend in newly-created polities, or will they opt for the capitalist's solution: expand the plant, increase sales, and create more job opportunities for all?. I cannot report on their response. There was a time, of course, when international agencies held dominant influence over both privatization and returns, but they chose to treat the two challenges separately. The international community's "stovepiping" has secured for Kozluk returnees the right to their original property and helped provide for their physical security, but it has left them without a livelihood. Now, the future of economic development in Kozluk, and of the survival of the community itself, lies in the hands of the plant's owners and officials of Zvornik Municipality and the Republic of Srpska.

The Kozluk case illuminates the omnipotence of those who achieved their own polity in the 1990s – in this case, the entity of the RS – in being able to either obstruct or advance the reconciliation process. Leaders of many new polities have shown disinterest or outright disdain for any economic development that would require inclusion of minorities in owning or working in enterprises, probably driven by the fear of eroding the patronage networks which are the backbone of nationalist party rule. The fundamental issue is the absence of a common vision of a future state. Even if Bosniak returnees see their future in the RS as a prosperous, functioning state that benefits them as its citizens, RS leaders may not share that vision, and instead envision their state as a monoethnic entity in which their monopoly on patronage is perpetuated, even at the cost of continued economic stagnation.

Virtually everyone agrees that the returns process can only succeed in the long run if it is accompanied by jobs and economic growth. I would like to propose a corollary of that principle, namely that neither reintegration nor reconciliation will succeed in the long run unless accompanied by economic growth or some other broader ambition shared by members of all groups. In the absence of shared economic expansion, competition for dwindling resources will only make each group more dependent on their co-nationals and increase friction between the dominant and minority communities.

Interpersonal reconciliation is extraordinarily difficult to achieve, even in stable societies and good times. Reintegration cannot take place without interpersonal and (at least to some degree) intergroup reconciliation. Today I raise the question of whether those goals are best achieved by subordinating them to more general objectives shared by both the dominant and subordinate communities. But economic growth can create new opportunities and expand human achievement, so that newly-created resources can be shared by all. I conclude that neither reconciliation nor reintegration can be achieved in the absence of shared goals and a common vision. Those who share a goal, and are prepared to sacrifice to achieve it, cannot long remain hardened adversaries.

ALFONSO OJEDA, PH.D.

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID, SPAIN

IMMIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Sooner or later the European Union (EU) has to cope with three main challenges. The first one is related to the accomplishment of the EU common project. I am referring to the European Constitution. Although there are some relevant initiatives aimed at activating this fundamental law, the European building process is currently at a standstill. The second challenge has to do with the energy market. It takes a competitive, fair and reliable market to guarantee the future expectations of sustainable development. The third challenge is particularly complex, because it concerns not only the political and economic areas, but also the civil society. Massive immigration is a consequence of globalisation. There are no accurate statistics on the global number of migrant people, but the United Nations estimates that the number of people living outside their own countries is around 170 million. As we know, the European Union is one of the most significant migrant destinations and the debate on how to tackle this problem is growing day by day. This specific issue should be addressed properly, taking into account a blend of pragmatism and the universal values of the human being. This is why immigration has to do with certain basic principles, such as tolerance and inter-ethnic relationships which are deeply rooted in the spirit of the ECPD.

Considering that one significant goal of the Treaty of Rome is the free movement of people within Member States, the term “immigrants” should refer only to the citizens of third States. Having said that, there are mixed feelings about the progressive increase of the non EU population. In general, the Europe of 25 countries sees the immigration issues as both an economic necessity and a social threat. Two trends are paving the way for demanding external manpower: Firstly, a decline in the birth rate and, secondly, the increasing ageing of the population. Therefore, immigrants make a positive contribution to economic development and to public finance. They mainly do jobs which nationals tend to refuse, particularly the 3 D jobs, that is to say, the jobs which are dangerous, dirty and difficult. However, recently qualified workers are also needed. Despite this,

a number of native workers, especially among low-skilled workers, are afraid of immigrants taking their jobs, driving them into unemployment or reducing their wages. In other words, a significant number of EU citizens experience anxiety as they believe immigrants may take away their jobs, threaten their welfare system or affect their cultural roots.

Policies on immigration are crucial for the future of Europe. Depending on how we can tackle all these issues we will have no alternative other than facing a risk or opportunities for shared prosperity. At the present time, there is serious concern. Eighty-two percent of Members of the European Parliament agreed that this is one of the main problems facing Europe. Chiefs of State and Government gathered in Tampere stated that the drafting of a common European policy in the fields of asylum and migration is the next major project of the EU after the single market and Economic and Monetary Union.

In fact, the EU has dealt with immigration topics on several occasions. Starting from the Maastricht Treaty (1990) up to the Hague Programme in 2004, in the meantime, there were relevant decisions and rules, for instance, the Schengen Agreements (1990), the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the Nice Treaty (1999), the European Council in Tampere (1999), the Laeken Treaty (2001) and the European Constitution project.

Despite a number of attempts, there is no consensus on key questions, such as a single visa or a common system of asylum. Every country implements its own immigration policy, including different integration projects or even granting amnesty to illegal workers without the agreement of their partners.

According to the Tampere summit, a common EU immigration policy should be implemented taking into account the following principles:

- A comprehensive approach to the management of migratory flows which involves finding a balance between humanitarian and economic admission.
- Fair treatment for third country nationals giving them rights and obligations comparable to those of the nationals of the Member States in which they live.
- Partnerships with countries of origin including co-development policies.
- A common policy for asylum which fully respects the terms of the Geneva Convention and the obligations of Member States under international treaties.

Unfortunately, the most effective and binding legal means to ensure a common policy on immigration is not in force yet. It could have been

provided by the European Constitution, whose articles 265 to 268 deal with policies on border checks, asylum and immigration. Solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility should pave the way for the common policy, but at the same time the constitutional project advocates harder measures such as checks on persons and the efficient monitoring of the external borders. There is neither the political will nor the effective means to achieve a common policy on immigration. Some countries insist on retaining their domestic competences. Others tend to chose opting-out powers and there are even some countries which prefer to reach bilateral cooperation agreements with third countries.

As we can see, the panorama is not particularly optimistic. Legal or illegal immigration bring about a large number of humanitarian problems which have to be addressed properly. Very often immigrants suffer the consequences of marginalisation, discrimination, racism and xenophobia. They try to react by living in ghettos. On many occasions immigration stirs up social tensions generated by high unemployment, weak economies, petty crimes and strong pressure on social services. Given their lower incomes, they are the best candidates to benefit from welfare programs (housing, nursery schools, scholarship for children and so on). All this provokes a feeling of displeasure and insecurity among native people who have financed the welfare system all their lives.

A significant number of problems could be solved by implementing a twofold policy:

- Effective control of illegal immigration.
- The achievement of a global consensus on a permanent and comprehensive project of integration.

Regarding illegal migration and security issues, in November 2001, the Commission released a communication which put forward some actions in the field of visa policy, information exchanges, border management, police cooperation and return and admission policies.

Even though some directives harmonising border control are in force, a comprehensive policy is far from becoming a reality. The last and most promising initiative seems to have failed due to the scarcity of resources mobilised in order to cut down massive immigration. We refer to FRONTEX which is a multinational security patrol deployed near the Canary Islands in order to monitor and intercept boats leaving from Senegal, Mauritania or Cape Verde. So far this year, more than 25,000 Africans have reached this gateway to Europe. In spite of the FRONTEX system, people still seek a better life.

Between two extreme positions which are the “open door policy” and a “European fortress” there is a sustainable concept of migration based on the following topics:

- Targeting traffickers and smugglers rather than punishing migrants.
- Finding a balance between humanitarian and economic admission.
- Signing agreements and partnerships with migrant countries, including policies of co-development in less developed countries.
- Dialogue with third countries to fight the smuggling of human beings.
- Implementing positive measures to address the brain drain.
- Fostering voluntary return programmes based on economic compensation.

Once the migrant is legally accepted, a new process of integration in the host country will take place. This is a key issue and means social acceptance.

Integration is seen as a long complex process of adaptation. In September, 2005, the Commission adopted a Communication on the integration of third-country nationals in the European Union (COM (2005) 309). This Communication provides new suggestions for action both at EU and national levels. However, the integration process is far from being implemented at the same level in all the Member States because of budgetary restrictions and the lack of political will.

According to the 2003 European Council in Salonika, integration is a two-way process. It implies the fact that legal immigrants have the right to benefit from social and welfare policies such as the job market, housing, education and the health care system under a non-discriminatory principle. Family reunification is based on a generous policy of global integration. Besides, one progressive measure, which is also a controversial one, is granting the right to vote in local elections. This political right could promote a sense of participation in a society in which political and democratic life belongs to the whole “civic citizenship”.

We have said that integration is a two-way process. This means that immigrants enjoy relevant rights, but at the same time, they have to comply with some obligations. Needless to say, integration has nothing to do with assimilation. They are entitled to develop their own cultures and pro-

fess their original religions unless practices conflict with national law or with inviolable European rights. Given that all the member states observe human rights, standards and values, such as equality between man and woman, freedom of speech, tolerance and so on, everybody, including newcomers, has to respect the core values of democracy and the rule of law. Likewise, the migrant population has to obtain some basic knowledge of the language of the host society, its history and institutions.

In short, Member States and the EU institutions need to develop more specific integration policies based on the fair treatment of aliens, the prevention of social exclusion, racism and xenophobia and respect for cultural and religious diversity. All these rights cannot be at odds with other inviolable European rights or with national law.

REFERENCES

- Bauböck, R. (ed.) (1994). *From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigrants in Europe*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Brubaker, R.W. (ed.) (1989). *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Elias, N. and J. Scotson (1965). *The Established and the Outsiders – A Sociological Inquiry into Community Problems*. London: Sage Publications.
- European Commission (2000). *Communication on a Community Immigration Policy*. 22nd November 2000.
- European Commission (2003). *Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment*. 3rd June 2003.
- Geddes, A. (2000). *Immigration and European Integration – Towards Fortress Europe?* Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Guiraudon, V. (1998). “*Citizenship rights for non-citizens: France, Germany and the Netherlands*”, in C. Joppke (ed.), *Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hammar, T. (1985). *European Immigration Policy. A Comparative Study*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Hansen, R. and P. Weil (2001). *Towards a European Nationality. Citizenship, Immigration and Nationality Law in the EU*. Houndmills, New York: Palgrave.
- Kostakopoulou, T. (2002). “*Integration, Non-EU Migrants in the European Union: Ambivalent Legacies and Mutating Paradigms*”, *Columbia Journal of European Law*, 8(2): 181-201.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995) *Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Niessen, J. (2001). "Overlapping Interests and Conflicting Agendas: The Knocking into Shape of EU Immigration Policies", *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 3: 419-434.

Peers, S. (2002). "Key Legislative Developments on Migration in the European Union", *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 4: 339-367.

Penninx, R., K. Kraal, M. Martiniello and S. Vertovec (2004), *Citizenship in European Cities: Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Rogers, A. and J. Tillie (2001). *Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

MATILDE CARLÓN RUIZ, PH.D.

COMPLUTENSE UNIVERSITY, MADRID, SPAIN

LAST DEVELOPMENTS OF THE SPANISH MODEL OF DECENTRALIZATION UNDER THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK

During the last decades, two forces described the development of some European countries: While they transfer many of their powers to the European Union following the rhythm of the integration process, at the internal level local and regional powers claim to have an increasing degree of self-government. The achievement of a balance between this two opposite trends is one of the main challenges of the European construction in the following years.

The Spanish case might be a good example of this. Specially now, when its own model of decentralization is under discussion.

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 settled an original model of decentralization trying to respond to the historical request of self-government coming from some Regions. Some of them had already achieved some degree of political autonomy under the Constitution of 1932. In this sense the Constitution of 1978 aimed to re-edit and improve the former status of these Regions, opening this choice of self-government to the whole territory.

In order to follow this target, the model of decentralisation settled by the Spanish Constitution of 1978, known as “Estado de las autonomías”/ “State of autonomies”, neither corresponds to a regional model such as the Italian one, nor to a Federal model like those of Germany or Austria. It is somehow in the middle. Nevertheless, one simple idea inspires the whole system: the Constitution does not fix the list of competences and powers to be attributed to the “Comunidades Autónomas”, the regional structures created by the process. On the contrary, the Spanish Constitution includes a list of competences which belong to the State –specially those more closely related to sovereignty-, so that any other competences are at the disposal of the new regional structures. These “Comunidades Autónomas” are able to define their own degree of self-government by choosing the competences they want to exercise, even including legislative powers. Self-government “à la carte”, one could say, where the Spanish Constitution offers the menu.

That being the logic of the model, there is no reason for surprise when Comunidades Autónomas have steadily claimed to improve their competences by reducing the limits of the State's powers. This has been particularly the case of so-called historical Comunidades, such as Cataluña, which recently has concluded the procedure of admenment of its Statutory norm. In this context one must analyse the *referendum* which took place last June. This referendum was the last requirement of the procedure and its success implies that a new Statutory norm has been approved, improving the powers of Cataluña. However, one thing is clear: this was not a referendum of self-determination like that which took place in Montenegro last Spring. Cataluña is a Regional power whithin the Spanish State. This was not under discussion.

Nevertheless, the extension of the powers recognised to Cataluña by the new Statutory norm have put under discussion the model of decentralisation itself. In fact, this new norm has been claimed to be against the Constitution since it would not respect the minimum of powers atributed to the State by the Constitution. The Spanish Constitutional Court will have to decide on this. In the meanwhile, provided that most of the Comunidades are following Cataluña's example, some even ask for the amendment of the Constitution itself, keeping in mind the Federal model as a clear reference.

Have these last developments of the Spanish model of decentralization any impact in the role of Spain in the European Union? The Principle of sovereignty would imply a negative answer, but some other aspects have to be taken into consideration, specially once principle of subsidiarity has been recognised as a key principle of the European construction. The extension of the powers of Cataluña and other Comunidades at the internal level will have implications in the definition of Spanish position before the European institution, asking for new tools for co-operation between the two levels of powers. For the moment, since 2004 representatives of "Comunidades Autónomas" are integrated either in the Spanish delegation to the Council of Ministers and its Working-Groups or in some Commission's Committees.

However, the role of regional powers in the construction of the European Union is not only to be decided at national level. The improvement of participation of regional and local powers at the European level is one of the challenges for Europe in the near future, following the path already opened by the "Committee of the Regions". Since its establishment in 1994, it has been consolidating its role in the definition of European legislation as a key tool for guaranteeing principle of subsidiarity. For this

purpose, the creation of the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network in 2005 is proving to be a good mechanism of co-operation.

The task is obviously difficult. Finding a balance when respecting self-government at regional and local level without denying the recognition of the role of the State Members is a challenge itself. Spain is now in the process of defining this balance under new terms. The basis of its decentralised political structure, where the Regional powers have the freedom to decide their level of self-government in the margin of the Constitution, implies an added difficulty. This is probably a lesson to be learnt.

TOMAŽ VUGA

VICE-MAYOR OF NOVA GORIZIA, SLOVENIA

TWO CITIES – ONE SPACE NOVA GORICA (SLOVENIA) – GORIZIA (ITALY)

INTRODUCTION

The city of Nova Gorica lies on the border between Slovenia and Italy, and its centre is actually joined with that of Gorizia, its counterpart on the Italian side of the border. If one looks at the two cities from a bird's perspective they could not tell one from another as they are completely intermingled except where separated by natural barriers. This notwithstanding, the state border between them continues to exist, most notably in people's minds. There have been efforts on both sides of the border to solve this situation and transform the border from a symbol of division into a symbol of union.

The border, both the physical one and the one in people's minds, has been subject to close monitoring and research ever since its erection in 1947. Those who did this as part of their official duty, first declared it hermetic (and as such a defence against influences from the West), and later open (actually, "the most open in the whole Europe", which was at that time divided into the East and the West by the "Iron Curtain", and as such a symbol of the former Yugoslavia). There were also scientists and artists increasingly interested in this border, in particular the section separating Nova Gorica from Gorizia, two "different worlds" that were otherwise tightly intertwined and interwoven. Already in the late sixties, the two cities with different histories and socio-economic systems became an interesting urban phenomenon. The first one to react to this phenomenon was the Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning of Venice, where some visionary ideas were developed of how to merge the two cities (note that this happened almost forty years before the entry of Slovenia in the European Union). After 2000, when it became clear that the border would soon be physically eliminated, some of the above-mentioned ideas materialised in various interesting ways. Let me first mention a workshop followed by an exhibition entitled "Gorica, Year Zero – The Remains of a Vanished Border". Exhibition was prepared by a team of authors led by architect Antonio Angelilli, and showed how – even in a space so vital as

that of the two cities, Nova Gorica and Gorizia – the border areas always remained somewhere in the background, abandoned, serving no real purpose. The workshop explored how to transform such areas into the most vital and central areas of this space. Let me also mention the film entitled “My Border” by Nadja Velušček and Anja Medved, showing the destiny of this border and the people leaving near it from 1947 till our days. Its message was optimistic, i.e., that even the most hermetic border cannot completely break contacts among people living alongside it, and that, despite being a tragedy as such, the border was, in certain aspects, also the vehicle for positive changes. The authors nevertheless concluded that it has been easier to erase the border from maps than from people’s minds, which was necessary should the cities should finally become one.

HISTORY OF NOVA GORICA

After this introduction, the history of Nova Gorica since its establishment in 1948 has to be explained in greater detail.

The city of Gorizia in Italy is a very old settlement, which was first mentioned more than a thousand years ago. It gradually developed into the centre of the area of the then Austro-Hungarian Empire inhabited by Slovenians, Italians and Friulians. The County of Gorizia and Gradisca, as the area was then known, stretched from the today’s Slovenian Alps in the North to the Adriatic Sea and Trieste in the South. It retained more or less the same borders also after WWI, when it came under the rule of the Kingdom of Italy, including the Slovenian part. WWII the border divided the region into two parts: its centre – the city of Gorizia – together with 20 percent of the territory remained in Italy, while the rest was handed over to the then Yugoslavia. However, this vast territory (of more than 2,300 square km) was as if ‘a headless body’, so the Yugoslav authorities decided to build a new centre, Nova Gorica (which means new Gorizia). The city celebrates its birthday on 13 July, when, in 1948, the corner stone of the first building was laid.

Being a project of national importance, the city initially grew fast, but after a couple of years the construction activities slowed down as the federal funds became meagre and gathered speed only when the local economy became potent enough to be able to finance them. The local economy developed on the one hand because of the border, as there were several businesses trading buoyantly with their counterparts on the other side of the border, and on the other hand despite the border, mainly after 1955,

when the two countries concluded several agreements and improved their relationship significantly, in particular in the field of economic and cross-border co-operation. One such agreement, concluded in Udine, facilitated border crossing for the citizens of border areas. Numerous border crossing points were constructed consequently so that eventually each street crossing the border had a border crossing point, be it of a local or national status. In those years, the entire Slovenia was pervaded by new entrepreneurship ideas coming from Europe, Nova Gorica even more so, since it was, firstly, a young city not burdened by old industries and thus open to new challenges, and, secondly, connected with the neighbouring Italian regions. Our businesses developed fast, and some of them eventually became market leaders in Yugoslavia and respectable competitors in Europe. Unfortunately, the trend reversed in the Eighties and Nova Gorica was not spared when stagnation spread across Yugoslavia. The situation became even worse after 1991, when we lost the Yugoslav market. The city shared the destiny of the businesses established there. While it had grown fast and assumed many important regional functions in the Sixties and Seventies (it obtained a hospital, an important secondary education centre, several cultural facilities and institutions, etc.), its development came to a stop in the Eighties, and immigration was replaced by instead emigration in particular of young people who could not find suitable local jobs.

In the last decade, manufacturing has been successfully replaced by tourism, which is being mainly developed around the gaming giant Hit. The company has been developing not only gaming, but also complementary services, and has built many sports and recreational facilities. Last year, a new kayak centre on the Soča river was completed, and there are other adrenaline sports facilities attracting the young from all over Europe. The development of Nova Gorica has regained momentum owing to a relatively high employment rate and to the possibility by the locals to find employment in Italy, but also due to its newly discovered interesting border position. This has had not only a quantitative, but also qualitative impact on the city's growth. One qualitative addition to our city is the theatre building, now home to one of the three national theatre companies in Slovenia. Then there is the library which meets all the conditions to once become a university library. And, most importantly, there is the University of Nova Gorica, the fourth in Slovenia, which was established this year. It has grown out of the Politehnika higher education institution and will gradually unite all faculties established in this area. Currently, we have some 2,000 students in Nova Gorica, and are about to build a campus for at least 5,000. In the field of higher education, the two neigh-

bouring cities co-operate very closely. The University of Nova Gorica, for example, has already opened a department in Gorizia, which otherwise hosts departments of the Universities of Trieste and Udine. Both cities can thus offer quite an interesting range of programmes to their 5,000 students. They are very important for our future, as they can most easily overcome the barrier represented by the border in our minds.

The extraordinary position of the two border cities also gave birth to the idea of celebrating the Slovenia's entry to the European Union here. Indeed, on 1 May 2004, the central celebration with Romano Prodi, the then president of the European Commission, as the main speaker, took place on the common square in front of the railway station building in Nova Gorica. Half of the square which in itself embodies a beautiful mosaic, lies in Slovenia with the other half in Italy, and symbolises the elimination of the border as a physical barrier.

Today, the town of Gorica has some 23,000 inhabitants alone and 30,000 and 70,000 together with the neighbouring Šempeter and Gorizia urban areas respectively. The latter is relatively quite a lot in view of the population situation in this part of Slovenia and the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Region. Such an agglomeration definitely represents a new development initiative right in the middle of a triangle delimited by Trieste, Udine and Ljubljana. These centres, as shown by the above-mentioned exhibition ("Gorica, Year Zero"), have always considered us as periphery. We, on the contrary, consider our town to be protected and not dominated by their presence. Thus we see an advantage in the given situation: we believe that we can catch up with the larger but somewhat quiet centres, and even surpass them in certain aspects.

Ever since the erection of the state border in 1947, Nova Gorica has been the centre of the informal Goriška region and has as such obtained many important regional functions since then. For the time being, Slovenia does not have regions, but will define them by 2009 at the latest, when we expect Nova Gorica to become seat of one of such new regions.

Co-operation with the neighbouring city and municipality of Gorizia

Given the destiny of "Siamese twins" of the cities of Nova Gorica and Gorizia, their close co-operation must be explained in greater detail.

There has been intensive co-operation between the two cities ever since 1964, mainly in the fields of water supply, urban planning, environment protection, culture, sports and economy. This co-operation intensified after the conclusion of the Treaty of Osimo in 1975, when the state border between the then Yugoslavia and Italy was finally defined.

This ended certain unfortunate situations, caused by the border running through the most vital parts of border areas, and initiated the construction of certain very important facilities. The most important was, no doubt, the highway connection to Nova Gorica and the Vrtojba border crossing. The latter was one of the most advanced at that time in Europe, and soon became the preferred border crossing for freight traffic between Yugoslavia and Italy. Another important facility was the road that connected Nova Gorica and Goriška Brda, a hilly area with a number of small villages cut off from the centre by the border. Running through the Italian territory, the road remains an attraction even nowadays and at the same time a symbol of the co-operation spirit that pervaded these border areas in the Seventies and Eighties.

Recently, the administrations of the two municipalities have become even more closely connected. They have formed task groups to cover all the important fields of co-operation in a detailed and expert fashion: urban planning and traffic, tourism and agriculture, information and communication, health care, culture, youth politics, education and sports. They ensure prompt resolving of issues and devising of common long-term projects, recently mainly in the field of infrastructure. Many of these projects were financed by the European funds PHARE and INTERREG already before Slovenia's EU membership. Such a close co-operation necessitates a set-up of a common cross-border office that could eventually grow into a seat of a mini "Euro-region" uniting all areas that, as mentioned above, constituted the County of Gorizia and Gradisca during the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The co-operation between the two cities comprises also various initiatives by independent institutions from both sides of the border (theatres, museums, libraries, galleries, chambers of commerce, schools, kindergartens, border authorities, sports clubs, associations of citizens, etc.) All this improves the quality of life of the people living on both sides of the border, and their direct relations. At the same time, it necessitates the elimination of the Schengen border, the only formal barrier remaining – more in people's minds than in reality – and as such to be erased as soon as possible.

ALEKSANDAR MITIĆ, PH.D.

INSTITUTE 4S, BRUSSELS

KOSOVO 2006

Institute 4S, Brussels, prepared a comparative study “Kosovo 2006”. Professor Alexander Mitic who was invited to take part in the ECPD International conference was a co-author of the Study. Professor Mitic, however, was unable to participate in the Conference but he suggested we copy three brief segments of the Study: “Kosovo Yesterday”, “Kosovo Today”, “Kosovo Tomorrow” to distribute them among participants of the Conference and to publish them in the ECPD Proceedings on the Second ECPD International Conference.

KOSOVO YESTERDAY: A DISPUTED LAND

Despite many claims laid upon the territory of today’s southern Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija (shortened as ‘Kosovo’ in further text), this region has to be seen first and foremost as the birthplace of Serbian statehood and the essence of the spiritual and cultural life of the Serbs ever since the Middle Ages.

This is neither a recent ideological statement nor an opportunistic evaluation of history, but a verifiable, legitimate fact.

Kosovo does have a few archeological artefacts of Roman, Illyrian and pre-historical origin, but nothing that would indicate the presence of an important political entity.

Moreover, the early Middle Ages and the Great Migrations period represent a large gap in the history of Kosovo, which challenges recent claims made by Albanophile historians of an alleged continuity between today’s Kosovo Albanians and pre-Roman Illyrian tribes.

At the time Serbs populated Kosovo, around the 10th century, the territory was largely deserted.

The rise and glory of the Serbian medieval state, from the 12th up to the 15th century, should therefore be seen as the first key period in the territorial administration of Kosovo.

The fertile plain surrounded by protective mountains became the center of the prosperous Serbian empire that stretched over most of the Balkans.

Over three centuries, the Serb nobility had formed all over Kosovo a great number of castled cities, which served as centers of important political and diplomatic decision-making.

Czar Dušan (1331–1355) moved the royal residence to the city of Prizren and the Serbian Orthodox church established its Patriarchate in Pec (1331).

Marriages with European royal families, support to Christian crusades, an important trade balance, a developed mining industry and impressive wine-making capabilities (including a 20km long vinoduct (!) from Velika Hoca to Prizren) made the Serbian society of the Middle Ages on the line of social, economic and cultural developments in Western Europe.

Its rulers were also keen on artistic and religious endowments. Over 1,500 monuments of Serbian culture identified in Kosovo are a living legacy of the Serbian historical presence in the region.

Many of them are part of world heritage, such as the UNESCO-protected monastery of Decani (1334), the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church at the Patriarchate of Pec (1331) and the glorious monastery of Gracanica (1320), which are still very active today.

Rulers endowed these churches and monasteries with large lots of surrounding land, which led for the whole western half of the province to the named 'Metohija' (from the Greek word "metohion", pl. metohia – meaning 'church land').

This name is still today part of the official title of the province, 'Kosovo and Metohija' and points to today's problems of ownership of church lands in Kosovo.

The second key period in the history of Kosovo is the Ottoman invasion of the Balkans, starting from the second half of the 14th century and ending in the early 20th century.

The famous Battle of Kosovo Polje (1389) was not only a struggle against the occupation of Serb lands, it was also a clash of two civilisations – the Muslim Orient and the Christian Europe. Its preparation, development and outcome has reached a mythical dimension in Serbian culture, abstracted in epic poetry which warmed the hopes of liberation during the five centuries of Ottoman occupation.

The values of self-sacrifice and loyalty, the resilience of spirituality, the strength of national identity, aspiration to freedom at all costs, arche-

types of heroes, traitors and martyrs abound in these historical songs, described by many scholars – including Goethe and Lord Byron – as finest examples of European popular poetry.

The fact that they remained attractive and widely admired through six centuries is another proof of their quality and of the importance of Kosovo in the national identification of the Serbs.

The Battle of Kosovo was a decisive turning point. A few decades later, Kosovo and the rest of Serbia fell under Ottoman (Turkish) rule. Their oppressive feudal system brought a dark age of destruction of Serbian society, architecture and cultural achievements, which led Serbia to lag far behind the rest of Europe during its Renaissance and Enlightenment periods.

At the same time, the demographic balance of Kosovo started to change. Serb resistance and solidarity with Christian Europe was punished by severe reprisals, which triggered waves of northward migrations, most notably in 1690 and 1739, following major defeats of Austro-Hungarians, with which the Serbs had sided up, against the Turks.

As the Ottomans settled in Serbian towns of Kosovo and Serbs were forced to move, Albanians from today's northern Albania began to settle in the region and to accept islamization in exchange of social favors. This trend continued in the 18th and 19th centuries, bringing out significant numbers of ethnic Albanians on Kosovo's demographic map for the first time in history.

Serb-Albanian relations were antagonistic from the start on both social and religious levels, with very little room for compromise.

The two liberation wars fought by the Serbs and Montenegrins against the Turks in 1876-1878 signaled the first serious head-on conflict between Serbs and Albanians. The Muslim Albanians fought Serbian troops to defend their privileges and the lands they had usurped. The ensuing defeat of Turkey meant a loss of these possessions: about 30,000 Albanians left liberated areas of south-central Serbia, including Kosovo.

Serbia gained independence in 1878 at the Berlin Congress, but under the Russo-Turkish armistice of the same year, the Serbian army was forced to retreat from the parts of Kosovo it had just liberated.

The Serbs in Kosovo were then put to terrible and bloody revenge, which resulted in yet another massive exodus.

The late 19th century also marked the rise of pan-Albanian nationalism, proclaimed by the Prizren League in 1878. The rising and increasingly radical Albanian population started making territorial claims on Kosovo as well, as part of their goal of creating a large Albanian state.

This obsessive propaganda continues to this very day, despite the fact the state of Albania was established in 1912 in its present-day borders. Albanians still keep laying claim, more or less overtly, to all territories in where they live or used to live, which implies parts of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Macedonia.

Kosovo was eventually liberated from Turkish yoke in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, re-integrated into Serbia and officially incorporated, in 1919, in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians – later called Yugoslavia.

However, this return under Serbian control after five centuries of Ottoman occupation has been interpreted by Albanian historians as “the beginning of the Serbian occupation of Kosovo”, thus legitimizing their non-cooperation and uprisings against the Serbs throughout the 20th century.

In World War I, they sided up with Austro-Germans and Bulgarians. In World War II, they supported fascist Italy and later formed special SS units. Both wars triggered new waves of Serb migrations out of Kosovo.

In Tito's Yugoslavia, the communist regime only reinforced this trend. In trying to minimize the strength of the Republic of Serbia, the biggest in the Yugoslav federation, Serb refugees were prohibited to return in the province while Kosovo Albanians were given extraordinary prerogatives after the constitutional changes of 1974, which granted high autonomy and rights of veto to the Kosovo Provincial Government.

This encouraged further anti-Serb discrimination and led to the departure of tens of thousands of Serbs towards central Serbia, while the Albanian population in Kosovo more than doubled in 25 years due to a record-high demographic explosion.

After Tito's death, radical Albanian requests of seceding from Serbia mounted, only to be crushed by Yugoslav authorities. Numerous incidents from that period, such as the widespread Albanian demonstrations of 1981 and desperate protests of Kosovo Serbs attracted much international media attention. Kosovo became synonym for trouble even before the breakup of Yugoslavia, and many analysts predicted that the poor and problematic Serbian province would be the catalyst of the desintegration of the entire country.

The Albanian diaspora, affluent and solidary, together with the Albanian organized crime network, financed the “Kosovo Republic” movement, which clearly aimed at changing the status of the province with the aim of seceding, as former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia did a few years later.

Compromise was once again off the agenda. Faced with an open campaign for a secession of Kosovo in the 1980s, the Serbian government headed by Slobodan Milošević abolished the autonomy of the province in 1989 thus triggering the creation of the Kosovo Albanian “parallel system”, which was based on the boycott of cooperation and dialogue with the Serbs and on the establishment of parallel, pro-Albanian underground institutions.

The absence of dialogue inevitably led to the radicalization of the situation. On July 2nd 1990, the Albanian-dominated Assembly of Kosovo proclaimed “the Republic of Kosovo”, which led to the introduction of a state of emergency, widespread harassment and institutional discrimination of dissident ethnic Albanians.

The second-part of the 1990s was marked by the appearance of the armed Albanian guerilla group calling itself the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), which staged numerous attacks on security forces and civilian targets in 1996-1998, aimed at inciting a foreign intervention.

Belgrade reacted with an effective police crackdown, first praised as war on terror by the White House – while it was still listing KLA as a ‘terrorist organization’ – and later condemned as “overwhelming use of force”, when the separatist guerillas were suddenly rebaptized partners of US interests.

The clashes between KLA and Serb security forces led to substantial collateral damage and initial displacement of thousands of Kosovo Albanian civilians from the areas of conflict. An OSCE observing mission was sent in to monitor the ceasefire, which the KLA took advantage of to re-consolidate and rearm.

New incidents set the stage for the Rambouillet negotiations, where NATO adopted a harsher tone, accusing Milošević of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and threatening to stage a military intervention against Serbia. Belgrade strongly disputed this interpretation, claiming it was only fighting separatists on its territory, and refused to sign what it considered to be a biased ceasefire ultimatum.

A few weeks later, despite the lack of approval of the UN Security Council, NATO launched a massive 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia, which resulted in all-out war on the ground, exodus of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians, significant material damage and loss of life.

On June 10 ,1999, a peace-deal was signed, ensuring the retreat of Yugoslav army and Serb police forces and the establishment of a UN-NATO protectorate in Kosovo.

KOSOVO TODAY: “UNMIK TITANIK”

In accordance with the Kumanovo Military-Technical Agreement and the UNSC Resolution 1244, which put an end to the Kosovo war in June 1999, all ethnic Albanian refugees returned to their homes, Serb security forces pulled out of Kosovo, NATO's 'KFOR' troops moved in and UNMIK, the biggest ever UN peacekeeping mission was established. Its mandate: administer post-war Kosovo from scratch, with full responsibility.

Seven years later, UNMIK's record is rather controversial. On the one hand, it is fair to say that the UN mission did set up a comprehensive set of provisional institutions in the province, including the executive, legislative and judicial bodies at the central and local levels.

Despite serious problems, public services and economic structures have been reorganized across the province and a process of privatization has begun. Several election processes have been held in cooperation with international institutions and damaged infrastructure has been repaired for the most part.

But while they achieved a certain success in institution-building and restoring normal living conditions for the ethnic Albanian community, UNMIK and KFOR have blatantly failed to challenge another side of the same problem – wide-spread campaign against the Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians.

“Albanian revenge attacks”, as they were apologetically called in the first weeks of the post-war period, became the syndrome of systematic eradication of Serbian presence and culture in Kosovo. Faced with deadly violence, discrimination and lack of freedom of movement, Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians either fled the province or relocated to isolated enclaves and ghettos, living in the worst conditions in the whole of 21st century Europe.

In the seven years of UN administration, in times of internationally guaranteed peace and despite the presence of dozens of thousands of NATO troops, over 2000 Serbs and other non-Albanians have been killed or remain unaccounted for and 220,000 of them have forcefully left Kosovo.

Thousands of homes have been destroyed; over 80 graveyards and 150 Christian Orthodox churches – many of them jewels of medieval architecture – were desecrated, mined or burned to the ground.

All symbols and monuments of Serbian culture have been removed, while many governmentsponsored materials grossly falsifying the history of Kosovo appeared, trying to wipe out all traces of Serbian presence in the province.

The remaining 120,000 Kosovo Serbs live confined in rural enclaves and ghettos with restricted freedom of movement, facing daily intimidation and harassment, limited access to health care, lack of employment opportunities and a blockade of Serb media outlets.

They survive thanks to the help coming from Belgrade and to the security provided by NATO soldiers, who maintain checkpoints around the most vulnerable enclaves and provide military escort to school children, priests and bus passengers.

But even this proved not to be enough: beatings, stonings, shootings, bomb, landmine and rocket attacks – cynically described as “isolated incidents” – continue on a daily basis. The proclaimed goal of multiethnic coexistence seems very far away.

Moreover, Kosovo has become in the last six years the launching pad for extremist activities in other regions of Serbia and Macedonia populated by ethnic Albanians.

In 2000-2001, extremists of the UCPMB launched series of attacks against the Serbian police in the 5km buffer zone surrounding Kosovo – but were forced to bring down their arms after a coordinated conflict-management operation by the Serb police and KFOR troops.

A similar campaign was staged in 2001 in the direction of north-western Macedonia, where a tense six-month standoff ended with the EU-approved Ohrid Peace Accord.

In Kosovo itself, several paramilitary groups claimed responsibility for a series of terrorist actions against the UN administration (seen as the “new occupiers”) and between their own rival factions (with targets including even late president Ibrahim Rugova and various Hague Tribunal witnesses).

All this is to be added to the problems that Kosovo faces as a society in general: the extremely difficult economic situation (skyrocketing unemployment, record deficit and widespread corruption), its trademark organized crime (drugs trade, sex trafficking, cigarette smuggling) and ever too frequent power cuts.

A poor and biased privatization process did not take into account the property rights owned by the Kosovo Serb workers or by the state of Serbia, and the expropriation of illegally occupied property is discouragingly slow.

Public condemnation of the living conditions of non-Albanians is virtually non-existent and a culture of impunity reigns: so far only a handful among thousands of ethnic-motivated crimes have been processed, thus further endangering prospects for a multiethnic environment.

In such a situation, it is almost understandable that the return of the displaced Serbs to Kosovo has been practically non-existent: in six years, only 5-6%, or some 12,000 people, returned to their homes, mostly on individual incentive.

In January 2006, there were less than one hundred (!) Serbs living in the six biggest cities of Kosovo combined, excluding the north part of Kosovska Mitrovica.

Even so, Kosovo Serbs did participate in the 2001 and 2002 elections, but they got disillusioned after seeing no progress in their living conditions and facing constant discrimination through majorization in the Kosovo parliament.

Parallely, a lack of decentralization policies brought the Kosovo Serbs farther than ever from the Priština institutions. Health, education, social services and financial aid are still provided to them by the Serbian government.

On the political plan, the Kosovo Albanian leadership continually refused all contacts with Belgrade, despite democratic changes and successful EU-oriented reforms in Serbia proper.

They were encouraged in this kind of thinking by the UN administration, which breached on numerous

This transfer of responsibilities failed to improve the situation, however, as the Albanian community had only one thing on their agenda – the urgency of talks on the final status of Kosovo. They keep ironically claiming that all problems would be solved only a posteriori, “when Kosovo becomes independent”.

The international community tried to move things from a standstill in December 2003 when it came up with the policy of “standards before status”, which called for the fulfilling of a series of eight key human rights standards before any talks on the future status could begin.

However, the record of implementation of these standards has been uneven, as reported in October 2005 by the UN special envoy for the evaluation of standards, Norwegian Ambassador to NATO Kai Eide.

On the one hand, there has been an efficient and rapid implementation of the first track of standards, which give greater statehood attributes to the province, but the results of the second track of standards – those related to the respect of basic human rights of Serbs and non-Albanians – were extremely poor.

In the meantime, the situation on the ground turned from bad to worse. The wide-scale anti-Serb violence of March 17-20, 2004 – branded “ethnic cleansing” by the NATO Admiral Gregory Johnson and “orches-

trated, planned violence” by international observers – was the worst outbreak of violence since July 1999.

It was the culmination of years of Kosovo mismanagement and exposed all the weaknesses of the policy of the international community in its impotence against Albanian extremism.

In three days of mayhem, 4000 additional Kosovo Serbs were expelled, 19 people were killed, dozens beaten up, hundreds of houses have been burned and 34 churches and medieval monasteries destroyed.

Yet, instead of pursuing with more firmness than ever the proclaimed policy of establishing democratic standards, the opposite happened: the standards were downsized, with the sarcastic argument that there could be no progress without starting the negotiations on the status of Kosovo.

Ironically, this was exactly what the Kosovo Albanian politicians wanted and what the Albanian extremists aimed at when launching their operations.

The “standards BEFORE status” policy was buried in the rubble of the March 2004 violence, cynically replaced by the motto “standards AND status”.

Negotiations on the future status of Kosovo began in Vienna in February 2006.

KOSOVO TOMORROW: THE MAKING OF A COMPROMISE

The aim of the talks on Kosovo’s future status is to finally provide a fair, stable, long-term solution for this crisis region.

The majority Kosovo Albanians must get a maximum of opportunities and real means to manage their future without feeling threatened, but also without endangering the welfare of Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians.

The interests of Serbia, the stability of the Balkans and the worldwide impact of these negotiations are also crucial factors which must not be neglected.

Within the principles of international law and the recommendations of the Contact Group (no return to the pre-1999 Milošević-era situation, no joining to neighbouring states, no partition), there are a series of possible solutions for the future status of Kosovo which deserve to be analyzed.

Despite early attempts by some lobby groups to close down the debate on Kosovo before it has even begun by suggesting there was only

one possible option (independence), a thorough and well argued debate based on past conflict-management experience has led to the understanding that negotiations on the status of Kosovo must meet a certain number of pre-requisites in order to be successful.

One-sided solutions, international precedents and artificial deadlines must be excluded, the final agreement should be based on compromise and not imposed, the final word should stay with the UNSC (which was the warrant of the peace-brokering in the first place) etc.

Based on these conditions, proclaiming the independence of Kosovo would indeed be a risky, unilaterally-imposed and ultimately wrong solution.

Not only would it endanger international law by creating a second Albanian state from scratch and critically hurting democratic Serbia, it would also create a dangerous precedent that could have severe repercussions in many similar hotspots around the world, especially in the strategic energy-rich Caucasus region.

What is so important about Kosovo that it would make it worthwhile to endanger the entire international legal system and worldwide security? What have the ethnic Albanians done to deserve this?

You can read here a comprehensive summary of Top 10 arguments against the independence of Kosovo, followed by a list of Top 10 bluffs about the alleged benefits of Kosovo's independence. Attempts to describe Kosovo as a "cancer" that Serbia should amputate, to suggest that Serbia will go faster into the EU without Kosovo, to speculate that "progressive Serbs" do not care about Kosovo or to estimate that organized crime and human rights abuses will disappear as soon as Kosovo becomes independent have not worked, nor have the emotional spin-arguments implying that Albanians must get independence simply because they want it very much, because they have a moral (sic) right to it or because they would explode in violence if their desires were not satisfied urgently.

Still, despite all these bluffs and notwithstanding Belgrade's continuously restrained and constructive role, a vicious sticks and carrots policy set up by some lobby circles continues to be applied against Serbia, not the least through constant proposals of "conditional" or "delayed" independence as the magic solution for Kosovo.

Luckily however, this idea, initially presented as a *fait-accompl* and even grossly hailed as 'compromise', quickly became downplayed as only one of the options on the table – and not the most rational one indeed.

Realistically and fairly looking, the most sustainable and just solution for the future status of the province lies between a standard autonomy for

the province – unacceptable for the Albanian aspirations – and the independence of Kosovo – unacceptable for international law, for the Serbs and for the Serbian state.

The proposal of a “maximum autonomy” for Kosovo within the borders of Serbia appears set to satisfy all these criteria, despite loud protests of Albanian hardliners and their lobby groups.

It responds to the realistic demands of Kosovo Albanians for self-governing, but it also protects the interests of non-Albanians, of Serbia itself and of the principles of non-violability of borders.

Kosovo would enjoy full legislative, executive and judicial capacity, a limited external representation – in particular full access to the international financial institutions – and most importantly, normalized relations with Serbia. Kosovo Albanians would thus keep all the power they have already and even more, only in exchange of giving up on breaking Kosovo away from Serbia.

On the other hand, Serbia still has many positive things to offer to Kosovo, including a strong push in its macroeconomic revival, a common market of goods, an integrated energy, electricity and infrastructure network, access to its health and education systems, a common fight against organized crime and a joint contribution to regional stability and European integration.

All these things could only be realized in a compromising solution of autonomy, and by no means in case of an imposed independence, which would never be signed by Serb officials and which would certainly result in the closing of borders, regional destabilization and a permanent threat of renewed conflict.

At the same time, an autonomous Kosovo would still need to improve its treatment of the Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians. Everything that is offered to Kosovo Albanians within Serbia could automatically apply for Kosovo Serbs within Kosovo, and vice versa.

A wide-scale decentralization, including a horizontal linkage of Serbian municipalities which would benefit from the education, social and health system of central Serbia is a precondition for the survival of Kosovo Serbs, as suggested by UN special envoy Kai Eide.

This horizontal linkage is not a model for partition and conflict but on the contrary a model for integration and survival, as these municipalities would be fully integrated in the autonomous Kosovo system run from Priština, while keeping vertical links with Belgrade.

Property rights could be solved, cultural and religious heritage would be saved, the 220,000 expelled non-Albanians could return in large numbers and economic investment in Kosovo would become sound.

Multiethnic coexistence would finally win.

Considering all this, an autonomy for the Kosovo Serbs within a maximum autonomy for Kosovo inside Serbia appears as the most reasonable, compromising and long-term solution.

More than anything, it is a win-win situation for everyone: the Kosovo Albanians will finally get the means to manage their future and so will the Kosovo Serbs; Serbia will not have its borders changed and its historical and religious cradle amputated; Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina will receive guarantees that the changes of borders in the Balkans are no longer tolerated; the European Union will obtain regional stability and take fully in charge its European perspective; the United States would be able to disengage its troops without losing its diplomatic leverage in both Priština and Belgrade; Russia, China, India and many other countries in the world would appreciate not having to deal with a dangerous precedent; the UN will have the basis of international law system respected.

Past mistakes should be acknowledged and reversed, not perpetuated.

Only arguments should be used as arguments.

Lobbying efforts should not preclude lasting solutions.

Pressure should be applied on creating those solutions, not on imposing one side's interests over another.

It is time to respect international law, it is time to find a long-term solution, it is time to be patient, fair, sound and consistent.

For the first time in the history of Kosovo, it is time for a successful compromise.

This printout is part of the "Kosovo 2006: The Making of a Compromise" CD-ROM ©,® Institute 4S, Brussels info@institute4s.com www.kosovocompromise.com occasions UNSC Resolution 1244 by transferring more competency than agreed upon to the provisional authorities.

TODOR MIRKOVIĆ, PH.D.

PROJECT DIRECTOR, ECPD SPECIAL ADVISOR

EDUCATION FOR PEACE AND TOLERANCE IN THE BALKANS⁹³

WHY EDUCATION FOR PEACE AND TOLERANCE IN THE BALKANS?

This **question** could be answered:

A. In General:

- Because peace is better than war;
- Because peace is progressive, while war is digressive;
- Because peace is constructive, while war is destructive;
- Because making war is more expensive than building peace;

B. In Particular:

Peace in the Balkans is threatened by new armed conflicts which must be prevented by all available means;

The Balkans which are often designated as the “European powder keg” are the least developed part of Europe and **one of the hot spots** in the world. The region is faced with numerous problems which hinder its development and threaten it with new challenges.

The Balkans are a multinational, multi-confessional and multicultural region. Throughout their history those characteristics were not used as advantages but, rather, as the causes of intolerance and conflicts among the Balkan peoples and countries. Over the centuries the Balkans have been the crossroads and destination of numerous military campaigns and the ground on which decisive battles were fought. The First World War began in the Balkans and this region was not bypassed in the Second World War either. After the perennial “cold” war, the Balkans were faced with a number of “hot” wars – ethnic and religious conflicts. The conflict in the southern Serbian province (Kosovo) escalated into the NATO military intervention (air campaign) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Each of wars either being an aggression launched by great powers

⁹³ Presented as a Challenge for Discussion and Decision-making

or an interstate conflict left very serious consequences on the economic and social development of the Balkan countries and their interrelations. The most serious consequences followed after wars waged in the Western Balkans in 1990s.

Peace restored (or, better said, imposed) after almost ten years of conflicts in the territory of former Yugoslavia is very fragile. Numerous problems that led to those conflicts have not been resolved, while some have become aggravated.

The Balkan region still abounds in challenges and uncertainties with respect to the further development of the situation. The prevention of the unfavourable turn of events and the outbreak of new conflicts are the imperative of our time.

HOW TO PREVENT NEW CONFLICTS?

There are various ways and means which could be used in preventing new perils and building paths and **conditions** for peace and stability including military force. However, famous Albert Einstein said **“Peace cannot be presented by force. Peace can be achieved by understanding”**. Another thinker Quincy Wright wrote: **“War to be abolished must be understood. To be understood, it must be studied”**.

It would be very difficult to appose these ideas, but how can understanding be achieved?

Promotion understanding among peoples of different national, confessional and cultural background is a very hard work in general and in the Balkans especially considering psychological character and historical heritage of the Balkan's peoples. **Ivo Andrić, Yugoslav Nobel Prize winner writing on these issues, observed: “Sometimes one asks himself isn't spirit of the Balkan peoples forever poisoned so that they are not able to do anything else but: to suffer violence or to make it”** (free translation from Serbian). These words have been written long before the most recent wars in the Western Balkans. Now it is even harder to make understandable (reconcilable, tolerable) one who lost his parents or children, relatives or friends by actions of his neighbour, friend or half-brother.

This could be discouraging, but is even more challenging and demanding in finding out possibilities for fastening reconciliation and improvement of tolerance. **Education for peace and tolerance is one of most promising ways leading to achieving the goal.**

WHAT COULD BE TEACHING SUBJECT?

In the program for educating for peace and tolerance in the Balkans the following subjects – as preliminary foreseen, could be included:

- **Philosophy of peace** (as opposite to Philosophy of war);
- **Culture of peace:** Ways and means building the cultured of peace;
- **European integration and the Balkan's fragmentation:** Causes and consequences;
- **War and violence:** Economic and social consequences of war and violence;
- **Peace and development:** Respecting the principle that without peace can't be a sustainable development and that without development can't be a stable and durable peace;
- **National reconciliation:** Reconciliation as precondition for peaceful life and prosperity in multiethnic communities;
- **Ethnic and religious tolerance:** Advantages of living in multiethnic, multi-confessional and multicultural society;
- **Human rights:** Importance of respecting Human rights in general and of minorities in particular;
- **Human security:** What is meaning of Human security and how it could be made;
- **Communications and peace:** Promotion of peace and tolerance thought mass-media

FORMS AND LEVELS OF EDUCATION FOR PEACE AND TOLERANCE

The above mentioned and/or other teaching subjects could be conducted through organization and carrying out the following forms and levels of education/studies:

- Specialist seminars and courses;
- Summer schools and workshops;
- Postgraduate specialist studies;
- Postgraduate studies of master's degree level;
- Elaboration of the master's and doctor's theses in the field of building peace and tolerance in the Balkans.

Specialists seminars and courses could be organized on specific subject and for specific group of attendants: teachers/professors of pedagogical schools and faculties, teachers of primary schools, representatives

from corresponding governmental or non-governmental organizations and the like.

Summer schools and workshops. At the first Study Group session in 'Sveti Stefan', Academician, Prof. Dr. Dragan Vukčević, Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts, suggested organization of a regional school on reconciliation and tolerance in a small town at the Montenegrin Adriatic coast. Discussions between Prof. Vukčević and ECPD is in progress about organizing a Regional Summer School on Multiculturalism at Bar with a good prospective that the School will be open soon and next year to start with the first course.

Specialist studies would be a higher form of education/studies for peace and tolerance. They could be organised and carried out in different ways. The ECPD has organised and manages several postgraduate master's degree studies in Management and European Law, for example. Now the ECPD is organizing postgraduate studies in International diplomacy. Into the programs of these studies a separate subject on Peace and tolerance could be included. More ambitious, the ECPD as an research and educational organization of international character, could organize separate two years postgraduate studies on International relations, within which one year could be devoted to Peace studies.

Postgraduate master's level studies Prevention of new armed conflicts and building peace and security in the Balkans are of paramount importance. Therefore it is necessary that war and peace – how they are made and what are their consequences, should be thought, researched and studied at highest levels. Organizing postgraduate studies on peace, conflict prevention and conflict management, stays in line with the ECPD tasks and objectives.

Master's and Ph theses on peace building and conflict prevention shouldn't be strictly linked with the courses of specialists and master's degree studies; they could be selected and elaborated on the basis of applicant's scientific and/or professional orientation. It is only the matter of attracting students for this kind of research and study.

Suggested forms and levels of education for peace and tolerance in the Balkans should be taken into consideration by the ECPD SG and Conference and at least some of them included into ECPD advanced training and postgraduate studies.

October 26, 2006

CHAPTER III

INTERCONFESSIONAL
TOLERANCE

MONS. STANISLAV HOČEVAR

BELGRADE ARCHBISHOP, CATHOLIC CHURCH, SERBIA

HUMAN RIGHTS RECONCILIATION AND TOLERANCE – THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

As the representative of the Catholic Church in Serbia, I wish, first of all, to express my happiness about this encounter and greet all participants most sincerely. The question here is about the foundations of society, joint life and the future. All believers and especially the members of one of the traditional Churches should and can make a great contribution to peace and reconciliation.

Just for this reason the well-known collection of Catholic social teaching, “The Elements of the Social Teaching of the Catholic Church” (“Osnove socijalnog učenja Katoličke crkve”), was translated into Serbian and published in Belgrade, in 2006.

Due to a limited time, this extremely important book, which is a comprehensive and interdisciplinary synthesis of this discipline, cannot be presented on this occasion.

I only wish to touch upon some specific aspects of social reality and voice my modest opinion about the highest priorities in the process of solving the problems in a positive way.

1. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE UNIVERSAL GOOD

All of us who live in this region must consciously adopt the basic principle of progress, consisting in the search for the **universal good** for all. This means that one must create such a climate and such relations in general that every individual can be original and make progress in his identity. And this will happen only if we develop a positive relationship with another individual, another identity, another group of people.

Who does not search for a positive solution for all, he cannot find the best solution for himself either.

As a physical or legal person, I can grow and make progress only if I enable others to make such progress, too.

2. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSONALITY

It is just the religions that can enable the genuine understanding of the human personality. Personality can realize itself by participating in the personalities of the Holy Trinity and this is why it is marked, in itself, by sanctity, sovereignty and integrity. It must not be manipulated, from natural conception until natural death. Catholic social teaching is based on this principle in a specific way and develops it integrally. This is the priority of all priorities. I think that our society must devote greater attention to this issue.

Where the respect for personality is authentic and objective, there will be no manipulation, hatred and destruction.

3. THE MEANING OF HISTORY

In our region, which is characterized by mutual pervasiveness and setting of boundaries and, thus, conflictuality, it is necessary to initiate one responsible process of studying history. So far, historical books have been full of partial truths and prejudice. A serious study of history alone cannot solve all problems, but it can provide the instruments for reconciliation. The more we learn the truth and accept the possibility of realistically interpreting the past and future, it will be easier for us to forgive because, at the same time, we will reveal the path to the future.

There is no doubt that it is necessary to transform the “state of conflictuality” into the “state of complementarity”. Although this is an ideal, it is quite logical and the only one that is realistic, if we wish to transform the past and live with hope, without which there is no energy for the future.

4. THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY

I intentionally emphasize this principle, because in our region there are still no authentic structures of subsidiarity. One leader alone cannot solve all problems. And this means that the entire universe as well as the entire mankind function and can function properly only on the basis of real subsidiarity. And this means that every physical and legal person, from the family and beyond, must perform his role. Society, which is a large family of many families, or the community of different communities, can “produce” harmony, cooperation and complementarity only on that basis. This principle enables everyone “to be on his own” and that he can “breathe” with his identity.

5. THE PRINCIPLE OF SOLIDARITY

It is quite clear that all mentioned principles can properly be understood and realized only if we adopt the principle of solidarity. Namely, nobody can live alone. Every human being is constitutively oriented toward another one. It is a social being and its self-realization is possible only in society. Egoism brings the disease into society.

By developing and promoting solidarity, and by observing subsidiarity, society is slowly healing itself and progressing. But, the whole society must consciously adopt and apply this principle. We do not have enough time to elaborate this principle in greater detail.

6. CONCLUSION

The Churches and religious communities carry in themselves just these values. The Christian Churches, which are derived from the deepest secrets of the Holy Trinity, know that they can exist only if they always promote the relations prevailing among which the divine personalities. There is no other reality in which there would be greater differences than in this one but, at the same time, there is no other reality in which unity, community and cooperation could be so strong like in this one.

Therefore, the Christian Churches are a great paradigm of peace and reconciliation and, as such, must make their contribution to the genuine understanding of tolerance.

HAJI HAMDİJA JUSUFSPAHIĆ

MUFTI, ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY BELGRADE, SERBIA

LET US ALWAYS LIVE IN PEACE AND HARMONY

May the Lord's peace be with you and with all of us! – this is the way God teaches us to greet the other and wish him successful work – this particularly refers to organisations like this one.

I have been ill for quite a long time, so it was only yesterday that I received the information about this Conference. When I heard about the Conference, I immediately had a wish to attend it and my sons have helped me to come here. I am quite pleased with what I heard yesterday and today, especially from my neighbour and colleague, because I see that we can hope for an overall peace. Our aim is the reign of peace in all parts of the world.

The Lord says – *All of you should enter the peace.* This phrase stands in a very important surah of the Honorary Qur'an. God loves all of us, we all belong to him and whoever praises Him in his heart, must know that God is one, that we are all His creation, and that we are all brothers. It is to this teaching that I always adhered, even in the communist Yugoslavia.

In 1945, my house was burned together with all our family possessions and I never got a scholarship for my studies, since they knew that I was not a communist nor I was to become one. I am grateful to Allah for allowing me to continue my studies of theology at the Al-Ashar University, which was at the time the only university where Islam could be taught. Nowadays there are many universities and faculties in the terminology of ex Yugoslavia and I hope that, if it will be God's will, that at least one faculty will start teaching Islamic theology.

My dear brothers, we are all brothers because God teaches us that way and thanks to him we have finished a difficult phase of our lives who were against us, but we have endured. Mr Bigović and Mr Hočevan, sitting besides me, have endured as well.

Note: The quotes written in italics were pronounced first in Arabic, then in Serbian.

Thanks to the dear Lord, all of us who are faithful to Him have endured. We all pray to God asking him to help us live always in peace and harmony. God says – *Enter the peace*. This is why we hope that one day the wars will end and we will live in peace. Thank you very much, may you be in good health!

Let me conclude by saying that in the previous times there was too much politics and attempts to introduce politics into the faith. I think that in future there will be more faith than politics.

RADOVAN BIGOVIĆ, PH.D.

ACADEMICIAN, FACULTY THEOLOGY, BELGRADE, SERBIA

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Social doctrine in the Orthodox Church has not been developed to such a degree as in the Roman Catholic Church and Protestant religious communities, since it does not consider the sociological and social issues to be essential or primary. The Orthodox Church is not and should not be a political power. Its greatest power lies underneath social weakness. Due to its nature and mission, it is above all political, class, national and other social structures. This does not mean, however, that it is apolitical and is not interested in social issues. On the contrary! The Orthodox Church is interested in all issues, from justice and peace to ethical principles and political system. Still, those issues have their conditional and relative value. Church's primary aim is the evangelization and Christianization of society and saving the world from sin and death. In a sociological sense, Church is a distinctly social phenomenon. It is "a new society", "a city upon a hill". It is the model and pattern of each worldly city and society. Nevertheless, its role is not to support any social order, or to be mobilized for the achievement of the aims of social structures and ideology. Its mission is to free people and entire societies from the historical shackles, social institutionalism and constitutionalism, which always pose a threat and challenge to human dignity and freedom. It reveals the suprahistorical, suprasocial and transcendental aims and values to the world and time. It reveals that which is ultimate and last, eternal and impassable.

Between modern societies and Church on the Euro-American continent there are no open hostilities and conflicts any more, but there are essential tensions and contradictions. Church does not regulate public and social life any more. It is on the margins of society, or has been functionalized in the codes of consumer ideology and progress. Liberal-democratic societies (societies "in transition" much more) are trying with all their strength to "emancipate" overall social life and institutions from Church's influence and exclude God, as an active participant, from the socio-historical process.

Many people hold that Church and civil society cannot exist together; that these notions exclude each other. In a radical form there is a dilemma: either *freedom* or *God*. In our country this dilemma also has educational implications, which is reflected in the imposed alternative: either religious or civil education. In our midst (and not only ours) it can be heard that the notions of Christian and modern are incompatible, that we cannot join Europe with Orthodoxy, that Orthodoxy is nationalistic, conservative, backward-looking and not forward-looking, and that it even poses an impediment to liberal and democratic processes.

Unfortunately, the European Union has not yet taken an appropriate approach to Christianity and Church, which would correspond to their historical role and their meaning for Europe, while at the same time corresponding to the nature of the secular political community. Modern societies are not anti-religious – they even develop various forms of secular religiosity – but are largely anti-church oriented or, even more so, anti-clerical. Christianity is being increasingly transformed into natural religion. We are faced with the upsurge of pagan and occult consciousness and religiosity. Modern man wants religion, but **does not want** God.

As we all know, the basic postulate of Christianity is belief in the Holy Trinity. This is the teaching that the Christian God is the Triune God and that He exists as the union of three Divine Persons: God, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Those three Persons are equal (identical, at parity) by nature. Those three Persons are made one being by the person of God the Father – and free, unselfish and unlimited love. Each Person of the Holy Trinity has own unique personal identity. The faces of the Holy Trinity are different, but they act in unison, in synergy, uniformly. On the first pages of the Bible one can read that man is the image of God or, more precisely, that he was called to exist in the way God exists. In other words, the Holy Trinity is the model and pattern of existence of Church, society and the world.

What are the sociological implications of this fundamental principle of Christian ontology? I will give several principles of social doctrine:

1. The Orthodox Church emphasizes *equality* (equal value) of each human being by nature. This implies gender equality by nature and the impossibility of *subordination* among individuals, peoples and genders.
2. Apart from the equality of human nature, the second principle is the principle of *pluralism and not relativism* (diversity). Diversity is a natural quality. This means that each human being must be

recognized the unique and unrepeatable personal identity. This principle must not only be proclaimed, but must also be protected and observed. In essence, the negation of diversity (pluralism) is the negation of freedom. It must be noted that this implies religious, cultural, national and any other pluralism.

3. The principle of *unity* (harmony, co-operation, joint action, agreement). God is not a tribal or national deity. He calls different people and nations, without exception and discrimination, to come into union with Him. He invites them to live in unity, agreement and harmony. The world is called to be the “cosmic Liturgy”. The unity of mankind is not something given; it is assigned as the ultimate aim. This unity does not imply the unification and uniformity of societies, let alone the suppression and annihilation of personal, national, religious and cultural identities. Christian unity is the *unity in Christ-Truth*, *unity in diversity* or *diversity in unity*. Church’s centuries-long experience shows that unity without pluralism (diversity), on a social plane, leads to a totalitarian collective, while diversity (pluralism) without unity causes – anarchy, conflicts, divisions, hostilities and, finally, death, among individuals, nations and religions. The Christian understanding of unity is love and not selfish interest. For Christians, the other is not a necessary evil, which must be tolerated for one reason or another, but is the other half of our being, our *alter ego*, our brother, regardless of whether it is the question of the *other* along the vertical or horizontal.
4. The principle of *balance* in the God-man, personality-community, one-many, private-common, have-be, faith-knowledge, unity-diversity, local-universal and national-multinational relationships. In practice, this has not always been so, but the principle of balance has never been abandoned. The idea of subsidiarity: maximum power at the local and regional levels and minimum one at the top.
5. The principle of *autonomy* (separation) of Church and State, as well as the awareness of the necessity of their mutual cooperation. That is how the well-known theory of *symphony* between Church and State in the Christian East has been developed.
6. The category of *self-restraint* in all respects played an important role in the history of East Christian peoples and societies. Apart from self-restraint, it is necessary to mention *love*, *penitence*, *forgiveness*, *reconciliation*, the idea of *sanctity* and the idea of *provi-*

dential people, which must be differentiated from the idea of chosen people.

7. The category of *martyrdom* (witnessing), *love and doing good deeds* to enemies as well, which has nothing to do with necrophilia. It means that it is not allowed to use any force in the settlement of disputes and conflicts among people. It also means that man, faced with a dilemma whether to *endure violence* or *use violence*, will opt for endurance. It also means giving up revenge, since it is always a repeated and augmented crime.
8. *Non-violent settlement* of disputes and conflicts which are, unfortunately, inevitable in history.
9. The person of God and the person of man are the greatest values in all worlds, which cannot be sacrificed for the attainment of impersonal aims and values.

A careful comparative analysis of numerous conventions and declarations concerning human rights and the legal and political practice of modern Europe, on one side, and numerous church documents dealing with the same social problems, on the other, would certainly show a great similarity or even identity when the issues of social ethics and axiology are in question. The greatest differences are encountered with respect to the issue of abortion.

Sociologists and political scientists emphasize the basic qualities of civil society: pluralism, autonomy, civility, relation, public character, volunteerism, communitarian structures, solidarity, subsidiary organization of society. Not one of those principles is contrary to the principles of Christian sociology.

Unless it wants to betray itself, Christ's Church must not avoid being a permanent movement of nonviolent resistance to all forms of totalitarianism, chauvinism, nationalism, etatism, egalitarianism, racial or religious discrimination. It does not have any reason not to support and encourage all those who advocate the respect for human personality, human rights and liberties, as well as duties, and all those who advocate a more equitable redistribution of material goods, the affirmation of social justice, environmental protection and disarmament. It should uphold the justified fight against crime, terrorism, human trafficking, narcotics, alcoholism, many abuses of science, technology and informatics, media, "missile diplomacy", as well as many other social deviations.

The Church must neither accept social processes *a priori*, nor reject them in a panic. It is expected to interpret and explain social phenom-

ena in a responsible, critical and creative way, to use the evangelical and prophetic language all the time and never to make pacts with the most powerful social authorities.

All national Orthodox Churches supported democratic processes in the countries of former real socialism on a number of occasions. In addition to certain number of “dissenters”, the Church was the only “opposition” to communist dictatorships and their greatest victim. It should support the integration of Europe and the world, but must also resist any forced assimilation and unification. The Orthodox Church has been a member of the ecumenical movement since its very beginning. From a theological viewpoint, one cannot dispute the need for inter-Christian and interfaith dialogue and cooperation, particularly for sotiurological reasons and not for utilitarian ones. The history of Church keeps reminding us that it is faced with two dangerous temptations – the temptation of “escape from history and the temptation of “subordination to history” and natural, uncontrolled social forces. I hope that it will know in the future how to resist both of them and that it will always live according to the well-known antinomy: the Church is in the world (to protect it and save it), but is not of the world. This is the best way in which it can perform its mission in the world.

All hitherto models of Church-State relationship have proved to be unsuccessful and, at times, even tragic both for Church and the world. If this is correct only in part, we are then faced with the challenge of searching for the new forms of co-existence of Church and society, which will differ from those in the past. New wine cannot be put in old bottles.

VLADETA JEROTIĆ, PH.D.

ACADEMICIAN, PROFESSOR FACULTY THEOLOGY, BELGRADE, SERBIA

BETWEEN NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND GLOBALISM

SUMMARY

The basic problem faced by most European countries, including the Balkan ones, is how to preserve their national and religious identity, while at the same time adopting the globalist concept of today's most powerful empire of the world, America. In the author's opinion, three factors are essential for solving this important problem: 1. the hitherto (centuries-long) flow of national and religious identity of a nation (or, more specifically, the Balkan nations), its hitherto power and endurance; 2. correct understanding of the meaning of globalist occurrences in the world and the monitoring of their trends, and 3. self-denial without losing one's identity.

Key words: identity, nation, religion, globalization.

1. The notion of identity anticipates a dynamic occurrence within an individual and a nation with the possibilities for both progress and regress, or for the combination of these two processes. This means that identity is not acquired once and for all; it is assigned to us as an "individuation process" (the term used by K.G. Jung) and/or as divinization (the Christian term "theosis"). Both processes never end, because a fully acquired identity, either personal or national, as well as full maturity (of an individual or a nation) – is a deception.
2. Identity (it is always the question of an individual and a nation, although they cannot be equalized in all respects), is a development category, which has four stages (according to Edith Jacobson): fusion identity, mirror identity, imitation identity and independence identity. Nothing can guarantee that every individual or every nation will reach the fourth, mature, stage of so-called independence identity. It is always possible to be delayed or remain at one of the previous stages for a long time. The gradual acquisition of a mature national and religious identity is condi-

tioned by the early development of self-consciousness and is influenced by identification processes in one's early childhood. We must not forget that the development of identity (of an individual and a nation) is inconceivable without crises. Crises should be understood as a chance and a challenge, and one comes out of them being either more mature or more infantile. Whether a nation can come out more mature from a war crisis (which is probably the worst kind of crisis), that is, a post-war crisis, is disputable, although the post-World War II relations between France and Germany, and between Germany and Poland point to such a possibility.

3. National and religious identity includes social and cultural identity as a sign of the need for entity. Their interrelationship is changeable and different among various peoples and nations, depending on the internal cohesion between church and state and external favourable or unfavourable challenges. Under normal developmental conditions, national and religious identity should develop harmoniously and simultaneously, which is more seldom in practice (when both an individual and a nation are in question).
4. The unfavourable conditions for the normal development of national and religious identity in the Balkans during the past few centuries have resulted in the confusion, diffusion and defusion⁹⁴ of the identity of most Balkan nations. Instead of normally developed patriotism, the constant exposure of these nations to the aggressive foreign invaders (Turkey, Austria-Hungary, Germany) has contributed to the strengthening of defensive nationalism – which, at times, could turn into chauvinism. Something similar happened with the religious identity of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Muslim peoples in the Balkans. Are these facts sufficient that we classify the Balkan nations as so-called belated nations? According to Helmut Plesner, an interesting German philosopher and sociologist, Germany would also fall into such a category, since it was not developing the idea of the state from the 17th century. Instead, it was confined to the notion of the nation linked to its soil,

⁹⁴ According to Erik Erickson, the defusion of identity is a defect of the synthesis and integration of ego-identity and is experienced as an individual's inability to make decisions, while at the same time experiencing isolation and inner emptiness.

homeland, old customs, that is, romantic notions, in essence, from which nazism easily evolved (“soil and blood”).

5. As for the relationship between national and religious identity, that is, the relationship between Church and State, Nikolai Berdyaev noted correctly that “the antinomy of the Czar’s realm and God’s realm will never be achieved”. The one-time, albeit periodical, “symphony” relationship between Church and State, which existed in Byzantium and in the Balkans in the medieval times, cannot be established in the 21st century any more.
6. How it is possible – under the present civilisational and cultural living conditions, primarily in the West European living sphere – to reconcile and fit into a relatively harmonious entity the globalist tendencies which are now surpassing the already acquired, partly acquired or non-acquired national and religious identity of the Balkan nations and which some scientists regard as being ominous and others as being the only possible and favourable solution. I think that this is possible only by improving the understanding of the historical past (consequently, its national and religious development) of the Balkan nations, and then by making a more appropriate, more tolerant and more gradual request for the voluntary acceptance and reconciliation of individual and national interests of the Balkan nations with the universal and global ones.

Zoran Vidojević writes correctly: “The loss of the cultural and any other identity of a nation is its historical death. But isolationism relative to the unavoidable globalization trends means an economic, technological and developmental death, no matter how brutal... Genuinely global culture can progress only as the resultant of surviving, equal cultures of all nations of the world or, expressed by the “common wisdom” of the theory of democracy and recognition of the equal value of all human beings – as a unity in differences”.

7. When it is the question of the globalization, or the emergence of “global society”, we will refer to the renowned American scholar Paul Kennedy and his book “Preparing for the Twenty-First Century”, published in 1993. However, it is first necessary to remind ourselves that “the cradle of classical sociology was represented by the Western civilisation – modern industrial society – na-

tion state” and that today’s new world is featured by “a clash of civilisations – postindustrial society – the rise of supernational powers... If some regard globalization as an objective and spontaneous planetary process... which implies the convergence and integration of the world, creation of a global economy and cosmopolitan culture... others regard it exclusively as the project of Western dominance, Americanization of the world... which will unavoidably lead to fragmentation, an increasing gap between the worlds and a clash of civilisations” (Miroslav Pečujlić).

Paul Kennedy first points to all foreseen and unforeseen threats to our planet posed by its overpopulation (uncontrolled birth rates in Africa, Asia, South and Central America) and then focuses on the possible damages to be included by globalization in the future: to the economic, nationalist and interested parties and companies which wish to protect their domestic markets and workers whose labour will become redundant when multinational companies decide to move their operations somewhere else. Kennedy then makes even more dangerous forecasts regarding globalization in the future. Namely, he states that the real “logic” of a world without borders is that nobody has control in his hands – except probably the managers of big multinational companies, who are responsible to their shareholders and who have, in a way, become new rulers... With the advent of the 21st century, the inhabitants of Earth will reveal that their lives are being increasingly governed by the forces that are irresponsible in the full meaning of this word.

As for the advantages and disadvantages of spreading globalist ideas throughout the world, Kennedy’s conclusion is even more pessimistic. He writes that it is hard to imagine that Earth can support 10 billion inhabitants, who “devour” its natural resources at the pace of affluent societies, or even twice as slowly... If the obstacles to domestic reforms persist, which is probable in many developing countries, one possible reaction is mass migration to more affluent parts of the world, while the rest will retreat into fundamentalism and reject the Western values (above all else – consumer mentality which is suspicious to it). Finally, it is not sufficient just to understand why we are here, on this planet. Since we all are the citizens of the world, in considering the ways in which we can, collectively or individually, prepare ourselves

better for the 21st century, we must turn to the ethical values and feeling for justice and proportions.

8. There is an increasing impression (yet only an impression!) that the world's major countries – even when they are sufficiently aware of an absolute disharmony between the hitherto mostly discontinuous development of the Balkan countries and the mostly continuous development of the European countries and America – have no actual possibility, due to the dazzling development of science and technology and, thus, their economy and politics, to act adequately and rationally in their relations with those countries (the Balkans, Africa, Asia) whose long history has so far had quite a different course.
9. Nobody who thinks in a modern way, in the best sense of the word, has any doubts that changes are unavoidable. The crucial question that imposes itself is who and what should be changed. According to pseudo-Christian internationalism-Marxism, man and his consciousness will change through violent worldwide revolutions and the achievement of socialism or communism. There was hardly any more tragic deception, with the disastrous consequences, in the countries in which such revolutions succeeded in the 20th century. The crucial question – who and what should be changed – has become even more topical in the 21st century. If it is extended a little, the crucial question would be: should man change (so as to change the social order), or should the system of government be changed (so that man can change)?
10. With the new form of internationalism in the world today, which is pejoratively called globalism/mondialism and positively universalism (or even new ethics), Zoran Vidojević warns of “uncritical understanding of globalization which equalizes it with ‘Westernization’, accompanied by the myth of global culture as an irresistible ‘cloning’ of the Western social order and its specific images of ‘good society’ in all parts of the world”. The old and oft-repeated crucial question – whether the nations change through history, naturally or forcibly, and how a mix of old and new is possible – is still of current interest, since it faces us with the greatest temptation: do we change because we are forced to change, thus painfully breaking our historical past, or we change with genuinely new “extended consciousness” to which a toler-

ant approach to all world's religions, different races and, naturally, different and original nations, that is, peoples of the world, cannot be alien.

11. One should not lose sight of the fact that a gap between civilisation and culture, in the Christian West European civilisation and culture until recently, has been increasing for a long time and that this additionally aggravates a harmonious union of the national and religious identity of specified peoples and nations with the Western globalist aspirations.

Once again, Zoran Vidojević points out rightfully that “when it is the question of human achievements and efforts, there is no guarantee that culture will make progress and that it cannot decline to a much lower level of cultural and general development than the current one.”

Melvin Konner, a contemporary anthropologist and neurologist, says that we seem to have lost the sense of wonder, the designation of our kind and the characteristic of the human spirit. He suspects that the human spirit is not sufficiently developed at this stage of evolution, like the wing of Archaeopteryx. Regardless of whether Melvin Konner is right or not, it seems to me that the human consciousness today (or for a long time?) is in a crisis and that the future of mankind will depend mostly or exclusively on its possibility to reach the state of superconsciousness, which is possible only by changing the hitherto human consciousness. Isn't it true that Christianity (in its way, as well as other world's major religions) have been requesting metanoia (spiritual conversion) from man for two thousand years already.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Vidojević, Z., *Kultura i globalizacija*, Književnost, 4-5-6, Belgrade, 2004.
- Jerotić, V., *Mudri kao zmije i bezazleni kao golubovi*, Gutenbergova galaksija, Belgrade, 2000.
- Kennedy, P., *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, Random House, New York, 1993.
- Kecmanović, D., “Nacionalni karakter: razmjere zloupotrebe”, *Nova srpska politička misao*, Belgrade, 2005.
- Pečujlić, M., *Globalizacija (Dva lika sveta)*, Gutenbergova galaksija, Belgrade, 2002.
- Popović, B.V., *Lični nacionalni identitet i identitet nacije*, Historical Institute of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (Proceedings), Belgrade, 2004.
- Schirmmacher (Hrsg.) *Die Darwin Ag*, Kiepenheuer/Witsch, Cologne, 2001.
- Tucker, E.M., *Worldly Wonder: Religions Enter Their Ecological Phase*, in: “Religion East and West”, June 2002, Berkeley, California.

AMBASSADOR DARKO TANASKOVIĆ, PH.D.

AMBASSADOR OF SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO TO THE HOLLY SEE, VATICAN

STATE AND CHURCH IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

To understand the conditions under which attempts are made to affirm the values and processes of reconciliation and restoring tolerance, it is necessary to take an objective approach to the social and political reality of this unique European region.

Insofar as the spiritual (religious, clerical) dimension of that reality is concerned, it is necessary to perceive the complex life's reality of dynamics within the dialectic State-Church-Politics-Religion quadrangle. Naturally, its linear presentation, to which we are forced in a written test or an oral presentation, is not adequate. It is the question of the crisscrossed relations among four interdependent factors, two of which (State and Church) are institutionalized and two (Politics and Religion) are conceptual/ideological, i.e. abstract, but having quite a specific influence on social and interpersonal relations.

I will deliberately leave Faith out of my paper and the theses I wish to advance in continuation, since it is elusive and immeasurable. It is one's intimate matter about which man alone can hardly make a reliable judgment. For this reason, I also hold that it is not recommendable to make the analytical use of the "raw" statistical data on the degree of religiosity/non-religiosity of the population in the West Balkan countries and communities for scientific reasons, although these data, in themselves, are very important from a sociological, socio-psychological and socio-metrical viewpoint. As for genuine religiosity, I agree with the view presented by Professor Dr Vladeta Jerotić at the circle Round Table (see: D.T. *The Reconciliatory Potential of Inter-religious Dialogue (Theory and Practice)*, in: *National and Inter-ethnic Reconciliation and Religious Tolerance in the Western Balkans*, Belgrade, 2006, pp. 22-23).

In presenting the selected aspects of the current State-Church-Politics-Religion interrelationship in the Western Balkans, I will strictly avoid value judgments or any inappropriate and pretentious arbitrariness. I will try to present certain phenomena, relations and processes as objectively and factually as possible, without evaluating what is good/positive or bad/

negative, or who is right and who is wrong. I will take this neutral approach not because I do not have any opinion about these issues, or because of some neo-positivist opportunism and value-moral relativism. On the contrary! I am convinced that there will be no genuine progress until we are able to formulate and present the principled and concrete value judgments about this sensitive subject of our debate. However, a prerequisite for this is that we perceive and describe the present situation and its elements as objectively as possible, that is, *sine ira nec studio*. This is the only path to typological generalization and, later, to value judgment, thus being able to determine at least the smallest “common denominator” of the (West) Balkan partial, parallel and confronted truths. Mathematical philosophy teaches us that parallel lines cross each other in infinity. The Balkan parallel truths crossed each other painfully many times in historical infinity and the last time they did so was just recently. From a psychological viewpoint, the conflicts among the (West) Balkan peoples are, in essence, the conflicts of their different and irreconcilable “truths”. Since they are still in the state of latent or clearly articulated refutation (at present, fortunately, without the use of weapons), it would be important to take an unbiased approach and “straighten them up” in order to become parallel. Thereafter, in a more tranquil atmosphere, it will be necessary to seek any points of contact or ground for an agreement on at least some basic starting points on the path to the rationalization of our joint present and future and, why not to say without any pathos, our destiny, while at the same time considering each of them from a phenomenological aspect. The recognition of the complementary and convergent real life’s interests in this process will certainly have a decisive role, while positive shifts on the spiritual plane of reconciliation and restoring tolerance can help it to ensure a desirable measure of civilisational irreversibility which is – hopefully with good reason – believed to exist in Europe. While making the initial steps on that long and rugged road, we must have honest intentions and modest ambitions, which means that we should refrain from making any evaluation and, in particular, passing judgment.

In this connection, I wish to point to the cognitively futile and methodologically wrong and harmful practice of some local individuals and groups engaging in research, social or (para)political activities in the (Western) Balkans, or devoting (mind-guarding) attention to them from the outside. They behave as if they live beyond the reality of their (West) Balkan communities and, probably with the best intentions and sincerely, apply to it and its actors the standards of advanced democracies and liberal societies in Europe insensitively and in a tutor-like strict and inexorable

(or, better said, disparaging) manner. Although it is usually the question of experts, who regard themselves as a social avant-garde, these individuals and groups are hopelessly at variance with the environment to whose modernization and democratization they wish to contribute. Namely, they do not want to (or cannot) understand that many “undesirable” social and political events in the (Western) Balkans are not the result of the conscious action of some evil, retrograde and anti-European political or clerical forces. Rather, they are the result OF various historical and developmental circumstances which must not be overlooked. Although this remark is more general, I thought that it should be made, because the described behaviour often comes to expression in dealing with the religious/clerical problems in the (Western) Balkans, or in evaluating the phenomena and relations within the State-Church-Politics-Religion quadrangle. Since some of the factors taking an uncritical and aprioristic attitude towards these complex problems are non-governmental organizations and associations, they reduce, to a significant extent, the contribution that this important civil sector could make towards improving the overall social climate and tolerance in their environments. I am sure that a balanced and responsible approach, which marked the discussion at the last year’s Conference, is the path that can take us gradually and patiently to our aim – reconciliation and the promotion of tolerance and mutual respect towards differences in the (Western) Balkans. Any shortcut can turn into a wrong road. Being already late, the (West) Balkan region has no time for a wrong road.

My previous remark could also be understood as a specific inclination toward an autistic retreat into one’s regional, national, ethnic, local or religious community, which is unresponsive to the favourable influences and civilisational norms of more developed and more advanced European societies, for which the Balkans and Balkan peoples are often reproached. However, this is not so and I am deeply convinced that our Balkan reality can be adequately perceived only if it is placed in a broader, European context, since the Balkan region is a part of Europe... I hope that there is no need to prove this to anyone, at least not here. However, the problem lies in something else and this is just something on which I wish to focus my attention as my basic thesis, which I wish to share with you in continuation.

Insofar as the State-Church-Politics-Religion quadrangle is concerned, I am sure that the current European framework is characterized by pronounced dynamics and the reconsideration of some basic determinants of the interrelationships within it. On the other hand, despite being

under an indirect influence of such trends, the (West) Balkan region is still concerned with quite different life's problems and contradictions, so that it cannot follow it, let alone join it. The result of this dramatic discrepancy, which is often overlooked, can be observed in the inadequate view of Balkan reality and its misunderstanding elsewhere, as well as in the distorted reflection of something which is presented in the Balkans as the modern European values and trends. While they in Europe raise the question of redefining the model and practice of secular society and state, in the (Western) Balkans there is still considerable confusion over their balanced and lawful functioning. As opposed to Europe, where there is mounting pressure for a change in the rules of the game, they in the (Western) Balkans are just making the first insecure steps towards their adoption and consistent implementation.

THE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK

The recent publishing of the valuable proceedings of the symposium entitled *Dopo l'Impero Ottomano. Stati-nazione e comunità religiose* (After the Ottoman Empire. Nation-States and Religious Communities, Catanzaro, 2006), which was held in Perugia, at the end of 2005, went rather unnoticed. In their introduction, the editors Anna Baldinetti and Armando Pittassio turn attention to the increasingly frequent cases of seeking state and political legitimating in the religious sphere, not only in non-European countries (Iran, Turkey...), but also in European ones, highlighting the case of Italy, and continue: "It would be wrong to confine this change in the relations between religion and politics to the instrumental determination of specified political forces; even if this is so, such a choice would point to the implicit recognition of a great deal of specific weight attached to the Christian community in society. But, there is also something else: intensive search for identity, for legitimating from above, from tradition, a defence against the uncertainty of tomorrow, which points to the discovery of the values that seem to be implied and not to be forgotten in our society and IN the state which was born from that society".

A correct observation! It is interesting to note that it was made by historians and not, say, by sociologists or political scientists, who are more limited by various forms of "political correctness" and ideologized cognitive and analytical stereotypes. Is history really becoming "the teacher of life"? Let us hope that this is possible, although it is difficult to believe in this, considering the Balkan experience. In any case, it is not neces-

sary to be a watchful sociologist or learned historian and recognize the need for reconsidering and, probably, redefining, the relations between State and Church. In fact, this reconsideration started before the eyes of the European citizens in social and political life, both theoretically and practically. In the interpretation and implementation of the model of a secular democratic system, which seemed to be inviolable until recently, one can observe serious fractures and uncertainties, so that the process of progressive secularization (which, according to some, has already been finished) found itself at the crossroads. The fact that the modern world is not such it was optimistically conceived by the mind of enlightenment – freed from religious prejudices linked to some obsolete stage of historical development – has also been realized by laicist political elites which are, faced with worldly challenges, beginning to resort, albeit timidly, to the references from the religious/Christian value system. In religion, they are again recognizing the hardly replaceable (if not irreplaceable) starting point of the fundamental individual and collective experiences, behaviour patterns and moral concerns, without which it is impossible to establish satisfactory (lasting) relations in the human community. Many of them find in the tragic lessons of the 20th century the confirmation that any attempt – especially a total or totalitarian one – to replace those traditional (and transcendental) matrices with some “ideological-political surrogates” is dangerous. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly more evident that the period of totalitarian temptations has not been finished with the fall of communism, as some have naively believed. The ambitions to acquire absolute power in the world and establish absolutist government are immanent to history and, in all probability, to the future of mankind. In principle, this applies both to State and Church. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a sustainable spiritual, legal, institutional and life’s balance among them. To be effective both at present and in the future, such an order must have an inherent and (if possible) inexhaustible potential for adjusting to different epochal circumstances, as well as for self-correction and self-adjustment, but without challenging its foundations in a radical, revisionist way. It is increasingly being held – and there is also increasing evidence – that the dominant model of liberal secular (the critics say – secularist) state in Europe does not have enough potential. This deficiency imposed the question of articulating some new synthesis. The opinion prevails that it should not imply the abandonment of the idea and practice of secularity/laicity and institutional separation of Church from State, which was also recommended in original Christianity; instead, it should lead to a more harmonious interaction of faith and reason and a fruitful

social partnership between the religious/clerical and political/state components, thus ensuring the well-being of each individual and the entire community. In short, it is necessary to find a new way to conceive, define and regulate the fundamental principle of secularity – the separation of Church and State, based on the knowledge that this should not be done in the social sphere by relying on exclusivism, domination and a complete repression, a victory or defeat. In the opposite, neither Church nor State will be defeated in the end, but the citizen, or man, or Man.

The recognition of the need for a thorough reconsideration of the prevalent concept of secularity and its application by using the political and institutional mechanisms of liberal democracy in Europe is not of a recent date. As early as the 1960s, E.W. Böckenförde, a renowned German jurist of a Catholic provenance, formulated the basic critical starting point in an approach to offensive liberalism in a concise and sharp manner: a liberal and secularized state is based on the normative assumptions which it alone (autonomously) cannot guarantee (*Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation*, 1967; in: *Recht, Staat, Freiheit*, Frankfurt, 1992, p. 92). According to Böckenförde, until the 19th century, religion was that inner communicating power on which the political system of society and the life of State were based. He posed the following question: Is it possible to base and preserve morality only by using worldly, secular means? How long can peoples and nations, united into the state, base their lives only on the guarantee of freedom, without having some connecting link which precedes that freedom? The Declaration of Human and Civil Rights entrusted (and left) the individual to himself and his freedom. In the new circumstances, the question of principle that imposed itself was associated with the need for integration based on the new foundations. The emancipated, free agents of society had to develop the new homogeneous communal spirit, so as to prevent the implosion of the state caused by the centrifugal effect of different as well as contradictory individual and corporate interests. During the 19th century, this crucial question was temporarily solved by affirming the idea of nation to the point of its absolutization. Within the national formations, however, the people continued to live, in essence, in accordance with traditional Christian morality. After World War II, the proclamation of liberal-type parliamentary democracy as the only adequate guarantee for preserving and promoting “general values” – among which “human rights”, “free market” and “profit” were gradually removing all others – opened to the door to excessive subjectivism and positivism in one’s daily evaluation and, thus, relativism “without shores”. Thus, the liberal state is brought into a paradoxical situation:

since it is liberal, it can exist only if freedom, which it guarantees to its citizens, is regulated from within, proceeding from the individual's moral substance and the achieved level of homogeneity of society. On the other hand, if the State – faced with difficulties in governing the totality and/or specified segments of its social and institutional organism – uses those internal regulatory means by itself, through legal compulsion and commanding procedure, it will annul its liberalism and succumb to the temptation of secularist totalitarianism, as opposed to clericalist, nationalist or ideological one in the past.

Over the past decades, the question raised by the “Böckenförde paradox” has been largely confirmed and sharpened. This has been lately contributed to a significant extent by the confrontation with tensions in the objectively multicultural and multi-religious European states, and the phenomenon being increasingly regarded in the West as a new, global Islamic challenge. The enlargement of the EU, the question of justifiability of Turkey's full membership in the EU in the future, disputes over mention of Europe's Christian values in the Preamble to the European Constitution and a crisis over its enactment, as well as specific circumstances and uncertainties in the configuration of the internal balance of power in specified countries, have brought the debate about the functionality and sustainability of the dominant model of secularity into the focus of public attention in Europe. Although their author continued to announce himself in public, Böckenförde's theses became better known and topical once again, when they provided a conceptual basis for an interesting and indicative dialogue between the former Cardinal, now the new Pope, Joseph Ratzinger, and the renowned German philosopher Jürgen Habermas on the topic “Moral and Pre-political Foundations of a Liberal State” (in Munich, on 19 January 2004). The very fact that these two renowned and influential exponents of the theocentric (Ratzinger) and homocentric (Habermas) vision of the world started a dialogue is a convincing proof that the subject of their debate is of current interest. Naturally, this increasing topicality is not only theological-philosophical or, better said, conceptual and abstract. However, this is not the occasion for a more detailed analysis of the dialogue between these two outstanding thinkers. After all, their debate was published in the form of a book, translated into many languages (including Serbian) and widely commented. It is also an unavoidable reference in the ongoing debate about the relationship between faith and reason, religion and politics, as well as Church and State, in search for their new and more harmonious interaction, while at the same time maintaining their secular separation. Due to their mutual tolerance, high

degree of cognitive articulation of different views and their clear and convincing argumentation, in addition to the strength of their conceptual starting points, the dialogue between J. Ratzinger and J. Habermas is a valuable lesson in intellectual responsibility and openness for a civilized confrontation with the opponent being worthy in all respects. The lesson that was really needed! As for solving the “Böckenförde paradox”, however, a more decisive breakthrough was not made, nor could it be expected. The world was actually confronted (and enriched) with two crucial statements based on opposite views which, in itself, is not irrelevant, considering a highly polluted atmosphere in which a public debate between “believers” and “laymen” is carried on, including arrogant incompetence, superfluous sensationalism and, very often, ideological, political or other bias. In essence, with the true understanding of partial rationale for its arguments and tactical dialogical shifts to the opposite side, J. Ratzinger defended the view that by “annihilating the belief in God, one ends up with the abolition of ethical foundations” (L. Kolakowski) and that it is necessary to broaden the scope of “witnessing” of Church so as to maintain harmony in a democratic, secular state. On the other hand, Habermas was a strong advocate of political liberalism (in the Kantian version of republicanism) whose “self-cognizance lies in the non-religious and post-metaphysical legitimization of the normative foundations of a democratic and constitutional State”. Despite their diametrically opposite starting points, the collocutors concluded that the dialogue, both theirs and universal, should continue, since it would be the only path to reaching practical life’s compromises. Some observers say that the dialogue is actually going on but, in the meantime, it became “asymmetrical”, since Cardinal Ratzinger was elected as the new Pope. As Benedict XVI, he continued to promote his vision of Catholicism/Christianity, both in the Catholic Church and beyond, but in a qualitatively new way.

In the context of our topic, it is interesting to consider the main directions of the debate about the State-Church-Politics-Religion relationship in Europe. On this occasion, we will not deal with the very inspirational hypothesis about the inability of capitalism to correct itself due to which – as the only really global system – it is pushing the liberal state as well as the whole world toward unforeseeable temptations (see, for example, the suggestive formulation in the article by British analyst T. Garton Ash “Il capitalismo – nemico di se stesso”, *La Repubblica*, 23 February 2007). We will remain focused on our complex quadrangle. There are two divergent roads leading from the crossroads at which, as we have seen, our liberal democracy found itself, but there are some noteworthy efforts to find a

middle ground for gradually overcoming the accumulated contradictions and mistrust.

The Catholic critics of the liberal state argue that the dissatisfactory situation can be improved only by reversing the direction taken by Luther onwards, whose “poisonous fruits” are excessive individualism, complete relativism and insoluble identity crisis. The teaching that every Christian is one’s own priest before God ended in a complete anesthesia and withering away of Church as the “Body of Christ”, thus pushing the self-confident, yet disoriented and secularized individual toward dangerous wrong roads and various forms of slavery (F. Cardini, “Stato e Chiesa – I limiti oltre cui non si discute”, *Avvenire*, 19 October 2006). This “diagnosis” points to the remark that the opponents of the liberal state in Europe, who differ from country to country, are mostly the Catholic Church and the Vatican, that is, the Catholic public opinion, while the Protestant churches and denominations feel mostly like a fish in water in the (hyper)secularized environment of “open society”. As for the social teaching and attitude toward the undesirable effects of radical secularization, Orthodox Christianity is much closer to Catholicism, despite their different historical experiences, while the Reform has objectively remained almost as great a challenge to the Catholic Church as secularist globalization.

Consequently, the Catholic critics of the liberal state insist on re-defining the place and role of Church and religion in social affairs and Church’s exceeding the narrow scope of privacy, both theoretically and practically, through a direct social involvement, propaganda and lobbying. Such “clericalist” tendencies and intrusive raising of the questions, which were believed to have been removed from the agenda a long time ago, are causing increasingly stronger reactions among the secular, intellectual and political circles. In some European countries, like Italy, for example, one can even hear the calls for revising or even cancelling the concordats which regulate the relationship between State and Church, because the church hierarchy allegedly offended their spirit with its revived social activism. The proponents of a strict separation of Church from State do not dispute that liberal, secular European societies, which are also multi-cultural and multi-religious, have problems and that they are faced with the threatening social, ethnic and religious stratification. In contrast to their Catholic opponents, they do not put the blame on secularization, but on its insufficiently consistent implementation. Such a state of mind gives rise to the political programmes which include the improvement of the relevant laws and regulations aimed at ensuring the stable, secular character of society and state. The examples of this orientation can be found in

traditionally laicist France, which marked the centennial of a separation of Church from State in 2005, as well as in traditionally Catholic Spain, where the Socialist Prime Minister Zapatero – after taking up his position – embarked resolutely on the adoption of the laicism laws governing family law and bioethics, thus provocatively antagonizing the Catholic Church and the Vatican and causing serious social shocks. Being unable to efficiently counter this attack on its fundamental teachings about man, family and life in Spain – due to the legacy of so-called “national-clericalism” – the Catholic Church “showed its teeth” in Italy. By the campaign, which was launched by the Bishops’ Conference of Italy and led by the powerful Cardinal C. Ruini, with a discrete yet strong support of Pope Benedict XVI, the Catholic Church and its loyal political forces succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat on the secularist advocates of amending the Law on Artificial Fertilization at the referendum in 2005. A similar thing could happen with the adoption of the controversial law on the legal regulation of extramarital unions, including homosexual marriages. Naturally, the Church does not think that it exceeds the limits of its religious and moral mission with such involvement. Although they were not so open and dramatic, the tensions between State and Church, that is, between “believers” and “nonbelievers” were also observed in some other European countries (in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Germany, Portugal, as well as Poland).

In the context of our topic, it should be pointed to one indicative tendency, which is characteristic both of some critics of a liberal secularized state and some of its most fervent advocates. It is the question of pronounced hostility towards the notion of tolerance, which was untouchable until recently. So, for example, the well-known French theorist and publicist J. Daniel calls on citizens to give up tolerance and be simply “the French style” secularists/laicists. After all illusions about a supranational world without borders and “global village”, and given a great deal of effective complexity of multicultural and multi-religious pluralist societies, the generous Voltairean tolerance is now losing its sense and easily turning into indifference, passivity and a lack of interest in the fate of the “tolerated”. Tolerance was the way out and great achievement at the time when it was necessary to overcome clerical intolerance and the arrogant exclusivism of only one church, the Catholic Church. Today, in genuinely pluralist European societies, it is even harmful. Sociologist C. Kintzler from the University of Lille stated with good reason that “secularity (*laïcité*) is not (the same as) tolerance”. If the first is active, the second is passive. The first is proactive and the second is indifferent. To tolerate in our

times means to accept almost with resignation. Tolerance reconciles to the private and public practicing of all religions, while secularity prescribes that God should remain at home and sends citizens to school. Moreover, “*laïcité à la française*”, proudly says Daniel, protects the individual both from the pressure of the group to which he originally belongs, defends the wife from her violent husband, allows man to change religion or become an atheist. In the opinion of J. Daniel and his supporters, who are also called “secularist fundamentalists” by some, the solution to the “Böckenförde paradox” should be sought in consistent secularism, which will be equally valid for, and binding on all citizens and social groups. This would be the only way to ensure their genuine equality and equal concern for all. There is no need to emphasize what most European Muslims, as well as Catholics and, in particular, Catholic intellectuals and church hierarchy think about such a recipe. However, they are also against tolerance for their, partly similar reasons, but their motives are different.

In defining the real and desirable meaning of today’s tolerance, Monsignor F. Follo, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to UNESCO, regards it as the “acceptance of the Other as a value and not as a problem”, which really sounds nice (*Avvenire*, 25 August 2006, 13). However, Catholic analysts are almost unanimous in their conclusion that modern tolerance has, unfortunately, turned into something else. In its semantic-use transformations, the notion of tolerance has almost come to full circle. At the beginning, to tolerate in matters of religious difference meant to deliberately and consciously bear the teachings and behaviour patterns which are regarded, in essence, as unacceptable. Mirabeau was the first to speak about the negative connotation of tolerance as a specified form of “tyrannical relationship”, because “one who tolerates may not do that”. However, from the 17th and 18th centuries onwards, especially in the context of the enlightenment and liberal ideas, tolerance assumed a positive connotation. It began to move closer to the meaning of mutual respect and enrichment in differences, just as it was formulated by Monsignor Follo. However, a prerequisite for such tolerance is the existence of a firm identity grounding and specified value system. In Europe, which is undergoing an increasingly deeper identity crisis, tolerance has become, in the words of the authoritative Catholic/Vatican commentator M.G. Giordano, “euphemism with whose noble ideological veil they are trying to cover or hide the situations and acts which are not too praiseworthy and deserve to be regarded, if not as dishonour or meanness, then as submission, compromise, collusion or complicity”. Without sparing the current notion of tolerance of criticism, Giordano also writes a “eulogy to intolerance”, considering

it as an opposite stance on the prevalent notion of “tolerance”. He argues that it is high time that everyone demonstrates his courage and assumes the responsibility for his ideas, making them known and defending them with absolute “intolerance”, because, as was written by Italian man of letters Luigi Capuana, “a paradox is the truth which does not seem like that” (*Tolleranza e intolleranza*”, *L'Osservatore romano*, 27 August, 2006, p. 3). From the perspective of the Western Balkans, the European questioning of the meaning and current use of the notion of tolerance is not irrelevant, because in the intra-Balkan relations, it is still widely used with a positive connotation. It is regarded as a prerequisite for preserving the harmonious multiculturalism and multi-religiosity of West Balkan societies. On the other hand, in Europe, tolerance as well as multiculturalism and multi-religiosity are being critically reevaluated as the ideals of democratic, secular states.

I hope that you could so far form some opinion about the current European framework of the dynamics within the State-Church-Politics-Religion quadrangle. I am convinced that this dynamics must be constantly kept in mind and analyzed when dealing with the same quadrangle at the West Balkan level. It is relevant at least for two reasons: (1) its indirect influence on the situation and processes in the Balkans and (2) as a contrast picture of one objectively developmentally different and (at this moment) immeasurable social, political and cultural reality, from which the higher-category standards and preoccupations are derived. The West Balkan region still has to undergo all preliminary phases in the process of creating the social, political, economic, cultural and, naturally, psychological assumptions for the application of such European standards and the sharing of the relevant preoccupations. While they in Europe are seriously reconsidering the solutions and models of regulating the relations between State and Church, the West Balkan region has not yet reached the stage of their stabilized institutionalization and application due to various circumstances. It is questionable whether such a discrepancy should be regarded as a handicap for someone who is late or, given the European experiences and newly opened debates, it would be possible to shorten to path for the West Balkan peoples and states towards finding optimal models? This question remains, but a discrepancy is evident and it must be taken into account both theoretically and practically. Chronic discontinuities in their socio-historical development, which have exerting pressure on the (Western) Balkans for centuries, are not a recommendation for skipping the lectures and classes. But, it would be necessary, both in Europe and the Balkans, to ensure an adequate measure of sound historic-

ity, political and socio-psychological realism, as well as patience in order to lessen this gap and, if possible, to bridge it through the European integration processes in the future.

THE WEST BALKAN CONTEXT

In contrast to the situation in (Western) Europe, which is increasingly less coinciding with the EU borders, the relationship between State and Church in the Western Balkan region is influenced by an volatile environment in the post-communist, post-conflict transition period, through which its societies and communities are passing. Although their intellectual, spiritual and political elites are more or less familiar with the European conceptual trends and debates, and some of their segments are even showered with them, the sociologically relevant life's reality refers and even forces the State and Church representatives to deal with much more trivial status-related and political problems. This is not a matter of choice or a wish; rather, it is a matter of inevitability and necessity, which are imposed on them by this historical moment, including a complete unpleasant legacy, as well as the achieved level of social development and democratic political culture. This important fact should always be taken into account when considering and evaluating the beneficial social and reconciliatory impact of churches and religious communities in the Western Balkans, and when perceiving their potential contribution to this issue.

The disintegration of the multinational and multi-religious Yugoslav federation, which was accompanied by armed conflicts, migrations, suffering of the civilian population, physical destruction, economic sanctions and economic downturn, as well as the establishment of new independent states, burdened by the legacy of interethnic and inter-religious conflicts, resulted in the new political geography of the Western Balkans. In its coordinates, both the states and churches/religious communities were faced with the essentially changed organizational and work conditions. Thus, the specific links of all West Balkan churches and religious communities with the relevant national and ethnic groups made their activities “spill over” the newly established state borders. At the same time, the tendencies towards adjusting the church organization to the current administrative and political divisions are strengthening. With their still unhealed traumas from the decades-long period of “scientific atheism” and systematic discrimination, the churches and religious communities plunged into the chaos of interethnic conflicts and civil war, being primarily called to

“pay off” their national debt and not to perform their spiritual mission. Thereafter, they found themselves face to face with the State in the process of building democratic institutions and regulating their own status on the new foundations. This was a great challenge both for State and Church, especially if one bears in mind that the political situation both on the national and regional plane has not yet been stabilized. Not all churches/religious communities have succeeded in coping with the new situation and realigning to the same extent. One can also observe the differences in the situations and behaviour patterns at the local level. Those being more experienced and better organized, like the Catholic Church, whose central seat is in the Vatican, have been more successful in adjusting to the changed work conditions, while for the Islamic Community and the Serbian Orthodox Church this has not been so easy. However, despite the differences and nuances in their responses, the fact remains that, over the past years, all churches/religious communities, as well as the West Balkan countries in which they perform their spiritual and secular mission, have been faced with the typologically identical questions. In further text, I will present how all this actually looks like, the consequences and the distance of all this from the European preoccupations concerning the relations between Church and State. A detailed survey of the situation – which would certainly be very useful – would require additional research and much more space, so that I will focus on some characteristic and, I believe, representative examples. In my presentation, I will stick to the religious-ecclesiastic taxonomy and not the administrative-political one. In other words, I will give a survey by church/religious community and not by state. Namely, as I have already mentioned, after the fragmentation of the political map and the establishment of new states, the main churches/religious communities also had to act “across the border”. The presentation of the situation by state, which would be meaningful for different research, could lead to an inappropriate and cognitively harmful and artificial division of something indivisible, and to futile repetitions. If someone wishes, it is easy to list all phenomena and classify them by state.

Let us start with the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), the conditions under which it operates in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the problems with which it is faced. Since it has the greatest number of followers, who are unequally distributed in all ex-Yugoslav republics, the SOC is faced with various challenges. Suffice it to read, say, the “Public Statement of the Holy Synod of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church Following Its Regular Session Held in Belgrade from 4 to 8 October 2006”, and assure oneself of that. After the principled and carefully worded

spiritual and pastoral formulation that “on this occasion, the Assembly also devoted attention to the holy unity of the Church, which cannot be achieved without preserving the fullness of Orthodox Christian faith and its genuine centuries-old canonical unity”, there follows the presentation of the specific topics broached by the Bishops of the SOC. They include the church rift in Macedonia, the report on the new imprisonment of the exarch of the Ohrid Archbishopric, Archbishop Jovan, in Skopje, whereby a hope is expressed that the new Macedonian Government will have more feeling for human rights and religious freedoms than the previous ones, and it is appealed to the judiciary to review the case according to its conscience, without the instructions “from above”, and free the dignitary of the SOC. In addition, the Assembly calls on believers to vote for the new Serbian constitution at the referendum, especially because “the unambiguous will of the Serbian people that Kosovo and Metohija remain an inalienable part of Serbia will find its full and binding expression”, since they are not only a part of the territory, but also the heart and soul of the Serbian people. The question of the future constitutional status of the SOC both in Serbia and in Montenegro was also considered. What can be concluded from this incomplete inventory of the views presented in the “Public Statement”? It can be concluded that this session was dominated by political topics or, in other words, by religious issues with distinctly political implications, whereby the following three are essential: (1) the church rift in Macedonia, with all unpleasant consequences, including the judicial persecution of Bishop Jovan with the secular “blessing” of the Macedonian authorities and the announcement that, according to the new Law on Churches and Religious Communities, which is being drafted, the SOC/Ohrid Archbishopric will not be able to register itself in Macedonia; (2) the problem of the future status of Kosovo and Metohija, the province to which the SOC and the Serbian people are spiritually and historically tied most closely, the problem which is so well known that there is no need for an additional explanation. The SOC calls on citizens to take part in the referendum and vote for the new Serbian Constitution for the sake of Kosovo and Metohija (28-29 October 2006), which is an understandable and justified yet political message, and (3) the situation of the SOC in Montenegro, after the smallest ex-Yugoslav republic won its independence. It is clear that its status is more uncertain and unenviable for political reasons and not for spiritual ones. The so-called “Montenegrin Orthodox Church”, which is canonically unrecognized and led by an unfrocked priest, and which is regarded by the SOC, at best, as a “group of citizens”, seems to be taking wings. Having the support of the influential

segments of the Montenegrin government, it not only aspires to seize the churches and monasteries of the Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral (SOC), but also announces that it may become the main Orthodox Church, before the SOC, under the new Montenegrin Constitution. Consequently, politics and only politics once again!

Apart from a rather difficult situation of its members in Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from which many Orthodox Serbs fled during the civil war, dozens of destroyed or damaged churches and monasteries, problems with the provision of funds for their reconstruction and the licences for the construction of new ones, as well as the slow realization of property rights, the SOC in Serbia is also not without problems. However, let us focus our attention on the disputes (about autocephaly) with the MOC and so-called “Montenegrin Orthodox Church”, because they are very illustrative for the religious and political problems arising from the new post-Yugoslav reality in the Western Balkans. Naturally, by absolutizing the organizational principle of the world’s Orthodoxy through national churches (“one nation – one church”), the proponents of independent, national autocephalous churches in Macedonia and Montenegro look at the problem of relations with the SOC from their viewpoint, which is quite opposite from that of the SOC. Their aspirations are also based on a different interpretation of church history and canon law but, in practice, they rely mostly on the support of the secular authorities, for which this became the question of the greatest national significance a long time ago, and for Macedonians – during Tito’s communist regime already. Commenting on the information that the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Serbia provided financial assistance to the Ohrid Archbishopric, which was evaluated by the MOC as scandalous, Macedonian President Branko Crvenkovski said (on 7 March 2006), for example, that such an act “can also be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of another sovereign state”. When at one time Metropolitan Cyril of the Moscow Patriarchate tried to mediate in the dispute between the SOC and the MOC, he realized after the first meeting with the members of the MOC Synod that some results could be achieved only by appealing to the holders of political power in Skopje. As I already mentioned at the beginning, it is not relevant who is right in this specific case, either from a canonical or democratic aspect. What is indisputable is a high degree of institutional and non-institutional politicization of the moot ecclesiastical questions which, naturally, has an essential influence on the relations between Church and State, in the way which is hardly conceivable in Europe. What model of harmonious secularity can be achieved under such

circumstances? But, this is the reality of West Balkan societies in transition which should be borne in mind by the representatives of the non-governmental sector and ultraliberal political parties in Serbia (if they wish to be useful), which otherwise wrote off arrogantly one imperfect yet decent Law on Churches and Religious Communities (2006) as being “obscurantist” and “medieval”.

Let us now see what problems are faced by the Islamic Communities (ICs) in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In principle, the collapse of the state did not disrupt the existing organizational set-up of West Balkan Islam, because the Islamic (Religious) Communities were mostly organized according to the territorial principle, which observed the federal structure of the SFRY. Although in the early 1990s the then Reis-ul-Ulema J. Selimovski tried to maintain the unity of the ICs in the entire Yugoslav territory, at least formally, his intention, just like Yugoslavia, was doomed to failure. Although it would be useful to present the current status of the ICs in all new independent states, established through the collapse of the former federation, I selected the Islamic Communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Macedonia as being the most interesting. Let us start with the last one.

The Islamic Community of Macedonia is mostly comprised of ethnic Albanians who, under the Ohrid Agreement, practically control the whole western part of the country and their number is especially high in the Macedonian capital Skopje. Over the past years, the Albanian Muslim community has been burdened by serious internal conflicts. At one moment, there were two or even three rival ICs. Finally, on 20 September 2006, Sulejman Rexhepi was elected as the Reis-ul-Ulema. This election was preceded by dramatic events. Namely, on the night before Rexhepi's election, unknown assailants fired shots at the building where the vote was to take place. Although many of them welcomed Rexhepi's election, the connoisseurs express their doubts about his ability to control the clashing political groups and criminal gangs, which have been fighting for control over the IC for a long time. This refers especially to the influential and profitable position of the Mufti of Skopje. When taking up his position, S. Rexhepi himself said that he would fight resolutely against the breakthrough of radical Islam into the IC of Macedonia, and called his opponents to “throw away their Kalashnikovs and stop using force”. The fact that this is not just pure rhetoric is evidenced by several earlier cases of the intrusions of armed persons into the IC premises, as well as the mysterious session of the Council of the IC of Macedonia in Struga (24 September 2005), which was staged by police officials and was under

the political control OF Ali Ahmeti, the leader of the Union of Democratic Unity (BDI), the then Albanian party in the ruling coalition. In the shadow of arms and threats, the session lasted only ten or so minutes, during which, without voting, the names of the “newly elected” officials of the Islamic Community of Macedonia were read. After this deplorable event, the secretary of the Religious Officials’ Association, Ilmije A. Tahiri, called on the spokesman of the Union of Democratic Unity to state clearly whether Macedonia was still a secular republic. Naturally, nobody answered, but it must have been clear to everyone what specific kind of secularity was in question. “Foul tongues” commented that the date of Rexhepi’s election for the Reis-ul-Ulema was fixed so as to take place after the parliamentary elections and enable the new authorities to have “their man” at the head of the Islamic Community. So much for that.

As of recently, the Muslims in Serbia (about 250,000) have been organized into four distinctly asymmetric Islamic Communities: the IC of Sandžak, seated in Novi Pazar and having the greatest number of believers, religious and religious-educational institutions; the IC of Serbia, seated in Belgrade and practically having jurisdiction in central Serbia; the IC of Vojvodina and the IC of Preševo Valley, in which there has been an internal division into two rival groups since 2003. Here mention should also be made of the IC of Kosovo, seated in Priština, in which, before the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, there was also the formal seat of the Meshihat of the IC for the whole republic. There is almost no need to emphasize that the IC of Kosovo has been independent for a long time, especially after 1999, and that it maintains close relations with the Muslims in Macedonia and Albania. The Meshihat of the IC of Sandžak, which was established in 1993, during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is administered by the energetic Mufti M. Zukorlić, is regarded as being subordinated to the Riyaset, that is, the Reis-ul-Ulema in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is also considered by the Bosniaks in Serbia as their motherland. The leadership of the IC of Serbia has quite a different view. It holds that the “Muslims in Serbia should look towards Belgrade, and not towards Sarajevo and Priština” (Mufti H. Jusufspahić) and disputes the supremacy of the IC of Sandžak in their representation. For years now, the heads of these two main ICs have been distrustful of each other and their mutual misunderstanding has been increasing, so that there is no cooperation between them. The state tries not to interfere in this dispute and maintains correct cooperation with both Islamic Communities. However, it cannot remain politically indifferent towards the fact that one of them, the larger one, demonstrates its spiritual unity and is organization-

ally linked to the seat in the neighbouring country with which mutual relations are improving, but still have many post-conflict characteristics.

During 2005 and 2006 and especially after the adoption of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities, as well as immediately before and after the enactment of the Serbian Constitution (at the end of 2006), there was increasing talk about the need for the organizational integration of the existing ICs of Serbia, both in Novi Sad and Belgrade. Moreover, the leadership of the IC of Sandžak proposed the new Statute of the IC of Serbia, whose draft was allegedly agreed at the Assembly in Novi Pazar (which is not recognized by the heads of the IC of Belgrade). The draft anticipates four equal ICs in Serbia, with two seats: the main one in Novi Pazar and the “representative and diplomatic” one in Belgrade. In the opinion of Mufti M. Zukorlić, it would not be appropriate or justified to establish the Riyaset (the head organization for religious questions) in Serbia, because the one, with traditional legitimacy, based on the *men-shura* (authorization, instauration charter) granted by the Sheikh-ul-Islam of Istanbul, already exists in Sarajevo. How much this argumentation in the post-Yugoslav relations is principled and how much (politically) desirable, one can sense by recalling the fact that much smaller Islamic Communities, like those of Montenegro and Macedonia, are now administered by the Reis-ul-Ulemas. As it could be expected, Zukorlić’s ideas and plans were rejected in Belgrade, whose counterproposals were, in turn, ignored in Novi Pazar. Thereafter, Belgrade’s leadership of the IC decided to take action and called the session of the Supreme Assembly of the IC of Serbia, at which (on 29 January 2007), “the legitimate representatives of that body from 52 municipalities in Serbia”, while observing the “legal and territorial integrity of their state”, brought the decision to establish the Riyaset of the IC of Serbia. Pursuant to the later decision of the same Assembly, the Statute of the IC of Serbia was promulgated and Belgrade’s Mufti Hamdija Jusufspahić was elected as the Acting Reis-ul-Ulema. Should it be noted that the representatives of the IC of Sandžak did not participate in these sessions of the Supreme Assembly and decision making, which were evaluated in Novi Pazar as being “non-serious”. It is evident that the Muslims in Serbia are now more divided organizationally and institutionally than ever before and it is rather clear what secular climate is generated by the clashing views on traditional, Ottoman and contemporary political legitimacy by the highest representatives of one religious community.

It is well known that the Muslims, who identify themselves as Bosniaks, constitute a relative majority of the population in the multi-national, two-entity, “Dayton” Bosnia and Herzegovina (about 48%), in which

Serbs and Croats enjoy the status of constituent people. In the former Yugoslavia, the IC of Bosnia and Herzegovina was regarded as the spiritual (and partly ethnic) seat for a great majority of Muslims in its entire territory. Today, it is regarded as the seat to a lesser degree for non-Bosniak Muslims (primarily Albanians), but has still preserved a certain religious prestige among them as well. At the same time, it considers itself to be the only relevant factor both on the regional and European scale. Like the whole Bosniak population, during the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the IC of Bosnia and Herzegovina was also faced – as the highest institution and spiritual centre of the nation undergoing the painful process of formation – with great temptations and the need to perform the mission which, by far, exceeded the religious limits. After all, a division between the secular and religious in Islam does not exist doctrinally.

Like the SOC and the CC, the IC of Bosnia and Herzegovina also shared the destiny of its people during the war: it was faced with deaths, persecution, material damage, destruction and desecration of its places of worship and the destruction of its property, while at the same time offering consolation, explaining the ongoing events and pointing to the path that should be taken. The imams were appealing to the believers from the mosque pulpits; some were involved in the organization of humanitarian aid as well as political institutions, while some were fighting carrying the gun, often together with the volunteers and “warriors for the faith” from the Muslim world, who came from afar to help their Balkan brothers in trouble. Those were troubled and dangerous times. There is no doubt that the war contributed to the radicalization of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina to some degree which, after longer hesitance, the IC began to deal with as “the instances of interpreting Islam... in the way which is contrary to the experience and tradition of Bosnian Muslims” (from the Resolution on the Statutory Changes and the Interpretation of Islam” issued by the Riyaset of the IC of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 27 March 2006). It is generally held among the Bosniaks that the highest leadership of the IC has been in a very close contact with politics since the coming of the energetic Reis-ul-Ulema Dr Mustafa Cerić at its head (1993), which has been encouraged by the fact that the main Bosniak political party, Izetbegović’s Party of Democratic Action (SDA), has been Islamistic since its formation. In some Muslim intellectual circles M. Cerić is criticized because he has gone too far in the politicization of the bodies, role and authority of the IC.

A more detailed survey of the extremely interesting configuration of the relationship between State and Church in the Muslim component of

B&H would take us too far. On this occasion, I will limit myself to one very indicative initiative of the Reis-ul-Ulema of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which points to his ambitions that surpass the local as well as narrower regional limits. It is the question of the project relating to the “institutionalization of Islam as a European religion”, whose textual expression is also the “Declaration of European Muslims”. This programme “Declaration”, whose author is Dr M. Cerić, was presented for the first time in London, in August 2005, with the support of some Muslim circles in this city. In 2006, he also presented it at the meetings of more than 150 European imams in Zagreb and Vienna. In the meantime, the Reis-ul-Ulema of Bosnia and Herzegovina gave a series of interviews to domestic and foreign media, as well as via Internet in order to explain and promote his idea of “legalizing” Islam as one of the equal religions in Europe. A more careful analysis of the “Declaration” and Cerić’s accompanying statements reveals a number of the examples of conceptual inconsistency, with the basic idea about the need and possibilities for the harmonious integration of Islam and Muslims into the open system of European values, while at the same time preserving their specific religious and cultural identity. There is no doubt that the “Declaration” is the result of the sensible and justified recognition of the need for a constructive participation of Muslims in the great debate over Europe’s essential issues, in addition to establishing not only their physical presence, but also civilisational dignity as equal participants in shaping the common history of the old continent at the beginning of the third millennium. However, due to the contents, structure and scope of the proposed model of “institutionalization of Islam” in Europe, the “Declaration” is nothing else but the cocktail of common wisdom, “politically correct” rhetoric phrases, unfounded and inappropriate requests and stereotypes from the arsenal of the conventional discourse of Islamic apologetics. At moments, one can also observe a symptomatic coincidence with some assumptions from Alija Izetbegović’s well-known “Islamic Declaration”.

What attracts special attention in this context is the motivational starting point of the initiative, whose textual expression is the “Declaration”. In essence, this is the search for identity, which is also encouraged by the European debates, which was already dealt with in the first part of this paper. So, for example, in the book by Adnan Silajdžić, a Muslim intellectual from Bosnia, *Muslimani u traganju za identitom* (The Muslims in Search for Identity, Sarajevo, 2006), we can find the following: “In such a climate, it is also extremely important to reflect on the election of the new Pope Benedict XVI, because in his programme revindications he

announces the gradual rehabilitation of the 'Spirit' of Christian Catholic tradition in European culture. His inaugural address is very significant: it can be understood as the attempt to rehabilitate faith before the onslaught of a general positivist sociologization of religion, but also as a mild closing of the Catholic Church before the onslaught of the ideology of globalism (Tetamanzi), which can mean the *new Catholic institutionalization of religion in Europe* (the italic by D.T.). Since this process will exert influence on the future of Islam and Muslims on the old continent, it might be concluded that it is necessary to "institutionalize" Islam in Europe as soon as possible. Consequently, the European framework is not quite neutral and without influence on the lines of thinking and the political ideas in the Western Balkans but, considering the local context, the state of mind and life's preoccupations, it is frequently perceived as a distorted mirror.

Despite having the best organization and most capable personnel, and being backed by the Vatican, the Catholic Church was not spared of serious temptations during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in some other former Yugoslav regions. In two new, mostly Catholic, states, Slovenia and Croatia, whose recognition was strongly supported by the Vatican on an international scale, the Catholic Church has a stable basis and an adequate organization. It is present in all spheres of life, whereby some resistance is offered by the secularized segments of the Slovenian society. But, Slovenia is not a part of the Western Balkans. The relationship between the Catholic Church in Croatia (which, while advocating Croatia's independence and in some episodes of the so-called "homeland war", behaved mostly as the "Croatian Catholic Church") and the Croatian state is regulated by four agreements ("concordats"), which are mostly implemented to mutual satisfaction. Both State and Church are trying to formally fit their partner relationship into the coordinates of the secular system and to observe its rules of the game, in which they are rather successful.

The position of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina is essentially different and considerably less favourable. Although the Catholics/Croats suffered proportionately the least during the war, it is claimed that almost 80,000 of them left the territory of the Republic of Srpska and that they are coming back too slowly, which is stressed by Banjaluka Bishop F. Komarica whenever appropriate. The situation in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is even more complex. The Croats are forced to share the entity and life with the Bosniaks against whom they fought even more severely at one moment than against Serbs. In the regions inhabited mostly by the Catholic/Croat population, in Herzeg-Bosnia, the

desired (yet not formed) “third entity”, there is now a small number of Bosniaks but, on the other hand, the Croats had to leave the regions in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina populated mostly by Muslims. Looking beyond the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, towards Zagreb and, further, towards the West, and being under the pressure of progressive Islamization of their joint living and social environment, as they put it, the Catholics/Croats are slowly leaving it in peacetime. The share of Croats in the total population of Bosnia and Herzegovina dropped from 17 per cent (before the war) to about 13 per cent, while some analysts give even lower estimates. According to Sarajevo Archbishop Vinko Puljić, in some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the number of Catholics almost halved, so that there is a threat that they lose the status of constituent people. Under such circumstances, the Catholic Church cannot afford to show exclusively the pastoral concern for its dwindling flock. Cardinal Puljić warns – both at home and abroad and regularly in the Vatican – about the unequal status of Catholics/Croats in the “Dayton” two-entity Bosnia and Herzegovina, their silent exodus and the danger of increasingly radical and expanding Islam. Faced with the passivity and inefficiency of the political factors (parties and individuals), which should represent the interests of Catholics/Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as with the forced passivization of Croatia, the Bishops’ Conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina stepped out directly into the political sphere. On 30 October 2005, it sent, from its 35th regular session, the proposal for a new social and legal system in Bosnia and Herzegovina entitled “Bosnia and Herzegovina – The Source of Instability and the Threat to Peace, or the Future EU Member?”. The Bishops’ Conference holds that it is necessary to implement serious political and constitutional reforms, implying the reorganization of the state according to the regional principle, i.e. the formation of four functional cantons: Sarajevo, Banjaluka, Mostar and Tuzla, instead of the existing two entities. In the opinion of the Bishops of Bosnia and Herzegovina, this is the only way to ensure and guarantee the equality of all peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This proposal, which was discretely supported by the Vatican, was not widely accepted neither in Bosnia and Herzegovina (except by the Croats living in it), nor in the international community, which is, naturally, unwilling to revise the Dayton constitutional framework radically and, thus, open a Pandora’s box in the Balkans once again.

Regardless of the future of the proposal of the Bishops’ Conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its questioning title is undoubtedly topical, whereby the words “Bosnia and Herzegovina” can be replaced without any

problem with the regional designation “Western Balkans”. Consequently: “The Western Balkans – The Source of Instability and a Threat to Peace, or the Future EU Member?” One who really wishes – from the European and (West) Balkan perspective – to contribute to the moving of our region closer to Europe, relying on the effective involvement of its states (political elites) and churches/ religious communities in the process of gradual European integration, must be aware that they are still forced to engage in social affairs and perform the national duties which have mostly been forgotten in Europe. In considering and, in particular, evaluating the relationship between State and Church in the Western Balkans, the awareness of this fact must be a methodological *conditio sine qua non*.

VERN REDEKOP, PH.D.

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF SAINT PAUL, CANADA

THE RELEVANCE OF TEACHINGS OF BLESSING AND JUSTICE OF BLESSING FOR RECONCILIATION IN BOSNIA I HERZEGOVINA

The story is told of someone who went on to the afterlife and wanted a tour of the premises. She wanted to see hell first. She found grumbling, unhappy people who looked as though they were starving. There were tables of food in front of them but their forks were longer than their arms so they couldn't get the food in. She went on to heaven where she found happy, well-fed people. The tables of food were the same as in hell as were the long forks. The only difference was, they were feeding each other.

This story illustrates the difference between mimetic structures of blessing and mimetic structures of violence. In this fictional heaven people contributed to each other's well-being; in hell they were not; in fact, out of their frustration they were probably poking each other with their long forks.

When mimetic structures of violence take over a relational system, people imitate one another in being violent; a pattern is established and the structure takes on a life of its own. One example is the ethnic cleansing that swept Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 90s. The pattern of hurtful attitudes tends to continue even though forms of violence may change.

Reconciliation may be considered to be the transformation of a relational system from mimetic structures of violence to mimetic structures of blessing. I will expand briefly on mimetic structures of violence, define blessing, provide an overview of reconciliation and then develop more carefully the concept of *teachings of blessing* and *justice of blessing*.

Mimetic structures are imitative patterns that go on through time. They express and determine the attitudes, orientation and actions of the parties involved. Violence may take many forms:

The concept of blessing comes originally from the Hebrew word *berikah* – it is associated with on-going well-being.

Blessing

berikah

Sustenance, well-being, creativity, Torah, land, flourishing, mutual respectfulness, life, joy, gift, peace


Vern Neufeld Redekop

Mimetic Structures of Violence

V	CONTROL (keep from)
I	FORCE (inflict on)
O	EXTRACT (take away from)
L	DIMINISH (reduce)
E	HURT (cause pain)
N	CURSE (wish evil)
C	WITHHOLD HELP (allow suffering when one has the means to alleviate it)
E	

Vern Neufeld Redekop

By comparing mimetic structures of violence and blessing, we can see that structures of blessing are characterized by openness, generosity, sharing, creativity and the generation of options. They allow for more complex patterns of interaction.



Vern Neufeld Redekop

There are some concepts that can be drawn from the Hebrew roots that provided added value and meaning to mimetic structure of blessing. From the root metaphor of *barak* as to kneel, we can make a connection between blessing and receptivity, a key concept in Taoism. Receptivity stands in contrast to power, which is an overwhelming value within mimetic structures of violence. But, in so far as mimetic structures of blessing are to provide a context and base for empowerment it suggests both the receptivity to receive from others as well as the

action oriented dimension of working to provide to others what they might need. Generosity must be balanced by receptivity for mutuality to work. The Hebrew association of blessing and land speaks to the need to include the environment in the equation. If land/environment is a necessary condition to living well, it becomes a partner in sustaining mimetic structures of blessing. Even though the literal significance of a locutionary act of pronouncing a blessing seems out of place today, that very concept can function heuristically by raising the question of the link between

speech and intentionality and hence between speech and the orientation of the locutionary actor. Even the fact that blessings often were intended to extend for generations can play the heuristic role of suggesting that mimetic structures of blessing should be constructed in such a way that they are sustainable through the generations. It links to the Canadian Aboriginal teaching that decisions are to take into account the history of the past seven generations are to be made in such a way that the benefits will be felt seven generations into the future.

Furthermore, within a relational system marked by mimetic structures of blessing there will be conflict, understood as a clash of identity need satisfiers, interests or desires that can result in mutual hurt. Within such a structure, however, conflict is transformed into an occasion for creativity so that there can be mutual contributions to the well-being of all parties. There is also a discursive field that includes compassion, patience and mercy that can contribute to the on-going restoration of relationships when they get off the rails.

Blessing is used to connote a life-oriented, creative impulse oriented toward the mutual well-being of Self and Other.⁹⁵ Within a mimetic structure of blessing Self and Other feed one another at many different levels of reality. If blessing becomes mimetic, both parties are at the same time receptive and generous. Symptoms of blessing are joy, confidence, self-esteem, peace, dignity and respect.

Reconciliation


Reconciliation can be understood as both a goal and a process. The first part of the goal is to get out of mimetic structures of violence. At this stage, people can co-exist without hurting one another and without fear of attack. The second part of the goal is to establish mimetic structures of blessing.

Reconciliation as a *process* may be understood as a complex set of exchanges that include a number of elements. At times, the process is directed through a conscious well-defined effort to achieve reconciliation, in other instances, the process may take place at the tacit level with different actors intuitively taking a variety of initiatives. Invariably, the process will include some or all of the following elements (Redekop, 2002) organized as Pre-requisites, Meta-requisites, Discursive and Symbolic Processes, Key-Result areas of Healing, Structural Change and Renewed Relationships, and Justice of Blessing:

⁹⁵ Ibid., 255-283.

PRE-REQUISITES

1. Vision and mandate: either one of the parties or a third party has a vision and desire for reconciliation and obtains a mandate to work to that end.
2. Safety: the safety of the parties needs to be assured. This means that overt violence must be halted. Sometimes a legal framework needs to be in place to assure the safety of potential victims. Safety also means that the parties do not intimidate each other.
3. Immediate survival needs: reconciliation processes can be demanding both cognitively and emotionally. Hence it is important that parties are assured of having their immediate physical and emotional needs sufficiently met to function through the process.



META-REQUISITES

4. Teachings: the process of reconciliation is directed by a framework, values, root metaphors and mental models that provide motivation and insight to keep the process going. Teachings may take the form of stories of previous reconciliation processes, traditional proverbs and customs, or analytical insights. Education for reconciliation includes the development of skills (Huyse, 2003) and generation of new beliefs and attitudes about both the conflict and the other party (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004a).
5. Gradual Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-Reduction (GRIT) (Osgood, 1966): one party may decide to make a low-risk gesture of goodwill; if the other party reciprocates with a similar gesture the first party may take another positive initiative (Osgood, 1966).

Gradually the tension dissipates and the parties are prepared to enter into another level of discourse to address the deep-rooted conflict.

6. **Institution Building:** in the face of large scale violent events, the various sub-processes need to take place within institutions that could include Truth and Reconciliation commissions.

DISCURSIVE PROCESSES

7. **Dialogue:** at some point parties will enter into a dialogue in which they are motivated to truly understand one another. Dialogue means that meaning flows freely between the parties (Bohm, 1997). There is also open disclosure of the emotional dimensions of the conflict.
8. **Truth-telling:** in addition to the dialogue there may be a need to formally establish the truth of what occurred. Ideally this will lead to a shared acceptance of the same presentation of the history of the conflict. Analysts, historians and lawyers may play a role in this and it may involve a formal process (Lederach, 1997).
9. **Expressions of acknowledgement, remorse, and apology:** eventually those who have committed acts of violence will understand the impact of these acts on the other party. As they acknowledge a) what they have done, b) the hurt it has caused, c) feelings of remorse over having caused the harm, and d) a desire to not commit the same acts in the future, they will be able to offer an effective apology.
10. **Expressions of victimization, openness to forgiveness:** those victimized will express to the perpetrator and third parties what they have experienced. As they hear an acknowledgement of their hurt from the perpetrator along with apologies and expressions of remorse they may become open to forgive. Forgiveness means to give up an impulse or right to make the perpetrator suffer in response to the suffering caused by the perpetrator, implying moral judgment, the humanity of the perpetrator, and a desire for a renewed relationship (Bole, Drew Christiansen, & Hennemeyer, 2004; Shriver, 2001).

KEY RESULT AREAS

11. **Justice and mercy:** justice involves making some judgment about what would restore a sense of balance to the relationship. Where

violence has involved theft or destruction of possessions, these can be restored. When there is emotional pain, torture, or loss of life, it is impossible to return parties to their previous state. Some things may be done by way of compensation or compensatory actions to alleviate the loss. Strict retributive justice could result only in another round of violence. Some form of mercy or generosity of spirit may be combined with positive balancing measures to craft a profound forgiveness (Ledrach, 1999).

12. Re-orientation: at some point the parties will re-orient their relationship. This re-orientation may demand inner changes of identity, attitude and orientation in relation to the other (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004a). Both parties and the relationship itself will be transformed such that both parties will contribute to mutual empowerment.
13. Healing of traumas and memories: in order for the reconciliation process to be sustained and for both parties to flourish, it is important that as much as possible emotional traumas and memories be healed. Reconciliation rituals may play a role in this process (Schirch, 2005) as can various forms of therapy (Herman, 1997), cognitive reframing and spiritual disciplines and practices (Hermann, 2004).
14. Re-defining terms of the relationship including transformation of structures: reconciliation is not complete if the structures left in place continue to victimize. For example, hegemonic structures, in which one party systematically dominates another party, involve economic, political, physical, and/or discursive dimensions. Action has to be taken in each of these areas to address systemic imbalances. New laws, customs, economic regulations and institutions may be needed to sustain the reconciliation process (Kriesberg, 2004).

Reconciliation is not a linear process; rather it is cyclical and iterative. Not all of the elements above may be present each time and some may have to be addressed repeatedly. Reconciliation can be understood as a freedom from mimetic (imitative) structures of violence that take on a life of their own and a freedom to create and nurture mimetic structures of blessing or peace, in which new life-enhancing options are systematically generated (Redekop, 2002).

Within this general framework, we will now look in a more focused way at the concept of teaching of blessing.

TEACHINGS OF BLESSING

Teachings can be considered value-laden content that drives processes, routine actions, heuristic endeavours, change and continuity. They may be collected into a text or they can be passed on orally.⁹⁶ Culture, Science and Religion are given shape by teachings.⁹⁷ Political and economic systems function on the basis of teachings.⁹⁸ Civilisations and societies run on teachings. Some teachings are presented formally through education systems and some are informally woven into daily discourse. Children are subject to teachings before they can talk.⁹⁹ Teachings lie behind routines and rituals. They form the network of unwritten rules that you need to know to function in various cultural environments. Some teachings are rooted in traditions that go back millennia and others are the result of recent insights. Teachings are operative at any level of consciousness.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Note the following paragraph from a 1989 justice proposal prepared by the Sandy Lake First Nation quoted in Rupert Ross, *Returning to the Teachings* (Toronto: Penguin, 1996), 5: “Probably one of the most serious gaps in the system is the different perception of wrongdoing and how to best treat it. In the non-Indian community, committing a crime seems to mean that the individual is a bad person and therefore must be punished.... The Indian communities view a wrongdoing as a misbehaviour which requires teaching or and illness which requires healing. (Emphasis added)” One of the best collections of Aboriginal teachings is in *The Sacred Tree* (Lethbridge: Four Worlds Development Press, 1985) it was the result of a process of synthesizing oral teachings from Elders from a number of First Nations. Within the Mohawk tradition, a yearly recitation of the Kaianere’ko:wa, Great Law of Peace, is important. Among Mohawks there is ambivalence around this being written down.

⁹⁷ Frijof Capra and David Steindal-Rast, *Belonging to the Universe—Explorations on the Frontiers of Science and Spirituality* (San Francisco: Harper, 1992) develop the notion of Religion and Culture as abstract categories. Following their lead, I will capitalize these words when dealing with them in the abstract and use the lower case when talking about concrete religions of political entities. Michael Polanyi, in *Personal Knowledge—Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 328-32, shows how within scientific disciplines there are rules of rightness that help to distinguish what is true and significant within the discipline.

⁹⁸ Free market economies still draw on normative concepts drawn from the work of Adam Smith. In addition there are customary rules of rightness that determine the parameters of business activity. This was brought home to me by émigrés recently arrived from the former Soviet Union in 1991. As they described the black market economy of Soviet era Russia, rules of rightness within the Canadian economy came into clearer focus.

⁹⁹ Muslims have a custom of whispering a teaching into the ear of a newborn baby. Toddlers who can understand but not speak are taught ways of behaving and respond to verbal directives.

¹⁰⁰ Ken Wilber, in *A Theory of Everything—An Integral Vision for Business, Politics, Science and Spirituality* (Boston: Shambala, 2001) uses spiral dynamics theory to develop an understanding of levels of consciousness. Within the description of these levels one can see that different teaching may be operative at each level but also the attitude and way in which teaching are used can change.

Michael Polanyi's epistemology emphasizes tacit knowledge, a vast body of knowledge that cannot be put into words¹⁰¹—knowledge that is built up through teachings. It includes skills, values and experiential learnings. It is out of the tacit dimension that we make our judgments and set a course for the practices that give shape to our lives. Teachings that we receive from childhood make their way into this tacit dimension, shaping our individual *Weltanschauungen*.

Teachings are lived out; in fact, it is in the living out of teachings that they are passed on with the greatest cogency.¹⁰² People living out certain teachings become models subject to mimesis. The mimetic effect of articulated teachings that are demonstrated in real life can be truly contagious within a group of people.¹⁰³

Teachings of blessing help come to terms with mimetic structures of violence, reducing their hold on relational systems, and generate, nurture, support and maintain mimetic structures of blessing. Discourse around teachings of blessing makes sense within a theoretical framework based on a distinction between mimetic structures of violence and mimetic structures of blessing.¹⁰⁴

The processes of reconciliation rely on teachings and the very articulation of reconciliation as a goal goes back to teachings. This assertion follows from the sense of teachings as being value laden information that drives processes. It can be affirmed in the abstract without acknowledging which particular teachings might be involved. However, once potential teachings are identified, they can be held up to critical scrutiny, refined or perhaps combined with other teachings to create new insights which can be the basis for even better processes, but we are getting ahead of ourselves.

As we pursue the idea of teachings, we must be mindful about who might be potential teachers. Given the basic mimetic nature of humankind, the idea that effective teachers are those who bring a certain pres-

¹⁰¹ Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge* as well as *The Tacit Dimension* (New York: Anchor Books, 1967).

¹⁰² Note that within their respective traditions the teachings of Moses, Jesus, Mohammed, and Buddha are totally wrapped up in their lives. Modern day figures like Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. had an impact because of what they said and what they did. The teaching of medicine came alive when making rounds with a mentor became central to the formation of physicians.

¹⁰³ Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (London: E. Benn, 1930), 141-47.

¹⁰⁴ This framework is developed in Vern Neufeld Redekop, *From Violence to Blessing*.

ence to the teaching process but that they also model what the teachings are all about. This concept starts to connect with recent mediation literature that demonstrates that the presence and modelling action of a particular mediator can be determinative of positive outcomes.

The initial statements indicated that religious teachings can be used as the basis of violence. The impact of particular teachings is largely a function of how they are interpreted. The question then becomes, How can we hold interpreters accountable such that the teachings they reconfigure for particular situations will actually contribute to human well-being. Or in terms of my colleague, Ken Bush who has developed a Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment tool, can we in effect do a PCIA on teachings?

The same challenge that faces the religious interpreter also faces the interpreter of any texts that are thought to play a normative function. For example, Lenin and Stalin's interpretation of Marx certainly produced violent results that were contrary to what Marx had in mind. I would suggest that an ethics of blessing guide the interpretive process.

The ethical is that aspect of the practical, understood in the philosophical sense of having to do with action, that is concerned with values and standards of rightness. It normally includes a deontological dimension expressed as moral principles or codes and a teleological component that includes the consequences of the action and the intentional dimension. By introducing the concept of an ethical vision, I am introducing a meta-ethical concept that can give overall direction to the sorting out of moral principles and evaluating the teleological dimensions of the ethical dimension.

What this means in terms of practice is that the moral principles we bring to bear in evaluating a potential or realized action should be chosen on the basis of whether or not these principles will contribute to the mutual creative empowerment of the parties involved. Likewise when we evaluate outcomes or consequences of action, we should do so on the basis of whether or not they contribute to mimetic structures of blessing. Regarding intentionality, it too should be constructed around the concept of blessing. Put another way, the creation and nurturing of mimetic structures of blessing is itself an individual and collective transcendent "good" in that it goes beyond individual self interest, acknowledging that ultimately the well-being of self and other are inextricably tied together.

Within most religious traditions is a vision for a more peaceful world. Within many sacred texts however are texts of violence; texts that could be used to inspire violence if interpreted in a certain way. Where there is an oral tradition, there is the potential for interpreting teaching for the sake

of violence or blessing.¹⁰⁵ A hermeneutics of blessing interprets religious texts in such a way as to harness the energy and insights of these texts for the sake of blessing. There are a number of methodological emphases that undergird this hermeneutical approach.

First is a heuristic impulse oriented toward blessing. Michael Polanyi argues effectively that scientists are motivated by an “intellectual passion.”¹⁰⁶ Often there is something that they have a hunch exists and they are determined to find it. With the discovery of mimetic structures of blessing comes an intellectual passion to discover more about these structures – what are their roots? How are they initiated? How are they maintained? What makes them vulnerable? One has a hunch that particular teachings have played a role. Biologist Mary Clark makes the point that human development has been made possible through bonds of connectedness that allow for sustained human communities.¹⁰⁷ These exist through time such that one generation can build on the insights of previous generations. Insofar as these communities contribute to the mutual well-being of their members we could say that they exemplify mimetic structures of blessing. This begs the question, “How is this possible?” which then leads to the question, What might be the role of teachings of blessing? This impetus within the context of Religion is strengthened as we reflect on what is at stake. With the potential that texts of violence can be taken out of context and used to motivate people to harm one another, the urgency to find a methodology of blessing is brought to the fore.

Second, it is important to look at the various dimensions of texts and orally transmitted teachings. One way of differentiating these dimensions is through Paul Ricoeur’s distinction between the *idem* and *ipse* dimensions of the human person.¹⁰⁸ The *idem* dimension represents key characteristics that are atemporal and can be compared with others. The *ipse* dimension is temporal, always changing and includes a sense of history as conveyed through narrative and a horizon of the future with a promissory dimension. Mutatis mutandis, relating this to teachings we can say that teachings have an *idem* dimension which is not limited to time; there is, for example, something about the Golden Rule that is not limited to time

¹⁰⁵ Within the Mohawk tradition Louis Hall put forward an interpretation of the Great Law that was oriented toward violence; in contrast, elders like Tom Porter interpret it ironically.

¹⁰⁶ Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, 132-202.

¹⁰⁷ Mary Clark, “Meaningful Social Bonding as a Universal Human Need,” *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*, edited by John W. Burton (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 34-59.

¹⁰⁸ Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 2-18.

or place. The *ipse* dimension pays attention to the historical context of a teaching; not only that it attends to the historical dynamics by which that teaching has survived to the present time. In the case of texts, attention to the history of the development of the text becomes important. If a text has survived intact for a period of time, one can attend to the interpretations of the text at various times and places. Insights about the nature and functions of teachings of blessing come about through a methodological path using all of the tools of historical, textual, and redaction criticism.

With this same heuristic impulse one can find additional layers of meaning by using literary and theoretical methods to examine the inner dynamics of teachings – be they in the form of apodictic law, wisdom sayings or stories. René Girard, for instance, placed taboos generated to maintain peace within a community in the framework of scapegoat and sacrificial cycles.¹⁰⁹ The taboos, taken as teachings of blessing, would be framed as preventive measures to avoid the outbreak of violent crises that could destroy a community. Rhetorical and form critical methods provide clues to the various manners of giving emphasis to key points.

Another factor in the search for a hermeneutics of blessing is to look for teachings about teachings. This search for meta-teachings of blessing includes looking for explicit and implicit clues that highlight what might be seen as a hermeneutical key for understanding the whole. Thomas Mooren, a scholar of Islam, has suggested, for instance, that the opening words of the Quran could function as such a key within Islam. *Besmillah Alracham Alracheem* – in the name of Allah most merciful and compassionate – signals that the book as a whole is meant to convey teachings that strengthen the impulse toward mercy and compassion.¹¹⁰ Biblical scholars have noted that the teaching to love one's neighbour as oneself is found at the middle of the book of Leviticus which is the middle book of the five books of the Torah. This literary centrality was given ideational centrality by both Hillel and Jesus.

A hermeneutics of blessing also asks how teachings have been used and modified for blessing at different times and places. One can see in the volume Sanhedrin of the Talmud how teachings about the death penalty have been interpreted by the Jewish community to virtually eliminate the use of capital punishment. While this exemplifies the “toning down” of a text of violence, it also makes possible the discernment of underlying

¹⁰⁹ René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1977) 250-73.

¹¹⁰ Thomas Mooren, “September 11 and the Future of Monotheistic Religions.”

principles of justice that help in the constitution of a mimetic structure of blessing.

Discovering, generating and validating teachings of blessing involves groups of people engaged together in a heuristic endeavour. Sometimes the engagement of the hermeneutical community in focusing on teachings of blessing can itself create a mimetic structure of blessing.¹¹¹ Sometimes the results help to identify teachings from one tradition that can apply to another. The very endeavour can mimetically inspire other communities to adopt a similar methodology.

One important aspect of the dynamics of a hermeneutical community is to develop a dialogical space—a discursive structural environment conducive to the free flowing of ideas, an openness on the part of participants to question their own previously held “mental models” and a commitment to principles of dignity and respect. A dialogical space is one in which there is a free flow of thoughts and ideas including the presuppositions and intellectual passions driving the search for truth. A dialogue is different than a debate in which one tries to win an argument and likewise it can be contrasted with “discussion,” which has its violent side; the root of the word is to shake apart.

Reconciliation is defined in terms of freedom from mimetic structures of violence and freedom to generate mimetic structures of blessing. As such it is both a process and a goal. In the wake of significant victimization there is a human emotionally charged urge to correct a perceived relational imbalance which is expressed in a cry for “justice.” This brings us then to the need to develop the concept of “Justice of Blessing.”

JUSTICE OF BLESSING

For victims, attending to the need for justice is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for healing. The idea that violent, oppressive actions can be taken with impunity adds to the sense of injury. “With impunity” means without punishment or without negative consequences. It points to a fundamental, almost visceral understanding of injustice. The primal call for justice is a call for perpetrators of violence to suffer negative consequences; not only any negative consequences that might naturally come their way as a result of violence but negative consequences imposed upon them by the victims, those in solidarity with victims, or by the state acting as a third party.

¹¹¹ In many seminars I have conducted on reconciliation, without fail a mimetic structure of blessing occurred such that participants could mutually contribute to their understanding of the topic and sense of well-being.

This primal sense of justice manifests itself first as vengeance and, at second order, as retributive justice – a justice based on punishment. French thinker René Girard, develops the concept of mimetic violence, that is, that violence, once introduced, is imitated, returned with interest (Girard, 1987). Victims define for themselves a need for violence to be balanced, what was done to them or their loved ones should be done to the perpetrator. However, as Girard points out, violence is always returned with interest; hence a spiral of ever increasing violence.

An initial act of violence not only inflicts harm, but it also creates a relative imbalance in a capacity to act. The one traumatized by the loss of a loved one, injury or loss of possessions is put at a grave disadvantage in terms of the horizon of the future. It is this relative imbalance that needs to be addressed.

Roots of Retributive Justice

“Justice” is a word with many meanings. Its roots go back through Latin to Greek (Kolbert, 1979) with a significant Hebrew interface (Schrenk, 1964). Originally it had connotations of what is right, or what is done to make right, or the process of indicating what is right. *Right* in turn had to do with balance (Sharpe, 2004), particularly in the wake of structural imbalance (Hahnel, 2005). It also had to do with custom and eventually was linked with the very concept of law.

Justice as finding a right balance of goods, that is, that which enhances well-being – economic, physical, rights, power, or recognition. The challenge is to define what “right balance” means in a particular case. This is a matter of both process and comparison with a standard (Rawls, 1999). The standard may be defined through a statement of rights, or laws, a moral code, or cultural tradition. Laws may either help to define the degree of harm (tort law) or the degree of offence to the community (criminal law).

In the case of one party causing suffering to another party, one way of attempting to balance the situation is for the party responsible for the suffering to be caused to suffer in a commensurate way through revenge or retributive justice (Walgrave, 2004). Strict justice means that the suffering of the perpetrator must come as close as possible to that caused by the initial act of violence.

So much is a matter of interpretation. If, for victims, not only are they hurt, not only are they traumatized by fear, but if they also interpret the harmful action as having disgraced their honour, they feel that much more that they something has been taken from them and hence the debt

owed by the perpetrator is that much greater. Likewise, when it comes to “repaying the debt,” this too is a matter of interpretation. Those who look to time spent in prison as a way of paying a debt to society, have a currency of prison time such that the more grave the offence the longer the sentence. The sentence then becomes a measure of the degree of injustice inherent in the wrongdoing. Those who interpret their victimization as having been severe and who witness a perpetrator getting a small sentence will perceive the system as having committed a further injustice by not according to their crime the severity they have felt. Yet all this is a matter of interpretation—first a system of interpretation of severity in terms of sentence and second a particular sentence as reflective of the degree of victimization. At a meta-level this assumes a debt to society on the part of the perpetrator which in turn presupposes that wrong-doing needs to be punished.

There are analogical comparisons to be made in the case of large inter-group conflicts. In these situations, the groups themselves become the agents of retributive justice making and inevitably there are mimetic rounds of revenge-based violence.

The fatal flaw in a violence-based paradigm of justice is that the victim, who initially is indignant at the violence done to them, gets drawn into a mimetic structure of violence (Redekop, 2002). The victim desires more than anything that violence be done to the other, to the perpetrator. The perpetrator, who is hated, becomes the model for the victim. The victim, then appears to be left with a profound negative aporia—for the perpetrator to be violent with impunity is untenable; to become violent in response means that the perpetrator becomes the model whose actions and attitudes are mimetically appropriated, the victim becomes like the hated one. In addition, to become obsessed with a passion for violence to be done is not a helpful, life-giving option for the thoughtful victim. Furthermore, there is the risk that violence overall will be increased over the long term, particularly if the perpetrators being punished become scapegoats for communal problems beyond the violence for which they are responsible (Girard, 1989; Redekop, 1993).

This retributive approach assumes that the violent action can be imputed to a well defined perpetrator (Ricoeur, 2000). A well defined perpetrator must be one who is capable of deciding spontaneously to engage in violence. The perpetrator must be able to be held accountable for the violence. Perpetrators have their own histories and identity needs. They are located within communities and cultures. In some cases clear decisions are made to harm innocent victims. In many cases, perpetrators consider

themselves to be victims and are acting out of their own desire for vengeance for perceived violence and injustice done to them.

These difficulties with retributive justice call for rethinking of the very concept of justice. There are some options that have been developed: something short of strict justice, mercy, forgiveness, restorative justice, relational justice. Before examining these options, it is important to enunciate some principles that should be present within any justice-making processes. First, the needs of the victim should be addressed. Second, the victim should be an actor throughout, that is, the victim should have options and should be empowered to decide upon different courses of action. Third, no further harm should be done to the victim and the victim should be better off at the end of the process. Fourth, any accrued benefits coming from the victimization should be removed from the perpetrator. Fifth, as much as possible, the perpetrator should be given an opportunity to play an active role in the justice making process. Sixth, there should be an equitable balance established as a result of the process. Seventh, the process should play an exemplary and pedagogical role within society such that it has the effect of reducing the likelihood of similar types of violence in the future.

Croatian theologian Miroslav Volf, points out that a response short of strict justice is called for (Volf, 1996). This means that at least there will not be an increase in violence within the response. Perpetrators are held accountable and may be punished but care is taken to limit the degree of punishment in order to decrease the possibility of violence being on the increase.

Restorative Justice

If the essential set of justice values is positive and constructive the emphasis is put on making things right, and the paradigm is known as restorative justice (Zehr, 1990). That is, first and foremost, rather than cause additional suffering on the part of the perpetrator, balance is sought by attending to the well-being of the victim (Johnstone, 2004). In this case, if the violence involves theft or injury to property, the property is restored to the victim.

Restorative justice puts the emphasis on a mediated negotiation by which the perpetrator agrees to do everything possible to make things right. This may include such things as apology, payment of reparations, and constructive symbolic actions. The emphasis is on restoring the relationship that existed before the initial violence, assuming that the relationship was positive.

Extending mercy means that the victim and/or the community recognize that full restitution is not possible and that strict retribution would not result in positive consequences and thereby extend mercy, to varying degrees to the perpetrator. Mercy functions then as a gift. To use the mercenary metaphor of accountability that is often used to define justice, it means that the debt accrued on the part of the perpetrator for having been violent is forgiven.

Forgiveness, then, is much like mercy but with different connotations. In forgiveness there is a reflexive dimension in that the victim that does the forgiving becomes an actor who voluntarily gives us the right to seek redress or to seek a balancing violence in the form of punishment to be perpetrated against the perpetrator. Forgiveness can occur without any interaction with the perpetrator. Mercy is something that is extended to the perpetrator.

JUSTICE OF BLESSING

In the case of genocide, mass killing or other severe human atrocity, the damage done stretches human capacity for comprehension, understanding, and empathy. The needs of victims are enormous. Perpetrators are caught in a web of denial, shame, self-justification and psychological guilt. There is a strong mimetic pull to a justice of violence enacted directly on behalf of victims in the form of vengeance or retributive justice whereby a third party causes the perpetrators to suffer.

The concept of a justice of blessing is meant to address the following challenges:

1. The woundedness resulting from atrocities is both profound and complex with an inner and outer side at the individual and collective levels.
2. The negative effects of atrocities continue for a long time affecting several generations.
3. The failure of perpetrators to take responsibility is a function of a self-justifying meaning system rooted in a particular historical consciousness and a fear of the violent consequences should they own up to what they have done.

At its core, a justice of blessing works within a meta-ethical framework of blessing. That is it is oriented toward establishing structures of blessing within which people contribute to the well-being of one another.

This raises many questions about whether or not this is feasible or even desirable in the wake of severe human atrocities.

The theoretical and conceptual development will be along the following lines: first, the introduction of key concepts and pre-understandings, each with its own theoretical base; second the development of a framework that can help to analyse the experience of loss and woundedness on the part of victims; third, the presentation of a framework that can be used to examine the experience of perpetrators; fourth, in the light of the overwhelming challenges that become evident, to describe what is required theoretically (or strategically) of a justice of blessing and finally to make some observations of how a justice of blessing might be operationalized.

Key-Concepts


A *relational system* involves a Self and an Other who are brought into contact with one another in an on-going significant way. This may be because they live in the same place, they work together, or events have brought them together. A relational system may be characterized by mimetic structures that orient Self and Other either toward violence or blessing.

Mimetic structures, as was mentioned above, are patterns of thought and action that are oriented toward a particular way of being in the world in relation to others.

The violence within a particular relational system may be anywhere along an axis from symmetrical to asymmetrical. At the symmetrical end of the axis, both parties have been violent to each other. Each party has been victimized and each has done its share of violence. At the asymmetrical end, one party has been severely victimized and has done very little to harm the other side.

An *integral approach* to any phenomenon, as developed by Ken Wilber, acknowledges that interior and exterior aspects need to be considered as do individual and collective as the following chart shows. The dotted lines in each quadrant show that there is development from simple to more complex in each of these areas.


Human Identity Needs are theoretical constructs that help to understand what motivates people. Needs for meaning, connectedness, action, security and recognition are closely associated with



emotions. When they are threatened, they invoke anger, sadness, depression, fear and shame respectively. The need categories are universal but the satisfiers are a function of experience and culture.

Victims' Integral Framework of Loss and Woundedness

Taking an integral approach to victimization highlights the fact that there is an objective or exterior side of victimization and a subjective or interior side. The exterior can be described in terms of loss while the interior is constituted by various types of woundedness.



Exterior – Individual

Human Loss – primary victims lose their lives; secondary victims lose people who are close to them. This has a profound impact on their need for connectedness.

Material Loss – victims often lose property which is either stolen or destroyed.

Loss of Status – one form of violence is to pass discriminatory laws; for example, the Nuremburg Laws passed in Germany by the National Socialists prohibited Jews from holding many positions.

Integral Approach to Victims (Wilber)

Interior	Exterior	
Woundedness —Hermeneutical •Emotional •Spiritual •Relational •Self Trauma	Loss of loved ones •Body •Property •Capacity •Status •Place	Interior
Continuity Coherence Imagination (Chosen Trauma) Vitality Capacity Victim of Injustice Loss of Complexity Rigid Boundaries	Loss of loved ones Body Property Capacity Status Place Culture Language	Collective

Loss of Security – victims may feel very vulnerable to additional violence.

Loss of Capacity – violent acts may clearly incapacitate people so that they can no longer do what they did before. This is most clear when people have lost arms or legs but there are less visible forms of this phenomenon. Someone may have fears that stand in the way of doing certain thing.

Loss of Place – many victims are uprooted and have to leave their homes or the territories where they used to live. Place implies space with symbolic, historic and emotional meaning attached to it.

Interior – Individual

Hermeneutical Woundedness – hermeneutics is concerned with interpretation and meaning-making. Victims of atrocities may find that their World of Meaning is shattered. They cannot make sense of anything. For some it means that basic values are dismissed. Another form of hermeneutical woundedness is that everything is interpreted in terms of their victimization. Also, the memory of violence is always present and colors everything. Victims may also lose capacity to generate meaning; the logotherapy of Holocaust survivor Victor Frankel addressed this phenomenon in particular. Victims are also left with the big question, “Why?”


Emotional Woundedness – there may be emotional memories that overwhelm an individual such that the horror of the atrocity is re-enacted internally again and again and again.

Spiritual Woundedness – for some, it may mean that they no longer have faith in God. For others, it may mean that they cannot connect to transcendence in other ways. They cannot see the beauty in nature or people, they cannot take delight in things working out, they cannot discern any higher purpose in life.

Relational Woundedness – victims may lament the broken relationships; friends with whom one partied the night before, killed one’s family the next day. There may be disassociation, a withdrawal from people. Some lose a capacity to build trusting relations. For some, the projection of a bitter attitude repulses people.

Woundedness of the Self – the cumulation of this inner woundedness can result in the identity of the self being wounded. This is a profound sense of not being well. The extreme form would be the “Muselman” of the Nazi concentration camps—a walking dead person with no meaning or direction.

Perpetrators' Integral Framework of Justification, Denial, Gain, Shame and Guilt



Justice of Blessing in Theoretical and Strategic Terms

A justice of blessing is meant to adjust the balance between victim and perpetrator, to make thing right, over the long term. In its first phase, it establishes the loss and woundedness on the part of the victim and the motivation and role of the perpetrators. The key is to get the perpetrators to admit to their violent actions, acknowledge the loss and woundedness that resulted, recognize that where people were killed, nothing can restore the situation but to commit themselves to working for the long-term well being of victims and groups of victims without knowing in advance what that might mean. There would be two temporal dimensions to the justice process. In the short term, stolen lands and property would be returned, to the degree possible. In the long term, there would be a commitment to periodic accountability sessions in which the healing and personal growth of the victims would be acknowledged and new needs derivative of the victimization would be identified. A plan of action would be undertaken to address these needs and at each subsequent accountability session, a report would be given on action taken. On going remorse would be communicated along with thanks for every act of graciousness on the part of victims. This would be the formal part of the process. Informally perpetrators would find ways to go beyond what was required in terms of contributing to the well-being of victims and victims groups. Over time, a new constructive relationship would be formed.

The root concepts out of which “justice” emerged, also produced the concepts of righteous, virtue, and goodness. These suggest a paradigm of justice called relational justice in which the goal is first and foremost to produce good, mutually empowering relationships. Within this paradigm,

justice as seeking a balance, becomes a part of a bigger process of reconciliation (see entry on reconciliation). As such there are specific justice making aspects of the process in line with restorative justice and there are broader dimensions of justice making as hegemonic structures, laws and customs that may have contributed to victimization are adjusted for long-term achievement of justice within larger relational systems (Napoleon, 2004; Redekop, 2002).

The link between healing, justice and reconciliation is complex just as identity-based conflict is complex. For some victims, the need for meaning is achieved through justice-seeking processes. This in turn, may help to reduce the trauma. For some victims, the result of justice and reconciliation processes may address their need for security and hence reduce the fear component of their trauma. If the very process empowers the victim to take action and to make choices, their sense of agency and self-esteem are enhanced. If the hurts of the victim are recognized by the community and acknowledged by the perpetrator, the feeling of being fundamentally violated may diminish. In like manner, the process may address the needs of the perpetrator who also is in need of healing (Staub & Pearlman, 2001). If the victim is allowed to see the humanity of the perpetrator and if both parties can acknowledge a shared humanity, this too will help in spiritual and emotional healing. Given the complexity of the situation, it is impossible to predict in which of these areas healing is most needed and in which, given the imperfect realities, positive redress will be achieved.

Justice of Blessing

- Assumptions:
- What is destroyed can't be restored
- Perpetrator is oriented toward enhancing the well-being of victims
- Victims are oriented toward rebuilding their lives


Justice of Blessing

- Starts with returning property that has been stolen
- Does an integral assessment of loss and woundedness
- Shared imagination and vision of long term best case scenario
- Sets short term objectives setting actions, attitudes, and orientation that address healing, structural change and relationship renewal

Justice of Blessing

- Works on the basis of accountability nodes through time
- Each accountability node takes stock of what has been accomplished in terms of key result areas and establishes short term goals to set the trajectory until the next accountability node

Justice of Blessing



Justice of Blessing in Operational Terms

What may have to happen, is that a mechanism like a truth may be the starting point. People could be given the option of moving into a justice of blessing process at any time. This would demand that both victims and perpetrators would be open to a joint, long term process. There may be a need for a sequential or concurrent series of justice processes that would include criminal tribunals and short-term restorative justice programs. Educational programs about the atrocity and its impact could be a significant part of the justice of blessing the overall program.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Appleby, R. S. (2000). *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation*. Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield.
- Capra, F., & Steindl-Rast, D. (1992). *Belonging to the Universe: Explorations on the Frontiers of Science and Spirituality*. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco.
- Chanteur, J. (1992). *From War to Peace* (S. A. Weisz, Trans.). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Cullompton, UK: Criminal Justice Press
- Cullopmpton, UK: Criminal Justice Press
- Girard, R. (1987). *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Girard, R. (1989). *The Scapegoat*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Hahnel, R. (2005). *Economic Justice and Democracy*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Herman, J. (1997). *Trauma and Recovery: Basic Books*.
- Johnston, D., & Sampson, C. (Eds.). (1994). *Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Johnstone, G. (2004). How, And In What Terms, Should Restorative Justice Be Conceived? In H. Zehr & B. Toews (Eds.), *Critical Issues in Restorative Justice*. Monsey, NY
- Juergensmeyer, M. (2001). *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kolbert, C. F. (1979). *The Legal Background*. In *Justinian: The Digest of Roman Law-Theft, Rapine, Damage and Insult*. New York: Penguin.
- Mooren, T. (2002). September 11, 2001 and the Future of Monotheistic Religions. *Mission*, 9(1), 39-64.
- Napoleon, V. (2004). By Whom, And By What Processee, I s Restorative Justice Defined, And What Bias Might This Introduce? In H. Zehr & B. Toews (Eds.), *Critical Issues in Restorative Justice*. Monsey, NY
- Pert, C. (1997). *Molecules of Emotion: The Science Behind Mind-Body Medicine*. New York: Touchstone.

- Rawls, J. (1999). *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Redekop, V. N. (1993). *Scapegoats, the Bible and Criminal Justice: Interacting with René Girard*. Akron, PA: Mennonite Central Committee.
- Redekop, V. N. (2002). *From Violence to Blessing: How an Understanding of Deep-Rooted Conflict Can Open Paths to Reconciliation*. Ottawa: Novalis.
- Redekop, V. N. (2002). *From Violence to Blessing: How an Understanding of Deep-Rooted Conflict Can Open Paths to Reconciliation*. Ottawa: Novalis.
- Ricoeur, P. (2000). *The Just* (D. Pellauer, Trans.). Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Schrenk, G. (1964). *The Concept of Law in the OT* (G. W. Bromiley, Trans.). In G. Kittel (Ed.), *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament* (Vol. 2). Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
- Sharpe, S. (2004). *How Large Should The Restorative Justice “Tent” Be?* In H. Zehr & B. Toews (Eds.). Monsey, NY.
- Steele, D. (1990). *Theological Assessment of Principled Negotiation as a Role Model for Church Involvement in the Mediation of International Conflict*.

BOŠKO BOJOVIĆ, PH.D.

PROFESSOR, FACULTY FOR SOCIAL STUDIES, PARIS, FRANCE

RELIGION – IDENTITY – MODERNITY IN POST-YUGOSLAV SERBIA

FROM TRADITIONALISM TO TOLERANCE AND PLURALISM

RESEARCH GUIDELINES

The end of ideologies, the rise of religiosity in the world, identity crisis, globalization processes and redefining of the relationship between the State and religious communities, especially in the countries in transition, raise a number of questions in the fields of sociology, religion and political science. Identity crisis, in correlation with the integration and disintegration processes in the countries in transition, raises the question of the relationship between identity and affiliation to a religious community. Affiliation to a religious community often implies the need for the affirmation of one's peculiarity relative to similar communities practicing different religions, as well as affiliation to the global community practicing the same religion. Thus, religious belonging can also imply the strengthening of particularism and identity closing off, as well as openness towards the a priori universal postulates of the major world religions. Consequently, it is necessary to understand to what extent re-socialization through religious affiliation is identity resistance to integration processes and to what extent it implies the need for openness towards more universal value criteria.

Today, one of the most topical questions in the sociology of religion is that of religious modernity. In post-Yugoslav Serbia, that is the question of whether the return to religion and religious affiliation is a reaction, that is, resistance to modernity, or a part of the socio-historical process of re-socialization, based on the new or restored ethic and universal value systems.

Social communities, which are faced with abrupt transitional changes and the erosion of institutional systems, tie themselves feverishly to religious institutions and their ideological logistics. In Western Europe, secularization resulted in an increasing discrepancy between the major religious institutions, despite a pronounced need of the population for the religious content, as shown by more recent researches. At the same time,

in many countries in transition, the situation seems to be almost diametrically opposed.¹¹² In those countries, an increasingly stronger coupling between state and religious institutions is bringing about a specific clericalization of society through the secularization of religious communities.

This phenomenon is probably more pronounced in the Orthodox part of Europe, where such inter-institutional dependence is an integral part of its cultural-historical heritage. This process is leading to the revival of an institutional monopoly on the society freed from a single-party ideological monopoly.

The survey aimed at investigating the mentioned social processes is based primarily on empirical studies and should promote a dialogue between religious and state institutions, on one side, and civil society, on the other.¹¹³ In Serbia, research would be conducted on the largest possible sample (1,700) of citizens belonging to different religions, in urban and rural environments, in proportion to their statistical share in the composition of the population. Extensive interviews of the most prominent representatives of the elites are also a very important part of the survey.

The aim of an analytical study is to determine whether and to what extent a religious revival in Serbia is geared to the preservation or recovery of traditional, national and local values, and to what extent it is open to the values and affirmation of civil society.¹¹⁴ To what extent the practicing of religion is now in the service of identity closing off and mistrust towards the external world, and whether it implies the need to respond to the challenges of its times. To what extent the prevalent conservative view is in the nature of religion as such, regardless of a religious community

¹¹² S. Ferrari, "Conclusion: Church and State in Post-Communist Europe" in S. Ferrari (ed.), *Law and Religion in Post-Communist Europe*, Peeters Uitgeverij, Leuven 2003, p. 422; Nonka Bogomilova, "Ethnic, Religious and Confessional Relations in the Balkans, Reflections on the Contemporary Religious 'Revival', Religion, Secularization, Globalization", *RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV*, 4 (August 2004), pp. 1-10. (<http://www.georgefox.edu/academics/undergrad/department/soc-swk/ree/2004/Bogomilova.pdf>).

¹¹³ Dragoljub Mićunović (ed.), *Crkva, država i civilno društvo*, Centre for Democracy, Belgrade 2000, pp. 11-12.

¹¹⁴ Despite valuable results, which should be primarily attributed to the competence and sacrifice of scarce expert teams, research work in this socially relevant field in Serbia is still far below the needs: "... it seems that the state or specified segments of society lost interest in providing financial support to the research work of sociologists of religion. This is more than evident: there is no research centre devoted to the sociology of religion, there are no more extensive research projects, while the journals devoted to religious research or having special editions devoted to this topics died out", T. Branković, "Sociologija religioznog društva", *Religion and Tolerance* 4 (2005), p. 70 (69-81).

and its hierarchy, and what is the contribution of an average member of a religious community to his religious affiliation.¹¹⁵

In this way it would be possible to determine the extent to which an accelerated religious revival as religious affiliation is a matter of the instrumentalization of identity crisis by the relevant institutions, or is a response to the need for restructuring the value system as a social need arising from calling the meaning of life, disappearance or change of the ideological framework and diminishing of social solidarity into question. Whether and to what extent religious affiliation can be in the service of social dynamics towards achieving an open and civil society, market economy and sustainable development.

The status of religion is now widely varied – ranging from secularized Western Europe to a vigorous rise of religiosity in the greater part of the world.¹¹⁶ The countries in transition form an important part of those social processes, since the rise of religiosity in them implies the change of direction of such processes over a long term. The situation in Serbia is especially important for the study of those processes, since they are taking place at an accelerated pace. The changes occurring at the beginning of the millennium also brought about in the introduction of religious education into state schools in 2001, whereby Serbia started to make up its ten-year delay relative to its neighbours, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, at an accelerated rate.¹¹⁷

According to the 2002 census, 95% of the population in Serbia declared itself as belonging to a religious community, which means that only 5% said they had no religious affiliation of whom only 0.5% declared

¹¹⁵ “Despite the fact that Serbia and Montenegro (as well as the former Yugoslavia) are multiconfessional, a religious distance and tolerance have not been the subject of research for a long time. This can be explained by the then atheization of our society, as well as a small number of those who declared themselves as believers. Over the past years, our society has displayed an increasing interest in religion and faith; the number of those declaring themselves as believers has been on the rise, while religious affiliation has become one of the major forms of group identification”, S. Joksimović, Z. Kuburović, “Mladi i verska tolerancija”, *Religion and Tolerance* 1 (2004), p. 19 (17-30).

¹¹⁶ As a criterion for social determination, “religion is a specific ideological, applied and symbolic dispositive, which constitutes, maintains, develops and guides individual and collective feelings of belonging to a particular religious heritage”, Daniele Hervieu-Léger, *Le pèlerin et le converti. La religion en mouvement*, Paris 1999, p. 24.

¹¹⁷ In Slovenia, a separation of church and state was carried out much more consistently, which also refers to the absence of religious education in state schools. S. Flere, “Slovenia: at a distance from a perfect religious market”, *Religion, State and Society*, June 2004, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 151-157.

themselves as non-believers.¹¹⁸ A comparison with the previous censuses shows that the change is more than spectacular. By what factors can such an abrupt change be explained? By the same or similar factors like those in other countries in transition, coupled with Serbia's peculiarity as the factor of Yugoslav heritage?¹¹⁹

First of all, religious affiliation must be regarded as the consequence of identity crisis caused by the accelerated disappearance of the state and ideological framework with which the population in Serbia was taught to identify itself for decades. The semantic religious content was slowly introduced into the ideological vacuum of the 1990s, which was shown by some important researches carried out in that period.¹²⁰ Consequently, how much did religion or identity contribute to the abrupt changes in the recent past?

The significance and proportions of these changes require new and systematic research. The population survey is only one method by which the relevant empirical knowledge can be gained. The best way to supplement its results is to carry out research on the discourses of religious authorities. It can be expected that this research will show that the discourse of popular science non-fiction with the religious content is much closer

¹¹⁸ "The census conducted in the Republic of Serbia in 2002 (with the exception of Kosovo, for whose population there is no available database) shows that there are 63 different religious groups and denominations. Most citizens (84.97% of the total population of 7.5 million) declared themselves as members of the Orthodox Church. Most Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, Romanians, Macedonians, Vlachs and Ruthenians belong to this confession. Catholics constitute the second largest religious community (5.48%), including mostly Hungarians, Croatians and Bunjevci. Muslims constitute 3.19% of the population and comprise mostly Bosniaks, Albanians, Turks and a certain number of Roma. Protestants account for 1.07%. This group includes various religious denominations, including the Slovak Evangelical Church, Evangelical Christian Church and Christian Reform Church (in the latter two Hungarians constitute a majority), as well as mostly multiethnic groups such as Adventists, Baptists, Methodists, Nazarens and Pentecostals. The Jewish Religious Community has 785 members. There are also 530 followers of various Eastern religions. According to the census, only 0.53% of the population declared itself as non-believers"; Angela Ilić, "Odnos religija i društva u današnjoj Srbiji", *Religion and Tolerance* 3 (2005), p. 48 (47-78).

¹¹⁹ For more detail on the laws and regulations governing religious communities (the Serbian Orthodox Church, Roman Catholic Church, Islamic Religious Community, Jewish Religious Community, Evangelical Christian Churches and Christian Reform Church), see: Angela Ilić, "Odnos religije i društva u današnjoj Srbiji", *Religion and Tolerance* 3 (2005), pp. 55-65.

¹²⁰ M. Blagojević, "Religijska situacija u SR Jugoslaviji: Revitalizacija religijskog ponašanja i verovanja", *Teme* 4 (2003), pp. 525-552; D. Radisavljević-Čiparizović, "Religija i svakodnevni život: vezanost ljudi za religiju i crkvu u Srbiji krajem devedesetih", in S. Bolčić, A. Milić, *Srbija krajem milenijuma: Razaranje društva, promene i svakodnevni život*, Belgrade 2005, Institute for Sociological Research, Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade.

to the original religious semantics than the rhetoric of the hierarchies and clergy of religious institutions.

It should also be noted that throughout history the religious institution was the guardian of identity in the Balkans to a greater extent than in other parts of Europe.¹²¹ Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the criteria for distinguishing religious from ethnic identity. Religious identity, as the personal and group content,¹²² from secular identity of a social community to which a religious determinant can be the common denominator only symbolically.

In practice, religious affiliation could thus be determined according to the degree of knowing, adopting and applying the religious contents.¹²³ The frequency of visiting the God-serving places of worship and participating in religious rites, the application of religious rules and customs in private and family life, insight into the content and reception of the discourse of religious authorities, the place and role of the ethical dimension of religious teachings, the degree of tolerance and exclusivism relative to other religious communities, as well as the contribution of the universal and local towards understanding and applying the religious principles.

It is especially important to establish a sequence in understanding two basic principles in the approach to religion and assigning priority to one of them. It is necessary to determine whether religion is primarily a matter of subjective and social conformism or, on the contrary, a tendency towards improving an individual's and interpersonal way of life and behaviour. The easiest answer would be that both of them are equally represented, which

¹²¹ As defined by Vjekoslav Perica, ethnoclericalism is derived from the "idea of ethnically based nationalism and 'national church', whose clergy is also called leaders of the nation, but is not considered to be responsible for political errors, as is the case with secular leaders" (V. Perica, *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002, p. 205), cf. Angela Ilić, "Odnos religije i društva u današnjoj Srbiji", *Religion and Tolerance* 3 (2005), p. 50.

¹²² "...mature religiosity is related to a higher degree of tolerance, since maturity leads to the adoption of autonomous morality and reliance on universal values...", S. Joksimović, Z. Kuburić, "Mladi i verska tolerancija", *Religion and Rolerance* 1 (2004), p. 28.

¹²³ "If we combine the categories of religiosity of those who accept whatever their religions teach them and observe the customs of their religions and selective believers, then 60.8% of the respondents in Vojvodina is religious. Other studies (Radisavljević-Čiparizović, 2002) also show that about 60% of the population in Serbia is religious." D. Radisavljević-Čiparizović, "Religija i svakodnevní život: vezanost ljudi za religiju i crkvu u Srbiji krajem devedesetih", in: S. Bolčić, A. Milić (ed.), *Srbija krajem milenijuma: razaranje društva, promene i svakodnevni život*, Institute for Sociological Research, Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade 2002; Zorica Kuburić, "Verske zajednice u Srbiji i verska distanca", *Religion and Tolerance* 5 (2005), p. 56.

is illusory in practice. Therefore, this dilemma must be resolved by coming out clearly for either one of two options as the primary one.

This can clarify the degree and motivation of adopting religious, ethical and conceptual contents, regardless of their role in the life of a religious community. To what extent religious teaching can be regarded as socially relevant and useful, or as futile and antinomic with social usefulness.

This is how the issue of religious institution and its hierarchy, as a social and ethical factor and not only as a charismatic religious one, should be addressed. The power and social influence of these factors cannot be disregarded in social environments in transition such as Serbia.¹²⁴ The weakness of civil institutions, lack of social justice, meager prospects of young people and moral crisis, collapse of ideologies and the weak State push the religious factors into the foreground of social events.¹²⁵ At times, they are assigned such a role and influence that one can already hear a critical evaluation that the Church is stronger or even more modern than the sclerotized State and its faltering institutions.

Therefore, the population should be given an opportunity to voice its opinion about such a development of social relations, which seem to be confined to relations between institutions, while at the same time disregarding the civil and social sector. Consequently, it is necessary to facilitate the dialogue of the silent majority with the institutions that speak in its name, the dialogue and exchange of views and evaluations that seem as if they never been carried out. In this way, the public voice and an individual's view and free judgment can develop understanding of the responsibilities of the hierarchies that seem to be above the law and social norms and responsibilities.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Angela Ilić, "Odnos religije i društva u današnjoj Srbiji: (Religion et société dans la Serbie actuelle). *Religion and Tolerance, Journal of the Center for Empirical Researches of Religion* (Novi Sad), No. 3 (2005), pp. 47-78.

¹²⁵ Although the status of civil and religious freedoms in Serbia is considerably better than in the past, it is still far below the standards and tolerance of an open society. "International Religious Freedom Report 1999", Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 9 September 1999; "International Religious Freedom Report 2004: Serbia and Montenegro", Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State, 15 September 2004; Paul Mojzes, "Religious Human Rights in Post-Communist Balkan Countries", in: John Witte and Johan David Van der Vyver (ed.), *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1996), p. 277; *Crkva, društvo i država* (a group of authors; editor Elizabeta Tenji), Social-Democratic Club of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Belgrade 2005.

¹²⁶ Zagorka Golubović, "Odnos crkve, društva i države. Princip sekularnosti", in D. Mićunović (ed.), *Crkva, država i civilno društvo*, Centre for Democracy, Belgrade 2000, pp. 36-38.

The situation that can hardly contribute to the social compact and social cohesion cannot be of benefit to the religious community itself which, according to Max Weber, turns into a “tasteless pro-régime formation”.¹²⁷

The identity issue is especially sensitive and important in the countries in transition, especially in those established after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. In that territory Serbia represents a unique and especially indicative case.¹²⁸

Identity should be the common (subjective as well as objective) denominator of a social community existing at a specified place and time.¹²⁹ It is usually based on a common culture and customs,¹³⁰ language, historical heritage and major institutions, such as the State, Church or some other religious institution. It embodies the awareness of a common existence throughout history, as well as a common experience with relations with the neighbouring and other communities, including all projections and accompanying stereotypes. The awareness of a common peculiarity with the projections of one's own and other communities. These values change and evolve over time in accordance with the collective empirical facts.

Over the past two centuries, the most important framework of that self-consciousness, especially in Europe, has been the Nation-State – people as a political and historical factor integrated into a state union.

Two basic concepts of such a community have been developed in Europe; they are usually defined as: a) “the right of soil” and b) “the right of blood”. The first concept implies cultural identity without distinction as to blood, race, religion or ethnic origin, and refers mostly to the Mediterranean and West European countries, primarily France; something similar

¹²⁷ This is the question of “Kalvinism, which lost its ascetic influence to a considerable extent: (in the 17th century Netherlands), cf. M. Weber, *L'Ethique protestante et l'esprit du capitalisme*, Paris 1964 (1905), p. 206, n. 1.

¹²⁸ “If one finds a stable way in which one people can respond to the challenges of the external or internal world, then the predictable answer to such a challenge is something that we can call its collective identity”, Đ. Šušnjić, “Granice tolerancije”, *Religion and Tolerance* 1 (2004), p. 12 (7-16).

¹²⁹ “In order to survive, not one community – even if it is in the contemporary profile being characteristic of the most advanced modernization – is in a position to break completely a minimum continuity which is derived in one way or the other from the source in ‘permissible memory’, as any tradition can be called”, Daniele Hervieu-Léger, *Le religion pour mémoire*, Paris 1993. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to surpass the customary antinomy between a traditional society (where religion is omnipresent) and a modern society which is aiming to narrow religious space. R. Campiche, A. Dubach, C. Bovay, M. Krüggeler, P. Voll, *Croire en Suisse(s)*, Lausanne-Geneva 1992.

¹³⁰ *Comprendre. Les identités culturelles*, 1, PUF (2000).

also applies to Greece. The second concept applies to the Central European countries and the European countries located further north, such as Germany, Poland, the Netherlands and the like, whose identities are based primarily on a common linguistic and anticipated ethnic origin. In the 20th century one can also speak about the Eastern ethnic concept versus Western civil concept of a socio-state union. By applying these two concepts with different ingredients, the centuries-long formation of the European nations has produced similar results, which are now tending to relativize, alleviate the opposites, as well as to weaken cohesion as a byproduct of the European integration processes. As a historical process, this evolution will lead inevitably to the silent redefining, rethinking or re-grouping of identities. Structural, cultural, confessional and demographic evolutions in secularized Europe point to the crisis of self-consciousness that may result in the formation of European identity, which still has to be defined in large measure.

The mentioned historical processes in the Balkan and some Central European countries were lagging behind the more developed parts of the continent for about a century, on the average.¹³¹ If the beginning of the last century marked the end of multinational empires, its end marks the end of the last multinational states in the less developed part of Europe which, due to weak democratic institutions and the lack of social cohesion, became more susceptible to disintegration processes.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Serbia joined a multinational union as a clearly profiled national State, modelled after the French Jacobine type of national statehood. Serbia built in the common state its complete state, institutional, legal, political, cultural and historical heritage, as well as its unsolved national question to which the common State itself had to be the solution. However, it was not so, because it came out of that state being conceptually structurally weaker than before its creation. This became more evident only after the separation of the last part of that union, which also marked the formal independence of Montenegro. While other States constituting the former Yugoslavia were established, on the basis of more or less formed cohesion, as national states rather than as civil ones, with the exception of heterogeneous Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia inherited rather unfavourable baggage from the former state union.

This is best seen in the case of national identity, which is regarded in different ways. Whereas a Muslim, an Albanian or a Catholic in Mon-

¹³¹ Zlatiborka Popov, "Pravoslavlje i izazovi demokracije, multikulturalizma i tolerancije", *Religion and Tolerance* 4 (2005), pp. 95-107.

tenegro can, just like before, call himself a Montenegrin rightfully and of his free will, regardless of his own minority ethnic or confessional self-consciousness, it is very difficult to conceive something like that in Serbia today. How can a Muslim, a Hungarian, an Albanian and now probably a Vlach express their state-national affiliation? As Serbians? As Serbs? Under the new Constitution, this affiliation is regulated in a compromising way (Serbia is the national state of Serbs and all those who live in it). A comparison with Bosnia cannot be made, since it was not a state in its more recent history until the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Consequently, Serbia has inherited the Yugoslav syndrome – the lack of cohesion and insufficiently defined identity, the weaknesses it did not have, or at least not to such an extent, before joining the common state.

Therefore, it is especially important to address the identity issue in present-day Serbia which, after the separation of Montenegro from the state union, could finally face the truth about itself and its self-consciousness in responding to the challenges of the new millennium and Euro-Atlantic integration. Therefore, the identity issue imposes itself as one of the major topics of this research because, if the state can be designative only of Serbs and not of other ethnic and religious groups and if about one-third of Serbs lives outside Serbia, then the state determinant can hardly be decisive for the Serbs themselves. In that case, they have only an ethnic or, to be more exact, ethno-confessional determinant. Thus, instead of a state people, they identify themselves as a church people, instead of a Nation-State, there is a Nation-Church, whereby the model of the Patriarchate of Peć is restored (16th-18th centuries), provided that the Serbian Orthodox Church survives as an entity which transcends the state borders. This would be something like the quantum jump for one Orthodox Church, considering its historical experience, that is, its greater or lesser political and structural dependence on the State.¹³²

¹³² “When a state does not establish, support and favour, or persecute, stigmatize or prohibit religious institutions – an individual’s freedom of conscience has the greatest prospects to be exercised. On one side, this is the aspiration of those social and liberal movements which we call liberal and democratic in the broadest sense of the word and, on the other, this fits into the general modernization pattern of social development, within which each institutional part of society can develop autonomously; consequently, the school system, economy, politics, religion, etc. are separated and function according to their rules and principles (subsystems of a global social system). This is a real institutional and normative basis for the affirmation of the principles of tolerance, without disregarding the fact that tolerance must originate from and be supported by other motives and elements, and especially by culture which permits and respects diversity”; (...) “as one moves further east, from the Czech Republic to the ex-Soviet republics in Asia, for example, the situation is increasingly less favourable with respect to the exercise of religious

Consequently, there is no further need to emphasize the importance of an ethno-confessional correlation as the decisive factor of the contemporary identity in Serbia. It is well known that such a correlation is the historical heritage and identification peculiarity of the Balkans. However, if Serbia, as the central and still significant State, and the Serbs, as a historically and geopolitically important factor, if not the decisive regional one, are not in a position to offer something qualitatively different, how that can be expected from other, smaller and (subjectively or not) more endangered communities.

It is especially important to determine the interdependence of ethnic and religious self-consciousness as the decisive identity factors by empirical and socio-historical methods and analyses. Despite being condemned as a heresy at the Council in Constantinople in 1873, ethnophiletism, an old temptation of the Orthodox Church, could thus become an even stronger point of division between re-evangelization and the revival of ethic criteria that are necessary in the post-communist period, as opposed to the political instrumentalization of religion as the last resort of anachronous social monopolies.

Consequently, it is necessary to facilitate the articulation of authentic aspirations, especially among younger people.¹³³ To foster a dialogue

freedom without government intervention. The principle of a separation of church and state is increasingly becoming a decorative constitutional element, while traditional and historically rooted religious institutions are finding themselves in the increasingly stronger grip of state and political factors. Such a situation is certainly a drag on the modernization of those societies, as well as on the exercise of the freedom of conscience and religion". S. Flere, "Princip odvojenosti Crkve od Države i verska tolerancija – o institucionalnim okvirima ostvarivanja verske tolerancije u savremenim evropskim okvirima", *Religion and Tolerance* 4 (2005), pp. 8, 9 (7-12).

¹³³ The surveys show a significant rise of religious and ethnic intolerance among young people: "The data obtained by surveying the citizens older than 18 (Pantić, 1991) show that, in comparison with the data obtained quarter a century ago (Pantić, 1967), there is a considerable decline in the number of those who do not manifest any distance (from 59% to 28%), which means that an ethnic distance is more pronounced. The data based on the sample of young people aged 15-17 (Bačević, 1990) show that in the late 1980s young people manifested a greater ethnic distance than young people in the early 1960s and that the mutual distance is the greatest between the members of those peoples being in conflict, and this points to the impact of situational factors". (...) "This distance is the greatest when the entering into a marriage is in question and the smallest with respect to one's readiness to be a friend with someone practicing a different religion. Out of 68% of young people being not ready enter into a religiously mixed marriage, 31% rejects the members of only one religion, 11% states two or three religions, 11% three to four religions, while 15% rejects everyone except the members of the same religion", S. Joksimović, Z. Kuburić, "Mladi i verska tolerancija", *Religion and Tolerance* 1 (2004), pp. 18-19, 21; see also: *Ibid.*, Verska tolerancija i distance, u Z. Kuburić (ed.), *Religija, veronauka i tolerancija*, Novi Sad, Center for Empirical Researches of Religion.

and an exchange of aspirations between the silent majority and paternalistic monopoly of specified institutions. To find out whether the common identity tissue in itself is xenophobic, autarchic, atavistic, traditionalist,¹³⁴ intolerant and archetypal closing off, or is rather the result of ideological instrumentalization. What great would be the potential of civil society in those environments where single-mindedness has left a deep trace? What is the contribution of a natural aspiration to openness towards the world and other communities and how many didactic instruments are missing so as to facilitate such openness? What is the contribution of religious and ethnic tolerance which always alternated with the opposite feelings?¹³⁵

Consequently, it is necessary to promote tolerance and openness by the mayeutical method, provided that the burden of traditionalism and exclusivism is not blurred and that the facing of the truth about narrow-minded distrustfulness is not avoided. It is important to get the clearest possible picture as to whether an ethno-confessional identity and its current discourse, which is being increasingly imposed by itself and by other means, carries the universal message of the major religious teachings or, on the contrary, serves as a transmission for the further promotion of irreconcilability. One must not lose sight of the fact that universalisms in themselves are exclusive and mostly incompatible. Therefore, the vocation of a state and social community is to overcome such exclusivism. In the societies where secularization and civil society are waning to a considerable extent, the weakness of civil and State institutions is providing increasingly more scope for religious ideologization.¹³⁶ Therefore, the conscience and critical consciousness of those interviewed who realize that the original discourses are instrumentalized in favour of ideologization, could be the factor of civil self-awareness and identity of modernity, rather than the spiral of self-closing traditionalism.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ Đ. Šunjić, "Prepreke na putu razumevanja, poverenja i pomirenja", *Religion and Tolerance* 5 (2005), pp. 8-9.

¹³⁵ One should not disregard the examples of religious and ethnic intolerance which are reflected in still numerous (or increasingly more) incidents; cf. Angela Ilić, "Odnos religije i društva u današnjoj Srbiji", *Religion and Tolerance* 3 (2005), pp. 66-72.

¹³⁶ Lj. Rajić, "Crkva, obrazovanje i fundamentalistički pokreti", in D. Mićunović (ed.), *Crkva, država i civilno društvo*, Center for Democracy, Belgrade 2000, pp. 17-26.

¹³⁷ "Traditionalism is an ideology that imposes the ancestors' the ideas, beliefs, values and norms on the descendants, which should be observed without any objection, while at the same time disregarding changes in the external environment or internal experience. As the closed consciousness, traditionalism poses a great obstacle to successful communication not only with one's own past, it is also an insurmountable problem in an attempt to establish communica-

Before the formation of Yugoslavia, Serbia was one of the most liberal States in the region; it was among the first in Europe to grant universal suffrage, while democratic institutions, land reform and civil society were already realized.¹³⁸ The thesis of Latinka Perović about the imperative of modernization as Serbia's only path to the future is based on the statement about its chronic lagging in that historical process. Regardless of how much it could and wished to initiate it, communism – as one of the most conservative ideologies for decades – turned this process into civilisational regression.

Disparities in the level of social development in post-bloc Europe are so great that it is difficult to find the common denominators and common criteria. How to categorize the Balkan countries – as modern, postmodern, transmodern or premodern – if there are considerable differences among them? Namely, differences in the level of development between the two poles of the former Yugoslavia did not change more significantly during its existence,¹³⁹ which is one of the most symptomatic indicators of its failure as a state.

It is even more difficult to establish the sociological criteria for the modernity of religion if one bears in mind all conceptual, structural, historical and other differences. After a decades-long (more or less) forceful process of secularization, accelerated and inconsistent urbanization, exculturation, social destructuration and identity crisis, the European post-communist societies in transition are in a lesser dissonance with some parts of the Third World than with more developed parts of Europe.

Desolidarization with religious authorities and discrepancy relative to the hierarchies, relativization of religious teachings, freedom to choose a particular religion¹⁴⁰ and autonomy relative to the spiritual values as

tion between other nations and their cultures”, Đ. Šušnjić, “Granice tolerancije”, *Religion and Tolerance* 1(2004), p. 12.

¹³⁸ So, for example, the YMCA department, which was established within the University of Belgrade, had about 1,000 members as early as 1911, at the time of the visit of John Mott, the founder of the movement, to Serbia, while the Christian Women's Association was formed in Belgrade in 1920; cf. D. Subotić, *Episkop Nikolaj i Pravoslavni bogomoljački pokret. Pravoslavna narodna hrišćanska zajednica u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1920-1941*, Belgrade 1996, pp. 19-20, 29-31, 34-35.

¹³⁹ It would be useful to compare the data and conclusions provided by Lj. Dimić, *Kulturna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918-1941*, Belgrade 1996, I-III (see, in particular, Vol. I, pp. 23-168) with those from the federal Yugoslavia.

¹⁴⁰ “The data that 90% of respondents agrees that everyone has the right to choose a religious community and belief, and that 84% of young people holds that the people must have equal rights regardless of their religion, point to the conclusion that most of the interviewed sec-

the elements of individualism, secularization, religious eclecticism and syncretism are only some of the major factors of modernity, which can be concisely defined as the antinomy of traditionalism. To what extent it is necessary to point to discrepancies between the proclaimed objectives and real effects? Is the emergence of a laicist apostolate, which sometimes attracts a much greater auditorium than the charismatic clergy, the result of the fact that the former appeals to an individual and the latter to collectivity?¹⁴¹ A tendency towards living in one's own time and increasingly less in the past or the future, points out clearly to an evolution in understanding and experiencing temporal self-determination?¹⁴²

While the Western sociology of religion was already determining the patterns in the process of "abandoning religiosity", it turned out that it was the question of the new emerging beliefs. So, this discipline is concerned with the modalities and logic of religious institutionalization, as well as a gradual diminishing of the influence of those institutions in contemporary secularized and laicized societies. Just like the destructure and restructuring of beliefs that are less susceptible to empirical studies; rather, they find their justification in conceiving an individual's subjective experience. The question that imposes itself here is how to define the notion of religiosity bearing in mind that its customary scientific determinants have become unusable and inadequate.¹⁴³

Consequently, the question is to what extent some parts of Europe are in different phases of the same or similar historical process, or else we have the differences that are reconcilable to a lesser or greater degree. Population ageing, a long-standing demographic and historical process common to all European countries, has such current and far-reaching social and economic implications that it is hard to perceive them. The well-known interdependence of demographic, ethnic and religious factors in these socio-historical processes, only points to the strategic importance of being familiar with them.

If the orientation to the medieval models by the Orthodox people, especially Serbs, or to the Turkish-Ottoman patterns by Muslim-Bosniaks

ondary-school students advocate religious rights and freedoms", S. Joksimović, Z. Kuburić, "Mladi i verska tolerancija", *Religion and Tolerance* 1 (2004), p. 24, sheet 2, p. 25. As for the adult population, the degree of intolerance is considerably higher (57%), which is explained by the fact that this part of the survey was conducted at the time of armed conflicts, pp. 25-26.

¹⁴¹ This phenomenon could point to the latent modernity of social processes in Serbia.

¹⁴² Daniele Hervieu-Léger, *Le religion pour mémoire*, Paris 1993.

¹⁴³ Daniele Hervieu-Léger, *Le pèlerin et le converti. La religion en mouvement*, Paris 1999, pp. 18-19, 22.

in more recent times can be a transitory phenomenon of identity fermentation, which has been experienced by many European and other nations, religious trends can be more lasting indicators. Do they have the lasting characteristic of conservatism in the Balkans, or enable an evolution into more modern trends, including the higher degree of tolerance?¹⁴⁴ This is one of the crucial questions in this part of our survey. If these trends are viewed through the prism of identity self-sufficiency, then the traditionalist option has an advantage. If they are refracted through the universal messages of the major religions, it would not have to be like that. But, in that case, the balance of powers of rival or conflicting universalisms – which used to clash severely in the Balkans in the past, but also knew how to find the ways and strongholds for local transitional syntheses and tolerances – can be decisive.¹⁴⁵

A critical or passive attitude towards religious authorities and hierarchy, the degree of religious solidarity, identification with teachings and the contribution of religious rites, orders and recommendations in the community and private life, the degree and method of re-socialization, the attitude towards “elective affinities”,¹⁴⁶ the role of sentimentalism (eudemonism)¹⁴⁷ or asceticism, the contribution of external doctrinal influences and the degree of tolerance in choosing the marital partner

¹⁴⁴ This can also be supported by some results of one more recent research according to which: “Both groups of respondents hold that religion and tolerance are related to some extent (none of the non-believers stated that their relationship was absolute), while 26.6% of believers hold that they are absolutely related”; the opposite view (which gives priority to affiliation) could be derived from some other results of the same research, which was conducted on a small sample (100 respondents) in the Republic of Serbia: “While most non-believers (80%) agree with the basic mission of this (ecumenical) movement – to restore the unity of all Christians – most believers do not agree with that (86.6%) and argue that religious and cultural identity would be lost”, Zlatiborka Popov, “Religija i tolerancija”, *Religion and Tolerance* 3 (2005), pp. 87, 90.

¹⁴⁵ It is important to note that over the past years a fruitful and constructive inter-religious dialogue has been especially carrying on by the representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Bishop of Bačka Irinej Bulović), Roman Catholic Church (Belgrade Archbishop Stanislav Hočevar) and the Protestant religious communities, such as the Conferences in Subotica (November 2004) and Novi Sad (September 2005); Angela Ilić, “Odnos religije i društva u današnjoj Srbiji”, *Religion and Tolerance* 3 (2005), pp. 73-75.

¹⁴⁶ The influence of religion on the “progress of material civilisation”, economy and an interaction of belief and ethics, M. Weber, *L’Ethique protestante et l’esprit du capitalisme*, Paris 1964 (1905), pp. 103-104, 164.

¹⁴⁷ Religion hedonism being characteristic of Zinzendorf’s understanding of pietism, according to which it is important to feel comfortable about one’s religion, and not to be better or more successful with the help of faith (secular asceticism), M. Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-165.

and the like, the freedom to choose a particular religious community and teaching, choice between eudemonism and asceticism, demanding and consistent application of the basic ethnic and spiritual principles, the index of confidence and satisfaction with the clergy and hierarchy, the relationship between religion and culture as an indicator of the traditional or modern. Those are the issues that should be addressed so as to develop understanding of the developmental or retrograde potentials of society, as well as the driving or static role of its elites.

Like in any society, regardless of whether it is the question of a religious or other community, there is almost always a line of division between more or less conservative and modern trends. In the Orthodox religion this is especially pronounced with respect to the issue of the Church calendar. In more recent times, a similar division can also be observed with respect to the frequency of taking Communion or, earlier, with respect to the liturgical language and the like.

It is the question of determining the quantitative relationship of the mentioned and other indicative tendencies by sociometric methods. In this way, it is possible to determine the major tendency. Just as it is possible to identify a moderate choice “outvoted” by tendentious instrumentalization by the mayeutical method.

One of the basic aims of promoting tolerance and pointing to the hopelessness of exclusivism¹⁴⁸ is to address the issue of religion and identity in Serbia by applying the relevant criteria which are used in the modern sociology of culture. So, for example, what meaning does the notion of “believing, without belonging”¹⁴⁹ have in present-day Serbia (whether and to what extent it can be the question of *belonging without believing*), which designates contemporary confessional “deregulation” in Europe or, in other words, a discrepancy between a religiously autonomous individu-

¹⁴⁸ “An individual whose mind is enslaved or shackled by the notions of his clan, tribe, nation, race, class, religion, party or similar proves that he is unable to think like (enlightened) man; he lacks the reasoning power and capacity to rise himself to the general view and feeling for the universal truths and values. He is still not open to higher forms of thinking and broader ways of life. And the prospects of human community rest on universal meanings, while a group develops on particular ones. All those references to a tribe, nation, class and the like testify that such an individual has not yet developed a civil way of feeling, thinking and acting. The clannish-tribal-national consciousness and way of life in this region can hardly be raised onto the plane of universal values, norms and rules of behaviour. If Christianity, as a universal religion, failed to eradicate this, essentially pagan pattern of thinking and acting, then we cannot hope that we will be more successful in the near future”, Đ. Šušnjić, “Granice tolerancije”, *Religion and Tolerance* 1(2004), p. 11.

¹⁴⁹ D. Davie, *La religion des Britanniques. De 1945 à nos jours*, Geneva 1996.

al and belonging to religious institutions? A discrepancy or differentiation between faith and belonging, between religion and identity. The question that imposes itself here is whether an increasingly stronger coupling between religious and state institutions speeds up the process of secularization or theocratization of the society in the Balkans?

The question as to whether one can expect a secularized process in the restructuring of identity in search for a new social cohesion that could be compared with Atatürk's modernization of Turkey, which made it a strong nation and State almost a century ago, or closing off in the past, based solely on the religious denominator?

The pace of social and historical processes in Serbia and in the broader region offers more questions than answers, thus imposing the need for their further research.¹⁵⁰ In its evolution from traditionalism to modernity, from atavistic closing off to the values of open society, from exclusivism to tolerance and religious and cultural pluralism, a religious-ethnic identity requires caution in deriving the conclusions about the current and, in particular, future development trends of society.¹⁵¹

The interrelationships of an individual's religious experience, institutions of religious communities and modernity will be the major subject of our further research, which will aim at promoting tolerance in the spirit of modern, enlightened civil society and universal spiritual, cultural and civilisational values.

¹⁵⁰ Their aim is to contribute to the preparation of the confessional map, and characterization and typology of religions in Serbia; cf. T. Branković, "Sociologija religioznog društva", *Religion and Tolerance* 4 (2005), pp. 75-76.

¹⁵¹ As a working statement, it would be difficult to dispute the conclusion of a significant research on socio-political progress on a normative plane: "When considering the progress made with respect to the relationship between church and state over the past years, one cannot disregard the fact that several positive steps have been taken. They include the adoption of several new laws and efforts to harmonize national legislation with international one; better legal protection of the basic human rights and broader inter-religious dialogue and cooperation within the country. The negative phenomena include the low degree of religious tolerance in the society; the nonexistence of the law regulating the work of religious communities and the preferential treatment of the Serbian Orthodox Church by the state, which is often at the expense of other religious communities." It is also necessary to bear in mind that: "Serbia is at the crossroads. Is the government willing to establish a new framework for the relationship between church and state and apply it? Will it take seriously its commitment to respect human rights, including religious freedom? How long will it tolerate religious discrimination and hate speech? Will the country finally admit that religious diversity can enrich the people? The answers to these extremely important questions are yet to come". Angela Ilić, "Odnos religije i društva u današnjoj Srbiji", *Religion and Tolerance* 3 (2005), pp. 75, 76.

NILGUN SARP, PH.D.

PROFESSOR, ANKARA UNIVERSITY, ANKARA, TURKEY

WOMEN IN ISLAM

“HELPING OTHERS BY PUTTING ONESELF IN THEIR PLACE”

INTRODUCTION

The studies on women in Islam have emphasized the context and settings, since these have a great impact on a religion and its effects on a society. According to literature, Islam was a reform that took place after the Jahiliyyah¹⁰ period. References to this period presents women as weak, sick human beings who were treated worse than animals and even killed when they were born. Islam provided women with some rights and, these rights were equal to half of what men had at that time (1,2,3,4).

Islam maintains that men are dominant. Women are subordinated to men for economic reasons. The man spends his earnings to take care of his wife and brings home food, and in exchange the wife obeys the husband's requests. The economy legitimizes men's superiority in many Muslim countries, and the Quran strengthens men's economic power with the *suwar*. Some interpretations, however, emphasize the importance of women; they are considered precious and have to be taken care of and treated well.

According to the Quran, two women are equal to one man when it comes to inheritance rights. The justification for this dictate in the Quran is the economic responsibility of men. Because men are responsible for taking care of their families, they need to inherit more. And since women receive money before their marriage, it is just that a man inherit twice the share.

The Quran does not mention women's work, nor it does consider their domestic responsibilities as work. The emphasis is on their roles as mother and wife. Women have a very important duty in Islam: They are responsible for pleasing their husbands under any conditions. A woman does not have the right to resist her husband, even if he stops taking care of her and bringing home food. According to Islam, men should work and women should stay at home, taking care of the husband and children. There is a saying in the Quran, “Heaven is beneath the mother's feet,” which places importance on women's child-bearing responsibilities. They are responsible for raising good, healthy Muslim children (5,6).

Since women were not engaged in any business-related issues at the time, it does not degrade women's intellect but instead seeks to avoid any mistakes women may make in calculations and decisions that are business related (7).

The contrast between women and men in Islam is clear in social life. As some religious experts say there are also some laws that protects women, like when a woman get married the man must give an amount of money to her. This money would stay with her and can just be used with her consent. Woman can only marry a man but a man can marry more than a woman. Polygamy was due to two points. The first one is explained through the reason that at ancient times a lot of men died in wars. Allowing a man to marry more than a woman would mean that this woman could give birth to kids that would turn into men and increase the army of the country. So on this way the Koran is protecting the state. The second point is explained on the fact that a lot of men die in war and they would leave their widow alone without any financial support. At that time women was not as independent as today, they did not sustain themselves financially and they did not have any profession. Giving the right for a man to marry more than a woman was also thinking in a way of protecting this women

The husband was allowed to divorce his wife without giving a reason and without any legal exercise. When the husband made his divorce claim three times verbally, it was considered valid. When the couple divorces, it is the man's duty to provide maintenance for the woman in order to pay for her food, clothes, accommodations, medical expenditures, and other things during her waiting period [of her after termination of marriage]; however, the woman has no such duty(4,8). The leader is a protector, the man is a protector of his family, and the woman is a protector of her husband's house and his children. So, all of us are protectors and everyone of us are responsible for his/her subjects.

According to the Quran, women should stay at home, If it is not necessary, they should not go out to pray at a mosque; instead they should pray at home. When women are in the presence of men who are not *halal* to them, they should cover some parts of their bodies. The parts that should be covered are not specifically stated. The interpretations of this verse are diverse in Muslim countries. While in most Arab countries women cover their faces and sometimes even their eyes. Even before the Quran's legitimization of women's veiling, women were already covering their faces in Babylon and Assyria. Veiling was the sign of belonging to a higher class, and women who were from the upper classes wore veils. At

the time slaves were not allowed to veil themselves. A headscarf worn by Muslim women; conceals the hair and neck and usually has a face veil that covers the face. Veil or Cover. This is the Islamic dress for Muslim women, which covers the whole body except the feet and the hands (9,10).

MODERNIZATION AND ISLAM

Third World countries now face the consequences of modernity with the effects of globalization,. Their degree of interaction with modernity affects different cultures in many aspects of life. The consequences of this encounter will vary, since different cultural and religious backgrounds have different norms and values that form the social structure. Especially in the Middle East, the interaction between religion and modernity has given rise to debates in many different areas. One of the most important and complex fields of study related to religion and modernity in the Middle East is that of women's studies.

In the beginning, the confrontation of the Middle East with modernity forced Muslim countries to develop modernization projects. In Egypt, Iran, and Turkey, efforts took place toward modernization. The notion behind nation-state projects was to combine traditional institutions with new, modern practices. Developments in family law, women's rights, and the political arena were the main goals of these modernization projects.

Ideologies within these societies put women in the center of the debate rather than discussing aspects of modernity. Although these ideologies wanted to liberate women by supporting their unveiling, education, and participation in the public sphere, they also supported women's domestic roles in the private sphere. Nationalism was the central ideology both for legitimizing public appearance and domestic adhesion; women were placed in the middle of these projects. Being a good citizen and being a good mother to raise good citizens were legitimized with the idea of nationalism. The interaction between modernity and the public sphere regarding women's status mainly consisted of applying new, scientific techniques to domestic roles, such as being an educated mother who uses her knowledge to raise her child according to new developments. Furthermore, with education and knowledge women were expected to become good citizens of the nation. But these practices were not practical and did not influence all classes; rural and working class women, with their limitations on receiving education, went unnoticed (11).

According to the relevant literature, these women became the driving force of the Islamist women's movements. Despite women's movements,

all fundamentalist religions like Taliban, first action is to limit women's rights and sexuality; that betrays Islam as a religion. Taliban restrictions and mistreatment of women include the :

1. Complete ban on women's work outside the home, which also applies to female teachers, engineers and most professionals. Only a few female doctors and nurses are allowed to work in some hospitals in Kabul.
2. Complete ban on women's activity outside the home unless accompanied by a *mahram* (close male relative such as a father, brother or husband).
3. Ban on women dealing with male shopkeepers.
4. Ban on women being treated by male doctors.
5. Ban on women studying at schools, universities or any other educational institution. (Taliban have converted girls' schools into religious seminaries.)
6. Requirement that women wear a long veil (burqa), which covers them from head to toe.
7. Whipping, beating and verbal abuse of women not dressed in accordance with the Taliban rules, or of women unaccompanied by a mahram.
8. Whipping of women in public for having non-covered ankles.
9. Public stoning of women accused of having sex outside marriage. (A number of lovers are stoned to death under this rule).
10. Ban on the use of cosmetics. (Many women with painted nails have had fingers cut off).
11. Ban on women talking or shaking hands with non-*mahram* males.
12. Ban on women laughing loudly. (No stranger should hear a woman's voice).
13. Ban on women wearing high heel shoes, which would produce sound while walking. (A man must not hear a woman's footsteps.)
14. Ban on women riding in a taxi without a mahram.
15. Ban on women's presence in radio, television or public gatherings of any kind.
16. Ban on women playing sports or entering a sports center or club.

17. Ban on women riding bicycles or motorcycles, even with their *mahrms*.
18. Ban on women's wearing brightly colored clothes. In Taliban terms, these are "sexually attracting colors."
19. Ban on women gathering for festive occasions such as the Eids, or for any recreational purpose.
20. Ban on women washing clothes next to rivers or in a public place.
21. Modification of all place names including the word "women." For example, "women's garden" has been renamed "spring garden".
22. Ban on women appearing on the balconies of their apartments or houses.
23. Compulsory painting of all windows, so women can not be seen from outside their homes.
24. Ban on male tailors taking women's measurements or sewing women's clothes.
25. Ban on female public baths.
26. Ban on males and females travelling on the same bus. Public buses have now been designated "males only" (or "females only").
27. Ban on flared (wide) pant-legs, even under a burqa.
28. Ban on the photographing or filming of women.
29. Ban on women's pictures printed in newspapers and books, or hung on the walls of houses and shops (12).

ISLAM AND TURKEY

Turkey, as a secular country, is the successor of an Islamic culture that was ruled by Islamic law known as *Sharia*. Turkey, which was never a colonized country, first faced the tenets of modernity in the late nineteenth century. The first ideas of modernity among the Ottoman elites paid attention to the techniques used by Western countries. The modernization projects concerned reforms in the military. But the notion of becoming modern exceeded military interventions and spread to other aspects of society as well. It is important to present the modernity project of Turkey to understand the social structure in which women became active participants in society. Without an understanding of Turkey's modernity project, Kemalism, and feminist discourses, it is hardly possible to understand Islamist movements and the status of women today(4).

The secularization of Turkey started in the society during the last years of Ottoman Empire and it was the most prominent and most controversial feature of Atatürk's reforms. Under his leadership, the caliphate – office of the successors to Muhammad, the supreme politico-religious office of Islam, and symbol of the sultan's claim to world leadership of all Muslims – was abolished. The secular power of the religious authorities and functionaries was reduced and eventually eliminated. The religious foundations were nationalized, and religious education was restricted and for a time prohibited. The influential and popular mystical orders of the dervish brotherhoods (*tarika*) also were suppressed.

In a 1923 speech made by Atatürk, marked the beginning of Atatürk's active campaign in favor of women. He said, "A society, a nation consists of two sorts of people: men and women. How is it possible, to elevate one part of society while neglecting the other half, and expect the whole to progress? How is it possible for one half of society to soar to the heavens while the other remains chained to the very earth?"

This empowerment for women, created a large number of women "penetrating" workplaces, from factories, schools, medical institutions, social centers, banks to commercial enterprises and university faculties. Turkish women were granted the privilege of voting and the eligibility for municipal elections in 1934; a great triumph for Turkish women, in comparison to their foreign sisters. French women were not allowed to vote until 1947, and Swiss women did not obtain this right until 1971.

Women in Turkey make up a larger proportion of lawyers and doctors than they do in the USA. However, in Turkey only a 4% increase occurred with women in parliament. In USA it is 12.5%, 42.7% in Sweden and 14.2% in Mexico. Despite that, Turkey was added to the small list of nations who elected female prime ministers.

Today polygamy is forbidden in Turkey and Tunisia. In Turkey a man can only marry a woman in the register office and the civil code is a copy of the Swiss code which was implemented by Atatürk the Founder of the Turkish Republic. Still in Turkey, in a religious ceremony in a mosque a man can marry more than a woman.

Although Turkey was secularized at the official level, religion remained a strong force at the popular level. After 1950 some political leaders tried to benefit from popular attachment to religion by espousing support for programs and policies that appealed to the religiously inclined. Such efforts were opposed by most of the political elite, who believed that secularism was an essential principle of Kemalism (4,13).

MUSLIM SURVEYS

In the 44-nation survey of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 14 countries where Muslims are either the overwhelming majority or prominent minorities were asked a series of questions pertaining specifically to the role of Islam and governance. In smaller, subsequent surveys, additional populations were surveyed. Those populations noted as “predominantly Muslim” are Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Mali, Senegal and Uzbekistan. Smaller surveys incorporated the Palestinian Authority, Morocco, and Kuwait. Muslims surveyed in countries where they are a minority of their country’s population are Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. In three cases where there are Muslim minorities – Ivory Coast, Ghana and Uganda – gender breakouts are not reported due to a small sample size (14).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Women have different challenges in into Islamic countries. But the real reasons are different in the world. Societies are facing a number of problems on national and international levels. Problems can be divide two categories; the first includes such problems as starvation, poverty, inequality, violence and terror, racial and religious discrimination and a lack of education. The second includes problems as a lack of dialogue and tolerance towards differences, as well as negligence of moral and religious values.

These problems concern the whole humanity on a global scale. Everybody (politicians, intellectuals, and scholars) needs to have a common approach in order to address and overcome such problems, not with words but with actions. These efforts must start in families and schools. In order to learn cultures, dialogue and tolerance “Peace Education” is important. Peace education can be placed in primary and secondary education. The general aims about “Peace Education” can be summarised as follows:

To make pupils become familiar with religious and ethical values in order to improve their points of view on faith, morality, and the life concepts of other people.

To make a contribution to personal growth which enables pupils to ask themselves, why, for which purpose, for whom, and in what kind of a world the religious and ethical knowledge can be used, in this context, rediscovering the peace giving power of religion.

To promote the development of emotional intelligence through tolerance, love, respect, justice, care, truth, cooperation, and empathy based learning experience (15).

CONCLUSION

According to Islam, men and women are equal and complete each other. There is no difference between men and women ontologically and in sharing religious responsibility. They both share religious responsibility in legal matters, and both have basic rights and freedoms. However, the social and cultural milieu, and especially the patriarchal family structure in which Islam flourished, were the dominant factors in determining the position of women. This situation is the main reason for various understandings or practices concerning women in Islamic societies. Peace education is the solution of learning life concepts, religions and tolerance of the humanity on a global scale.

REFERENCES

- Altindal, Aytunc. 2004. *Turkiyede Kadın*. Istanbul: Alfa Yayinlari.
- Bilgin, Beyza. 2005. *Islamda Kadini Rolu; Turkiyede Kadın*. Ankara: Sinemis Yayinlari.
- Ahmed, Leila. 1992. *Women and Gender in Islam; Historical roots of a modern Debate*. New Heaven & London: Yale University Press.
- Gurpinar, A.G. 2006. *Women In the Twentieth Century: Modernity, Feminism, and Islam In Turkey*. ProQuest Information and Learning Company. USA
- www.submission.org/women
- <http://debate.domini.org/newton/women.html>
- Roald, Anne. S. 2001. *Women in Islam; The Western Experience*. London & New York: Routledge.
- www.diyonet.gov.tr
- <http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=hijab>
- www.islamcan.com/dictionary/cgi-bin/csvread.pl
- Hatem, Mervat. 1993. "Toward a Critique of Modernization; Narrative in Middle East Women Studies" *Arab Studies Quarterly* 15(2):117-122.
- <http://www.rawa.org/rules.html>
- <http://www.theturkishtimes.com>
- <http://pewglobal.org/reports>
- Bardakoglu, A. 2006. *Religion and Society: New Perspectives from Turkey*. Publications of Presidency of Religious Affairs. Ankara.

CHRISTINE SAMANDARI-HAKIM

COMMUNAUTÉ INTERNATIONALE BAHÁ'ÍE, PARIS, FRANCE

EDUCATION FOR PEACE – A GLOBAL APPROACH TO LOCAL CHALLENGES

Mr. Chairman,
Your Excellencies,

It is indeed a great pleasure and an honour for me to attend this conference for the second time and to listen to so many distinguished speakers with different perspectives on reconciliation.

Having been involved in international development, educational and human rights activities for well over two decades, I concede that one can ask the legitimate question of the usefulness of such gatherings and their relevance to the enormous task of accomplishing Human Security and Reconciliation in the Balkans – the stated aim of our conference in Belgrade.

The simple answer to this question is yes, provided certain conditions are fulfilled. If through our gathering we can exchange our views and experiences, discover and elaborate on universal principles which govern our lives and finally agree on common objectives and decide to act with a unity of vision, thought and purpose, then certainly not only we will have achieved the stated objectives of this gathering but also fulfilled our moral and spiritual responsibility and solidarity towards our brothers and sisters in the Balkans.

The challenges of ethnic, religious, racial, social, economic, gender and class intolerance are not new. They absorb the vital energies of entire societies and nations and prevent them from reaching their full potential.

I would like to contribute to the discussion by sharing with you the essence of what I have witnessed throughout my academic and professional life as well as family and citizen experience on processes and approaches which have been able to fundamentally change the behaviour of entire populations in a deliberate, voluntary and peaceful manner.

The first illustration comes from my Ph.D. thesis which was centred on one such a deep individual behavioural transformation with fundamental social and economic consequences.

The starting point of this journey was the recognition of some fundamental principles such as:

- The recognition that all human beings belong to the same family, Humankind;
- That human beings have both a material as well as a spiritual reality;
- That knowledge is the source of all progress;
- And finally, that science and religion should walk side by side and complement each other.

The earnest adoption and assimilation of these principles, communicated and transmitted through religious leaders, family, educational institutions but first and foremost through the life example of those who have recognized their veracity and true meaning can bring about significant and vital change in societies in different parts of the world.

Indeed, I closely studied over a period of time (between 1974 and 1975) several villages in a remote geographic area of Iran where a mixed population of majority Muslims and minority Bahá'ís lived (Bahá'ís are followers of the Bahá'í faith, born over a century ago).

The ethnic background and socio-economic composition of both communities was identical, the only distinguishing factor being the voluntary adoption of a set of values and beliefs along the lines described above. The statistically significant differences between the two communities, built over a period of several generations were startling.

In contrast to the majority of the population of these villages – that confronted ancestral customs such as inequality of men and women, extremes of wealth and poverty, local centeredness, fanaticism etc. – there was a distinct social and behavioural transformation within the Bahá'í Community: women were full members of the community, girls attended school, as classmates to their brothers, there was a more equitable distribution of wealth, villagers belonging to this religious minority were open, outward-looking and tolerant.

Over the years, I had the opportunity to witness comparable transformations in other parts of the world.

In India, for instance, the distinction of individuals belonging to different casts have gradually disappeared and are almost abolished over the lapse of several decades within the Bahá'í community.

In North America, the difference between races, still the source of many social and economic strife and inequalities in some ranks of the society, is no longer an issue for the American Bahá'ís.

In summary, though not necessarily spectacular on the onset, it can be empirically demonstrated that universal principles put in action locally and individually, if they are generally acknowledged and adopted by religious and civil leaders, proclaimed and practiced by schools, parents and families, can bring about significant and vital change in modern societies without recourse to coercive methods.

The second illustration, very briefly, comes from my personal family experience. My grandfather, a Frenchman died during the First World War as many other men of his generation in an environment of hatred between Germany and France. The generation of my mother and many of her fellow citizens as well, however, became the supporters of a dream, which envisioned that peoples can be diverse and still united. This dream, envisioned by Paul-Henri Spaak and Jean Monnet, proclaimed that never again should Europe be a prey to such devastation and encouraged the continent and its citizens to embark upon the great project of European Unity, where the enemies of yesterday had to become the allies of today.

Today perhaps more than at any other time in history, great and incalculable possibilities have opened before us. One such promise is that of a world community, a global awakening prefigured by the great poet W.B. Yeats who said:

“When we act from the personal we tend to bind our consciousness down as to a fiery centre. When, on the other hand, we allow our imagination to expand away from this egoistic mood, we become vehicles for the universal light and merge in the universal mood.”

CHAPTER IV – ANNEX

FIRST ECPD
INTERNATIONAL
PERMANENT STUDY
GROUP SESSION

SVETI STEFAN, MONTENEGRO,
JUN 17, 2006

H.E. PROF. TAKEHIRO TOGO, PH.D.

PRESIDENT OF THE STUDY GROUP AND PRESIDENT OF THE ECPD ACADEMIC COUNCIL

OPENING ADDRESS

Honourable Ladies and Gentlemen,

1. GENERAL CONCEPT

At the outset, I would like to welcome you and wish you successful work at our first session as well as the sessions that will follow.

We have gathered here today in this beautiful and historic city of San Stefan on a historic day when Montenegro has just recovered independence after nearly a century. Let me congratulate the leadership and the people of Montenegro on independence and wish them success in building a democratic, multiethnic and multi-religious civil society.

It is precisely because of the independence of Montenegro in a peaceful way that our meeting today and the Conference in October will assume much more significance and momentum. If the problem of Kosovo will be solved also peacefully by the agreement of all parties, this may well change the general current of situation in the Western Balkans, and I sincerely hope that it will come in not too distant future.

The peoples in the Western Balkans, who have gone through fratricidal conflicts and wars in the post Cold War Europe for so long, may at last have come to the realization that peace is better than war, and that they want to take up seriously the task of post conflict state building and reconstruction and also to look for the ways and fields of cooperation among the states and entities in the region. This may usher in a totally different atmosphere and political climate in this long troubled region. And if that is really going to be the case, the task of the Conference in October would be to encourage such a new trend in the history of the Balkans, by identifying where lays problems and dangers that might put break on such development and discuss the ways and means for the consolidation of such new trends.

In that case, the task of this session of the Permanent International Study Group will be to discuss and determine under which general concept and the agenda, the Conference should be held.

In order to do this, we should first of all discuss seriously how we should view the present situation. Is it premature to conclude that a change for the better in the political climate in the Region has taken place, because there are still many problems left unsolved, the Kosovo problem being only one of them. The solution to that problem is still not a forgone conclusion yet, and Bosnia and Herzegovina may, yet pose serious challenges and far from having been normalized, and the departure of foreign contingents may well cause to revert to the conflict situation, one may want to argue. But I want to argue that, even if it is not firmly established, if we can discern even an embryo of optimism, we should nurture it and let it sway the minds of the people in the region by our persistent efforts.

The last year's Symposium on National and Inter-ethnic Reconciliation and Religious Tolerance by ECPD was generally regarded as a great success and widely taken up by electronic media and press media in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia and in some Balkan Countries, and the Voice of America also prepared two presentations. I would like to commend the efforts of ECPD and of all renowned statesmen, diplomats and scholars who participated from the wide areas of the world, I would like also to express appreciation for the Governments of Serbia and Montenegro and Japan, as well as to our sponsors from Japan, the Japan Foundation and FEC.

The final document of the Symposium, summing-up the discussions and the papers presented, clearly stated that the problems concerning inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in the entire Balkan region are very serious, that it is necessary to consider numerous factors in order to solve them, and made the relevant recommendation for the European Center for Peace and Development to implement organizational and other measures that will contribute to the promotion of inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations, and, thus, avert the danger of new conflicts in the Balkans. It also emphasized that the end of the Symposium marked the beginning of the future ECPD activities.

On such recommendations, the ECPD formed the International Permanent Study Group and continued its work on organizing the International Conference in Inter-ethnic Reconciliation and Religious Tolerance in the Balkans.

Armed conflicts, which accompanied the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, inflicted heavy human and material losses on all ethnic and religious groups and communities and worsened their mutual relations still further. In recent times, one could observe some step forward with assistance of EU, UN and international community. And as I mentioned earlier, separa-

tion of Montenegro from the Union of Serbia and Montenegro was achieved peaceful and direct talks between the representatives of Serbian authorities and its southern provinces – Kosovo and Metohija have started and there is also a possibility that the status of Kosovo will be settled soon. The Balkan countries are slowly but surely converging towards the European Union and other Euro-Atlantic integration processes, and prophetic and economic cooperation among the Balkan countries is being promoted and expanded.

But it is also a fact that in some parts of the Balkan areas, peace is kept thanks to the presence of the international contingents and under the pressure of international community. There still lurks the latent danger of new form of violence and arms conflict. The legacy of history is hanging still heavily on the Balkan areas, underdevelopment, high rate of unemployment, market instability, corruption and crime and grater national ambition still lurks like phantom in some quarters of the region. All these are posing serious threat to peace and economic and social prosperity of the entire Balkan region.

The ECPD project in question, in which our Permanent International Study Group is involved, has been designed to contribute to the solution of the complicated inter-ethnic and religious problems, as well as to the promotion of peace and stability of the Balkan region.

2. CONCEPT TO BE APPLIED

Now, we shall discuss and determine under what concept and agenda the Conference should be held.

When we deliberate on this subject, I would like to refer to the concept of “Human Security” which has been developed by the UN in conjunction with the Millennium Summit to deal with the challenges of the post Cold War situations in the world. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called upon world community to advance twin goals of “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear”. Wide spread and pervasive insecurities stemming from adversities such as conflict, poverty, infectious diseases, and human right violations threaten survival and dignity of millions of people today. This is in order to face these challenges that the Secretary-General made such appeal and as a contribution to this effort, the Commission on Human Security was established with the initiative of the Government of Japan. It is Co-chaired by Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and Amrtya Sen, Nobel Laureate and Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. The Commission issued the final report

in 2003, covering many aspects of human security, and in particular, the project on conflict focused on individuals and communities facing extreme situations like displacement, discrimination and persecution. It addressed the special security needs of people and protection of victims, refugees and internally displaced people. It also addressed the interrelations between insecurity and the need to secure that development activities proceed alongside conflict resolutions.

All these themes are quite relevant to the present day situation in the Western Balkans. It may be useful to conduct our Conference as the application of this effort to the Western Balkan Region. And ECPD being a UN institution, it may be useful to be associated with such similar efforts of a UN Commission.

I have made a preliminary consultation with Mr. Keiichi, participant from JICA in our last year's Symposium JICA, if JICA can postpone opening ceremony of their office in Belgrade to be opened in September, so that Mrs. Sadako Ogata, the President of JICA can come for the opening and at the same time address our Conference as a guest of honour.

If this concept is agreeable with you, we can work out our agenda for the Conference accordingly. In any case, ECPD's role would be to identify the problems and tasks, and to produce overall scheme that might be needed to appeal to governments and public that we have reached a critical turning point, in the history of the Western Balkans, and through cooperation, we might be able to achieve a break through in the vicious circles of distrust and disintegration.

There are so many things we can do, through many different channels. We need to approach governments for the implementation of many themes, or even conferences with the participation of the regional as well as outside governments, for instance for the development and rehabilitation of the region. There may be themes that could be realized through private channels, such as academic, cultural and religious institutions or international organizations in these areas.

We in our meeting should work out a long term agenda for us to tackle for some years continuously. Maybe, compilation of accurate record of the conflicts in the Balkan regions and also the world may help our work in the coming years. Any thought and suggestions are quite welcome.

Last, but not the least, I would like to express my deep appreciation for the Government of Montenegro, the Tokyo Club in Japan and Madame Cristine Samandari Hakim, president of International Community of Baha'is, France, for their generous contribution which made our meeting possible.

Thank you for your attention.

LIST OF THE ECPD INTERNATIONAL
STUDY GROUP MEMBERS

FIRST ECPD INTERNATIONAL PERMANENT
STUDY GROUP SESSION

SVETI STEFAN, MONTENEGRO, JUNE 17, 2006

PRESIDENT

of the International Study Group and Chairman of the Session

- Takehiro TOGO, President of the ECPD Council;

THE STUDY GROUP MEMBERS PRESENT AT THE MEETING

- Ljubiša ADAMOVIĆ, Professor, Florida State University, USA;
- Johanes BALAS, Professor, University of Vienna, Austria;
- Jonathan BRADLEY, Professor, University of West England, UK;
- Vjekoslav DOMLJAN, Professor University of Sarajevo, B&H;
- Charles INGRAO, Professor, Purdue University, USA;
- Slobodan LANG, Professor, University of Zagreb, Croatia;
- Jeffrey LEVETT, Professor, Athens University, Greece;
- Sir James MANCHAM, President of the World Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, Founder and the first President of the Republic of Seychelles;
- Marina Yurjevna MARTINOVA, Scientific Advisor, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian Federation;
- Paskal MILO, Professor, University of Tirana, Albania;
- Todor MIRKOVIĆ, ECPD Scientific Advisor;
- Yves-Rastimir NEDELJKOVIĆ, Professor ECPD;
- Alfonso Marin OJEDA, Professor, University of Madrid, Spain;
- Negoslav P. OSTOJIĆ, ECPD Executive Director;
- Vitomir POPOVIĆ, Professor, University of Banja Luka, RS/B&H;
- Christine SAMANDARI-HAKIM, President Communauté Internationale Baha'ie, France;
- Georges SKOROV, Professor, HEC – Paris, France;
- Dragan VUKČEVIĆ, Professor, University of Podgorica, Montenegro;
- Valentin YAKUSHIK, Professor, National Academy of Ukraine, Ukraine.

OTHER PARTICIPANTS

- Svetlana CICMIL, Director, MBA Bristol Business School, UK;
- Branislav GOŠOVIĆ, Advisor, South Center Geneva, Switzerland;
- Tauno KEKALE, Professor, University of Vaasa, Finland;
- Budimir LAZOVIĆ, Professor, ECPD UPUN;
- Milomir MIHALJEVIĆ, Adviser of the Prime Minister of Montenegro;
- Branislav ŠOŠKIĆ, Rector of ECPD International Postgraduate Studies;
- Miodrag TODOROVIĆ, University of Seychelles, Seychelles;
- Marijo VUKOJA, Institute for Dialogue of Cultures and Civilisation, Sarajevo, B&H;
- Jelena VILUS, Professor ECPD;
- Bojan STAREC, Trieste University, Italy, Secretary of the Study Group;

JONATHAN BRADLEY

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST OF ENGLAND, UK

PROPOSALS OF THE STUDY GROUP PROGRAM WORK

The single most important task to be completed at this meeting will presumably be to define clearly what the long-term strategic objectives of the group should be. These discussions will need to focus especially on four aspects:

- Outcomes – the desired results of the work conducted
- Scope – the geographical and academic boundaries
- Scale – how many people and/or organisations involved
- Time – the periods over which work will be done

A useful way to organise the discussion would be to attempt a structured process of debate and decision-making. This could start with agreeing the broad characteristics of the context that has given rise to the existence of the Study Group, the generation of ideas amongst group members for further discussion, synthesis of some of the best ideas into the outline of a plan, and then a series of targets for implementing further work and following stages in the work of the Study Group. These stages in the structured process broadly break down, therefore, as follows:

- Agreement on context
- Generation of ideas
- Synthesis and refinement
- Outline overall plan
- Implementation targets

I set out below a few preliminary thoughts about all of the headings I have so far mentioned. These are simply a few of my own ideas, offered as a basis for starting discussion.

PROPOSED OUTCOMES

These must be linked to the broad aims of ECPD, and ultimately to those of the United Nations, with which it is affiliated. As I understand them, the constitutive documents of ECPD state that it should: “organise and conduct appropriate postgraduate studies and research, including the dis-

semination of knowledge, which contribute to the promotion of peace, development and international cooperation.” The Study Group should therefore define and plan a programme of activities that identifies the kinds of knowledge that are most relevant to the overall aims, that conducts the necessary research, discussion and debate to produce the knowledge and then effectively disseminates it. I would suggest that in this context ECPD could usefully consider the potential of what is known in contemporary academic discourse as “knowledge exchange”. This involves a close and fruitful interaction between academic institutions and other key spheres, such as government, business, and the professions. Research can be led and guided by “real world” problems, carried out with the rigour of academic discipline, and can then underpin policy-making. ECPD, in my view, would be especially well placed to carry out this kind of knowledge exchange because it fits well with its strategic purposes, with its remarkable network of friends and collaborators, and to some extent with its current *modus operandi*. In this regard it should possibly pay special attention to the modes of dissemination of the knowledge created.

SCOPE: GEOGRAPHICAL AND ACADEMIC BOUNDARIES

There is clearly room for much debate about this. In its public documents ECPD has referred to a special focus on the Western Balkan region. This is neither surprising nor inappropriate in an organisation based in Belgrade and founded under agreements made by the former Yugoslavia. I understand well that ECPD has always stood for the broadest international ideals and connections.

I suggest, however, that ECPD might again perhaps broaden somewhat the practical boundaries of its activities to encompass the whole of South Eastern Europe, with a special emphasis on its links with the rest of Europe. With the end (we hope) of war in the region, and with the prospect of a settlement of the Kosovo question, the live issues of public debate are likely to be on a wider scale. National reconciliation and religious tolerance in the Balkans are likely to be furthered by involving neighbouring state and peoples that might have claims as “stakeholders”. The European Union is an obvious candidate for such linkage, but Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Austria, Italy and Hungary, as well as other states and groups might also be relevant.

As for academic boundaries, I suggest that it would be fruitful to be inventive in our approach, since some modern problems, such as internet

crime or environmental degradation, challenge the traditional limits of the academic disciplines. While respecting the analytical strength of accepted academic approaches, we should be prepared to bring together people with very different backgrounds in our pursuit of creative knowledge exchange. Again, ECPD has already been doing this, and has access to relevant expertise not only in the social sciences, but also in Medicine, Law and Business Studies, among other academic areas. The academic boundaries should be defined by the nature of the problems and issues we wish to address. We may need to broaden the field of academic disciplines involved.

SCALE – HOW MANY PEOPLE OR ORGANISATIONS

ECPD has already in the past brought together many distinguished, knowledgeable and influential people. The Study Group meeting in June 2006 will no doubt be no exception to this practice. I have just few a thoughts about extending slightly the range of people involved.

Strategic links

I believe that ECPD may have the opportunity to pursue several strategic links with institutions elsewhere in Europe, and the opportunities afforded by these links should be exploited for the benefit of the work of the Study Group.

Business

I believe that ECPD, through the work of the Study Group, should attempt to engage more actively with local and international businesses. They have many problems in respect of which research might be able to provide some answers, they are a potential source of funds, and their leaders may have valuable insights to offer the Study Group. As the economies of the former Communist states become more market-orientated, and as a powerful non-government business sector comes into existence, so business becomes more important in relative terms. ECPD should ensure that it takes account of this.

Generations

I would suggest that serious consideration should be given to ways of involving younger generations in the work of researching and disseminating knowledge. It may be possible to establish projects, under the guidance of the Study Group, in which students or former students of ECPD courses participate.

TIME

I gather that it is suggested that the Study Group should make plans for activities over a time period up to the year 2010. It may be helpful to have a rolling programme, so that at any given time there are five years' worth of activities planned. This will allow for both long term planning and for some flexibility to make adjustments as circumstances change. At the end of the first meeting it would be useful to have at least an outline of the timelines expected for various elements in the overall programme. These can be expressed in diagrammatic form if necessary. Projects may be of different lengths, and may run concurrently.

PROPOSED OUTPUTS

These should be designed to optimise the primary objective of sharing valuable knowledge. They should also, however, serve to enhance the reputation of ECPD among key stakeholders, who would be likely to include academics, government officials and diplomats, financial institutions, members of the press and other media, professionals such as lawyers accountants and architects, and business executives and directors. The media likely to be used should, of course, include traditional publications such as books and academic journals, but should also include electronic and internet-based media such as websites of various kinds. It might be worth experimenting with virtual conferences or web-based discussion to further the work of ECPD.

We need in each case to be clear about the audiences we are attempting to address, and especially the balance between academic enquiry and policy-making.

Perhaps we should discuss trying to establish a Balkan equivalent of Davos.

SOME INITIAL SUGGESTIONS FOR OTHER AREAS OF INVESTIGATION

- Sustainability in the Kosovo economy
- Protection of the rights of minorities
- Inter-faith dialogue in areas of recent conflict
- Regional cooperation in transport, energy, and conservation
- Re-defining statehood in the Balkan states
- The notion of European Citizenship

Preparing for EU membership
Economic and political analysis of corruption
The Montenegrin example
New modes of corporate governance
Economic integration in various spheres: trade, finance, energy, tourism, water
I could suggest many others, but this list is at least an indication of some possible ideas.

RESOURCES

A key element in any implementation plan resulting from our discussions must be the identification of the financial and human resources required for the expected outputs with a realistic appraisal of the sourcing of them. Each project should, at some point, be properly budgeted, and should be designed to maximise the likelihood of external funding from charitable, government, or international bodies.

PROPOSALS OF THE STUDY GROUP PROGRAM OF WORK

1. AIMS:

- 1.1. Better understanding the core problems.
- 1.2. Further developing comparative studies. New academic publications.
- 1.3. Informing the public and the experts community in the Balkans and in other regions. Influencing decision-makers through relevant intellectual work. Creating an efficient and influential public forum for the discussion of current problems, trends and finding possible ways out.
- 1.4. Providing for the students research related to regional and local topical issues. (And involving students in general ECPD research).
- 1.5. Assisting in course development. (In cooperation with other universities).
- 1.6. Expanding ECPD activities, structures etc.

2. "TARGET GROUPS":

- experts and decision-makers; academic community;
- general public;
- students;
- most troubled regions opinion-leaders and general public.

3. STRUCTURE

- 3.1. The "core" International Study Group on Reconciliation in the Balkans.
- 3.2. Topic teams (including some ECPD students researching under the guidance of ECPD Faculty Member).
- 3.3. Sub-regional or/and local team (on several topics related to a particular country, region or local community).

- 3.4. Forums for exchange of experience, knowledge and skills:
 - (a) for presenting results of the research;
 - (b) for exchanging experience with the relevant groups working as to other regions (e.g. Caucasus, Africa, Asia – Pacific etc.) etc.
- 3.5. Fund-raising and strategic communication project team.

4. TENTATIVE LIST OF TOPICS:

- 1) Divided nations (e.g. comparing Serbs with the Germany before unification; with Arabs, with Albanians etc.).
- 2) Historic examples of a successful (thought difficult) post-imperial development within much shorter national borders (e.g. comparing “imperial” and post-imperial Yugoslavia with Austria and Japan).
- 3) Contemporary irredentism (values, problems and competing approaches within the international community (e.g. comparing Serbs, Albanians, Moldova, Caucasus).
- 4) New independent states (especially Montenegro) and the unrecognised “states”. Is there a place for “double standards” (comparing Kosovo & Metohia with Cyprus, Bosnia, ex-Soviet republics etc.).
- 5) Can Bosnian (and Cypriot) approaches for the de-limitation of “ethnic regions” be applied to Kosovo? Or to Macedonia?
- 6) How can small nations survive. What are the confronting possible trajectories for Montenegro?
- 7) Are problems of tribalism topical for the Balkans? (Comparing with Africa, Pacific etc.).
- 8) Official language politics. Bilingualism, trilingualism. (NB: Macedonia, what is the future for Montenegro in this area? Other countries.) Making a new language (Bosnian case)?
- 9) Will the Balkan Cultural Commonwealth exist?
- 10) EU and other areas of regionalisation in the world. Experience relevant to the Balkans.

MOMČILO SAKAN, PH.D.

TODOR MIRKOVIĆ, PH.D.

THE ECPD SPECIAL ADVISORS

DEFINING THE PROJECT'S PROGRAMME OF WORK ON THE PROJECT

1. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The Balkan geopolitical knot has been burdened for centuries by numerous national, ethnic, religious and other conflicts, rebellions and wars with very serious consequences. The Balkan region was the scene of two world wars. The First World War started in the Balkans, while the calm after the Second World War was shattered by a series of inter-ethnic conflicts and wars interrupted by a series of inter-national conflicts and wars with grave consequences and a tendency towards their continuation in the 21st century and spread to other countries.

There were also the periods of peace, but the periods of stable peace, from the time of antiquity to the present day, were very short. Peace in the Balkans was most often restored under the pressure of the foreign powers and conquerors, to the detriment of one of the conflicting parties. For understandable reasons, such peace did not last long, since the injured party in the previous war tried to redress injustice by starting a new war as soon as certain conditions were created and the balance of power in the international community and the region was changed.

The frequent conflicts in the Balkans were not only the result of the accumulated problems within or between different national and religious groups which live there. Intolerance has existed and it still does, but it was very often stirred up from the outside – by others and especially by the leading countries in the international community and the region in the pursuit of their own political, economic and other interests.

The Balkan peoples belong to numerous national and religious groups. The dominant religions are Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim, There are also numerous religious sects and institutions. According to their authentic principles, they all advocate peace and tolerance, but their practical influence on the events is very small. Instead of being the factor of unity and rapprochement, religion and the religious feelings of individuals and groups are abused for political ends, most frequently in the pursuit

of separatist, nationalist and global aims, as well as for enhancing differences among the Balkan peoples. Instead of being used for reconciliation, religious feelings were very often used so as to stir up a conflict and war.

During the past two decades, the conflicts and wars in the Balkans, especially in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, caused many additional problems and had far-reaching consequences. Twenty years ago, there were six independent states in the Balkans, which were relatively politically and economically stable. They functioned under conditions of relatively stable peace and had good mutual relations. However, dynamic geopolitical changes in Central and Eastern Europe also had a strong influence on the entire Balkan region. Almost all Balkan countries were faced with abrupt changes in their socio-political systems. The accumulated internal contradictions in the former Yugoslavia ended in an ethnic and religious war. Instead of one independent and economically stable state, there appeared six states, which were faced with numerous economic, ethnic, social and other problems.

War and poverty affected all groups of people, especially those from ethnically mixed marriages and families, refugees, pensioners, young couples, the handicapped, as well as a large group of unemployed people. Many refugees still live outside their homes, in improvised and uncomfortable accommodation facilities, at the edge of human existence and dignity and without hope that they will return to their hearths. If one adds psychological problems and traumas, as well as the pain caused by lost lives, wounded and disappeared family members to all this, then the conclusion about the moral crisis and apathy of many people in this region simply imposes itself.

Historical legacy and numerous outstanding problems, caused by the formation of new states, still pose a great obstacle to the restoration of peace, tolerance and economic cooperation. Instead of the mentioned six states, there are eleven new states in the Balkans, showing a tendency towards the further fragmentation of that compact geopolitical region. Of the mentioned six new states in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, only two of them, Macedonia and Montenegro, separated from it by non-violent means. In contrast to Montenegro, Macedonia avoided war in this process, but was faced with it from within, between the Macedonians and members of the Albanian national minority. Serbia did not separate from anyone, but it did not avoid war. Apart from internal conflicts in Kosovo and Metohija, Serbia was the victim of the military campaign of the 17 most advanced countries of America and Western Europe. The establishment of Slovenia as an independent state and, in particular, the inde-

pendence of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with two entities were accompanied by fierce inter-ethnic wars, with numerous consequences and outstanding problems. In general, the processes in the Balkans took the opposite direction from the global and European trends towards globalization. Instead of the consolidation of states and orientation towards regional processes, associations and organizations in the Balkans, the territory disintegrated in a geopolitical, cultural and other sense. Instead of free mobility of people, goods and capital, there is now a great number of the new, unsettled borders, border crossings and outlets, which pose a great obstacle to legal transit and the entire economic integration process. On the other hand, such a situation proved to be very suitable for trafficking in humans, drugs and weapons, as well as for international terrorism.

The basic characteristic of almost all Balkan countries, especially the newly established ones, is the low level of economic development and insufficient integration into international and regional agencies and organizations. Among those countries, only Slovenia and Greece have per capita income which is over 10,000 euros. In all other countries it is between 1,250 and 7,000 euros. In addition, only two of them are members of the European Union, five are NATO members, three are members of the Partnership for Peace and three are not members of any of the mentioned institutions.

In addition to political, economic, cultural and other differences, low level of economic development and slow processes of democratization and integration into international organizations and associations, the Balkan countries are faced with numerous inter-national, inter-ethnic and inter-state problems which, if they are not resolved, threaten to become the causes of conflicts and wars. The major problems arise from the differences in defining the borders and names of the states, differences with respect to the national and ethnic minorities, endangerment of human rights and liberties, return of refugees, constitutional solutions, attitude towards the Hague International War Crimes Tribunal, certain legal actions and the like.

Consequently, reconciliation in the Balkans is a very complex, multi-disciplinary, multidimensional and stratified problem. However, it is also a very important one. It is comprised of numerous factors, from a philosophical approach, through sociological problems and historical legacy, to practical procedures for crisis management and peace preservation. As for their origin, these factors can be found in the family, school, working environment, socio-political organizations and communities. They also cover numerous spheres of activity: educational, economic, political,

religious, cultural and other. However, the most relevant factors for this project are those relating to inter-national reconciliation, economic development, religion, education, media, culture and sport.

Considering all this, the European Center for Peace and Development – in addition to its long-standing efforts and activities geared to the establishment and preservation of peace and development in the service of peace – decided to intensify its work on the project: *Inter-national Reconciliation and Religious Tolerance in the Balkans*. This is a long-term project, with the concretization of the activities during the next five years. The project should provide an answer to the basic question: “How to achieve national reconciliation and religious tolerance in the Balkans?” Or, to be more specific, “how to establish, preserve and promote stable peace in the Balkans?”

2. THE SUBJECT OF RESEARCH

The subject of research is at the level of the project title “**National Reconciliation and Religious Tolerance in the Balkans**”.

There is plenty of knowledge about the subject of research, which is related to the problems and potentials for establishing, preserving and advancing peace in the Balkans. It is well known that the Balkan region was burdened by wars for centuries and that today, after the wars in the last decade of the 20th century, there is still intolerance among social groups, national minorities and peoples. However, it is also known that there were periods of peace from which it is possible to derive invaluable experiences in favour of peace and tolerance. The Balkan region, as a European sub-region, is a fountainhead of specific rules, paradigms and norms of tolerance and joint life of ethnic groups, religions and peoples. Consequently, from a geographical, economic and cultural viewpoint, it is a compact region in which these peoples lived, cooperated and exchanged material and cultural goods. In the Balkans there are also unbreakable family, cultural, sports and other ties, not to mention mixed marriages, especially in the states which constituted the former Yugoslavia. In the Balkans there are some language barriers between certain states, but there are also the states with an identical or similar language. In the Balkans, like in other parts of the world, the broadest sections of the population are clearly committed to peace and tolerance.

The Balkans also have a deep-rooted tradition and the traces of the centuries-long, temporally and spatially adjusted, mutual relations. In the

whirlpools of life, burdened by cyclical destruction, the Balkan peoples developed the authentic and potentially universal bastions of mutual cooperation, harmony, as well as a cultural and spiritual synthesis despite overall complexity, in the name of peace and survival under conditions of wars and misfortunes.

This statement, supported by the facts, speaks unambiguously in favour of the view that peace and tolerance in the Balkans, as well as the economic prosperity of that European subregion are not only possible, but that they are also necessary. To that end, it is necessary to establish a strong link with the “fountain” of life and offer resistance to permanent and aggressive, open and hidden attacks by powerful forces and assailants from the outside. It is also necessary to abandon the incorrect, risky, unfair, provocative and disturbing view of the Balkan region as a source of conflict, a powder keg, or the door to exotics and savagery, which can only be helped by “the spread of Western culture”. Consequently, there is a very strong basis for the establishment and advancement of peace in the Balkans.

However, it is not known in what way and to what extent it is possible to return the Balkan region to its ancient tradition; upgrade the current state of peace and tolerance in the Balkans; foster economic development, that is, make an economic boom like the Asian Rim countries, as well as achieve the aims of this research in general. Therefore, project implementation anticipates a complex scientific and practical approach and intellectual efforts of an international group, coupled with a combination of scientific meetings (conferences, round tables and symposia) over a long term. In addition, project implementation requires the active role of numerous other participants, especially those representatives of the governments and institutions in the Balkans, Europe and international organizations, who can have a decisive influence on the implementation and advancement of peace.

3. THE AIMS OF RESEARCH

The basic aim of the project “Inter-national Reconciliation and Religious Tolerance in the Balkans” are *to contribute to national reconciliation and religious tolerance and, thus, the prevention of new conflicts, preservation of stable peace and building of confidence, cooperation and tolerance among the groups, peoples and states in the Balkans in the post-war conditions.*

However, the special and particular aims are derived from this basic aim and the most important ones are:

- Contribution to the advancement of the fundamental knowledge about peace in general and their application to the problems of peace in the Balkans – in particular;
- Contribution to the identification of the sources of intolerance and the potential crises and causes of wars in the Balkans;
- Proposal of the measures for crisis management and the prevention of armed conflicts in the Balkans;
- Practical contribution to the establishment, preservation and advancement of peace, tolerance and cooperation in the Balkans.

The fulfilment of these tasks is realistic and possible, all the more so because the project is realized in the organization of the inter-governmental and international institution – the European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD) of the United Nations University for Peace.

The mentioned aims can be achieved by fulfilling numerous tasks, the most important being:

- The influence on lessening the potentials for aggression and promoting the knowledge about how to resist it with the least damage;
- Training of people for conflict management by peaceful means – by looking for a compromise solution through negotiations, agreement and mutual respect;
- Elimination of the prejudices and negative stereotypes about enemies and the creation of the climate for better understanding among the peoples and cultures;
- Promotion of the “citizen of the world” category and the Charter of the Organization of the United Nations, as opposed to the ambitions of some nations and groups to achieve their aims and pursue unrealistic ambitions to the detriment of others;
- Establishment of stronger economic cultural, sports and other relations among the Balkan peoples and states;
- Development of the feeling among the people that they have the influence and power that should be directed more resolutely and more confidently to peace and progress in the Balkans, and not to war and violence;
- Influencing the international community to participate more intensively in the economic development and integration of the Balkans into the European and international institutions and organizations.

4. HYPOTHESES

Project implementation is based on a general hypothesis that reconciliation and peace building in the Balkans are possible only with the permanent involvement of others in building inter-national confidence; economic cooperation; religious tolerance and respect, as well as the strengthening of cultural, sports and other relations. Other hypotheses, within the system of hypotheses, have been derived symmetrically with the structure of the contents of peace elements in the Plan of the Study Group's Activities in Project Implementation (Annex 2).

5. THE METHOD OF IMPLEMENTING THE PROJECT

The project is carried out by the International Permanent Study Group (in further text: Study Group) and, if required, it is possible to organize scientific meetings (conferences, round tables and symposia) in direct cooperation with the governments of the Balkan and European countries, non-governmental organizations, Contact Group, US Security Council and other institutions that can contribute to the practical implementation and advancement of peace.

4.1. Composition and Organization of the Study Group

The Study Group has its permanent and changeable composition. Its permanent composition includes the representatives (experts) of all Balkan countries, representatives of the world's leading countries and representatives of international organizations and associations which deal with the problems of peace, tolerance and cooperation. The Group has a multidisciplinary character and covers the wide area of peace in the Balkans. The list of the permanent members of the Study Group is given in the decision of the President of the ECPD Academic Council, in Annex 1 of this document.

When the need arises for complex research on peace in a more specific area (diplomacy, religion, economy, sport, culture, etc.), it is also possible, at the proposal of the members of the Study Group, to set up special research teams, which will be to conduct research on the mentioned area and present the results of research to the Study Group. The composition of these teams are proposed by the members of the Study Group and the decision on their formation is brought by the Academic Council of the ECPD.

The work of the Study Group is continuous, which means that its members, autonomously or in mutual communication, undertake the activities relating to the prevention of crises and peace preservation in the

Balkans. They inform the ECPD and the Study Group about their activities and especially about the undertaken measures, suggestions and proposals, at their regular annual meetings.

The Study Group meets at least once a year and as needed. At these sessions it addresses the problems of peace in the Balkans, laying special emphasis on the most topical issues (as set forth in this document).

The Study Group can meet in its permanent or extended composition. The focus areas and issues being on the agenda of the sessions of the Study Group in its permanent composition up to 2010 are given in Annex 2 of this document. The sessions of the Study Group in the extended composition, will be most frequently held together with the members of the research team, which will be temporarily set up for research on the specified areas of peace in the Balkans. At the session of the Study Group, that team submits the introductory statement and informs the Group about the basic results of its research on the mentioned problem. The team submits a comprehensive report on its research to the members of the Study Group and the ECPD in the form of monograph.

Those responsible for project implementation are the experts – members of the Study Group. They have full autonomy in selecting the methods, techniques, instruments and sources of data for project implementation. Apart from a direct influence on peace and tolerance in the Balkans, they present the results of their research, in the form of papers, at the sessions of the Study Group.

4.2. Organization of Scientific Meetings

Apart from the Study Group, it is possible to organize, during project implementation, scientific meetings (conferences, round tables and symposia). The modalities of organization are adjusted to the current conditions and requirements of the Study Group.

4.3. Presentation of the Results of Research

The papers and discussions of the members of the Study Group and other participants, after the session of the Study Group or scientific meeting, will be published in the form of monographs which will be combined into a synthetic study on peace in the Balkans after a cycle of 5 (five) years. The results of the work of the Study Group are regularly submitted to all Balkan states, the world's leading countries and more important international organizations dealing with the problem of peace in general – including the United Nations.

6. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

In essence, the significance of the project lies in the fact that its implementation will contribute in large measure to the promotion of inter-national reconciliation and religious tolerance in the Balkans. In other words, it will contribute to the avoidance of potential conflicts; improvement of environmental quality, general safety and health of the people; building of confidence among the peoples, social groups, nations and states; education for peace; promotion of economic cooperation, rise in productivity and improvements in the living standards of the people; establishment of stronger cultural ties, reduced influence of national differences and religious intolerance, etc.

Project implementation is also significant from a scientific and methodological viewpoint. The practical results of research can be successfully used for the further development of general peace theory, which can thereafter find its practical use in other areas as well. Experience gained in applying the methods, techniques and instruments in project implementation can also be used so as to improve scientific research methodology, as well as in the implementation of other projects, especially those relating to peace in other regions.

PLAN

of the Study Group's Activities in Project Implementation: "Inter-National Reconciliation and Religious Tolerance in the Balkans"

Area	Questions	Year
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Epistemological fundamentals on man, social groups, national minorities, nations, states and the international community in general and in comparison with the Balkans; • Practical relations: man – social groups – national minorities – nations and states in the Balkans; • Relations: globalization of the world – separation of the Balkans; actual condition, causes and effects on the region, Europe and the world; • Political-legal fundamentals of the state and its citizens in international law and practical solutions in each country, especially in the Balkans; • The causes of intolerance among social groups, national minorities, nations and states in the Balkans; • Relations between man as a social being and a member of a specified people; • Influence of the international community on peace and war in the Balkans; • Factors of peace and tolerance among the nations and national minorities in the Balkans; • Proposal of the measures for inter-national reconciliation in the Balkans. 	2006

Area	Questions	Year
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theoretical fundamentals on the influence of economic development on peace, in general, and on the Balkans, in particular; • The level of economic development of the states in the Balkans, with special emphasis on those states which constituted the former Yugoslavia; • Causes of economic underdevelopment of the Balkans and its consequences for peace in the region; • Influence of economic development and economic integration on the abolition of discrimination within and between the nations and states in the Balkans; • The possibility of economic integration of the Balkans; 	2007
EDUCATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education in the family; • Education in kindergartens; • Education in schools and at faculties; • Education in the working and social environment; • Peace studies and courses; • Education of families, schools, economic institutions, politicians and human communities in general – the nation, the state and the world as a whole. 	2008
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of religious tolerance in the Balkans; • Authentic principles of the religions in the Balkans relating to peace, tolerance and relations with the peoples of other religion; • The possibility of increasing religious tolerance in the Balkans. 	2009
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, MEDIA, CULTURE AND SPORT IN THE SERVICE OF PEACE IN THE BALKANS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The influence of inter-governmental international organizations on peace and tolerance in the Balkans; • The influence of international non-governmental organizations on peace and tolerance in the Balkans; • The influence of international governmental organizations on peace and tolerance in the Balkans; • The media influence on peace and tolerance in the Balkans; • Popular culture and peace in the Balkans; • Sport and peace in the Balkans. 	2010

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In closing the first session of the Permanent International Study Group for preparation of the October Conference on Inter-ethnic Reconciliation and Religious Tolerance, I should like to express my heartfelt appreciation for your very active participation and enthusiastic discussions throughout 3 sessions today. All these discussions gave testimony as to how deeply all the participants are committed to the cause of peace and stability in the West Balkan Region.

In the changing situation in the West Balkan Region, the discussions touched upon many important issues that should be seriously analyzed in our Study Group. The basic tone was that the long lasting disintegration process in the Region is now coming to its consummation, and a new turning point seems to be looming in the horizon. The peaceful separation of Montenegro may signify a new trend in the general political climate in the region, and if the status of Kosovo will be decided by agreement of all parties, it may lead to a situation in which peace rather than war should be the order of the day in the Balkan Region. This Region suffered long enough in the fratricidal conflicts and animosities. There are still many issues to be settled, but if any element of optimism may be discerned, that should be, by all means, nurtured by the efforts of all countries and entities in the Region, and the role of consists in ECPD analyzing and identifying such elements in the present turn of events in the Region and make them known widely in the Region and the world, so that such a process in the right direction could be accelerated and consolidated and make it irreversible. Such a trend may create enough incentive to the countries in the Region to make efforts to prepare themselves for the membership in EU, by economic development and reforms in their social structure. The EU itself is in disarray but in the long run, integration in the entire EU community will contribute greatly to the solution of the problems in the West Balkan Region. We must seriously discuss and prepare the ways and means by which peoples in the Region can, at last, look to the future, not

forgetting what caused such a horrendous conflict and turmoil in the past. For this purpose, intellectual potentials of all in participants the Conference should be fully mobilized.

- The issues raised are the following:
- The atrocities committed in the Region through greater nation states nationalism ignited the whole process of fratricidal war and ethnic cleansing and disintegration, but in the ensuing conflicts, victims of atrocities were on many sides and it should be squarely admitted and apologized and on that basis only reconciliation is possible. “Forgiveness, no recrimination, no revenge” was a strong message by Nelson Mandela in transcending the long standing apartheid in South Africa.
- Inviting representatives of the all religions may be conducive to achieving religious tolerance.
- The underdevelopment of the economy, high rate of unemployment, trade deficit, inflation and the lack of direct foreign investment in the region are exacerbating the tension leading to instability in the society.
- Illegal trafficking in women, children and drugs are the negative phenomena in many countries and areas of the Balkan Region.
- Education is important to teach young generation what happened in the past and to think of the future of their society. Amartya Sen also stresses that school education is important because it can affect the view of an individual on his identity and his relationship with other people. Education expands the domain to be ruled by reason, and avoids narrow mindedness and nurtures tolerance in religion and understanding of culture, literature and society of other peoples.
- Improvement of health conditions in the Region is indispensable.
- Underlying all these issues are the necessities of guaranteeing human security, focussing on individual people and building societies in which everyone can live with dignity, by protecting and empowering individuals and communities that are exposed to actual or potential threats. Human security is based on two pillars. Freedom from fear, covering conflict, natural disaster, disease and epidemics, economic crises, etc and freedom from want, covering the question of poverty. Human security is the concept to protect the vital core of all human lives in the ways that enhance freedoms and human fulfilment.

In conclusion, I would like to thank again the Government of Montenegro, the Government of Serbia, the Tokyo Club of Japan and Madame Christine Samandari-Hakim of France for their generous support of our projects. I would be grateful, if the participants in this meeting could make efforts to find other sources of support for our endeavour.

Thank you again for your dedicated cooperation.

REPORT IN BRIEF

FIRST ECPD INTERNATIONAL

PERMANENT STUDY GROUP SESSION

SVETI STEFAN, MONTENEGRO, JUN 17, 2006

BACKGROUND

The European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD) of the University for Peace established by the United Nations, an international educational and research organization with Headquarters in Belgrade, Serbia, was founded and tasked to “organize and carry out the corresponding postgraduate studies, research activities and dissemination of knowledge which contribute to the promotion of peace, development and international cooperation”. Its mandatory area of activity is defined as so called Helsinki Europe, but during the early 1990s it shifted its attention to the countries of transition, especially to the countries of South-eastern Europe, that is the Balkans.

In accordance with its new strategy, the ECPD, in its long-term plan and programme of work, included a special project entitled “**The Balkans in the 21st Century – The Paths Leading to Building Peace and Security in the Balkans**”, out of which separate educational programs and research projects arise. **National/inter-ethnic reconciliation and inter-confessional tolerance** is one of the most recent projects derived from the Balkans-21”. It is a five-year project which is articulated in two directions: 1) work of the ECPD International Conference and 2) ECPD International Permanent Study Group. The First Conference (Symposium) was organized and held in Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro, on October 28-29, 2005. The Conference suggested and the ECPD academic Council approved the establishment of the ECPD International Permanent Study Group to deal with the problems of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in the Balkans

ECPD STUDY GROUP ESTABLISHMENT

The ECPD International Permanent Study Group (SG) for national reconciliation and religious tolerance was organized upon the proposals of the first ECPD International conference and the decision made by the ECPD

International Academic Council. Namely, the Final Document of the First ECPD Conference summarizing the discussions and the papers presented, clearly stated that the problem concerning inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in the Balkans were very serious and that it was necessary to consider numerous factors in order to solve them and made relevant recommendations for the ECPD to implement organizational and other measures that will contribute to the promotion of better inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations, and thus, to avert the still present threats to peace and security in the Balkans. Upon such recommendations, the ECPD Academic Council, at the meeting of October 30, 2005, made the decision on establishment of the ECPD International Permanent Study Group with the aim to study national and inter-religious relations in the Balkans, to identify the key issues and to search for their solutions. Pursuing this decision, the ECPD established its International Permanent Study Group consisting of the President and 22 members, prominent scientists and public figures from most of the Balkan countries and several other European and non-European countries, including USA and Japan. The first SG session was held at Sveti Stefan, Montenegro, on 17 June, 2006.

THE FIRST STUDY GROUP SESSION

The first SG session was a constitutional and working one. It was preceded by intensive communications between the organizer, that is, the ECPD, and its members.

The first SG session was held just after the Montenegrin people voted for independence of the Republic of Montenegro and it was obvious that the session would be made without serious problems. Certainly, it was encouraging but all Balkan countries (eleven altogether) although made on the “Nation state” principle, are still multinational and most of them multi-confessional. The struggle for national independence fought during the 1990s make national and religious relations even worse. Such an estimation directed, in essence, the SG work during the session and in the up-coming period.

The Session was carried out according to the Draft Agenda, that is through introductory procedure and three working sessions (Draft Agenda is enclosed). Several SG members (Prof. J. Bradley, Ph.D, Prof. V. Yakushik and Ph.D. M. Sakan and T. Mirković) sent to the organizer their written suggestions concerning the tasks of the SG and its first session. Such papers were the basis for their presentations and the discussions during the session.

The session was attended by 37 participants: 23 SG members and 14 others. It was chaired by H.E. Prof. Takehiro Togo, a distinguished Japanese diplomat, President of the ECPD Academic Council and the President of the ECPD SG. Among other distinguished participants there were also Sir James Mancham, the first President of the Republic of Seychelles; Academician Branislav Šoškić, former President of the Republic of Montenegro; Academician Paskal Milo, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania; Academician Dragan Vukčević, Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts; Prof. Valentin Yakushik, Deputy Director of the Institute of European Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; Prof. Charles Ingrao, Professor, Purdue University, Indiana, USA, and others. (List of participants is enclosed). The honorary guest, H.E. Miodrag Vlahović, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the new independent state of Montenegro delivered an appropriate speech expressing his satisfaction with the SG session being organized and held in Montenegro and on the ambitious undertakings by the Study group.

ACCOMPLISHMENT

According to the judgement of most of the participants, the first SG session was very successful. Presentations and discussions were inspiring and productive. Most of the speakers expressed their views on the current inter-ethnic and inter-religious issues in the Balkans and their opinions how they could be resolved. Discussions and recommendations on the tasks and objectives of SG, as well as the fields of its further activities in the upcoming period, were presented.

Setting out from the changing situation in the Western Balkans, the speakers and the discussants touched upon many important issues that should be seriously studied and analysed by the SG, which – as suggested, should be engaged in two major fields of activity: 1) Human Security in the Western Balkans, and 2) Education for Peace and Tolerance. Mr. Togo's proposal that the SG and the Second ECPD International Conference should be devoted to the problem of Human Security in the Western Balkans were accepted, as well as Mr. Dragan Vukčević's suggestion that a regional school on reconciliation and tolerance should be opened in the particularly multi-ethnic and multicultural town of Bar (Montenegro).

The SG undertook the obligation to continue its work on the elaboration of its mid-term program of work and to present it at its second session. It was also concluded that the second SG session should be organ-

ized and held one day before the Second ECPD International Conference. More details about the results of the SG first session were spelled out in the Chairman's Closing Remarks (enclosed).


The organization and conduct of the first Study Group session was supported by the Tokyo Club, Tokyo, Japan and the Montenegro Government.

July 25, 2006



In recognition of
a significant contribution to
the programme and objectives of
the International Year of Peace,
proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly,
the Secretary-General designates

European Centre for Peace and Development



as a
Peace Messenger

Javier Cuéllar

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

15 September 1987