

NATIONAL AND INTER-ETHNIC RECONCILIATION AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

*Proceedings of the ECPD
International Symposium*

Editors:

Takehiro Togo / Negoslav P. Ostojić



EUROPEAN CENTER FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
at the University for Peace established by the United Nations

NATIONAL AND INTER-ETHNIC RECONCILIATION AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Proceedings of the ECPD
International Symposium

Belgrade, October 28-29, 2005.

Editors:

Takehiro Togo / Negoslav P. Ostojić



EUROPEAN CENTER FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
of the University for Peace established by the United Nations

Published by **European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD)**
of the United Nations University for Peace
Terazije 41, 11000 Beograd; tel: (+381 11) 3246-041, 3246-042,
3246-043, 3246-044, 3246-045; fax: 3240-673, 3234-082;
e-mail: ecpd@EUnet.yu i office@ecpd.org.yu

For the publisher: **Negoslav P. Ostojić**, Executive Director ECPD

Editors: **Takehiro Togo / Negoslav Ostojić**

Design **Nataša Ostojić-Ilić**
Copy editing **Gordana Hofmann**
Number of copies 1 000 in English
ISBN 86-7236-017-6

Printed in Serbia by: **graficom|uno**

Belgrade, 2006.

© All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission
in writing from the publisher

PREFACE

ECPD INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM “NATIONAL AND INTER-ETHNIC RECONCILIATION AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS”

Organizer of the Symposium was the European Center for Peace and Development of the University for Peace established by the United Nations . The Symposium was a part of a larger ECPD research and educational project: THE BALKANS IN THE 21ST CENTURY — the Ways Leading to Building Peace and Stability in the Balkans, which is being in the process of realization. Organisation and holding of the Symposium was supported and financially helped by the Japan Foundation and the Friendship Exchange Council, both organizations closely linked to the Japanese Government.

The main Symposium goal was contribution to strengthening of peace and stability in the region through promotion of national and inter-ethnic reconciliation and religious tolerance. In that respect, more than one hundred reputed scientists and public workers from all the Western Balkans countries/entities and several other European and some non-European countries were invited. The Symposium was attended by 100 participants. Due to personal, family or other reasons several invitees had to cancel their participation, but some of them (Nano Ružin, Macedonian ambassador to NATO; Aleksandar Mitić, Lecturer at the University of Belgrade; and Slavko Miloslavlevski, Professor at the University of Skopje, Macedonia) have sent their written papers, which were copied and distributed among the participants. Professors and students of the University of Trieste, Italy, observed the meeting. It was prepared by the Programme-Executive Committee headed by Professor Takehiro Togo, the President of the ECPD Council, an international educational and research organization with headquarters in Belgrade, SCG.

The Symposium was chaired by Takehiro Togo, and co-chaired by Janez Stanovnik, Sir James Mancham, Oleg Bogomolov and Darko Tanasković. Boris Tadić, President of the Republic of Serbia, delivered his welcome address and a brief occasional speech. The opening ceremony and process of the Symposia work was observed by the mass-media. As a result, publicity of the event in electronic and press media was large and wide-spread. Particularly, great attention was given in the electronic

media in Serbia and Montenegro , Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in some other Balkan countries. The Voice of America has prepared two presentations lasting 15 and 7 minutes. The role of Japan in organizing and holding of the conference was particularly emphasized.

Editors and the publisher want to thank the Japan Foundation and the Japanese Friendship Exchange Council for their sponsorship of the Symposium, as well as to the Japanese Embassy in Belgrade for its extended help. The Municipal Assembly of the City of Belgrade was so kind to let the City Hall premises to be used for the Symposium and we are greatly thankful for this generosity. We are especially indebted to Mr. Boris Tadić, President of the Republic of Serbia, for his participation in the Opening Symposium ceremony and his welcome address. Our gratitude goes especially to H.E.. Takehiro Togo, President of the ECPD Academic Council and Chairman of the Symposium, for his tremendous efforts made into organizing and running the event. Distinguished persons such as Yasushi Akashi, Janez Stanovnik, Oleg Bogomolov, Paskal Milo and Sir James Mancham, took part in the Symposium and we want to thank them for their great contribution to the Symposium promotion. We are greatly indebted to all participants who submitted their papers, took part in discussions and made the event greatly successful. We were honoured to have professors and students from the University of Trieste who wanted to acquire additional knowledge by observing an important international meeting dealing with such an arduous issue as the reconciliation in the Western Balkans.

The Editors

CONTENTS

PREFACE **III**

INTRODUCTION **VII**

CHAIRMAN'S CONCLUDING REMARKS **X**

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS **XIV**

TAKEHIRO TOGO: OPENING ADDRESS **1**

BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI:
MESSAGE ON THE OCCASION OF THE SYMPOSIUM **9**

YASUSHI AKASHI
CAUSES OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS ARE DIFFERENT,
BUT THE WAYS OF RESOLVING THEM COULDN'T BE THE SAME **11**

SIR JAMES R. MANCHAM
EDUCATION FOR CULTURE OF PEACE **13**

DARKO TANASKOVIĆ
THE RECONCILIATORY POTENTIAL
OF INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE (Theory and Practice) **19**

PASKAL MILO
THE CONCLUSION OF KOSOVO STATUS — CONTRIBUTION FOR PEACE
AND STABILITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS **41**

JONATHAN BRADLEY
RECONCILIATION THROUGH DEVELOPMENT **47**

ALFONSO OJEDA
HARMONIZING DIVERSITY IN SPAIN:
LESSONS AND CHALLENGES **69**

JENS WOELK
RECONCILIATION IMPOSSIBLE OR (ONLY)
UNDESIRABLE? SOUTH TYROLEAN EXPERIENCES **75**

MELITA RICHTER
SIGNIFICANCE OF WOMEN'S NETWORK FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE CULTURE AND TOLERANCE:
EXPERIENCES FROM THE TERRITORY
OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA **95**

ALPAR LOŠONC

VOJVODINA OR A REGIME OF TOLERANCE IN CRISIS **104**

SAMIR N. BANOOB

THE ROLE OF HEALTH DEVELOPMENT IN IMPROVING
WELFARE AND RECONCILIATION OF COMMUNITIES **117**

MILAN VUKOMANOVIĆ

RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS AND RECONCILIATION
IN THE BALKANS **127**

CHRISTINE SAMANDARI-HAKIM

NEEDS MORE TO BE DONE IN THE ARENA
OF THE RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE **134**

PAVLE BUBANJA

PEACE AND LOVE IN THE PRINCIPLES OF LIFE

Setting and development of the formula of reconciliation
and peace as points on the scale of progress towards more
beautiful, better and fairer world **139**

PATRICE DABOS

RECONCILIATION: CAN NATO HELP? **149**

Svetozar LIVADA

INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF RECONCILIATION **157**

SLAVKO MILOSAVLEVSKI

ROMA IN MACEDONIA (1953–2003) **165**

ISLAM YUSUFI

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OHRID ACCORD **177**

ALEKSANDAR MITIĆ

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN PROMOTING ETHNIC AND
RELIGIOUS RECONCILIATION: LESSONS, WARNINGS
AND TIPS FROM THE JOURNALIST PERSPECTIVE **183**

DAMIR KUKIĆ

THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN THE BUILDING
OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND THE
PROMOTION OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE **191**

YVES RASTIMIR NEDELJKOVIĆ

THE PARADIGMS OF FOREGIVENESS AND
RECONCILIATION IN THE WISDOM
OF PEOPLE'S PROVERBS **205**

INTRODUCTION

The European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD) of the University for Peace established by the United Nations made its decision to organize this Symposium based upon the estimates of the economic, social and security conditions in the region and on its possibilities to organize such an important international meeting.

One of the major characteristics of the Balkans are their multinational, multi-confessional and multi-cultural composition. Throughout history these values, however, were not used as advantages but, rather, as causes for disputes and occasional conflicts among peoples and states. Such state in the social sphere was also caused by the facts that over the centuries, the Balkans have been the crossroads and destination of numerous military campaigns and decisive battles with grave economic and social consequences. The bloodiest wars, with unaccountable damage inflicted on the human beings and material destructions, were fought among peoples and states in the Balkans during the last decade of the 20th century. These wars have further worsened the unfavourable inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations in the Western Balkans, inherited from the past. Therefore, today it could be said that the Western Balkan countries and peoples are torn apart more than ever before.

Within the Western Balkans there are several hot spots: Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, southern part of Serbia, western Macedonia. Peace in these areas, and in the Western Balkans in general, is enforced and kept by the presence of foreign military forces. The peace kept by force, however, could hardly be considered a real and durable one. Eventual withdrawal of the international troops from the region, before the disputes among nations and the states are settled down, would be a serious threat to peace and stability. This situation coupled with the economic and social problems dictates necessity to step up all efforts towards easing of tensions among ethnic and religious groups and preventing new conflicts; prevention is much less expensive than cure, especially if cure is made by force.

For twenty years, the European Center for Peace and Development has been making its utmost efforts in promoting peace and development,

national understanding and cooperation, including promotion of the universal human rights and freedom. Being stationed in the very centre of the Balkans, these efforts, naturally, were directed primarily towards that turbulent region with emphasis on finding the ways leading to building peace and security. Therefore, the aim of the Symposium spelled out as — contribution to conflict prevention through national reconciliation and religious tolerance, stems not only from the current situation in the region, but from the efforts which were being made towards achievement of the ECPD aims and objectives as well.

Preparations for the Symposium were carried out in accordance with the Draft Agenda. As it was conceived, the meeting of the Symposium was conducted in the opening ceremony and five plenary sessions, which were covered by the following topics:

- 1) Need and Obstacles to the reconciliation;
- 2) What Could be Learned from Conflict Prevention Outside of the Balkans;
- 3) Ways of Achieving Inter-confessional Tolerance;
- 4) Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management; and
- 5) Role of Mass-Media and Other Influential Factors in Reconciliation and Tolerance.

Takehiro Togo, a distinguished Japanese diplomat, professor of International relations at the Tokai University, Tokyo and President of the ECPD Council, presided the meeting. Each plenary session, however, was managed by a separate moderator or chairman: the First by Takehiro Togo; the Second by Yasushi Akashi, former Under-Secretary of the UN Secretary-General and the UN Representative for the former Yugoslavia; the Third, by Janez Stanovnik, former General Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva and former President of the Republic of Slovenia; the Fourth by Darko Tanasković, Ambassador of Serbia and Montenegro to the Holy See, Vatican, Rome; and the Fifth by Oleg Bogomolov, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Each plenary session had four or five speakers and open discussion lasting at least one hour. Most of the speakers submitted their written papers and some of them sent their papers later on to be included in the proceedings.

The speeches and the discussions, in general, were in correspondence with the aim and the nature of the Symposium, although some different views both on the causes of the issues and the ways in which they could be overcome were brought forward.

Inter-ethnic and inter-confessional disputes were not only the Balkan speciality. There were other countries or regions facing the same or similar

issues. Several speakers presented the problems in their own surroundings and how they were resolved.

Within the Balkans three major Euro-Asian and African religious met: Christian Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam. Unfortunately, throughout history the followers of those faiths have not lived in harmony, mutual respect and tolerance. Today, the situation is even worse. Speeches delivered and discussions made on these issues deserve attention. However, the problem, as it has been stressed, is extremely complicated and it requires systemic research in finding the ways and making conditions for mutual understanding and living in tolerable neighbourhood.

It is widely recognized that the Western Balkans are in a state of crisis. Currently, the major one is the Kosovo crisis. Resolving it, as it has been emphasised, would mean a significant contribution to peace and stability in the region. Nongovernmental organizations can bring some ideas, but resolving the problem in a satisfactory way for all interested sides, now is the International Community's responsibility.

It had been stressed up at the Symposium that numerous activities in a society make strong influence upon inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations. However, the strongest influence make mass-media supported by political and other centres of power. Several participants considered the use and the misuse of mass-media in building the bias in national and confessional relations.

At the Symposium, it was strongly emphasized that the wounds inflicted upon the hearths and the minds of the peoples of all national groups and religious faiths in the Western Balkans were too deep and too painful and it would take a lot of time and patience to cure and heal them. A successful breakthrough in the ethnic and confessional reconciliation requires an active approach and strong determination of all influential sources of society. Greatest responsibility, however, lies upon governments and their organizations, as well as the religious communities. Many other subjects of influence, as it has been stressed, such as families, schools and systems of education in general, mass-media, non-governmental and international organizations could also give significant contribution to achieving the goals. International community has great power and corresponding responsibility in keeping the peace and preventing conflicts in this region.

More details about expressed ideas and given recommendations could be seen in the papers included in this Proceeding. The views expressed in the papers, however, are by the authors not necessarily from the European Center for Peace and Development as the organizer of the Symposium and the publisher of the Proceedings.

The Editors

CHAIRMAN'S CONCLUDING REMARKS

Allow me to conclude this Symposium by presenting to you the summary of what was achieved and what lay ahead. With your permission I would like to introduce the following four provisions as an outcome of this event.

Firstly, ECPD is working to continue activities in the direction determined by this Symposium.

Secondly, the Symposium is to become a regular annual meeting held in a different Balkan state each year.

Thirdly, ECPD will promote and coordinate the setting-up of a standing panel of international experts and independent institutions which would, if so required, provide its analyses, assessment and opinions to the governments and governmental institutions in the region upon their request.

Last but not least, ECPD would like to extend its gratitude to the Japanese side for its support to the Symposium and dears to hope for its continued assistance in the future. ECPD would also like to call for support from other entities so as to make this a truly international endeavor.

If you would allow me, I would now proceed to share with you a few ideas that have emerged as a result of our deliberations during these one and a half days. Our discussion has been both complex and vitally important for the present and the future of the Balkans. Many ideas, many interesting suggestions have been made but you must appreciate that the main work, the real work must be done on the ground. Reconciliation is a long process, a few decades, perhaps one or two generations and it is far from being a straightforward process.

What impressed me most in the discussion was the general support of the idea that it must come from the heart rather than from rational analysis.

As many speakers pointed out, the best way to achieve reconciliation is by joining efforts of different communities in implementing priority projects. Common projects create common interest. Common interests create mutual trust. Trust helps to focus people's energies on what needs to be done. If this is done, people's life will gradually improve.

In my introduction I asked if we can break new ground in the fields under discussion and I think that together we have taken a significant step in that direction. We have looked at local specifics, world experiences and I feel that we have obtained a balanced approach. It was sometimes intense and emotional and quite rightly so. As experts, you have presented your views on important issues and I thank you for that.

First of all, we have built the foundations of positive relationships that now must be sustained.

Reconciliation and a culture for peace and human dignity cannot be achieved without addressing past wrongs. A culture of peace is embedded in the respect for human rights and a deep knowledge of the “truths of harm”. It requires recognition of mistakes, mutual forgiveness and catharsis. Reconciliation has to be fair.

Peace is the responsibility of country leaders, while reconciliation is a matter, which has to be accepted by the people.

We have to accept commonalities and differences and recognize that reconciliation is a voluntary act following conflict and cannot be imposed.

Emphasis must be laid on mutual forgiveness and compensation for damage.

It is necessary to have unbiased insights into the causes of conflict. We cannot turn back the clock but we can approach the future with greater knowledge and understanding and try both to set free the “slaves of hate” and “dry up the water in which hatred swims”. Hatred leads to fanaticism and disaster. We have to reduce the psychological fears of human beings and address the equal rights of women and the need for a society of all ages.

Bringing out adversarial evidence leads nowhere. This is a lesson that can be drawn from all successful instances of reconciliation in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Many speakers emphasized that out of two sets of policy instruments available for the post conflict reconciliation — punitive and constructive — the latter is by far the most important. But people who have committed atrocities and human rights abuses must be held to account. It must be done to prevent past horrors from happening again.

Tribunals cannot provide reconciliation. Their function is to send a message that misbehavior and violation of human rights are unacceptable and will not be tolerated.

To achieve reconciliation one has to focus on improving conditions on the ground. Conditions for all and not for just a few, first and foremost for those who suffered, the victims. This is a real challenge.

Meeting this challenge requires political will, perseverance and years of relentless work. Above all it requires letting the heart speak. We must focus on tolerance and forgiveness, not on guilt and punishment. We must work on the future, not on the past. That will change hearts and minds.

Health is a basic condition for economic development and access to health services is a common denominator to reduce population vulnerability, aid democratic governance and give peace a chance. Neither angry hearts no hungry mouths are positive for reconciliation.

Development policy in the Balkans should be checked to ensure that it encourages reconciliation.

There have been suggestions for research activities that address the complexity of the problem space, conducting of multidimensional analysis and using metaphor to explore more deeply the subject matter of this meeting.

Further points underscored include the role of religious leaders; special role of mass media; education; health care; sports; implementation of principled and moral values to be shared by all people; need for a dialogue and open communication as a prelude to reconciliation; need for education as a prerequisite to cultural changes.

I think we agree that the European Center for Peace and Development should continue to study inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in the Western Balkans.

We are hopeful that this event, for which the Japanese Government has made one important contribution, is the end of a new beginning, for the future activities of the ECPD.

Takehiro Togo
President ECPD
Chairman of the Symposium



JAPAN FOUNDATION



EUROPEAN CENTER FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT
UNIVERSITY FOR PEACE ESTABLISHED BY THE UNITED NATIONS



FRIENDSHIP EXCHANGE
COUNCIL (FEC)

ECPD INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM
NATIONAL AND INTER-ETHNIC RECONCILIATION
AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

BELGRADE, OCTOBER 28 - 29, 2005

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Takehiro, Togo	President of the ECPD Council and Chariman of the Symposium, former Japanese Ambassador in the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Turkey; Professor, Tokai University, Tokyo;
Tadić, Boris	President of Republic of Serbia;
Nagai, Tadashi	Ambassador of Japan to Serbia and Montenegro;
Adamović, Ljubiša	Professor, Florida State University Tallahassee, USA;
Akashi, Yasushi	Former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia;
Banoob, Samir	Professor, University of New York at Albany, USA;
Bogomolov, Oleg	Academician, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russian Federation, Honorary Director of the Institute of International Economics and Politics;
Bovaird, Tony	Professor, Bristol Business School – University of the West of England, UK;
Bradley, Jonathan	Professor, the Bristol Business School University of the West of England, UK;
Bradley, Harriet	Professor, University of the West of England, UK;
Bubanja, Pavle	Professor, University of Niš, Serbia;
Clesse, Armand	Director, IEIS, Luxembourg;
Ćosić, Dobrica	Academician, Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences; Former President of the SFR Yugoslavia;
Davidović, Jelena	Cabinet of the President of Republic of Srpska;
Dabos, Patrice	Advisor, Department of Public Diplomacy, NATO Headquarters;
Fukuda, Keiji	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Japan;
Galauner, Petar	Pater, S.I. Superior, Catholic Church;
Gošović, Branislav	South Commission, Geneve;
Grčić, Mirko	Professor, University of Belgrade;
Hashimoto, Keiichi	Expert for International Cooperation, Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Tokyo;
Hutin, Gonzague	President, Euroscopia, Paris, France;
Jakovljević, Radmila	Coordinator, Program of Education fore Peace, Bosnia and Herzegovina;

Jazić, Živojin	Former Ambassador of the SFR of Yugoslavia;
Jerotić, Vladeta	Academician, Professor, Faculty of Theology, Belgrade;
Jovanović, Miroslav	Professor, UN Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva;
Jovanovski, Tihomir	Professor, University of Skopje, Republic of Macedonia;
Kawahara, Hitoshi	Senior Regional Coordinator, Central and South Eastern Europe Division, European Affairs Bureau, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Kovačič, Tatjana	Cultural Attache, Embassy of Slovenia in Belgrade;
Kukić, Damir	Professor, University of Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Kirkham, Janet D.	Professor, University Hertfordshire, UK;
Knight, Julia Harriet	Professor, University of West England, Bristol, UK;
Lazović, Budimir	Vice Dean, ECPD Postgraduate Studies;
Levett, Jeffrey	Director, National Institute of Health Protection, Athens;
Lilleorg, Kristiina	MGIMO; Moscow UN Information Center;
Livada, Svetozar	Professor, University of Zagreb, Croatia;
Lješević, Milutin	Professor, University of Belgrade;
Losoncz, Alpar	Professor, University of Novi Sad;
Mancham, Sir James	President of the World Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, former President of Seychelles;
Milo, Paskal	Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Albania, Professor, University of Tirana, Albania;
Mirković, Todor	ECPD Special Adviser the Symposium Project Director;
Miyamoto, Michiko	Attache, Embassy of Japan;
Nakauchi, Masataka	Aid Coordination Advisor Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA);
Nassif, Samir	Professor, University of Monaco;
Nedeljković, Yves-Rastimir	Professor of ECPD Postgraduate Studies;
Ojeda, Marin Alfonso	Professor, Madrid Complutense University, Spain;
Omeragić, Bajram	President of the Council for Even Regional Development, Government of Republic of Serbia;
Ostojić, Negoslav P.	ECPD Executive Director;
Petrović, Nikola	ECPD, Senior Research Fellow;
Richter, Melita	Professor, University of Trieste, Italy;
Sakan, Momčilo	ECPD, Special Adviser;
Sakaedani, Akiko	UNICEF Office in Japan;
Samanadari-Hakim, Christine	Communauté Internationale Baha'ie, Paris;
Skorov, Georges	Professor, HEC, Paris University, Paris, Francuska;
Stanovnik, Janez	Former President of Slovenia; Professor, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia; Former General Secretary of the UN, Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva;
Starec, Bojan	Faculty of Diplomacy, Gorizia, Italy;

Šćepanović, Milorad	Ambassador, Director, Department for OEBS and EU, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Serbia and Montenegro
Šoškić, Branislav	Academician, Former President of the Republic of Montenegro;
Sunada, Tsutomu	First Secretary, Embassy of Japan;
Tamura, Aya	Representative of the Japan Foundation, Tokyo;
Tanasković, Darko	Professor, Ambassador of the State Union of the Serbia and Montenegro to the Holy See, Rome;
Tekawa, Asja	Attache, Embassy of Japan;
Todorović, Miodrag	Associate Minister for Health, Seychelles;
Tsubota, Tetsuya	Secretary, Embassy of Japan;
Vukomanović, Milan	Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade;
Wallace Jr., Don	Professor, Georgetown University, President ILI, Washington D.C.;
Woelk, Jens	Professor, University of Trento, Italy;
Wolte, Wolfgang	Ambassador; Austrian Society for European Politics, Vienna;
Yakushik, Valentin	Deputy Director of the Institute of European Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Professor of University Kiev-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine;
Yusufi, Islam	Center for Policy Studies, Budapest – International Policy Fellow;
Zirdum, Dženita	TVR Association, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

OBSERVERS

Bekčić, Nebojša	Embassy of Japan;
Simić, Tatijana	Embassy of Japan;
Antonović, Maja	University of Trieste, Italy;
Župljanin, Nemanja	University of Trieste, Italy;
Kocić, Vladimir	University of Trieste, Italy;
Zefi, Manushaque	University of Trieste, Italy;
Lista, Ilaria	University of Trieste, Italy;
Pagura, Francesca	University of Trieste, Italy;
Licata, Andrea	University of Trieste, Italy;
Calliari, Elisa	University of Trieste, Italy;
Cragolini, Giulia	Faculty of Diplomacy, Gorizia, Italy;
Sudar, Korana	Faculty of Diplomacy, Gorizia, Italy;
Bertoncini, Samuele	Faculty of Diplomacy, Gorizia, Italy.

TAKEHIRO TOGO

PRESIDENT OF THE ECPD COUNCIL AND THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE SYMPOSIUM

OPENING ADDRESS

Ladies and Gentlemen, dear colleagues, allow me, first of all, to acquaint you with the fact that twenty years have already passed since the establishment of the European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD) of the United Nations University for Peace. It is an international educational and research organization, and the organizer of this international gathering.

I take this opportunity to congratulate our organizer — the European Center for Peace and Development on this important anniversary and to wish it much success in its further efforts to promote peace, development and international cooperation.

Last year the Japanese Government convened a significant Ministerial Conference devoted to the **consolidation of peace and economic development in the Western Balkans**, which was attended by the ministers of foreign affairs and economy of all West Balkan countries, representatives of 39 other countries and 12 international organizations from Europe and other parts of the world.

One outcome was to support the ECPD through the Japan Foundation and the Japanese Friendship Exchange Council for this event. As President of the Symposium and on behalf of the ECPD we express our gratitude to these organisations and to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of Japan, as well as to the Serbian authorities and the Municipality of Belgrade for their support of this very important project.

Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues,

We are holding this meeting at a crucial moment when a peaceful political solution for the Balkans is approaching its climax. At this very moment the UN is holding a meeting in New York with a view of finding a political solution to the most difficult and controversial problem — the future status of Kosovo.

Numerous national and international organisations have been engaged in finding a lasting solution for the Balkan “problem”. Hundreds of meetings, many high level international missions, well known political personalities have been involved in this work.

The UN has adopted a number of important resolutions. The European Union has started negotiations with several countries of the region on the preparatory steps for their accession to the European system. In other words, significant progress has already been made. But a lot still remains to be done.

Our work is not to duplicate the work of these international organisations and institutions. We may contribute to the settlement in the Western Balkans in a different way — by identifying major hurdles on the way of inter-ethnic reconciliation and religious tolerance on the ground, as well as specific formslave measures aimed at overcoming these hurdles.

That is how I would define the main purpose of the Symposium.

Political decisions and inter-government agreements set the framework and direction. But treaties, to paraphrase a famous word by Winston Churchill, are not an end and not the beginning of an end but the end of a beginning.

Joining the European Union is a priority objective for all countries of the region. The solution of the Balkans issue is conceivable only within the framework of the European system. But to think that the accession to the Union will remove all outstanding issues on the ground and guarantee that no conflict at the local level would emerge in the future would be an illusion.

Conflicts in the life of human societies are natural and even inevitable. The whole problem is to solve them peacefully. The advantage of entry in the European Union is that it provides security for all its members and creates a favourable climate for a peaceful solution of conflicts.

However, the real work must be done on the ground in every day's interaction between people concerned. In relations between former antagonists, now neighbours. If we could break the ground in this field, we would make a significant step forward.

To be able to do it we must bear in mind the following three parameters:

- 1) Local specifics;
- 2) World experience;
- 3) Balanced approach.

We are experts. Experts must be knowledgeable, objective and responsible.

This being said, I must confess, in all humility, that I cannot pretend to be an expert on the Balkans. I have a considerable knowledge of the subject. I read a lot. I travelled a good deal in the region and met a lot

of people. I have my own vision of this part of the world, but I still do not consider myself as an expert on this particular issue. I count on your knowledge, wisdom and advice.

ECPD asked you, dear participants, to prepare contributions on specific issues in the domain of your personal competence, and I would like to thank you very much indeed for the work done. Some of the papers which arrived earlier have already been distributed as the working documents of the symposium, others will be reproduced shortly for general circulation. But in addition to that, I would like to benefit from your presence at the meeting to “pick up your brains”, if you allow me this expression, i.e. to have your ideas on a few most acute and controversial issues of the reconciliation.

I would appreciate it very much, if you would focus on issues that I intend to introduce for discussion. You may certainly use the basic points of your findings so as to bring them nearer to the specific issues raised by the Chairmen of the panels. I think the best use of our time would be to benefit from your presence as renowned experts and have your personal views on specific issues proposed for discussion.

We expect panelists to speak approximately for **ten minutes** allowing the greatest possible number of people to take part in the open discussion. All other discussants are kindly requested to limit themselves to **five minutes** and, should need arise, to take the floor again for another five minutes. That will give us plenty of opportunity to hear everybody’s view.

Regarding the subject of the meeting I would like to propose the following working definition of reconciliation so as we could speak the same language.

A reconciliation process involves five interwoven and related strands. These are:

1. *Developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society:* Although individuals may have different opinions or political beliefs, the articulation of a common vision of an interdependent, just, equitable, open and diverse society is a critical part of any reconciliation process.
2. *Acknowledging and dealing with the past:* Acknowledging the hurt, losses, truths and suffering of the past. Providing the mechanisms for justice, healing, restitution or reparation, and restoration.
3. *Building positive relationships:* Addressing issues of trust, prejudice, intolerance. Accepting commonalities and differences. Embracing and engaging with those who are different to us.

4. *Significant cultural and attitudinal change*: People must learn to hear and be heard. A culture of respect for human rights and human difference will create a context in which each citizen becomes an active participant in society and feels a sense of belonging.
5. *Substantial social, economic and political change*: The social, economic and political structures which gave rise to the conflict and estrangement are identified, reconstructed or addressed, and transformed.

This definition that belongs to Brandon Hamber and Grainne Kelly will enable us to identify the issues we are going to discuss.

A distinctive feature of the Balkans, as I see it, is that national identity in this part of the world is determined not so much by citizenship but rather by ethnicity and by religious and confessional affiliation. Religion throughout the centuries has been a powerful, if not the only constituent feature of national identity in the region: Orthodoxy for the Serbs, Islam for the Bosniaks and Albanians, Catholicism for the Croats.

What complicates the picture is that people of different beliefs have often lived not only in compact distinctive settlements but in scattered and mixed settlements.

The only region that has some similarity with the complexity of the Balkans is the Northern Caucasus where close to sixty different ethnic and religious groups live on a relatively small territory. Many of them speak the same language, as is also the case in the Balkans where Serbo-Croatian language is a common vernacular. But culturally they are different, and so are the peoples in the Balkans.

The Serbs, the Croats, the Bosniaks may speak one language but culturally they are different. What is particularly important is that they define their national identity primarily through religious affiliation and much less so through their ethnic roots.

This is the reason, why religion is the important factor on which we should focus our attention when we deal with obstacles to reconciliation and ways of overcoming them.

Religion played a key role both at times of war and at times of peace. But wars have been first and foremost the continuation of politics by different means (Clausewitz). Religions, contrary to some assertions, did not cause wars, though the religious fanaticism was often used as a means of exacerbating animosity, fears, and hatred.

Today we have every reason to try and use the power of religion as an anchor of peace, as a strong ally in the Balkan settlement.

We must do our utmost to instil religious tolerance. We must do our utmost to see this opportunity being realised. How to do it best, is for you to suggest. But it is a priority. I would say that it is a real opportunity, rather than a hurdle.

As regards other factors that could be considered in this connection as hurdles on the way to reconciliation I would point out to the following:

- Hatred, inherited from older generations, a deep rooted feeling of animosity towards those who were different and, therefore, enemies in the past conflicts;
- Fresh unhealed wounds from the atrocities of the 1991-1999 war;
- Drastic deterioration of personal situation of those who lost their kin;
- Unfulfilled expectations of compensation for the damage incurred in the last war;
- Unequal access to public and community services;
- Heavy unemployment;
- Widespread poverty;
- Corruption;
- Organised crime.

This is not an exhaustive list of hurdles on the way to reconciliation but just the most important ones that come to mind.

None of these hurdles is insurmountable. All are manageable. But it would require time and efforts to overcome them.

The task of our meeting is to suggest the best ways for doing it, having in mind that we work for the younger generations, for the future of the region, for a place that was once a cradle of the European civilisation. If we chose the right track and set the proper goals our work will positively affect the life of millions even today.

Without precluding our discussion, I would like to suggest the following steps for promoting reconciliation and tolerance to which I hope you will add more proposals as people being familiar with conditions on the ground:

- Recognition of mistakes, wrongdoings and crimes committed during the 1991–1999 war and public presentation of excuses by all parties concerned;
- Punishment of the key people responsible for the last conflict but not a witch hunt that would lead nowhere;
- Mutual forgiveness as a fundamental basis for the reconciliation;
- Compensation for the damage suffered by individuals. That would require considerable resources. They may come from the European

Union's structural fund as a way of humanitarian aid and also as an instrument for enhancing cohesion of the Union;

- Increased role of spiritual leaders of all confessions and their cooperation as a powerful means of cultivating tolerance, new attitudes, common values and rapprochement between different communities;
- Joint efforts on the ground in tackling specific issues of everyday life of local communities as the key instrument of actual reconciliation. This is the most efficient way of improving human relations, creating a civil society and developing democracy;
- A special role of mass media, particularly television networks, in analysing the past and developing new attitudes of civilised behaviour;
- Careful revision of school textbooks with a view to present an objective and concerted view of recent history. This is a critical step in bringing up the young generation in the spirit of tolerance, understanding and mutual assistance;
- Development of special groups of competent people at the local and regional level that would elaborate long term projects improving the actual life of all communities in the region. In particular these groups may address issues of employment, health care and education development.

Most of these suggestions are drawn from the experience gained outside the Balkans:

- the post-World War II settlement in Europe and Asia, particularly Franco-German reconciliation on the initiative of General De Gaulle and Conrad Adenauer;
- the normalising relations between Japan and its neighbours of the Pacific;
- the experience of South Africa that benefited from the political and spiritual guidance of Nelson Mandela and Bishop Desmond Tutu;
- post-conflict settlements in South East Asia, Latin America and other parts of the world.

Let me say it again that this is not an exhaustive list. It is just a few proposals to stimulate discussion with a view of elaborating a more comprehensive set of measures that may be used for practical purposes by local communities throughout the region.

We obviously won't be able to finish this work in one and a half days, but if we manage to identify a few steps that would help to move things on the ground, I would think that our meeting has fulfilled its purpose.

However, this Symposium is not an end into itself for the European Center for Peace and Development will establish a **Standing International Study Group** that will systematically study inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations in the Western Balkans laying emphasis on regional reconciliation and religious tolerance in the region. A broader national and international support to the organizer of such a significant event would be desirable and especially valuable. In that sense, the example of the Japanese Government can be instructive.



MESSAGE ON THE OCCASION OF THE SYMPOSIUM

I regret very much not to be able to participate in person in the deliberations of the forthcoming ECPD International Symposium “National and Inter-ethnic Reconciliation and religious tolerance in the Western Balkans”, to be held in Belgrade, 28-29 October 2005.

Having had very close ties with Yugoslavia and its republics and peoples over the decades of public service in my country Egypt, including the post of Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and having been involved directly, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in the recent conflicts that ravaged this part of the world, I am very pleased to see the process of national and inter-ethnic reconciliation well on its way. This international symposium is an example of the efforts to lay the intellectual and analytical foundations and establish a network of institutions and personalities that will work for such reconciliation and tolerance.

I have always believed, and I can say it today freely as an elderly statesman, that the bloody conflicts that engulfed what is today referred to as the Western Balkans were not necessary and were not desired or approved by the majority of Yugoslav peoples, including those who succumbed to nationalist passions and propaganda.

How the conflict came about, its causes, the internal and external factors and actors that fuelled it, is a matter for historians and political scientists to analyse and draw conclusions. What matters today is the future, a positive future for peoples and nations of this region, who share centuries of common life and history, culture, geography, languages and indeed, an interdependent economic and ecological space.

I am a firm believer in the possibility, indeed imperative of reconciliation, cooperation and mutual interdependence, of unity and solidarity in diversity. These are already happening. They are logical, given the context, and reflect the objectives and values embraced by the international community and the United Nations.


I often refer to the example of Franco-German relations, which after two savage wars in a time frame of less than three decades, evolved in a positive direction. Patiently and gradually these relations were brought to

the highest levels of economic and political integration and cooperation in the framework of the European Community.

The future of the “Western Balkans” is not that of mutually hostile micro-states, jealous of each other, continuing to maximize differences and what separates them. In this context I am glad to see that the Symposium will also delve on the issue of religious tolerance, for indeed, the three religions, and the respective religious institutions, that meet and mix in this part of the world should offer an example of tolerance and promote peaceful coexistence, rather than to be one of the major factors and actors in hampering such coexistence and in continuing to stoke the ambers of nationalist aggression and intolerance, and ethnic and religious conflicts in these lands.

I am encouraged by the trends on the ground, and especially among the very young who have grasped the human folly of fratricidal struggles that took place in this part of the world. The more the young come together and the more they understand that they face common and shared problems and challenges, the greater the chance of reconciliation and cooperation after this recent period of conflict, bloodshed and economic crisis caused by the disintegration of the common polity and shared market.

I am also heartened by the positive attitude to admitting and integrating all successor states of former Yugoslavia into the European Union and the larger European space. By incorporating them in an overarching political, economic, social, and cultural environment that would be conducive to and foster such reconciliation, this will make it possible and necessary for them to come together again in a shared political and economic framework and to resume their journey to a common future which was interrupted when this region was plunged into conflict.



Boutros Boutros-Ghali

Chairman of the South Centre Board and
President of the Egyptian Council of Human Rights

18 October 2005

YASUSHI AKASHI

LONG STANDING UNDER-SECRETARY OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL
AND FORMER UN REPRESENTATIVE FOR EX-YUGOSLAVIA

CAUSES OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS ARE DIFFERENT, BUT THE WAYS OF RESOLVING THEM COULDN'T BE THE SAME

GIST OF THE SPEECH

After the end of Cold war, contrary to earlier expectations, internal conflicts came to thrive in the region instead of international conflicts on a large scale. There were often conflicts with ethnic, cultural or religious undertones, but some conflicts resulted from incitement by ambitious leaders who wanted to make political capital out of the antagonism among different ethnic groups.

The United Nations Charter only stipulates in Chapter VI and VII how to deal with international conflicts, but not how to deal with internal conflicts. Indeed, Article 2, paragraph 7, prohibits interference in domestic jurisdiction. The Millennium Declaration of the UN adopted in 2000 declares the necessity of solving both international and internal conflicts through respect of the law, conflict prevention, peaceful resolution of disputes, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. The “outcome document” adopted in September 2005 at the United Nations summit refers to the same subject, emphasizing the significance of the human rights, human security and post-conflict rehabilitation. It also proposed to create an intergovernmental peace-building commission.

Having in mind experiences of the other countries or regions in resolving inter-ethnic and the interconfessional disputes, as anticipated in the AGENDA, I want to refer briefly to the Sri Lanka case. Mainly, in June 2003, I took part in a Tokyo Conference on Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka, which aimed at a durable peace. The Tokyo Conference proposed a close inter-linkage between peace process and assistance process. We decided to offer economic incentives as a compensation for the difficult transition from war to peace. This was an initiative aimed at protecting ordinary people in the country, and if the government could not protect them, international community had to take necessary measures. There is a general tendency to move out of the traditional principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, but to judge action of the states on the basis of the new concept of “responsibility to protect”.

It should be emphasised that some conflicts which have taken place outside a particular region are alike, but no two of them are completely identical. In each conflict, some specific elements are involved. In the case of Sri Lanka, it was partially religious, linguistic and ethnic conflict, but it had another element of indigenous caste system.

We must pay attention to the causes of conflicts, and to why they escalate. There are often psychological causes which may pertain to the realm of sociology. When we look at the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1992, they differ from the conflicts in other regions. A limited scale clash in a small village in southeastern Croatia escalated into a larger conflict. The murder of persons belonging to a different ethnic group generated mutual fear and antagonism, which escalated and spread into fear and antagonism on a massive scale.

There is probably no panacea to cure generated mutual fear. We may employ short term political or diplomatic measures, but other measures for economic and social development over a longer period may be more effective. We have to combine shortterm measures with longer-term economic, social and educational policies.

In spite of globalization, or perhaps because of it, nationalism in a pent up situation tends to grow into a narrow-minded chauvinism. In Europe, as elsewhere, peace must be established through some sense of justice and respect for human rights. Similarity in conflicts offers some clue to the characteristic of a particular region. At the same, it is probably futile to try to extract a generalized or abstract lesson from numerous conflicts occurring in different circumstances and in different areas.

SIR JAMES R. MANCHAM

FOUNDING PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES AND CHAIRPERSON
OF THE PRESIDING COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSAL PEACE FOUNDATION

WELCOME ADDRESS

The United Nations has declared 2001-2010 to be the decade for a culture of peace. But the UN definition of culture of peace is mostly technical, speaking of the absence and rejection of conflict. But it leaves out, once again, the important issue of philosophy, religions, language and ethnicity.

Mr Chairman, we have to move beyond dialogue to come to consensus on what is good and what is evil. This must start with trust between religious leaders who are usually the guardians of a society's morals and ideals.

Today, I speak to you as the Chairperson of the Presiding Council of the Universal Peace Federation which was inaugurated on the 14th of September 2005 at the Lincoln Centre in New York by the Interreligious and International Federation for World Peace, which itself was founded some 18 years ago in an attempt to get the religions of the world to unite and work together for peace.

Mr Chairman, we need more than a culture of peace that is simply avoiding conflict. We need a culture of heart that recognizes that all of us are part of the culture of humankind, or one human family. If the human heart is in the wrong place, there is no future. In the end, people shape culture, not institutions. Change does not begin in the UN buildings – but deep in our hearts. We are all one family, and we all have the same needs, if we can get beyond the issue of greed.

In the past eighteen hundred years, spiritual men and women came across as people of such deep conviction that I am left challenged by them. There is much in their theology that I will disagree with and some would say was purely based on superstition. But despite their failings, here was a relatively small group of people who sought to spread the message of peace with an emphasis on many of the values they had held dear for many years. These people placed a strong emphasis on the weak and the poor. They believed that living simply was vital for others to simply live. This was the epitome of spiritual wellbeing. And whilst they recognized the political powers around them, these people realized that earthly power was unimportant when compared to the authority of God.

In the early 20th Century, many Europeans thought that science was the greatest achievement of men and would lead to peace. They felt they were at the beginning of the golden age of progress and not, as history was to prove, on the brink of continental and even global disaster and conflict.

Mr Chairman, we need a change in culture if we are to change institutions. If the culture remains the same, the institutions will not be different. For example, towards the end of the League of Nations, members felt free to pursue their own ends. Thus, did Russia marched into Finland and Japan into Shanghai. Does not that seem rather similar to the reality of the UN today, where powerful Nations don't always feel the need for a UN mandate?

Mr Chairman, at this time humanity is turning at a moment of opportunity. With the nuclear threat hanging over the world, can we allow ourselves to say no to an age of peace? The hope of all ages must be for a unified world of peace. But the realization of such a world depends on no one else but ourselves. The force of love must prove greater than any weapon that has ever been produced.

The United Nations Organization was created with the fourfold purpose of:

1. Saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war;
2. Reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights;
3. Striving for justice and respect for international law; and
4. Promoting freedom, social progress, and better living standards.

We must support and uphold and sustain the United Nations, that most imperfect organization seeking for perfection in a flawed world. To its credit it has been able to uphold the principle of universality, through the General Assembly, while recognizing the existence of power politics through the Security Council.

But without drawing on the wisdom of the world's spiritual traditions, and with an exclusive reliance on Governments, national interests, and economic and social affairs, the United Nations has a severe imitation. It can be compared to a person who has many abilities, resources, education, and capacity – but lacks spiritual wisdom and maturity. It was for these reasons that the Universal Peace Federation is calling for the renewal of the United Nations by the establishment within its structure of "Peace Councils," which could help in the establishment of Peace Nations. The Peace Council of course will only succeed in so far as we apply and practice the core principles and values of living for the sake of others. Most of all, we must keep God in the center of our life. Without that, we all toil in vain.

As my friend and associate in the Universal Peace Federation – the Rt. Hon. Sir Lloyd Sandiford – former Prime Minister of the republic of Bar-

bados recently made clear in an address in New York City – “We must continue to work patiently and with perseverance to gnaw away at the underlying causes of strife, discord, enmity, war and underdevelopment. We should therefore be clear on what we have to do. But, first of all, we must cast off what the Romans of old called, *superbia*. And what today we call *pride*”.

Mr Chairman, it is clear that our world in crisis requires prudent, judicious, balanced, wise and discerning leadership based on the following principles.

1. All people should centre their lives on the dynamic of living for the sake of others.
2. All people should aspire to live lives based on the highest moral and ethical principles, including honestly, truthfulness, unselfishness and love.
3. No effort should be spared in working for the reduction and elimination of religious intolerance, bigotry, hatred, prejudice and all forms of discrimination.
4. The virtues of tolerance, understanding, compassion, dialogue, cooperation and mutual respect should be promoted at all times.
5. The value of diversity and cultural differences among individuals, groups and nations should be espousing the search for a better and more peaceful, just and sustainable world.
6. A global environment in which existing economic, social, cultural and other inequities and injustices are reduced and eliminated should be advocated.
7. There should be a call for a spiritual, religious, moral and ethical reawakening among the nations of the world and for the replacement of the current unconscionable greed and self interest by commitment to the common good of all mankind.
8. All endeavours should be utilized to foster a culture of peace imbedded in respect for human rights, justice for all, economic and social development, the elimination of conditions that lead to war and the building of educated, wholesome and drug-free communities.

Mr Chairman, here in the Balkans we need to solve the problems of wounded pride and the feeling of no justice, if we are to dry up the water in which hate swim. Dialogue and engagement are the only possible way to succeed, however impossible it may seem. Let us therefore move forward, not with instruments of external power, but with the instruments of internal power — i.e. through love, unselfishness and the promotion of a passion for peace.

DARKO TANASKOVIĆ

AMBASSADOR OF THE STATE UNION SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
TO THE HOLY SEE, VATICAN

THE RECONCILIATORY POTENTIAL OF INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE (THEORY AND PRACTICE)

Before passing on to the topic of my paper, I wish to make a minor correction in the formulation of its title in the “Programme” of our Symposium. That will probably be the best way to broach the topic itself. Namely, it says that I will speak ABOUT “inter-confessional”, and not about “inter-religious” dialogue, as I registered my topic. It is not just a terminological question. It is the question of a different plane of inter-religious dialogue. It is known that under “inter-confessional” dialogue we usually understand so-called “ecumenical”, inter-Christian or, more exactly, intra-Christian dialogue carried on by the Catholics, Orthodox and Protestants, and not the dialogue with the Jews, Muslims and members of other world religions. On the horizon of the Judeo-Christian doctrinal continuum there are views that, in a broader sense, the term “ecumenical” or “inter-confessional” may also refer to the Christian-Jewish dialogue, but not the one with the Muslims.

In addition, the part of the original title of my topic in parentheses – Theory and Practice – has been omitted. Naturally, that is not something bad and I would not mention that intervention at all if I were not concerned just with the relationship or, to be more exact, the discrepancy between theory and practice with respect to inter-religious dialogue as a way of reconciliation in the Western Balkans and elsewhere. In fact, I am especially interested in the reconciliatory potential of inter-religious dialogue in the Western Balkans at present and in the foreseeable future and it can be evaluated and predicted only on the basis of the hitherto results and quality of the ongoing processes.

On the basis of my knowledge, as well as an insight into this matter, which is neither sufficient nor thorough, by the nature of things, I dare say that the results achieved so far in the process of interethnic reconciliation and building religious tolerance differ very much both territorially, that is, regionally and locally, as well as from the viewpoint of the religious affiliation of those who should achieve a reconciliation and tolerance through a dialogue. Otherwise, instead of “tolerance” as the target, I would always give preference to “mutual respect on equal terms”, because tolerance im-

plies etymologically, as well as empirically and historically, the relationship between superiority (of the one who tolerates) and subordination (of the one who is tolerated), but that could be the subject of a special and interesting debate. In any case, the problem was observed a long time ago and it is the subject of a serious consideration and debate in the world. However, despite being unequal, the hitherto results of inter-religious dialogue are significant and, at times, very encouraging, considering the unenviable starting point, but they are far from being sufficient and satisfactory. Therefore, it is difficult to be optimistic that inter-religious dialogue will have a fast and broad-based effect as the way to achieve a reconciliation and tolerance. On the other hand, there are no valid reasons that, in principle, one has doubts about the reconciliatory potential of dialogue and interaction. In order to succeed, it is important, first of all, to face the truth and, to the extent that is possible and tolerable under the prevailing circumstances, call the phenomena and things their right names, that is, as unambiguously and as precisely as possible.

Let us start with the very notion of “inter-religious dialogue”. It is important to agree as to what it is understood under this term in each particular case, that is, whenever it is used. Without such precision, which is not only terminological one, but is also conceptual and qualitative one, there are no grounds to make an evaluation of the success/failure of the mission of “inter-religious dialogue”. Depending on the contextual coordinates within which communication is established, as well as on its subject, there is a number of its forms and levels, ranging from the formalized and institutionalized dialogue between the representatives of the church hierarchies (I know that it is a commonplace to state that in Islam there is no church organization, but I hold that there is, functionally), through the polemics of learned theologians, discussions of intellectuals, cooperation among the clergy in the field and relations among ordinary believers in daily life, to the dialogue of the people who are not believers at all, but belong traditionally and culturally to the civilizational formations based on different religious teachings. Here is, for example, what Dr Jelena Đorđević, religion sociologist, says about that: “I think that inter-religious dialogue must be carried on by ordinary people who belong to different faiths, regardless of whether their faith is absolute or simply conditioned by culture and birth. In that context, dialogue begins with cooperation among the neighbours, schoolmates, colleagues at work, invitations to participate in the religious rituals of others, to hear someone else’s wisdom, to taste a different dish, to watch a performance, or to perform a dance of a group that belongs to another, foreign religious and cultural circle” (“Interreligijski dijalog i svakodnevni život” / “Inter-religious Dia-

logue and Daily Life”/ in the proceedings: “Interreligijski dijalog kao oblik pomirenja u Jugoistočnoj Evropi” /“Inter-religious Dialogue as a Way of Reconciliation in South Eastern Europe”/, Belgrade, 2001, p. 101). All this is anticipated in a somewhat cumulative and insufficiently differentiated way when “inter-religious dialogue” is mentioned. Such a broad generalization rules out the possibility of factual and concrete consideration and, thus, of making the judgment on the complex and stratified phenomenon of individual and collective interrelations, whose complexity by far exceeds the limits of a dialogue, as one of its manifestations, that is, methods (in the original Greek meaning of this word). Consequently, the problem must be analyzed and specified. Naturally, on this occasion one can only make a rough division of the dialogue levels.

There is no doubt that inter-religious dialogue in the Western Balkans is carried on rather intensively and institutionally, that is, officially, in all directions, at the level of church dignitaries and higher hierarchy, which is also administratively and politically encouraged and organized from the outside. There is no doubt that this dialogue and cooperation have a great symbolic and practical value. Thus, they must be welcomed and supported. In a narrower sense, in the Western Balkans there is still no theological inter-religious dialogue in a more developed form, like the one that is regularly carried on by members of the Pontifical Council for Inter-Religious Dialogue or the appropriate Commission of the Islamic Al-Azhar University in Cairo and it is normal that there is no such dialogue. Considering all these circumstances, with which we cannot deal now, it is too early for that. However, that does not mean that among the theologians here there is no professional capability, good will, intellectual curiosity or responsibility. When a more favourable atmosphere is created in general, there is every prospect that a theological dialogue will be initiated but, considering its nature, it cannot be limited and determined at the local or regional level. IT Communications among the priests and other representatives of the West Balkan churches and religious communities exist in everyday life, but their intensity and quality vary to a great extent at the local and regional levels, so that it is impossible to evaluate them as a whole. For example, in Vojvodina, some parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and, to a degree, in Sandžak, there is proportionately intensive cooperation, with the elements of inter-religious dialogue. On the other hand, there is no cooperation in Kosovo and Metohija, which refers especially to the relations between the Catholic Albanians and Orthodox Serbs, as well as in some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.

All mentioned levels of inter-religious dialogue are significant and contribute to the building of confidence and mending of the torn or damaged threads of cooperation among the members of different ethnic and religious communities, whereby the entire social tissue is restored and revitalized. However, the basic criterion for measuring the success of inter-religious dialogue would have to be the reconciliatory effect on the broadest plane, among the people or, better said, among the citizens. That is the everyday form of kind and civilized communication which the President of the Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue, Msgr Michael Fitzgerald, calls “vital dialogue” (“dialogo di vita”) and which some of them do not regard as inter-religious dialogue in a narrower sense (*Il dialogo interreligioso e la pace*, Rome, 2006, 6). The results on that plane are still virtually negligible, if one excludes the statistically limited effects of the planned activities of certain organizations and institutions through post-conflict management projects, workshops and other forms of group re-socialization, with reconciliation as the ultimate aim (the characteristic example is offered by certain activities of the Inter-religious Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Peace has now been achieved by using diplomatic-political, military-security, legal, administrative and economic instruments, coupled with the decisive role of the international factors, considerable pressure and conditioning, as well as the increasingly more responsible and more mature behaviour of the democratically minded domestic political forces and governing elites. Reconciliation is still far away and peace will not be irrevocably secured until it is achieved among ordinary, average citizens. Therefore, it is necessary to work persistently on the creation of conditions that will encourage and speed up the process of reconciliation, including inter-believer dialogue.

It has lately been observed that, instead of “inter-religious”, the term “inter-faith” is used in the languages which permit such a differentiation. Is that an accident? I do not think so. I believe that it is also intended to terminologically emphasize the superiority of dialogue between believers as the champions of faith in their hearts and directly involved social actors and not solely between its institutionalized and, thus, somewhat alienated religious-church representatives. The mission of inter-religious/inter-church dialogue at various levels of ecclesiastical hierarchy is great and elevated, but primarily to the extent to which it contributes to the initiation and direction of the vital, everyday inter-believer dialogue of acquaintance, recognition, confidence and love. And there is still too little of that, but not only in the Western Balkans. Why?

It is impossible to give an unambiguous answer to this question, because that is an extremely complex and differentiated issue that can be ad-

dressed from various aspects. Nevertheless, I would try to point to some possible explanations that are more directly related to the absence of any greater effect of inter-religious dialogue in a narrower sense or, more precisely, the dialogue in which individual participants are believers and priests and collective ones – churches and religious communities. I wish to do that because I know that area a little better and because I hold that it is not advisable to put inter-religious dialogues in a broader sense, that is, the confrontation and communication of laymen belonging culturally to different religious traditions, into the category of inter-religious, because that only clouds the issue. That can be, and in the Western Balkans that is most often the case, an interethnic or inter-national or, simply, inter-citizen dialogue and not inter-religious one, because its participants simply do not participate in faith. At best, the religious for them can only have a symbolic connotation, which is often very pronounced. But, being derived as a secondary one, it is susceptible to manipulation for ideological and political ends, including dishonest, violent and harmful ones. And just for this reason, which has recently been amply confirmed in the Western Balkans, one should avoid using the term “inter-religious” to designate the notions and phenomena, which has no real connection with religion, let alone with faith. This is something that should be taken into account by all those who engage in initiating and organizing so-called “inter-religious” dialogue with only the highest intentions. I repeat: inter-religious/inter-faith dialogue can be carried on only by believers themselves!

Among those who launch numerous (and increasingly more numerous) initiatives, projects and activities relating to inter-religious dialogue in the world, there is no adequate exchange of information or coordination, which is not good, because one can derive benefit only from the exchange of experiences and, possibly, the harmonization of the theoretical and methodological views. It is always started anew, disparately and unsystematically, with the insufficiently expressed desire for networking, at least at the regional level, if not at the global one, which is objectively unrealistic. So, for example, some activists from the non-governmental sector – who have been concerned in an organized way with “inter-religious dialogue” as a way of reconciliation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia for the past fifteen or so years – have been surprised to learn about the conference on “Building Inter-faith Harmony Within the International Community”, which was organized within the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) on Bali, in Indonesia, on 21 and 22 July this year, as well as about the adopted Declaration with some provisions that could be directly applied to the West Balkan situation. This is not the only example. At times, one gets the impression that some projects and manifestations

devoted to “inter-religious dialogue” and “reconciliation” are adjusted to a greater extent to the donors’ requirements than to the attempts to establish horizontal cooperation on the national, regional, European or broader plane.

As the participants in this International Symposium, we are in the position not to succumb to the temptation and inertia of self-sufficiency and affirm at least the continuity in dealing with its topic in Belgrade. Namely, five years ago, the Centre for Religious Studies (CIREL), within the Belgrade Open School (BOŠ), organized the very successful round table on “Inter-religious Dialogue as a Way of Reconciliation in South Eastern Europe” in Belgrade. The proceedings were published under the same name the following year. I am glad that this continuity has been even personally preserved through the participation of Dr Milan Vukomanović, the then coordinator of CIREL and organizer of the previous round table, in our Symposium. Although, at least in my opinion, the proceedings of the round table on “Inter-religious Dialogue as a Way of Reconciliation in South Eastern Europe” are one of the best of their kind in terms of their contents and quality, they have not been given sufficient attention and have not been sufficiently used in later research and debates. The theoretical contribution to research on inter-religious dialogue, which was made five years ago by Đuro Šušnjić, Vladeta Jerotić, Ratko Božović and Milica Bakić-Hayden, to mention only a few names, remains topical and binding. On the other hand, the fact that the previous meeting was basically focused on the same geo-political territory of South Eastern Europe and that a certain “transition” period passed enables us to make an interesting comparative survey. Were there any significant changes in the meantime and where are they reflected? What were the actual reconciliatory effects of inter-religious dialogue, which the competent round-table participants evaluated as being just initial and modest five years ago?

In an attempt to answer the question whether there is an authentic dialogue and what it is about (especially among the persons of different religious persuasion), Dr Vladeta Jerotić gave an convincing explanation why inter-religious dialogue was devoted insignificant attention during the fifty-year long existence of the communist and socialist Yugoslavia. He gave three basic reasons: (1) a small number of authentic believers in all periods and at all places (with a pessimistic prediction that it would continue to decline); (2) the insufficiently expressed will and ability of the members of the churches and religious communities to initiate inter-religious dialogue; and (3) the government’s atheistic-Marxist ideology and the initially hidden and then increasingly more open confrontation of nationalisms (which Jerotić distinguishes, in principle, from healthy and de-

sirable patriotism). To this Jerotić's causal trinity, one might certainly add some other reasons, but I propose that we hold to his for the time being, because they have been derived from both the scientific (psychoanalytical) and religious experience and thought, which makes them particularly convincing and relevant, especially for our Symposium which is devoted, let us not forget, to inter-religious dialogue and reconciliation.

Did something important happen in relation to the period which was observed and analyzed by Vladeta Jerotić and, if it did, what was the impact of change on the state of inter-religious dialogue?

There is no doubt that many things have changed in the Western Balkans for the past ten or so years. I believe that nobody has to be assured of that. However, it is much more difficult to assess the impact of change on the state of inter-religious dialogue in a reliable way. The relationship is by no means linear and unambiguous. Although many of them will not agree with this statement, I must say that I have an impression that, regardless of the changes that have occurred and are still occurring, and probably just because of them, inter-religious dialogue in a narrower sense, as a dialogue carried on by believers, has not yet made any more significant breakthrough. Therefore, the reconciliatory potential of that dialogue has not yet become evident. In his recently defended PhD thesis at the University of Edinburgh, American sociologist S. Goodwin has concluded, on the basis of a great number of talks/interviews with representatives of the three constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that all of them want peace, cooperation in practical matters and prosperity but, when it comes to reconciliation, they are very reserved about that idea, let alone about forgiveness (S.R. Goodwin, *Fractured Land, Healing Nations: A Contextual Analysis of the Role of Religious/Faith Solidarities Towards Peace-Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2005). And can one imagine reconciliation without forgiveness from the aspect of faith?

Before I try to explain in short why I hold that Jerotić's judgments are still valid, not only with respect to the situation in the Western Balkans, I wish to refer to another unambiguous "authority on dialogue", whose testimony is somewhat different but, in essence, coincides with and complements Jerotić's one. That will also broaden our base for understanding the current phenomena in the sphere of inter-religious dialogue. It is not without relevance that it is a Catholic voice which is in full agreement with Jerotić's Orthodox one. While participating in the work of the symposium on "Spiritual Resources of the Religions for Peace", which was organized in Rome, at the beginning of 2003, by the Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue, the Archbishop of New York, the renowned Cardinal

Theodore McCarrick, delivered a penetrating and inspiring speech about the ways in which the religions can make a constructive contribution to peace. He emphasized that he was speaking from an American perspective and experience.

According to McCarrick, the churches and religious communities can contribute to peace and reconciliation in society in three ways: (1) by spreading and preaching those messages from holy scriptures which call to peace and cooperation among the people and such messages can be found in all religious teachings; (2) by opting for cooperation and joint work with the members of other churches and religious communities, which logically implies inter-religious dialogue; and (3) by acting towards the authorities and the political sphere in general so as to promote peace and tolerance, since the major role in deciding on peace and war is still played by the dominant political forces in the state and society. Prior to presenting these three forms of contribution to peace by churches and religious communities, Cardinal McCarrick found it necessary to point to one phenomenon which was essentially limiting the scope for their activities in the United States and on a broader plane. It is the question of the other side of the freedom of religious practice and equality, guaranteed by the secular system of government, which manifests itself as a kind of “civil religion”, that is, “the corpus of antireligious views that penetrate the American legislation and public policy”, according to which the churches and religious communities have nothing to do not only in the political sphere, but also in the social one (Th. E. McCarrick, *Religions for Peace: An American Perspective in Spiritual Resources of the Religions for Peace*, Vatican City, 2003, 73–81). Objectively, this also prevents believers from raising their voice in public and influencing the activities of public concern according to the postulates and value system of the religion they exercise. Thus, positive secularity becomes distorted into exclusive and, thus, harmful secularism which is, it can be heard, only the new name for atheism (as well as for “antitheism”). Although they are based on American experience, McCarrick’s observations and statements are also relevant for the situation in Europe and in the Western Balkans due to which I decided to add them to Jerotić’s diagnosis of the state of inter-religious dialogue in the Yugoslav and early post-Yugoslav period. Let us now return to that diagnosis and check whether it is still valid today.

Let us begin with the first statement, the “chronically” small number of authentic believers who should be the only actors of true inter-religious dialogue. At first glance, as well as on the basis of various sociological indicators, including statistical ones, it seems that the number of believers in the Western Balkans increased considerably during the first decade of

the so-called post-communist transition. The church and religion stopped to be a taboo subject; the long-awaited time of the free exercise of religion came and the column on religious affiliation was included in the census records. In nominal terms, the number of members of all churches and religious communities increased enormously. Does that mean that the number of authentic believers also increased as much, or at least proportionately? It is very difficult and probably ethically incorrect to judge the religiousness of those declaring themselves as believers. After all, it cannot be measured precisely. Nevertheless, I will make the assumption that the number of believers has not increased more significantly over the past years. In other words, I doubt that many people in the Western Balkans can answer sincerely and affirmatively the three questions that have been formulated by Vladeta Jerotić as a specific test of one's religiousness. Without any comprehensive research or great wisdom, one can conclude unerringly – on the basis of some widespread negative phenomena in the “transition processes” in the Western Balkans, including their pronounced socio-pathological metastases – that authentic believers are still a minority in this part of Europe. The situation could not probably be different for various reasons.

The doubts about a more significant increase in the number of authentic believers in the Western Balkans should not tempt us by any means to neglect the inclination of an increasing number of people, including a great number of young people, to declare themselves as believers. From a sociological aspect, this is very important fact which has far-reaching repercussions, including those for the phenomenon of so-called “inter-religious dialogue”. The citizens who claim that they are believers, or even believe that they are, but they are not, pass judgments on their and someone else's religion, on the status of the churches and religious communities in society, and start a dialogue with similar “believers”, that is, “persons of different religious affiliation”, being convinced that they start inter-religious dialogue. I do not intend to bring their right to do that in question; nothing is further from my mind. On the contrary, I think that such contacts and activities are potentially useful for social cohesion both on an individual and collective plane, but that is not inter-religious dialogue and should not be presented as such. In the opposite, apart from favourable effects, various forms of manipulation and misunderstandings are also possible. Observing the increasing tendency in Europe that some political, social and, primarily, interest groups, which do not have much connection with religion, are the loudest in the campaign for the preservation of the fundamental Christian values, the renowned French historian, Rémi Brague, coined the term “christianists” and pitted it binarily against the

Christian name (by analogy with the pair “Muslims” – “Islamists”). He has pointed out that, in principle, he has nothing against the “christianist” campaign for the European Christian values. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that the “civilization of Christian Europe was built by the people whose aim was not to create the Christian civilization” and that, in other words, “we are indebted for it to the people who believed in Christ and not in Christianity”, which is not a slight difference (see: Christians and ‘christianists’, Brague’s interview for the Catholic journal *30 Days*, October 2004).

On the assumption of one’s clear awareness of own identity, full openness and respect for the values of Another, inter-religious dialogue for an authentic Christian must be the testimony of Christ’s faith and love. After all, dialogue is assigned to the believer and the priest as the most noble mission of “awakening Christ who is sleeping in other religions”, as was said by the Lebanese Orthodox Metropolitan Georges Choder (see: V. Paglia, *Essere cattolici*, Milan, 2005, 182). In the same spirit, the Antiochian Patriarch Ignatius IV, who is a great supporter of inter-religious dialogue, emphasizes that Christ, according to Nicolaus Cusanus, is a “supernatural man” and that we “must try to reveal His presence even where it seems absent or, moreover, has been rejected” (*L’arte del dialogo*, Comunità di Bose, 2004, 115). Such inter-religious dialogue, understood in a narrower sense, cannot be a way of reconciliation, since its presumption is peace, peace with oneself and with another, to whom one wishes, with full respect, to convey and offer the Truth of his own faith. Is it necessary to prove that in the Western Balkans, except in some cases, the internal and external conditions for inter-religious dialogue have not been created? One may find a certain comfort in the fact that the situation is not much better elsewhere in Europe and in the rest of the world.

Being aware of all those internal and external restrictions and obstacles on the path to it, the convinced supporter of inter-religious dialogue of “the children of Abraham”, the Swiss theologian Hans Küng (who is, otherwise, the most severe critic of the alleged departure of the Catholic Church leadership from the spirit of openness of the Second Vatican Council), puts “the least common denominator” of dialogue between members of different churches into the context of global, universal ethics, “which is common to all people, believers and nonbelievers alike” (H. Küng, *Islam, Passato, Presente e Futuro*, Milan, 2005, 789). True to his vision of the church as being open to society to the greatest possible extent and by introducing the (hypothetical) universality of global ethics as the basis for general inter-religious dialogue, a prerequisite for achieving peace among the religions, without which there can be not peace among the people,

Küng solves the problem of squaring the circle of inter-religious relations by stepping out of that circle. By opting for ethics, the component with which the phenomenon of religious does not exhaust itself and to which the dimension of utility is also originally inherent, the Swiss theologian offers a pragmatic solution which deserves attention, but also implies the inevitable marginalization of the overall, historically shaped, religious-church tradition and its ecclesiastical institutionalization. I believe that such a concept and rationalization of “inter-religious” dialogue could be close to something which is, under the same name, attempted to be organized in the Western Balkans, mostly by laymen. However, the question that imposes itself here is how much the members of the mainstream churches and religious communities can find themselves there, except for probably some Protestant denominations and, say, the Bahais. And just the actually existing (and not some perfect, “universally moral”) Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim peoples, together with the proportionately sparse Protestants and Jews, could be the protagonists of inter-religious dialogue. Thus, we have come to Jerotić’s second reason for the absence of that dialogue in the Balkans, “the insufficiently expressed will and capability of the members of the churches and religious communities” for starting it. Did the situation change during the past few years and how much?

There is no doubt that, in the meantime, there were the examples that the will was expressed and that specific steps were taken towards a dialogue and cooperation with the compatriots of different religious affiliation and neighbours on all sides, especially in Vojvodina, some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, as well as in Sandžak. Such initiatives and actions deserve credit and support. However, all things considered, one must note that there is no much greater will or capability for a true inter-religious dialogue today that it was at the time when Dr Jerotić made his judgment. For such a state of affairs there are several internal and external factors. Let us start with the internal factors which have their roots in the churches and religious communities themselves. However, it will first be necessary to remind ourselves of the inevitable factor of time, since all changes occur in time and here we have the “processes of long duration”, which has too often been neglected in the Western Balkans and, even more so, among the foreign observers and analysts or, in other words, within the so-called international community. For a more significant change in the mentality and strengthening of the will of an individual and/or a group, as well as for becoming ready for a dialogue, the period of a few years is too short, if not negligible. This simple and stubborn truth should always be taken into account when assessing the speed and results of various social processes in the Western Balkans. Albanian President

Alfred Moisiu was right when he said the following to the author of this paper: “What we in the Balkans need the most at this historical moment is a little more time and our problem is that we have the least time at our disposal”.

If we consider the will and capability of the churches and religious communities to carry on inter-religious dialogue from a doctrinal, that is, theological viewpoint, we can observe that they are unequal and vary from one religious organization to another, as well as locally and regionally, which depends on the specific social constellation. Without entering into details on this occasion, let me only say that this is also the question of the West Balkan expression of global circumstances, as well as of its specific regional characteristic. If inter-religious dialogue is understood in the way in which it was defined by Pope Paul VI in his well-known encyclical *Ecclesiam Suam* (1964), which can be valid, in principle, for all Christians, as well as for believers in general, then it can be said that, in the Western Balkans, the Catholics are the most open for dialogue, that the Orthodox recognize the need for it but mostly abhor it, while the Muslims do not see its real purpose (for more detail see my paper: “Susret ili sukob civilizacija?”, *Letopis Matice srpske*, 179, 472/6, 2003, pp. 949–964). As a rule, the Protestants are ready for a dialogue and, frequently, for launching such an initiative, but their number is relatively small, so that they cannot have a more significant influence on the situation in the Western Balkans. Just like any generalization, this evaluation of the readiness of the churches and religious communities to initiate inter-religious dialogue is very abstract. To be able to present the specifics of the West Balkan situation as adequately as possible, it should be pointed out that in the field there are various local and regional configurations of the inter-church and inter-believer relations, which essentially affects the general statement. So, for example, the Orthodox people in Vojvodina and in some parts of Croatia are much more open for dialogue with the Catholics than in Bosnia and Herzegovina, some other parts of Croatia or in Kosovo and Metohija, while the Muslims in Sandžak and Montenegro are much more open for communication with the Orthodox people than in the greatest part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or in Kosovo and Metohija. Although it has been stated that, in general, the Catholics are more inclined to inter-religious dialogue, the Albanian Catholics from Kosovo and Metohija are persistently avoiding any dialogue with the Orthodox people despite the incentives from the Vatican, but not because they are Orthodox, but because they are Serbs. For similar reasons, but not primarily for theological ones, there is no true inter-religious dialogue between the Muslims and Catholics in Western Herzegovina... It is possible to give more examples,

but I believe that these are sufficient to illustrate how the (un)readiness of the churches and religious communities in the Western Balkans to initiate inter-religious dialogue originates to a lesser degree from the doctrinal and theological horizon, although that dimension should not be disregarded. And where it is active, the theological argumentation for the acceptance or rejection of a dialogue with those belonging to different religions is, at least in part, promoted by the rationalization of the interests or resistance arising from the non-religious sphere of reality, from the historical and current experiences and temptations or, in other words, from their collective psychological perception.

As an argument in favour of the above mentioned, let us cite what Klaus Buchenau wrote six years ago in his very inspiring paper "Religions in South Eastern Europe in the 21st Century: The Change of Significance (using the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church in Croatia as the example) about the prospects for solving "the problem of the constant Orthodox fear of Catholic, Protestant, sectarian and other proselytism". As explained by this author, "when the Serbian or Russian Orthodox Church now complain about the proselytism of other religious communities, it is mostly the question of winning over the religiously indifferent people to the religious community to which their ancestors did not belong, and not of winning over the Orthodox believers to another religion. I think that it is not the question of proselytism in a narrower sense, but of something that is very old and natural in the history of Christianity — the mission" (Inter-religious Dialogue as a Way of Reconciliation in South Eastern Europe, Belgrade, 2001, pp. 114–115). Although I agree readily with the statements that the fear of proselytism among the Orthodox is often excessive and unfounded and, at times, serves as an alibi for inactivity and spiritual sluggishness, it is clear that the understanding of the mission as a free, almost market game, which is preceded by the abolition of the term "canonic territory" (see, for example, A. Garuti, *Libertà religiosa ed ecumenismo. La questione del 'territorio canonico' in Russia*, Rome, 2005), must cause the resistance of those who feel that they are epochally yet unequivocally on uncertain grounds. And let us not forget that dialogue for the church is one of the methods and instruments of the mission from which it has no right to desist!

Consequently, although the state of ecumenical and inter-religious relations and dialogue in the Western Balkans is inevitably the reflection of the state at the global level to some extent, it is certain that it is determined to a much greater extent by the historically created specifics of the regional situation. Among those specifics, which became even more pronounced during the past fifteen or so years, is the close link of local

churches and religious communities with the destiny of the people which mostly or exclusively belongs to them from a historical, cultural, traditional and (self-)identification aspect, if not from a believer one. Dr Vladeta Jerotić (*op. cit.*) points out with good reason that it is probably most difficult to be impartial in treating the connection between the awakening of the national sentiment among the Yugoslav peoples and their religious awakening on the eve of the collapse of the common state and in the immediate post-communist period, with a strong tendency to turn into exclusive chauvinism and religious hatred towards the neighbours and compatriots of different nationality and religion. However, he holds that such an effort is necessary, since the burden of blinding nationalism is one of the major obstacles to the beginning of inter-religious dialogue in the former Yugoslavia.

I am convinced that there is no need to explain how it has turned out historically that, with the exclusion of the Albanians, the borders of the national and religious differentiation of all West Balkan peoples of similar origin coincide almost in full. Their tragic consequences, the armed conflicts and fratricide wars in the more distant, more recent and most recent pasts, which are still going on in some form, are well known. Although all these things are well known, an individual or common, impartial, open, constructive and forward-looking position on them has not been taken. This statement, which is often heard in public and for which it is difficult to provide convincing evidence, is accompanied, as a rule, by the complaints from all sides against other nations, churches and religious communities for being a slave to the retrograde myths of the past, obsession with the ideology of “blood and soil” and unreadiness to face the truth, not to mention the endemic hostility towards one’s own nation, that is, one’s own church or religious community. As a specific “mondialistic”, a-national superaction of these mutual reproaches, all stumbling and prodigal nations, churches and religious communities of the Western Balkans are exposed to the reproaches of the self-styled mouthpieces of the so-called “civil society” and, allegedly, “European path”. It is also interesting to note that among those “mindguards”, on all sides, one can easily recognize the descendants of the period of communist monolithism, who have turned democrats and are now “internationally” closely linked to the world centres of radiation of the new life-saving Truth and, thus, being persistently against all other divine and human truths. How many parallel, exclusive and confronted truths are now existing in the minds and hearts of the inhabitants of the relatively small West Balkan region! How can one succeed in initiating a true inter-religious dialogue in such a situation, for

which it is not reasonable to blame anyone specifically? With great difficulty, as was honestly concluded by Vladeta Jerotić six years ago.

A vital prerequisite for the removal of this great obstacle, as well as all other obstacles to this dialogue in the future, is to consider it in an impartial and comprehensive way. Although each case of merging the national (or nationalist) with the religious (ecclesiastical) has its specifics, it is important, first of all, to reject the widespread thesis that such an “unfortunate” union is peculiar only to some West Balkan churches and religious communities and, in particular, to the Serbian Orthodox Church, due to which it is held the most responsible not only for the absence of inter-religious dialogue, but also for much more serious sins. From the different internal organization of the world’s Catholicism and Orthodoxy, whereby the former is centralized, with the Vatican as its centre and the Pope as its absolute leader, and the latter is divided into a number of autonomous local churches, with pronounced synodality in joint decision-making and activities, one logically derives the conclusion that the disintegrating phenomenon of excessive ethnophiletism is peculiar only to the eastern churches. The Catholics often point out and even reproach their Orthodox brothers that the national character of their churches and inclination towards the “symphony” between state and church is harmful to the universality of the Christian message and a major obstacle to the progress of ecumenical dialogue. However, one loses sight of the fact that, in the given historical circumstances, certain local Catholic churches were not less aware of their national mission than the Orthodox ones and that they got down to perform it at least as zealously. Suffice it to mention the Croatian Catholic Church in the Western Balkans and the Polish Catholic Church on the European scale. The proposal for a change in the system of government of “Dayton” Bosnia and Herzegovina toward the end of 2005 was not formulated by the Croatian politicians, but by the Bishops’ Conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina, headed by the Archbishop of Sarajevo, Cardinal Vinko Puljić. This type of political osmosis between the leading political party of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims/Bosniacs, Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Islamic Community in this Republic has already become the topic of doctoral theses (see, for example, X. Bougarel, “From Young Muslims to the Party of Democratic Action: The Emergence of a Pan-Islamist Trend in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, *Islamic Studies*, Islamabad, 36, 2–3, 1997, 533–549), while some of them still claim that the SDA is a civil political party and that “there is no church in Islam”.

In principle, from a theoretical aspect, nationalism and monotheistic universalism, as is correctly observed by Nikolai Berdyaev, cannot go side by side, because “nationalism with its idea does not pretend to be univer-

sal, unique and exclusive, although in practice it may result in the negation and destruction of other nationalities to a degree.” But, by its nature, nationalism is particularistic. It is always specific, so that even its negation and destruction do not have universal aspirations, similarly to the biological struggle of individuality in the animal world (“Nacionalizam i mesijanstvo”, *Ovdje*, November–December 1994, 189). In the Balkans, unfortunately, this discrepancy between theory and practice has found its full expression.

The isomorphism of national and religious corpuses is a dominant characteristic of the West Balkan region and it cannot be assessed in value terms. This phenomenon, including its inertia, must simply be approached analytically. How else can one explain the efforts to “complement” one’s national or state independence by establishing one’s own national church regardless of the canonic order, like in the disputed cases of the Macedonian and Montenegrin Orthodox Church? Regardless of the approach taken towards these processes, it is certain that they do not contribute to inter-religious dialogue, since they affect communication even between those believers who originally belong to the same parent community. Can one speak in that case about the doctrinal or theological reasons for a split? Off course, he cannot. The Serbian Orthodox Church is not disturbed by the establishment of the Greek Catholic exarchate in Bački Krstur, but it has some disputes with the Romanian Orthodox Church in Banat...

The only exception in the Western Balkans, the Albanians, confirms the regional dependence between the religious and national in the opposite way. Although their intra-national harmony was not devoid of tensions, the Albanian Muslims, Orthodox and Catholics are always the Albanians first, which is a unique example of the national cohesion of a multi-religious people in this part of Europe. Consequently, as believers, they are nationally determined but, conditionally speaking, on a suprarreligious plane. In the specific West Balkan situation, that determination also has an inhibiting effect on the readiness for inter-religious dialogue. As already mentioned, the Albanian Catholics in Kosovo and Metohija avoid a dialogue with the Christians, that is, the Orthodox Serbs and Montenegrins, and cooperate with their Muslim compatriots.

Together with their peoples, the churches and religious communities in the Western Balkans experienced the inferno of armed conflicts and all accompanying challenges during the last decade of the 20th century. From that period, they also came out, and are still coming out, wounded, shaken, distrustful and burdened by various mortgages, whether real or designed from the outside. During the armed conflicts there were attempts by some religious leaders, priests and church officials, as well as ordinary believ-

ers to call to reason, desisting from violence, overcoming of hatred and elevation of those noble values that can be found in all religious teachings. Those were the valuable efforts to which one must give credit. However, their practical effect was weak for the destructive force of hatred and hostilities, which was stirred up from various sides. The impartial future historiography will reveal how the individuals in the churches and religious communities behaved during those troublesome times. Something is already clear. However, it is absolutely wrong and counterproductive to condemn – on the basis of something that is clear, or thought of as being clear – the churches and religious communities in general for something they could or could not be responsible. And there are such cases. Here we have already come to the next reason or criterion provided by Jerotić, as well as McCarrick's relating to the absence of inter-religious dialogue, that is, the evaluation of the conditions for the influence of churches and religious communities on societal processes. It is the question of a sensitive sphere of the government's attitude or, more exactly, the attitude of authority in the state, which now also includes the privileged media and a part of the privileged intellectual elite as the actual centres of power, towards the churches and religious communities, as well as towards the sphere of religion in general.

Before dealing with this important segment of my topic in greater detail, although not sufficiently due to limited space, I wish to conclude the survey of the aforementioned at least tentatively. Naturally, it will require further research by serious and competent students of the West Balkan and other environments, as well as their cooperation freed from any non-scientific burden. The churches and religious communities in the Western Balkans will not be sufficiently prepared for and capable of initiating an intensive inter-religious dialogue, especially the one at the "grassroots" until all moot political questions among the peoples, which mostly or exclusively belong to them, are not solved once and for all. The reasons for reservation, distrust and resistance arise primarily from the contradictory and traumatic experiences, from uncertainties and unfinished processes in the social and political sphere and not in the religious one, so that the solutions should also be sought on those grounds. How can one expect progress in inter-religious dialogue in the situation when the uncertain and complex process of determining the future status of Kosovo and Metohija is about to begin; when the golgotha of the non-Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohija continues before the eyes of the military, police and administrative representatives of the international community; when the Holy Synod of Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church states that giving independence to Kosovo and Metohija would be equal to oc-

cupation; when a well-informed participant (from the Republic of Srpska), at a panel discussion at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), agrees with his Bosniac and Croatian colleagues that “although Dayton has brought peace, it has not eliminated the threats that have been present in the three constituent entities”, so that “as a political framework it provided the scope for the political forces in Bosnia to pursue their prewar and war aims”; when Cardinal Vinko Puljić states at the World’s Bishops Synod in Rome that the Catholics/Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina are under “Muslim occupation”; when the Bishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church Jovan (Vraniškovski) is serving a sentence in the Skopje prison despite the protests and appeals from all sides; when the preparations for the controversial referendum on the state status of Montenegro are underway when Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral Amfilohije (Radović) is compared by some officials with a “Taliban”, when... when... one could give examples for a long time as to how under such political pressures, as well as mental pressures of their members and devotees one can expect that the churches and religious communities in the Western Balkans can turn heartily to a dialogue? Any such attempt, and there are such attempts, must be regarded as a real feat, especially if the churches and their priests are accused of everything, not to mention the public statements of the chief prosecutor of the Hague Tribunal that the Vatican, that is, the Catholic Church in Croatia, and the Serbian Orthodox Church are helping the indicted of war crimes to hide!

Consequently, it is evident that there is still no necessary degree of mutual respect and confidence among the church, certain social groups and the state due to which there is no real readiness for cooperation and not only declarative one. Such a situation can be explained from a developmental aspect, but a prerequisite for any coherent attempt to explain it is an unpolished and nonevasive statement, which is still avoided in a “politically correct” and opportunistic way. Let us recall that Vladeta Jerotić mentioned “the government’s atheistic-Marxist ideology” as the third main reason for the absence of inter-religious dialogue in the communist-socialist period which, I am sure, does not require any additional explanation. On the other hand, Cardinal McCarrick mentions, as a third way in which the churches and religious communities can contribute to peace and reconciliation, “action towards the government and the political sphere, in general.” Accordingly, inter-religious dialogue, as the reconciliatory and peace-making effort of churches and religious communities in society, can be effective only if there is a productive interaction between the religious and political sphere or, to be more exact, between the churches/religious communities and government/state. During the com-

munist-socialist period, there was no such constructive two-way relationship, which would have to become the specific feature of mature secular political culture. Thus, there was no scope for dialogue either. Did the situation change essentially in the meantime?

It certainly changed for the better. The process of democratization of the state and society after the collapse of communism, that is, “real” (and “semi-real”) socialism, regardless of all differences in its pace and form across the countries, brought into all West Balkan countries the freedom of religion as one of the fundamental human rights, as well as the radically changed and more favourable conditions for the unhindered activities of the churches and religious communities. The believers and the clergy could finally breath a sigh of relief and, without tension and fear, devote themselves to the satisfaction of their spiritual needs and the performance of their mission, which is not confined to the prayers and religious rituals. In the just initiated process of changing the inherited rigid and conservative mentalities, the democratically conditioned and restricted state and the democratically liberated and encouraged church started to compete for control (or influence) over some segments of social space and institutions. Despite being aware of the need for the establishment of relations according to the model of a democratic secular state, neither the democratic government nor the church entered the new delicate phase of their relations being adequately prepared and with clear ideas about an optimal future model. Considering the long duration of the previous period, from which they managed to come out with great difficulty, one could not expect that the situation would be different. The “salutary” rationalization of that troublesome stumbling and wrestling with the internal and external challenges was found in the term “transition”. It is used to explain and justify everything and, what is also important, to postpone “until the conditions are met” for overcoming “transitional problems”. If we also use this analytical instrument, we can conclude that in the Western Balkans the relations between the churches and religious communities, on one side, and the state/government, on the other, have entered the period of transition which inevitably exerts influence on the actual and direct reconciliatory potential of inter-religious dialogue. At the time of official atheistic monolithism, the status of the churches and religious communities was difficult and very unfavourable, yet it was clear and unambiguous. Today, it is incomparably easier, more favourable and more dignified but, in many respects, it is less clear, vaguer and more uncertain. This also applies to the state. Understood primarily as the procedure, democracy does not bring certainty until the democratic state establishes itself as a lawful one and until the respect for the new rules of the social game does not

guarantee, in addition to law, the fundamentally changed frame of mind of those who participate in it legitimately. It is natural that we are still far from that.

The problem I wish to emphasize is not only the West Balkan problem. It is increasingly becoming the European problem in general. After a longer period of relative rest, the relationship between church and state was secured by a high degree of agreement on the prevalence and optimality of the model of secular (laicist) separation of state and church, including full freedom of religion and principled equality of all churches and religious communities, all this being in the political context of democratic pluralism. It can be observed that the mentioned model, which is not disputed in essence by anybody (at least in Europe), is being increasingly questioned in the sense of its reinterpretation and application of its fundamental postulates. In short, the question that imposes itself is what should be understood under secularity (laicism) of the social order and the system of government at the beginning of the third millennium.

Participating in the very successful conference on “Christianity and European Integration” (Belgrade, 2003), Dr Sima Avramović stated rightly that the issue of legal regulation of the relations between the state and religious communities in Western Europe “is also rather vivid and changeable” and not only in South Eastern Europe. Turning attention to the widespread view that in Europe there are three systems of regulation of those relations – the original French system of a strict separation of state and church, then the system of a state church, where the state is identified with the church of the majority population (like in Britain, Greece and some Scandinavian countries) and, finally, the model of cooperative separation, which is based on benevolent cooperation between the state and religious communities (Germany, Austria, as well as Italy and Spain) – Avramović pointed to the necessary variety of concrete solutions for each particular situation (“Legal Framework for the Relations between Church and State in Europe”, in the proceedings “Christianity and European Integration”, Belgrade, 2003, 49). For our topic Avramović’s view that in Europe there is an increasing number of supporters of the third model of regulation of relations between state and church is very important. That is the system of cooperative separation where, despite their principled separation, state and church carry out a number of activities in common interest, whose performance is not satisfactory without their mutual cooperation” (*ibid.*, 53). Indeed, the strict secularity of a French type, *laïcité à la française*, is often mentioned on various sides as an alibi for exclusive secularism, just as “anticlericalism” is often used as a justification for a rigid sectarian attitude and intolerance towards religion and church in

general, in many cases being of Bolshevik, totalitarian mental and ideological provenance. Over the past years, in the intellectual and political circles, as well as in general public in some European countries (e.g. in Italy, Spain...), there has been a lively and, at times, heated debate on how one should interpret, apply and experience the secularity of the traditionally and culturally Catholic/Christian societies under the conditions of the modern world and new civilizational challenges. It comes to polarization which brings to mind the almost forgotten clashes of the believers and laymen within the European nations. The new, value judgment of secularity is being gradually shaped by renowned intellectuals (politicians, scholars, thinkers...) who are called, with certain irony, “new enlighteners” by the commentator of the Italian daily *La Repubblica*, Mario Pirani. For them (e.g. Giuliano Amato, a reputed centre left politician) the old assumption of secularity that the place of the religious factor is strictly in the private domain, is not viable today, because religion has become not only a part of the public sphere but, moreover, “the fundamental principles of democracy, the freedom of conscience, equality and respect for the rights of all can be preserved only in a dialogue dialectic with the Church” (“I nuovi ‘illuministi’ tra Ragione e Religione”, *La Repubblica*, 15 October, 2005). He often returns to the words of (the then) Cardinal Josef Ratzinger, now the Pope Benedict XVI, that “the union of religion and reason is essential for the struggle against any phanaticism” (see: G. Amato, “Che cosa vuol dire essere laici oggi”, *La Repubblica*, 31 August 2005).

In the West Balkan societies, the recently reestablished or, for the first time, established democracies after the long period of the authoritarian, mostly communist-socialist regimes, the regulation of the relations between state and church poses an especially great challenge for understandable reasons. The complexity of the problem is certainly not lessened by the fact that it is mostly the question of multireligious and multinational states, burdened by the heavy mortgage of the historical and recent fierce conflicts. Although in all West Balkan countries, a qualitative democratic and legal shift in relation to churches and religious communities has been made, the achievements are unequal and are unevenly distributed from a structural viewpoint. Somewhere the position of churches and religious communities is regulated by law in full and somewhere it is still not; some countries finance the church activities in part and some other countries do not; somewhere the nationalized property has been restituted to the churches and religious communities and somewhere this has not been done, or such a procedure is just timidly starting; somewhere religion has been returned into schools and somewhere it has not; somewhere theological faculties have been included in the system of civil

higher education, while somewhere they do not even think about that; somewhere priests have been assigned to military barracks, hospitals and prisons and somewhere they have not... One can list for a long time the areas and specific cases which form the diversified picture of the current relations between the state and religious communities in the West Balkan region. However, that is not my intention, although this issue would deserve a serious comparative study, with the potentially very interesting and indicative cognitive results. Altogether, the situation is not uniform and still not standardized, which does not contribute to the readiness of the churches and religious communities for inter-religious dialogue. They simply have more important things to do and the problems in their relations with the authorities, which are cautiously and gradually being regarded as partners, while at the same time being on guard so as to avoid any unpleasant surprise. In large measure, the same applies to the state, but in the opposite direction.

However, incomplete laws and regulations governing the status of the churches and religious communities in the Western Balkans, as well as the “transitional” quality of their relations with the state are not the main obstacle to inter-religious dialogue. I would say that the much more serious problem is the one which Cardinal McCarrick characterized as “the other side of the freedom of religion and equality guaranteed by the secular system of government” and Dr Sima Avramović noted that “the echo of the phrase that religion is ‘the opium of the people’ is still deeply rooted here” (*op. cit.* 51). Officially, there is no obligatory scientific atheism from the communist-socialist period, about which Dr Vladeta Jerotić was speaking, but there is still its rather widely present and persistent “allotropic modification” with the democratic sign, which has been articulated as concern for the secular system, due to the alleged tendencies of “reclericalization” of the social and political space. Some parts of the political elites accept the emancipation of religion and church as a necessary evil, being inclined to instrumentalize the contacts with the religious sphere and institutions in a calculated and piecemeal basis in order to obtain political points and improve their rating in the public. In the West Balkan countries there is a considerable number of intellectuals being active in political life who experience the new position of the believers, clergy and religious communities as “collateral damage”, caused by the progress of the process of democratization. On the other hand, representatives of certain forces from the political ultraright, as well as some politicians with the serious identity crisis “push” and “pull” the church hierarchies towards some form of political involvement, which should not be peculiar to them, whereby they are actually trying to increase their own chances in

the struggle for power. There are situations in which the renowned church dignitaries, due to hesitation, inconsistency or divisions among the politicians, are forced to, or feel competent, to come out in the crucial moments as the interpreters and defenders of the national and state interests, which certainly is not the most favourable option. Finally, one can also meet ambitious religious leaders and officials who deliberately wish to mix into the division of political power and influence, sometimes in collusion with the religious-ideological centres abroad. Although it is the question of an expressly complex issue with a number of crossed and contradictory variable, which should not be evaluated unilaterally, I am still free to express my conviction that the mentioned ideological “anticlericalism”, which regards *a priori* the activity of the churches and religious communities in social matters as a threat to democracy and the secular order, is especially harmful. They actually wish, as stated by some French “deconstructivists” being on Derrida’s track (like Jean-Luc Nancy), that religion is “deconstructed” after politics because, in the opposite, they sense the danger that it might assume the role of politics and/or become its measure. Without entering into the discussion as to whether and to what extent the representatives of the churches and religious communities were right when, in some specific situations, they decided to appear in public, in a non-church context, one must note that it is difficult to expect from someone to initiate inter-religious dialogue and take a constructive part in it, while at the same time considering him to be unfit and nonqualified for cooperation in the matters of vital importance for the citizens. In what virtual space one should carry on inter-religious dialogue and contribute to reconciliation among the alive people and nations? There is no rational answer to this question because there cannot be the one.

On the basis of the above mentioned, I am convinced that only one conclusion can be derived, the one with which I started this debate as the assumption and impression. During the past ten or so years, the overall situation in the Western Balkans changed radically in many aspects, but in the changed circumstances there are too many “transition” contradictions which do not permit the beginning of a broad-based inter-religious dialogue and the use of its reconciliatory potential. Only the full awareness of the real situation and the objective factual confrontation with it, as well as sincere readiness to change it jointly in common interest can create conditions that, in ten or so years, a future analyst states to his relief that both Jerotić’s and our reasons for today’s mostly negative judgment on the state of inter-religious dialogue belong to the West Balkan history once and for all. Emphasis is placed on “once and for all”. At the same time, that will be the pledge of the European future and the future of Europe, which should

not be forgotten. Illusions always lead to disappointment and defeat, and the Balkan region has become tired of disappointment and defeat. Therefore, let us not be deceived! There is no dialogue without the truth of oneself and others, the truth that will provide a basis for building mutual confidence and respect. At the same time, this is the most difficult and most demanding path, but the other one simply does not exist. That is not the first time in the Balkans. “Let be something that cannot be!”



PASKAL MILO

FORMER ALBANIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF TIRANA, ALBANIA

THE CONCLUSION OF KOSOVO STATUS – CONTRIBUTION FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Talking about the Kosovo issues and its status even if in an international symposium, might not be welcomed by some people in Belgrade, especially if given by an Albanian, a politician and former foreign minister of Albania in the conflict time in 1999. But I am convinced, and that's why I am here today, that in our countries qualitative and positive democratic changes have occurred which allow us to sit down and discuss together even if we might not have the same thoughts and options about this case. Therefore any thought that will be expressed does not aim to hurt anyone, but only expresses a reflection of a personal position. After the decision of the Security Council of the United Nations to begin the negotiations for the future Kosovo status, the case has been dimensioned again and the discussions about it have taken a new vigor. It has returned Kosovo under the attention of chancelleries, of the international institutions and public opinion. It is an open file from many years now that is expected and has to be closed in order to normalize life in Kosovo itself, so as to open a perspective development, to free the region by a continuous hearth of crisis and to disengage the international community, even if partially, by a big burden.

There might also be other reasons which must be taken into consideration but all converge in one aim: the definition of status. But the question which subdues is: what status? The formulas have been different here, also initiated by different interests. The Security Council of the United Nations, as an international known and accepted authority and arbitrator, with its decision of some days before has only opened a path to define the future Kosovo status. From this moment a new chapter is taking life in the agitated history of Kosovo.

The most interested in its future are the people of Kosovo itself, the Albanians which make the majority, the Serb minority and other ethnic minorities who live there. The Union of Serbia-Montenegro is without any doubt very interested in the way this case will be solved, state which still formally guards the sovereignty upon Kosovo and which has legitimate rights to take care of the destiny and future of its minority in this country.

With a particular attention and with a reason the discussion of the status issue is being followed also by Macedonia and Albania as neighbouring countries with Kosovo but also by all the other countries of the region which are also sensible about the effects that are created in the security and stability of the region. These are the most interested regional factors but not the only ones and not the most decisive. The Security Council and the Contact Group will decide for an issue they have administrated for years and which have kept and will keep the future burden of overall expenses.

The negotiations will not be easy. The included parts will go there with maximal demands already known, meanwhile the international arbitrator will try, within the mandate given by the Security Council, to find the optimal solution. Will this negotiation scheme work? Predictions are hard to be done. It's important that everybody comes out as a winner by these negotiations, firstly Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo and then peace, stability and security in the region.

There are a lot of approaches to the Kosovo status, but three of them are some of the most important: the option of the Kosovo Albanians who seek its full independence. The position of the Union Serbia-Montenegro which insists on objecting the independence and has declared the formula "more than autonomy and less than independence." And a proposition made by many nonofficial and opinion-making international resources who express themselves for a conditioned independence of Kosovo.

The authors of any of these approaches argue that the solutions they offer guarantee better peace, security and stability in the Western Balkans. The main international factors, the European Union and the governments of the member countries, the United States of America and some other countries, permanent members of the Security Council have been reserved in expressing their official attitude by seeking to find themselves in a common international attitude. An exception here is maybe Russia and any other country which is inclined to support Belgrade's option.

The generally accepted thought even in Belgrade, as the minimum possible, is that Kosovo cannot return to the state it was before 1999. This is the basis on which all the minimal, intermediate and maximal options have been built about the Kosovo status. Beyond this basis the authors of these three variants also have specific arguments that justify their approaches about the Kosovo status. They are already known and repeated especially in the last days. But facing these views and arguments, even if they are known, might contribute in helping in the negotiations' progress. Led by this thought allow me to express some views which are not necessarily those of the Albanian government.

Six years after the end of the Kosovo conflict we can not use the same terminology to characterize its internal situation. Kosovo now is outside the conflict and is not a country in crisis. There might have been and there have been hearths and elements of crises which in certain moments either urged or spontaneously are lit and vivid again. Kosovo is on the way of normalizing in all fields and aspects and this is the evaluation of the special envoy of the General Secretary of the United Nations in Kosovo Kai Eide in his last evaluating report about the situation in this country presented to the Security Council last month. Of course there are still many problems and preoccupations already known which concern the rights and freedom of the Serb minority and of all other minorities in Kosovo: the return of the refugees, the properties, unemployment, poverty and rhythms of economical development, the citizen's security, protection of the cultural monuments and religious traditions, the fight against corruption and organized crime, etc.

Precisely these have been and remain primary responsibilities of the Kosovo and international institutions present in the country by fulfilling so the requested standards in order to go towards the creation of a democratic and multiethnic society. This is a process that needs its own time and that has to be encouraged because such deficiencies in a size or another are found even in other countries of the Western Balkans, including here Albania and the Union Serbia-Montenegro. Facing these problems requests the enforcement of the central institutions of Kosovo, giving competences for full decision making, the involvement of the Serb minority representatives in this process, the deepening of decentralization, etc. The actual Kosovo status does not guarantee to the central and local institutions opportunities to exercise competences and powers in function of accomplishing these objectives and this is a general observation accepted by all. The problems and the long run future of Kosovo cannot be solved nor defined by others, whoever they might be, international or regional factors, with all the good desire and will they might have. It's the people of Kosovo itself who with their free will take responsibilities for their own future. Actually it needs to be assisted not in a paternalistic way, to define the status in accordance with this expressed will. There is also a clear articulate desire of the majority of the Kosovo population which is Albanian and seeks for its full independence. This population has its own rights which should be realized without violating the rights of others who have lived together for centuries. That's why the next formula of the Kosovo status should take into consideration the creation of circumstances and mechanisms that guarantee a stable and democratic cohabitation between the Albanian majority and the Serb minority and other minorities who

live there. This should be the main concern of the future negotiations, by the solution of which will depend the stability and the future of Kosovo and of the whole region.

Kosovo cannot turn back, it looks ahead as well as the other countries of the Western Balkans. She also cannot be chopped to pieces, or touched in her territorial integrity which is known by everyone. Practically, it broke away from Serbia at the end of the conflict of 1999 even if the 1244 resolution of the Security Council still formally recognizes the sovereignty of the Union Serbia-Montenegro. Now it's time that Serbia "sets free" from Kosovo, and gets back to realpolitics which is so necessary, to administrate and use the energies, the potentials, the resources and the precious time for her own economical prosperity and european future. There are lots of people in Serbia who think in this way among which are also politicians and intellectuals. By respecting the solidarity and responsibility for fate, the rights and freedoms of their co-natives in Kosovo, they have to gain the lost time and politics should come out from prejudices and temporary electoral calculations. This would be not only a precious service to Serbia but also to peace and security in the region.

The next Kosovo status will be a vital element for the stability of the whole Western Balkans aswell, especially for its neighbouring countries. The finalization of this status according to the free will of the people of Kosovo would lower sharply the inter-ethnic tensions and would extinguish their hearths or the sources of encouragement. Any comparison of Kosovo with other countries and any hesitation to give a satisfying solution so as not to create political and legal precedent is non- realistic. The future Kosovo issue might have similarities up to some point with other countries, but her totality in substance, dimension and time makes her unique, by seeking at any rate a solution that adapts only to this profile. Any other attempt or tendency about Kosovo would solve an issue opened somewhere else, but it would not be able to touch the "Kosovo problem itself". In my opinion the definitions of status are made by three main elements; the first: the compilation of an agreement of the Rambuje type; the second: a framework of arrangements about the regulation of Kosovo relations with the neighbouring countries; the third: an arrangement for the regulation of inter-ethnic relations inside Kosovo. The arrangement of status under the form of a treaty or agreement would be or would also bring, in the same time, international guarantees for not changing the borders between Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia. The intensive moves and contacts that are pre-leading the opening of the negotiations between the representatives of the governments of the region have in their agendas also the discussion of this issue. Albania has declared clearly and in a repeated

way that it is against the creation of the so called "Greater Albania". The Albanian governments of all political colours have come naturally to this position because they have been and are aware that the future of Albania and of the other countries of the region is not shut down in the trench of nationalism but in the regional and european integration of them. This is a general opinion in Albania and only some people, most of which political speculators, still keep the idea.

Albania, in an understandable way, is sensible about the Kosovo issue. Her interest does not go beyond the legitimate rights for the fate of her co-natives, for their european democratic future. The Albanian governments have tried to play a constructive role in the developments of Kosovo and many times they have been under the target of critics of political parties and Kosovo media when they have not supported their demands as happened in the last case with a proposal of a conditioned independence of Kosovo. Albania will follow very attentively the opening and development of the negotiations but she is aware that the fate and future of Kosovo will not depend neither from her and nor from any other country in the region. It is a process which has already taken a path and is irreversible.

The common future of Western Balkan countries is already outlined. Croatia has been accepted as a candidate country for the European Union, Macedonia hopes to win the same position, and Albania is close to assigning the Stabilization and Association Agreement. As for the Union of Serbia and Montenegro it was just decided to begin the negotiations for this agreement, meanwhile such a thing is hoped also for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kosovo will have its place in this process too. The integration in EU as a real perspective would impede the demons of nationalism to keep hostage the stability and security in the Western Balkans.

JONATHAN BRADLEY

PRINCIPAL LECTURER,

UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST OF ENGLAND

CHAIRMAN, THE BALKAN FUND

CHAIRMAN, INVESCO PERPETUAL EUROPEAN INVESTMENT TRUST PLC

RECONCILIATION THROUGH DEVELOPMENT?¹

ABSTRACT

Using an eclectic analytical approach, this paper examines three main questions: in what ways can economic development help to promote reconciliation, what can the spheres of business and economics offer to “conciliatory development,” and what practical measures might be envisaged for the Balkans? After offering attempted definitions of development the paper concludes that it is necessary but not sufficient to promote lasting reconciliation and that business activity and economic thinking may be able to help in its promotion. It concludes by suggesting some policy principles and practical measures for the future.

INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this paper is to discuss whether development really can promote reconciliation, but in passing it will glance also at the question of whether reconciliation can promote development. First of all I shall offer brief definitions of terms, then explore some theoretical issues, and finally outline some practical suggestions for action.

I shall try to examine three main questions:

- Can development help to promote reconciliation and tolerance?
- What can the spheres of economics and business offer to what I shall call “conciliatory development”?
- What practical measures can we envisage in the Balkans for promoting it?

CAN DEVELOPMENT BRING RECONCILIATION?

Reconciliation

What do we mean by reconciliation? It is to make friendly again after estrangement or conflict, to bring about acceptance of what is, to set-

¹ This paper is the copyright of the author and no part of it may be quoted or reprinted without his written permission.

tle quarrels, to engender compatibility, to harmonise. Very often reconciliation involves bringing together again people who have been divided. Clearly this is difficult to do if the people concerned have been divided for a long time or if, occasionally, they have always been mutually hostile.

First of all, people need to be reconciled with their own situation, because it is difficult to go somewhere else if you have not accepted that you are where you are. I have the impression, for instance, that in Serbia an attitude survives even now that can be summed up thus: “how did things come to this? It must be the fault of somebody else”. This is conjecture on my part; I have no regression models to prove it. Full reconciliation with the rest of the world will come only with the acceptance of the stark reality of the situation of the country, and with the will to live for the future rather than in the past.

The next logical step is an understanding of others, and of their situation; this may lead eventually to sympathy and tolerance. Tempers have to cool, unpleasant memories have to fade, and the first glimmerings of renewed friendship may appear. This is presumably what Nelson Mandela meant when he said: “true reconciliation does not consist in merely forgetting the past” (Mandela, 1996). For this tentative friendship to evolve into sustainable reconciliation and peace it is likely that many ordinary people will spend years going about their relatively mundane business in practical ways that encourage them to relate positively to one another.

In some ways reconciliation between national states may be less difficult than the pursuit of it in an inter-ethnic context. The citizens of nation states derive a degree of confidence and security, however misplaced, from the existence of national borders. A line on a map can make people feel safer, and their rulers can seek arrangements with the rulers of previously hostile states according to the cool exigencies of inter-state *realpolitik* rather than the emotional urgings of popular sentiment. Rebuilding inter-ethnic trust may be more protracted. Engendering widespread personal trust between Serbs and Albanians, Muslims and Christians, or Greeks and Turks may also entail overcoming the animus of personal hatred and revenge.

Let us now examine the meaning of development and investigate what it might contribute.

Development

There does not exist one generally accepted definition of development. It is a term used in economics, political science, anthropology, sociology and other academic disciplines in slightly different ways. Even those working within these disciplines are not agreed about precisely what they

are trying to do. Recent work in economic anthropology, for instance, has explored some of the divisions within that sub-discipline, such as that between practising anthropologists and “critical” anthropologists (Cohen and Dannhaeuser, 2002).

I shall concentrate mainly on *economic* development. Economists too have varied conceptions of the meaning, purpose and measurement of development. A common basic starting point is the amelioration of human welfare, with reference to variables that can be measured, such as physical production, roads and railways, standards of housing, and above all, real Gross National Product per head. The enormous literature on the subject has added many refinements, many of them attempting to encompass wider and more informative indicators of the state of human welfare. The sub-discipline of development economics is particularly devoted to matters such as the economic institutional framework, provision of infrastructure, the planning of population growth and increasing agricultural yields.

A much wider and more imaginative notion of development is propounded by the economist Amartya Sen, in a book with a title that itself speaks volumes: *Development as Freedom* (Sen, 1999). “Development”, he says, “can be seen...as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen, p.3). He looks beyond material improvement to the fundamental human values that increased wealth may help us to attain. In this view, founded on the observation that material poverty is likely to impose a serious restriction of the choices available to us, freedom is an end in itself but also an effective means of promoting greater prosperity for all. Freedom and development are not synonymous, but they are mutually supportive, even symbiotic. The importance of freedom is therefore both that it is a yardstick against which to gauge development *and* an effective means of achieving it. He supports his view, I believe convincingly, with ample theoretical underpinning and hard empirical evidence.

One of the attractions of a view of development as the pursuit of freedom is that it may appeal not only to our practical need for food, shelter, and increasing wealth, but also to our need for inspirational ideals. We may *desire* pork sausages, but unless we are pathological *gourmands* we are unlikely to *believe* in them as guiding stars for our life or our nation. Who is likely to be inspired by a sausage? We could, however, believe in a widely construed developmental freedom that may include the consumption of pork sausages. If human beings can be inspired by it then it may lead to more durable results, and this would be particularly helpful if it could also be shown to contribute to reconciliation and peace. Sen’s view of development appeals to me and is so widely accepted that I intend to use it as a working assumption for this paper.

We should not just assume that development will of itself lead to reconciliation. This seems often to be taken for granted, but we need to examine the claim more closely. We could cheat, of course, by defining development so widely that it encompassed peace within its meaning, and so that development would be said not to have occurred if peace were not present. This line of reasoning would maintain that peace, the intended outcome of reconciliation, is in effect *freedom from conflict*, and so a necessary part of the ultimate outcome of development. I do not think, however, that this would really help, especially if we see freedom more as the unconstrained capability to act. Can we not imagine that a free or well-fed person could be involved in conflict? It seems clear that these terms should be separately defined, that they are actually different phenomena in the real world, and that they represent distinct goals for policy-makers.

If this is so, how might we suppose that development, as understood here in Sen's meaning of the word, could promote reconciliation and tolerance? First of all let us look at some difficult evidence, which initially looks distinctly unhelpful. In a major study of the causes of civil conflict, "economic development and modernization" are identified as one of the significant underlying causes of it (Brown, 1996). Economic development brings change, such as movements of population, alterations in relative income and wealth, inequalities, or industrialisation that can lead to civil and international tension.

Another recent analysis of the early warning signs for conflict observes that there is no conclusive evidence linking economic hardship with violent conflict – what is known as the *relative deprivation hypothesis*. This study does, however, acknowledge the likelihood that economic problems and distribution issues may have exacerbated intercommunal violence in the Balkans. The same work refers to "normality indicators" used by peace-keeping commanders in Bosnia in 1996, which included the prices of many everyday foodstuffs and the frequency of public transport, in an attempt to judge the danger of further violence. Overall, the author is sceptical about their value (Last, 2003).

There remains also the theoretical problem: what about the converse – if there is a questionable link between deprivation and violence is it likely that the existence of abundant sufficiency will bring about peace?

Another sceptic is Graeme Simpson of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. In an academic paper, again using Bosnia as an example, he sets out five reasons why it cannot be taken for granted that economic reconstruction and growth will lead to reduced social con-

flict. The first of these is that ethnic and religious identities are difficult to demobilise once they have been activated. Secondly, he too points out that development generates its own forms of social conflict, related to the scarcity of resources (the principal claimed purpose of the study of economics – this author’s comment). Thirdly he observes that conflict may change its shape, transmuting, for instance, from inter-ethnic discord into criminal activity. Fourthly, reconstruction may not redress previous inequities, and may even worsen some of them; and fifthly, economic change does necessarily result in more accountable and transparent state institutions or private sector organisations (Simpson, 1997).

The essence of Simpson’s argument is not that economic development is unnecessary, or that it cannot be helpful in bringing peace and reconciliation, but that it is not in itself *sufficient*. It is, in that phrase much favoured by economists, necessary but not sufficient.

There is, however, also evidence supporting the contention that greater economic development, in the right circumstances, is more likely than not to reduce tension and promote peace. To start with, there are good theoretical reasons. An obvious economic reason is that increased wealth may raise the opportunity cost of war beyond what it was previously. This would be true theoretically even if there might be expected gains from conflict. If you have become wealthier the potential marginal net benefit of conflict will reduce, all other things being equal. At the most basic, if you have the main physical requirements of your life you do not *need* to resort to violence in order to acquire them, even if from time to time you may do so.

There is also useful empirical evidence supporting the positive connection between development and peace. In a series of well-known publications, Collier and Hoeffler have found and reported some interesting conclusions. First of all they have shown a clear statistical correlation between levels of per capita income and the incidence of violent civil disturbance (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002), so that richer countries are less likely to suffer internal conflict, and poorer countries more likely. Other authorities also have commented on the observed links between civil conflict and economic motivations, many of them connected with underdevelopment.² The reasonable supposition would be that by removing conflict-inducing economic motivations peace might be encouraged. Secondly, using econometric modelling, Collier and Hoeffler show statistical evidence that high

² For a comprehensive bibliography of literature concerned with this and related issues consult: “A Selected Bibliography of Studies of Civil War”, available on www.worldbank.org, posted 5 July 2003.

military spending by the former participants after conflicts significantly increases the risk of renewed conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). This is an especially important finding to which I shall refer again below. Gurr and Duvall find that “greater social justice within nations in the distribution of economic goods and political autonomy is the most potent path to social peace” (Gurr and Duvall, 1973). The Carnegie Institute takes a balanced view, seeing economic conditions as powerful agents for good or for ill, depending on the circumstances (Carnegie, 1997). Rowlands and Joseph, in an analysis of how the International Monetary Fund could contribute towards preventing conflict, appear to echo this view, writing: “...there appear to be sufficient grounds for recommending that the IMF routinely incorporate an evaluation of the conflict potential of member states in their country review process” (Rowlands and Smith, 2003).

I think we may reach some tentative conclusions from this brief review of some of the literature. First of all, although the relationship between economic prosperity and development on the one hand and peaceful existence on the other hand is both complex and contingent, the weight of theoretical and empirical evidence is that *on balance* development should in principle be helpful rather than harmful to reconciliation. It should be acknowledged honestly that the evidence is contradictory, so how can we tip the balance further in a favourable direction?

It is at this point that I propose my small and humble addition to Sen’s account of development as freedom. We have seen how even his widely construed interpretation of development does not necessarily fully encompass human reconciliation. We have also seen that the empirical evidence shows that economic development may not be enough in itself to reduce or prevent conflict. I suggest, therefore, that development, albeit understood in terms of the pursuit of freedom, is also conducted in a manner conducive to human concord. Development and reconciliation have to be conducted in a mutually supportive fashion. This would be *conciliatory* development, deliberately designed to reduce tension and to encourage reconciliation among people, and, I suspect, entirely consistent with Sen’s broad view. This is a small but potentially very important addition, which, I shall attempt to demonstrate, may have clear implications for public policy.

A note on economics and religious tolerance

Religious tolerance comes in different forms. In 16th and 17th century Protestant England “tolerance” of Roman Catholics consisted principally in *not burning* them. This was a minimalist interpretation of tolerance that we would readily recognise now as insufficient. In the fullest sense of the

term we would hope that tolerance goes further than allowing the other person to live; it should also involve trying to understand the religion of another person and, if possible, to find common ground with them. I shall not be diverted into a discussion about whether some (or even all) religions may perhaps possess an intrinsic tendency towards intolerance of other religions. I am a political economist and I must stick to my brief.

A first glance at the history of religious intolerance might tempt us to suppose that it could have beneficial economic effects. We could point to the prosperity of the mercantile Jews in mediaeval and renaissance Europe, driven to concentrate on their business ventures by their exclusion from the corridors of political power and from normal social intercourse. We could note the stimulative effects of the alienation of Protestants from Catholic Europe at the time of the Reformation, and the great benefit to the English economy of Huguenot refugees after their banishment from France by an intolerant and murderous monarch. We could, perhaps, invoke Weber and Tawney, with their accounts of the connection between Protestantism and the rise of the most dynamic economic system ever experienced, capitalism (Tawney, 1926), Weber (1958).

I would suggest, though, that we can turn these arguments on their head. Even if it stimulated achievement amongst some Jews, intolerance of them impoverished the economic lives of their Christian excluders, who could have benefited from a tolerant integration of them into all aspects of normal society. Similarly it was not so much the intolerance of Protestants by Counter-Reformation Catholics that gave nascent capitalism its impetus but the enterprising free-thinking of the Protestants. A more liberal or imaginative Catholicism could have nurtured capitalist enterprise, as indeed it has done in more recent times.

Besides which, at a basic economic level religious intolerance is wasteful of economic resources that could more fruitfully be allocated elsewhere. Every minute that is dissipated in hating a Muslim or a Christian is one less minute spent making money! Able people are excluded from jobs that they could perform well, trade is stifled that could be mutually profitable; resources are needlessly diverted towards protective security when they could be spent on new roads; so the list could go on. In the end religious intolerance can only be economically harmful, and it could be an unusual avenue of research for a postgraduate student to try to measure by just how much. For good economic reasons, quite apart from moral or philosophical, the pursuit of religious tolerance should be part also of any plans for a conciliatory development.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS TO CONCILIATORY DEVELOPMENT

The Role of Economics

In her great essay *On Violence*, Hannah Arendt quotes Friedrich Engels as defining violence as “the accelerator of economic development” because of its capability to further the supposed economic laws of history (Arendt, 1973). His view was coloured, of course, by his belief, shared with his friend Karl Marx, that capitalism should and would eventually be destroyed as a result of its own inherent contradictions. As we know, capitalism in its many shapes is still alive and kicking. We are looking for the opposite and mirror image of Engels’s vision: economic development as the *decelerator* of violence. Let me mention two elementary ways in which market economics, which lies at the heart of capitalist systems, may be able to help in finding this philosopher’s stone.

There are at least two simple concepts much used in economic theory and analysis that may be able to contribute markedly to an elaboration of the economics and business of conciliatory development: incremental adjustment and equilibrium. There is nothing sophisticated or original about this, but sometimes old ideas can be surprisingly useful.

A key aspect of market-orientated economic systems operating in relatively normal circumstances that gives them robustness and vitality is the ability to adjust incrementally, that is to undergo many small changes that allow them to thrive and grow. In small countries as much as in large ones every day of economic life brings many millions of transactions freely determined by those making them. Every day, prices, wages, or investment decisions, may change just a little, so that a system that may look superficially the same has in fact changed imperceptibly. This capability has stirred many economic thinkers into an almost messianic zeal for the wonderful properties of the market as an economic mechanism. Milton Friedman, for instance, remarks that in a well functioning market every transaction is entered into for the benefit of two parties, that it permits wide diversity and is effectively “a system of proportional representation. Each man can vote for the colour of tie he wants and get it; he does not have to see what colour the majority wants...” (Friedman, 1962, p.15). It is a system, he believes, that “permits unanimity without conformity” (ibid., p.24).

I hardly need to recall the many objections and sceptical voices that have been raised against the supposedly perfect nature of the free market. Marx, Keynes and Sen are thinkers mentioned elsewhere in this paper

who have all, in their different ways, called the market into question. Nevertheless, it is not just the only serious contender in the modern world for achieving a functioning economy, but it is also not hard to see how the judicious employment of market systems might enhance conciliatory development. Well-functioning markets are blind to religion, nationality or ethnic origin, they encourage exchange between strangers for mutual economic benefit, they allow diversity, they permit incremental change, and they spread decision-making very widely. That is a good start.

In economics equilibrium is a situation in which people have no immediate reason to change their actions, because it is at least temporarily satisfactory. On a broad canvas, in respect of entire economies, equilibrium refers to conditions where activity and price levels are such that the plans of various groups such as savers and investors are consistent, so that they can all be put into effect. Stable equilibria are not always easy to achieve, and one of the great questions of economic policy is to accomplish an equilibrium in which growth, employment, inflation, and economic equity are in an optimal and predictable relationship with one another. The nature of the equilibrium is important. Two warriors locked in equal combat could be said to be in equilibrium. They would still be in equilibrium having just killed one another! Economic equilibrium is not in itself enough, but an equilibrium containing favourable macroeconomic variables *and* subject to policy constraints designed to encourage reconciliation and safeguard peace would a valuable outcome. I shall discuss below what these conciliatory elements might be. I am well aware that game theory uses the concept of equilibrium, and that it has useful insights to offer in the realm of peacekeeping, but there simply is not space to discuss them here.

Economics is sometimes accused of being a cruel and heartless science, which belittles moral values in an excessive attention to the material world. Adam Smith and Amartya Sen both seem to me to be very good examples of great economic thinkers who have shown in their work that economics as a discipline is not devoid of moral content. The shaping of economic policy to pursue reconciliation in the name of peace strikes me as an admirable way to follow their lead.

The Role of Business

I interpret business, in this context, as the world of practical economics, and many of the theoretical observations made above about the academic discipline of economics would apply also to business. In the same way that overall economic conditions can influence social and inter-ethnic relations either positively or negatively, so also can business enterprises.

The patterns of ownership of them, their market behaviour, the nature of their governance arrangements, methods of financing them, their attitude towards their customers and their employees, all have the potential to sow discord or to promote concord.

In general terms the legitimate pursuit of business objectives for private gain can be regarded as beneficial for society at large. I hope you will forgive me for mentioning Adam Smith again. The following passage is so well known that I almost hesitate to include it:

“Every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of society as great as he can. He generally neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. He intends only his only gain, and he is, in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.” (Smith, 1776)

Smith did not, however, envisage an economic system devoid of values; far from it. Sen discusses the application of values in economic relations by Smith, Montesquieu and others, referring to “the fact that the pursuit of interest in an intelligent and rational way can be a great moral improvement over being driven by fervour, craving and tyrannical propensities.” He further quotes with approval Alfred Hirschman’s analysis (Hirschman, 1977) of the way in which “the early champions of capitalism saw a great motivational improvement in the emergence of capitalist ethics” (Sen, 1999, p.263) – interesting and perhaps surprising words. Max Weber, too, observed the multifaceted nature of capitalist business endeavour: “unlimited greed for gain is not in the least identical with capitalism, and is still less its spirit.” (Weber, 1958)

In practical terms we need to identify what there is in business activity that is potentially conciliatory or divisive and act accordingly in making policy. In doing so we must certainly distinguish carefully in what ways it is helpful for public authority to intervene in business affairs, and avoid interventions that could reduce the economic effectiveness of the market capitalist system. Equally, we should note that private businesses, as well as governments, have the means to affect economic life and therefore to contribute to conciliatory or to divisive behaviour. The operation of business in this domain may be paradoxical: businesses nurture teamwork and cooperative activity in pursuit of their own commercial objectives, and simultaneously engage in ruthless competition with other businesses. Individuals and social groups may, however, find these contradictions useful in learning how to accord cooperative and competitive behaviour to their appropriate realms and how to place civilised limits on them.

Jerzy Muller concludes his scholarly review of capitalist thought with a discussion of the intellectual tensions experienced in a capitalist era. He writes:

“An awareness of how these tensions came about and why they are intrinsic to the human condition in a market society...may lead us to greater criticism or greater reconciliation.” (Muller, 2002)

This comment seems very wise and accentuates the need to choose a road that leads towards reconciliation.

Practical measures for the Balkans

Where we are and where we have come from

So far, much of what I have written has been concerned with the theoretical basis for linking economic development and reconciliation. This section will describe briefly the economic situation of Balkan countries, identify key persisting problems, and offer some tentative suggestions for development policy that is self-consciously conciliatory.

Table 1 shows what we all know already: that the output per head in Balkan countries as measured in terms of Gross Domestic Product is relatively low, with a simple average of only \$3,190 in 2004 (we do not yet have the figures for this year).³ The equivalent figure for Slovenia, by the way, was \$16,250. We can also see from the table that in 2004 only two countries on the list had exceeded their real output level in 1989. Sadly this is probably not because of any inherent superiority in the capability of the Albanian or the Romanian economies, but because they started from exceptionally low levels at first, and although they have had their problems they have not experienced long civil wars. By far the most shocking figure is that for this country, Serbia and Montenegro, where real output in 2004 was only a little more than half its level in 1989. Also included in the table is a column showing the Human Development Index for each country as calculated by the United Nations. This is the very index that Amartya Sen helped to design. It takes account of several indicators of human development, such as life expectancy, literacy and education, as well as of economic output per head. The United Nations tables are divided into three sections: high, medium and low human development. Two of the countries in the table, Croatia and Bulgaria, appear in the “high development” section, the higher of them, Croatia, appearing below Kuwait and above Uruguay. Four others, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mac-

³ Most of the GDP per head figures would be somewhat higher if computed on a Purchasing Power Parity basis. Comparable figures for 2004 were not available at the time of writing.

edonia, and Romania, are in the “medium development” section, and Serbia-Montenegro does not appear at all in the table. The lowest, Albania, appears just above Thailand.

Table 1. GDP comparisons in the Balkans: 2004

Balkan countries:	\$ GDP per capita: June 2005	Real GDP (1989=100):	Human Development Index 2003
Albania	2,230	131.6	0.780
Bosnia & Herzegovina	2,070	70.9	0.786
Bulgaria	3,130	92.0	0.808
Croatia	7,340	94.7	0.841
Macedonia	2,590	83.5	0.797
Romania	3,180	100.2	0.792
Serbia & Montenegro	2,790	55.3	Not listed
Balkans	3,190	87.1	
Sources:	Economist Intelligence Unit	EIU	United Nations

For centuries human beings have been making war, and in the process have been impoverishing themselves. The ancient Chinese student of war, Sun-tzu, who lived at least one century earlier than Plato, but at the other end of the known world, wrote of the huge cost of warfare that it “drains the pockets of the common people and the public treasury.” His conclusion was that in war, “ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle, but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting” (Sun-tzu, circa 490 bc and 2005). Fighting is extremely expensive in human and economic terms, as the countries of the Western Balkans found in the 1990s.

There is no need to offer further explanation to people in the Western Balkans about the impoverishing effects of war, and I shall not. There is, though, a long history of relative underdevelopment in the Balkans as a whole, as war and poverty have interacted malignly in a long and damaging dance of death. Until the advent of Communist regimes to most of the countries in the late 1940s they were predominantly agrarian economies with low output per head.

The economy of Yugoslavia differed internally from those of other Communist countries, being much less centralised and making more use of market mechanisms, and was more open to international trade. Even so much of it was, by the standards of Western Europe, underdeveloped.

In 1989 and 1990 all of the previously Communist countries experienced revolutions or regime change, and their new governments ostensibly embarked on reform programmes to create properly functioning open market economies. Bulgaria and Romania were initially half-hearted

about this; Albania began a long descent into anarchy. Yugoslavia, despite having previously been the most independent-minded and liberal of the former Communist states, ironically came under the sway of Milosevic's socialist regime, which attempted to preserve many of the salient characteristics of the previous system.

The problems associated with such an inauspicious start along the road to capitalist market economics were then massively compounded by the outbreak of war in 1991. It is therefore not easy to separate clearly the economic effects of war from those associated with the transition process itself. In other post-Communist states the transformation of their economies from centralised command-based systems into market economies was a long, arduous, and often traumatic task, involving output slumps, rising unemployment and high inflation. Even without war it can be assumed that the Balkan states would have experienced these difficulties, but in a war setting they were much more acute.

“Conciliatory” development for some key economic problems in the Balkan region

In this last section of the paper I shall extend my discussion of some of the key economic problems described above and explore what kind of solutions might be sought in a “conciliatory” economic development policy. There is a large and growing literature on the economic development of this region. For example, an early post-war discussion of local conditions took place in the conference organised by the European Movement here in Belgrade in 2001. The published conference proceedings contain many excellent proposals for economic and political development (Lopandic, 2002).

BAD HABITS FROM THE “WAR ECONOMY”

Immediately post-war economies inherit many of their main attributes from war economies, so reconstruction efforts clearly need to be designed to match their unusual configuration and to promote economic structures and patterns of behaviour more appropriate to peacetime. As Goodhand has pointed out, in his work on the post-war economy of Afghanistan, disfunctional aspects of war economies may persist perniciously unless active measures are taken to counter them. Administrative corruption and smuggling would be two obvious examples of this.

Table 2 uses Goodhand's methodology to summarise key aspects of the war economy in combatant countries such as former Yugoslavia. Of course, the experience of Afghanistan is not directly comparable with that of the Balkans, for two main reasons: Afghanistan was even poorer than

the poorest of Balkan countries and a state of war existed for far longer there than in the Balkans. Nevertheless there are sufficient similarities to justify the use of a modified version of the analysis.

Table 2. The structure of the war economy

	The Combat Economy	The Shadow Economy	The Coping Economy
Who?	Official armed forces, militia commanders, politicians, armaments and munitions suppliers	Smugglers, bandits, corrupt officials, workers in war supplies industries	Households, refugees, under-employed state employees, workers in non-war industries
Why?	Pursuit of war aims, personal enrichment; some have interest in continued war	Profiting from the opportunities of war; end of war may be economically difficult	Survival, maintenance of family income and asset base; want peace, and benefit from it
How?	Controls, high taxation, printing money, confiscation, sanctions-busting, blockades	Trafficking, of arms, people and narcotics, suborning of officials and politicians	Family networks, casualisation and splintering of working patterns
What effects?	Inflation, shortages, market distortions and disruption, migration, impoverishment	"New war rich", inequalities, weakening of state, rule of law and business ethics	Erosion of human, social and physical capital, lack of investment

Source: Adapted for Balkan experience from Goodhand, 2004.

Goodhand segments the economy of a state at war into three principal categories. The first of these is the Combat Economy, which is concerned with the production and allocation of resources in pursuit of war. The second is called the Shadow Economy, which refers to economic activities conducted apart from the state in the context of a war economy, and the third is the Coping Economy, referring to the vast majority of the population, simply maintaining or even eroding their personal asset base.

The table, assembled by the present author taking account of Balkan conditions, gives some clues about the kind of economy that existed at the end of the war in the countries directly involved in it. Although neighbouring states were not all affected in the same way, some of them undoubtedly experienced similar problems. Smuggling, for instance, takes place across borders and necessarily involves more than one state. Since trade patterns were seriously distorted by war many states were affected.

Many of the patterns of economic behaviour encouraged by war have disappeared or are being tackled. Some, such as the trafficking of drugs and people (mainly women), corruption, and tax evasion, perniciously endure. Such practices deplete the public purse, weigh as a burden on the honest, breed cynicism, and cause dissension. A conciliatory development

plan needs to include strong and honest policing, stringent penalties for corruption and an enforceable tax regime. Failure to address these issues could lead to renewed tension. Some post-communist states have been experimenting with so-called “flat tax” systems. Perhaps they should be investigated for Western Balkan countries. There is a lot of research to be done in this area. In summary, policy needs to ensure that there exists a peace economy and not a half-reformed war economy.

DEFENCE SPENDING

In the light of the clear results of empirical research showing a close link between spending on armaments it would seem to make good sense to monitor spending in this region closely, and for individual states to disclose clearly to others how much they plan to spend and on exactly what (see Collier and Hoeffler, 2002 and 2004). This at least would be a simple and inexpensive way for nation states to build greater trust between them. Table 3 shows estimated military spending by states in the Balkan region, along with the United Kingdom for comparative purposes, in 1999 and 2002. At the time or writing comprehensive reliable figures were not available for 2004, but according to provisional figures compiled by the CIA military spending as a proportion of GNP in Balkan region states appears to be lower in 2004 than it was in 2002 (CIA, 2005). If this is true then it would be a very healthy move in the direction of reconciliatory development.

Table 3. Defence Spending in Balkan countries as % of GDP

Country	1999 WMEAT est	2002 IISS est
United Kingdom	2.5	2.4
Albania	1.3	2.5
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4.4	3.8
Bulgaria	3.0	2.5
Croatia	6.5	2.4
Greece	4.7	4.4
Macedonia	2.5	2.7
Moldova	0.5	1.7
Romania	1.6	2.3
Serbia-Montenegro	5.0	5.3
Slovenia	1.4	1.5
Turkey	5.3	5.1

Sources: World Military Expenditures and Arms Tranfers from United States Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control; International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Military Balance: 2003-2004, OUP, p10. Drawn from “Comparisons of US and Foreign Military Spending: Data from Selected Public Sources, CRS Report for Congress, January 28 2004, by Jeffrey Chamberlain.

“BRAIN DRAIN”

On my visits to the countries of this region I frequently hear concern expressed about the leakage of talent and expertise to other countries, and the associated fear that more free movement of people would be economically harmful, leaving peripheral and marginal states full of the elderly and unemployable. These fears and worries are understandable. Very similar things used to be said in the Irish Republic twenty years ago and that country now has a high GNP per head, and a well-educated and relatively young population. Many factors have contributed to Irish success, but two of the principal reasons have been European Union membership and liberal economic policies, and both of these lie within the reach of many Balkan states.

The relevance of this to reconciliation is that there must surely be few more certain ways of ensuring that the young, mobile, and able will seek their fortunes elsewhere in the world than by failing to tackle intolerance or the fear of renewed conflict. This is an example of the reverse process at work, where reconciliation can help to encourage young talent to stay in the Balkans, and contribute to its economic development. Any other policy that promotes economic prosperity will tend to the same end, as will the determination to continue with high education standards here.

POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

It is widely agreed that a significant proportion of the populations of Balkan states live at or below the “poverty line.” In some cases the social groupings worst affected still harbour bitterness about the circumstances that they believe led to their poverty. Many of these people are refugees or minority groups. There are no easy answers to the reduction of poverty, but the problem should be seen as a danger to peace as well as an economic or moral matter. This is a major issue, and my comment here is little more than a pointer to further research and analysis, but there cannot be much doubt that any conciliatory development must have a poverty reduction programme at its heart, preferable co-ordinated amongst nations of the region.

BARRIERS TO TRADE

Policy-makers and academics alike have agreed on the vital importance of trade for the pursuit of economic renewal and considerable progress has already been made since the end of the wars. Trade, after all, can be way a of persuading otherwise wary peoples to have dealings with each other. The history of regional trade, however, is not encouraging. Gligorov found that in 1997, after the end of the Bosnian phase of the war, but before the

Kosovo conflict, there were very patchy trade linkages. He lists 10 countries in his trade survey, amongst which there were 45 possible bilateral trading relationships. Well over one third of these possible relationships were either absent or so small as to be insignificant. There was very little or no trade between, for instance, Croatia and Romania, or, more surprisingly, between Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the basis of this interesting study he reaches several conclusions: that the Balkans were not a trade-creating area, that historical barriers to trade were very persistent, that trade with the EU was more important than trade within the Balkans, and that this is an “area in which the regional regime of doing business is the one that can be characterized as that of illiberal trade”. (Gligorov, 2001)

Following the end of war we can see that a concerted effort has been made by regional and international negotiators to change these long-ingrained habits and to stimulate higher levels of intra-regional trade. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2001 by seven countries and by a further country in 2003 had as its ultimate purpose the creation of a Balkan free trade Area.

According to Messerlin and Miroudot, there has been since late 2003 a quasi free trade area in the Balkan region for many industrial products. By contrast, there were still many trade barriers in intermediate products such as textile fibres, word products, chemicals and metals, and in agriculture, where only 6 of the FTAs had instituted free trade.

Since agriculture is a major contributor to total output in most Balkan countries, and notoriously politically sensitive in any part of the world, this finding was perhaps predictable, but also an indicator of the obstacles still to be overcome. The creation of a fully functional and well-disciplined free trade area should be a policy priority. This will be beneficial not only in itself but in facilitating a smoother movement into the strong gravitational influence of the EU. At the Ministerial Meeting of the Stability Pact Trade Working Group at Rome, in November 2003, the EU Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy said: “...trade liberalisation is a cornerstone of the EU Stabilisation and Association process for the Western Balkans. Free trade creates the necessary conditions to achieve what we all want: prosperity, stability and peace.” (Lamy, 2003). All the countries of the Balkans that are not already members have expressed a public wish to join the EU, and further trade liberalisation and integration would be excellent means of further expediting their strategic objectives and encouraging peaceful cooperation.

The Balkan countries would benefit from massive foreign investment, and the lack of it would be a large barrier to future peaceful evolution. Happily, the potential for the development of a full Balkan Free Trade Area, together with the stability engendered by the EU “Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe”, has already yielded positive benefits for the region in terms of significant increases in foreign direct investment. A strong surge in FDI to the Balkans was experienced in 2003-2004, coincident with a slowdown in that going to Central Europe (Kekic, 2005). This is most encouraging for Balkan economic recovery prospects as it suggests that foreign private investors have finally discounted the political and security risks associated with the region and that investor confidence is growing. Table 4 below illustrates the scale of FDI adjustments in the Balkan region since 2000.

Table 4. FDI inflows by country (\$m)

Country:	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Albania	143	207	135	178	341
Bosnia & Herzegovina	146	119	268	382	650
Bulgaria	1,002	813	905	2,097	1,803
Croatia	1,089	1,559	1,124	1,998	1,076
Macedonia	175	442	78	95	150
Romania	1,037	1,157	1,144	2,239	5,100
Serbia & Montenegro	25	165	562	1,542	1,040
Balkans	3,617	4,461	4,215	8,531	10,160

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

While the FDI inflow pattern may be irregular over the period at the country level, the contrast between inflows for 2000 and 2005 are impressive for countries such as Serbia/Montenegro (\$25m up, to \$1,040m), Bulgaria (\$1,002m up, to \$1,803m), and especially for Romania (\$1,037 m up, to \$5,100m, and demonstrate what can be achieved in a relatively short space of time. On the other hand, signs of weakness have persisted, notably in Macedonia (\$175m down, to \$150m) and Croatia (£1,089m down, to £1,076m). In the Balkans favour is the fact that, unlike some of their central European neighbours, the privatisation process has yet to run its full course and may well, in the future, act as a magnet for enhanced FDI inflows.

To maintain and strengthen FDI inflows also requires the Balkan governments to tackle effectively the very political and economic problems that are also holding back inter-ethnic and national reconciliation. These include the constitutional status of Kosovo, the quality of legal and

accounting systems, standards of corporate governance, and of the rule of law in general. Foreign direct investments, and in due course portfolio flows into stock markets, would probably be a good indicator of the perceptions held outside the region about the extent of progress towards reconciliatory development.

RISK MANAGEMENT

There are naturally many more economic problems requiring reconciliation-friendly solutions than those I have touched on. Every economic policy in every Balkan country should be carefully examined for the extent to which it is likely to raise or lower the level of risk of conflict or tension. I would suggest that this should apply to all macro and micro economic policy, with special attention to high risk areas. There is not space to list here all the likely constituents of such a risk list. An obvious one is inflation. My illustrious fellow-countryman, John Maynard Keynes, in a work written at least in part about peace, famously wrote:

“Lenin was right. There is no subtler, no surer, means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose.” (Keynes, 1919)

Serious inflation in the Balkans is avoidable and would be catastrophic for peace and reconciliation if it were to occur. This may be a sound reason for seriously considering the even wider use of the Euro.⁴

The european union: working with the grain

When cabinet-makers are working on a piece of fine furniture they know that cutting or planing across the grain lines in the wood is much more difficult than working in the same direction as the natural characteristics of their material. In some ways economies are the same, and policy-makers need to find ways of working with the grain of culture and popular disposition.

This principle would apply no less to the economic management of Balkan countries in the future if they were all eventually to join the European Union. One way of imagining what economic policy-making might be like in such circumstances would be to suppose a narrower hypothetical state of affairs: an economic and political union in the Balkans. What would it be like? It would presumably respect ethnic identity, follow the principle of subsidiarity in devolving whatever could sensibly be devolved,

⁴ Daniel Gros has written extensively on this subject.

have a strong and dependable centre capable of enforcing fairly laws and rules about economic affairs agreed by all parts of the union, it would seek equity in the incidence of economic development, would encourage freedom of trade and movement of people, and would maintain security for the conduct of business. I am aware of treading here on sensitive ground – someone here is already thinking “this is a cruel rhetorical trick; the beginnings of such a union could have existed and might have been called Yugoslavia”.

The picture I have painted is clearly, however, not quite accurate because the hypothetical union I am imagining would include many entities that were not part of Yugoslavia. Instinctively we shrink away from the thought of such a state, mainly on the grounds of complete impracticability. It would “go against the grain” of history and of common sense to throw together into one unit such diverse nations and peoples with such a troubled history. It is nevertheless a useful intellectual exercise to imagine this in relation to European Union membership. Many people come closer than they might imagine to such an eventuality when thinking about the EU. In my travels in the Balkans I have found that it is very widely believed in each country that EU membership would be beneficial for that country and should be actively sought. What is less widely discussed is that if all the countries of the region joined the EU they would be required to relate to each other in ways that do not currently occur. They would all be members of a unique supranational entity requiring big changes in their actions towards one another. For instance, in connection with policy, with some trepidation I mention the question of the free movement of people. Why wait for the EU to require it – why not start doing it now? Of course, I understand why not, but I suggest that discussing such issues could make a major contribution towards conciliatory development.

It would also be very helpful from an economic point of view for a constitutional settlement in Kosovo to be made as soon as possible.

CONCLUSIONS

I am acutely aware that in the short space of this paper it has not been possible to elaborate in any detail the practical implications of conciliatory development. I have probably raised more questions than I have answered. I hope, all the same, that the policy measures that I have been able to outline above, no doubt along with many potentially useful and practical policy proposals that I have not mentioned, should form a checklist for “*reconciliatory* development”. The Balkan post-war states should critically appraise their development policies, of all kinds – economic, social and

political – to ensure that they encourage reconciliation and peace rather than the opposite. I do not claim any great originality for this idea, but equally the actions of governments and international organisations, and the recommendations of policy commentators, do not obviously give evidence of sufficient emphasis on lasting reconciliation in economic life.

Note: I should like to record special thanks to Dr Derek Braddon and Dr Svetlana Cicmil for their help in discussing the content of this paper. I should like to stress that any faults or weaknesses are entirely my own responsibility.

REFERENCES

1. Arendt, H. (1973), *Crises of the Republic*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth
2. Brown, M.E. (1996), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
3. Carment, D. and Schnabel, A. (2003), *Conflict Prevention*, United Nations University Press, Tokyo
4. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1997), *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, Carnegie Corporation of New York, New York
5. Central Intelligence Agency (2005), *CIA World Factbook*, updated to 28th July 2005, at <http://www.cia.gov>
6. Cohen, J.H., and Dannhaeuser, N. (2002), *Economic Development – an anthropological approach*, Altamira Press, Walnut Creek
7. Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2002), “Aid, Policy, and Peace: Reducing the Risks of Civil Conflict”, *Defence and Peace Economics*, 13(6): 435–50
8. Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004), “Military Expenditure in Post-Conflict Societies”, conference paper, available at <http://www.carecon.org>
9. Gligorov, V. (2001), *Trade and Investment in the Balkans*, Vienna Institute, working Paper
10. Gurr, T.R. and Duvall, R. (1973), “Civil Conflict in the 1960s: A Reciprocal Theoretical System with Parameter Estimates.” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.6, 1973, p.160
11. Hirschman, A. (1977), *The Passions and the Interests*
12. Kekic L (2005), Long Term prospects for the European transition economies and some implications for the tourism industry, Economist Intelligence Unit, June
13. Keynes, J.M. (1919), *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, Chapter 6
14. Last, D. (2003), “Early warning and prevention of violent conflict: the role of multifunctional observer missions”, in Carment and Schnabel, 2003
15. Lopandic, D. (2002), *Regional Co-operation in South Eastern Europe*, European Movement in Serbia, Belgrade
16. Mandela, N. (1996), speech made on 7th January 1996 and quoted in *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, 1999
17. Messerlin P.A., and Miroudot, S. (2003), “Trade Liberalization in South-East Europe: from a network of 23 FTAs to a Free Trade Area?”, Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
18. Muller, J.Z (2002), *The Mind and the Market: Capitalism in Modern European Thought*, Alfred A.Knopf, New York
19. Plato, (371 bc, translated 1987), *The Symposium*, Penguin Classics, London

20. Rowlands, D. and Joseph, T. (2003), "The International Monetary Fund and conflict prevention", in Carment and Schnabel, 2003
21. Sen, A. (1999), *Development as Freedom*, Random House, New York
22. Simpson, G. (1997), "Reconstruction and Reconciliation: Emerging from transition", in *Development in Practice*, Vol.7, No.4, pp.475–478
23. Smith, A. (1776), *Wealth of Nations*, book 4, chapter 3.
24. Sun-Tzu, (circa 490 bc and 2005), translated by John Minford, *The Art of War*, Penguin Classics, London
25. Tawney, R.H. (1926), *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, Allen and Unwin, 1930
26. Weber, M. (translated by Parsons, T., 1958), *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, New York, page 17.

HARMONIZING DIVERSITY IN SPAIN: LESSONS AND CHALLENGES

For a long time Spain has been considered a key case study on how to blend unity and diversity. Anyone who travels around Spain soon realizes that it is a varied country. Spanish regions are diverse in their political structure, ethnic culture, language and linguistic expressions. In an extreme case, Basque nationalists even go so far as to claim a racial distinction. Thus, while Spain has a wealth of cultural richness which infuses our country with certain values, particularly, vitality, tolerance and the willingness to live with minority groups, at the same time multiculturalism creates a number of problems and tensions that have to be properly addressed.

To understand the present situation we need to analyze Spain's orographic situation and history. Spain is a very mountainous country. It is the second highest country in Europe. Massive mountain ranges cut across the Iberia Peninsula from north to south and from east to west. When modern communications systems were not yet developed, every region and local community inevitably suffered the effects of isolation. A famous historian, Salvador de Madariaga, said that Spain was made up of a great number of castles with strong walls (the mountains) which prevented contacts with neighbours. This explains why from region to region you can find a rich and varied folk culture and dissimilar institutions, arising from different historical roots. In the same way that the history of the Balkans has shaped the current diversity in this region of Europe, our reality flows from our history. There is one important distinction that must be made between our case and the Balkans. Spain is not a religiously diverse country.

During Hapsburg rule, the Spanish territories were united by a weak confederal link, but with the arrival of the Bourbon dynasty an intense centralization process began. The II Spanish Republic is remembered as one attempt to meet nationalists' demands. However, the hatred between communist and fascist forces, the political tensions between the centre and the periphery and, above all, the lack of a balanced civil society led to the Spanish civil war. Foreigners see the civil war as a romantic war

against totalitarianism, but it was so cruel and destructive that even today the younger generations lament the bloodletting of that past era. Under the Franco dictatorship any kind of cultural and ethnic diversity disappeared. The regions with distinct cultures were treated as inferiors. Intolerance became the rule and harmony was the exception. Catalonia, the Basque Country and, to a lesser extent, Galicia reacted against the unitary, centralized state. One of the by-products of this reaction against efforts to amalgamate the regions was the inception of sectarian violence in the Basque Country. The terrorist group ETA followed the path of the Irish Republican Army and other national liberation movements.

Democratic feeling sprang up in Spain after Franco's death. The whole country took part in the process as Spain evolved toward democracy. The so-called "Spanish transition to democracy" is important because this model of replacing authoritarian rule with a representative government has been exported to other countries, particularly to Latin American countries. Moreover, this peaceful movement is a matter of study in political science departments at universities all over the world. In the Spanish case, the process was a relatively easy one. First of all, there was a crucial need for reconciliation among the relatives and descendants of the winners and the losers. With this aim, a generous amnesty was granted to political prisoners. More balanced studies on the country's history were released. Any kind of political party, including non-violent secessionist parties, had the chance to compete in local, regional and general elections. The Monarchy was transformed into a symbol. The army was ordered to remain barracked. Business and trade unions agreed on a compromise to stimulate the economy and to improve social benefits and workers' rights. A new Constitution, enacted 1978, was the keystone of a new political architecture.

The Spanish Constitution tries to address long-standing territorial tensions, a never-ending source of conflict and disappointment, by mitigating centrifugal and centripetal forces. In consequence, it establishes three principles: unity of the Spanish nation, autonomy for the regions and the nationalities, and solidarity among rich and poor regions.

All regions and nationalities enjoy a high level of self-government, including legislative, executive and judicial powers. Some powers, such as diplomacy, defence, basic law or maintaining a single economic policy belong to the state. Other powers, such as environmental policy, trade, police or inter-regions public works, are shared between central government and regions. Remaining areas can also be assumed by the regions under their statutes. Any conflict about where the limits of these powers lie has to be resolved by the Constitutional Court.

We, the attorneys and scholars, can in theory design a perfect law but complex reality often eclipses our intentions and desires. It is true that under the so-called self-government regime Spain has improved its level of economic prosperity and social welfare, but territorial problems still remain.

There are a number of obstacles to overcome. For instance, there are not clear boundaries in certain regions. The Basque Country considers as part of its territory not only Navarre but also the French Basque Country. Some Catalanian nationalists want to extend its historical border to include Valencia and the Balearic Islands.

The second problem is financing. The Basque Country and Navarre enjoy historical rights which benefit their own budgets. They raise and collect their own taxes, and a number of negotiations with the central government have determined what proportion the nationalities transfer to the national coffers. Year after year the amount of money given to Madrid is very low in comparison with the goods, investments and services provided by the central government. An increasing number of autonomous regions wish to get their hands on this fiscal mechanism. It is easy to imagine the unfortunate consequences an upsetting of the central budget would have nationally. Not least among them would be the negative effects on the solidarity between rich and poor regions.

In contrast to those problems, citizens feel that the regional system takes care of their needs better because it is closer to them. The size of the bureaucracy has increased dramatically but public services are more efficient. Most of the regional economies complement one another. There is no longer the impression that a big culture, the Castilian, suppresses other national minorities, like the Basque or Catalanian. Spanish internal immigration from poor to rich regions has not created big problems of integration. In Catalonia there are about a million citizens from other regions who are totally integrated and even assimilated into Catalanian culture. Interestingly, it is the new foreign immigration from Africa (Morocco, Algeria and black Africa) Latin America (Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Cuba) and East Europe (Romania) that is the target of racism and xenophobia.

Given that the Spanish Constitution has some elements of ambiguity in the shaping of territorial organization, nationalists and regionalist parties consider that the territorial pattern is still open and new changes could be made to accommodate their demands. From a constitutional point of view, I think there is room to develop and improve the powers of the regions and nationalities. There are some controversies which could be resolved in this way, such as the slow pace of return of tax money collected and the differing treatment individual regions receive. Other de-

mands, particularly those put forward by the Basque nationalists, such as the right to self determination, have no constitutional grounds. Changing the Constitution is the only way to legalize the right to self-determination, but if we venture to change this section of the Constitution, we also would have to take into consideration that the procedure to reform or amend the document is quite rigid and the majority of the Spanish voters would have to approve the reform through referendum.

It is important to note that self-determination, as a right of the people, has progressively lost significance since Spain joined the European community, known today as the European Union. In fact, the concept of European citizenship represents overcoming parochialism and short-mindedness. Some traditional signs of a state's identity, like the national currency, diplomacy or national borders have begun to be refashioned and now have a new image. We have transferred part of our sovereignty to the European institution. Therefore, a new process to achieve a new Europe, maybe a European Confederation, is underway. Of course, we can not forget the recent failure of the European Constitution project, but today's Europe has been built with ups and downs, sometimes at high speed and sometimes at a slow pace.

The European Union argues the case for diversity within unity and shares some values with Spain, made up as it is of regions, particularly the idea of solidarity, the single market and the principle of subsidiarity.

The industrious Catalonia and Basque Country need a scale economy to sell their goods. They know that the Spanish and European markets are crucial to their economic survival. Their collective rights and their special personality are duly protected. Catalonia and the Basque Country enjoy a wide margin of autonomy. Language, culture, education, institutions and self-government are means to strengthen awareness of their collective identity. We have been living in Spain under this system for the last 25 years.

Over the last year, we have initiated a new phase characterized by increasing self government. Regional governments want to change their basic laws in order to add to the level of regional powers. To do so they have presented an ambitious project to reform their own legal framework. Weighty negotiations have begun between the central and regional governments. The only limit to their achieving this goal is the Constitution.

Consensus is the magic word in my country. The Constitution and the regional system were approved with the consensus of all the political forces, nationalists and centralists, left wing and right wing, trade unions and business. Today we must revisit the time of our democracy's birth and recapture the idea of consensus and negotiation.

The political trend in Spain could well be a significant move from a unitary State with regional self-government toward a federal system. This trend is based on the strong sense of territorial identity which is growing all the time. A first step may have been taken through the project to turn the Senate into a chamber for territorial debate. The future will have the last word.



RECONCILIATION IMPOSSIBLE OR (ONLY) INDESIREABLE? SOUTH TYROLEAN EXPERIENCES

1. INTRODUCTION

Ten years have passed since the formal declaration of conflict-settlement, 30 years even since the entry into force of the 2nd Autonomy Statute, the “Basic Law” of the South Tyrolean autonomy. But does it really represent a “success story”, a model for conflict resolution?⁵ Despite the autonomous system established and decades of peaceful coexistence, ethnicity and symbols still play a major role in South Tyrolean society. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the South Tyrolean autonomy lies in the duration of this same agreement. Because there are only few other cases with such a long practical experience in working autonomy, the experiences of South Tyrol could prove valuable in answering the question of where minority-protection and autonomy might lead in the future.

After a short description of the evolution of the conflict and its resolution the main legal features of the autonomy arrangement will be presented, followed by an evaluation of today’s situation which can be summarized as “parallel societies” living side by side in the same territory. This paper argues that the very detailed legal regulation of nearly all (controversial) issues of living-together succeeded in establishing “tolerance by law”, thus permitting reconstruction, but has also revealed to be an obstacle in the transition to “ethnic normalization” or reconciliation, raising questions of sustainability of the settlement.

2. FROM CONFLICT TO RECONSTRUCTION

2.1. *Short History of the Conflict and its Solution*

South Tyrol, situated in the very north of Italy on the border of Austria, covers only 2.5 % of the Italian territory. Its major valleys form passage-

⁵ For example Alcock 1994, 46, Feiler 1997, 10, Magliana 2000 (esp. 127 ff.), and, critical, Kager 1998, 1; for the question of applicability in the context of South East Europe, see Böckler 1996, Böckler/Grisenti 1996 and Böckler 1999, 87 ff.

ways through an overall mountainous terrain. The population of 450.000 inhabitants (corresponding to 0.8 % of Italy's population) consists of two-thirds German speakers, less than one-third Italian speakers and some 20.000 Ladin speakers.⁶ The majority of German speakers live in the valleys and rural areas, whereas due to the immigration policies of the past and the attempts at industrialization, the Italian group is concentrated in the three major cities (Bozen/Bolzano, Meran/Merano and Brixen/Bressanone) and in the southern parts of the Province, bordering on the Province of Trento (Trentino) which is almost entirely Italian.

In some way, the conflict in South Tyrol reflects the main historical developments of the 20th century: it dates back to the annexation of the former Austrian territory by Italy in 1919, which was done in spite of Woodrow Wilson's declarations of self-determination as guiding-principle for the Post-War-order. The 1920s saw the repression of the native German speaking group by a totalitarian regime, the Italian fascists. After the end of WW II (and a period of direct occupation by the III. Reich), Italy established a first autonomy regime in order to fulfil its international obligations taken 1946 in the De Gasperi-Gruber agreement (an international treaty between Italy and Austria which became part of Italy's Peace Treaty, annex IV). South Tyrolean German speakers soon criticized this first autonomy which had been granted on a regional basis, including the neighboring all-Italian inhabited province Trentino, as a flawed implementation of the treaty. Thus the political struggles aimed at achieving a satisfying autonomous regime began, reaching their climax with several bombings on power lines in the Sixties and the discussion of the case before the UN General Assembly (taken there by Austria as a "protection power").

It was only 30 years ago, that after long negotiations between the Central State and the South Tyroleans a legal framework came into force which put an end to the conflict: it is known as the "Package", consisting of 137 implementation-measures, which "updated" the first and unsatisfactory autonomy and resulted in the actual 2nd Autonomy Statute.⁷ It took another 20 years to have all of its enactment laws adopted and implemented, so that formally the conflict was settled just 10 years ago, in

⁶ The Ladin population is concentrated in two valleys in the Dolomite mountains, in the southeastern portion of the Province. Although interesting, because of the special regime applied in the Ladin municipalities (e.g. trilingual road signs, a "mixed" school system with German and Italian as languages of instruction), the two valleys are too small and isolated for exercising a major influence on the policy of the Autonomous Province as a whole or on the relations between the two major language groups, this article is focussing on.

⁷ The "new" Autonomy Statute, although formally adopted for the Region Trentino-South Tyrol (Presidential Decree, d.p.r. 31.8.1972, no. 670), elevated its Provinces, South Tyrol and Trentino, to the rank of Autonomous Provinces, transferring all important powers to them.

1992.⁸ Three years later, Austria joined the European Union and in 1997 the Schengen-Treaty was adopted, an event which transformed the border between Italy and Austria, formerly a strict line of division separating cultures, languages and peoples, into a mere administrative boundary.

2.2. Settlement and Implementation by Institutionalized Negotiation

The compromise between the South Tyrolean People's Party and the Italian State leading to the South Tyrolean "Package" consisted in the explicit recognition of (cultural) diversity⁹ and a division of the spheres of influence and powers. As a precondition both sides had to renounce on incompatible positions: the South Tyroleans no longer asked for self-determination (in its external form) and the Italian government formally stepped back from the assimilation politics of its predecessors.

The most important objective for the South Tyroleans was their increased protection as a minority; an improvement in their relations with the Italians was a logical consequence of, but not the aim of negotiations (Baur/von Guggenberg/Larcher 1998, 25). Italy's aim, on the other hand, was above all to settle the conflict. Thus, neither of the two sides involved had an underlying vision or project for the construction of a multicultural and plurilingual society. It is for these reasons that the agreement has been compared to a "Concordat" between Church and the State (Langer 1996, 167), i.e. a pact of mutual recognition, respect and non-interference (Baur/von Guggenberg/Larcher 1998, 27 f.). This is reflected exactly by the basic structure of the "Package", a compromise between principles of protection of individuals belonging to the German/Ladin group and the group(s) itself, on the one hand, and of the principle of territoriality, on the other.

A remarkable feature of the compromise is the creation of a framework of institutions and procedures for negotiations, enabling both sides to jointly elaborate solutions for the issues at hand (Böckler 1999, 95). Even though the detailed, pre-established time-frame for enactment of the Autonomy Statute (the so-called Operational Calendar), could only be realized with considerable delay,¹⁰ the adoption of each implementation-de-

⁸ By a formal Declaration of Austria recognizing the fulfillment of all obligations undertaken by Italy in the so-called "Package" of 137 measures (one of which was the adoption of the 2nd Autonomy Statute) in order to create a genuine autonomy on the basis of principles already contained by the De Gasperi-Gruber-Agreement of 1946 (an annex to the Peace Treaty with Italy), the international anchoring of South Tyrol's autonomy. For more details see Palaver 1990, Alcock 1982 and 1994, and Feiler 1997, 35.

⁹ See Marko 1997, 67 ff.

¹⁰ The two years originally envisaged for its completion were obviously too short a period, given the complexity and the mere number of matters to be dealt with; thus an extension was agreed upon and finally it took 20 years until the adoption of the last measure.

cree, worked out in special joint commissions, had the effect of a trust and confidence-building measure (this was particularly felt, when during the 1980s the enactment process temporarily came to a halt).

The joint commissions, in which the representatives of the State and of the Province have equal number and standing, were formed for the negotiations on the implementation mechanisms.¹¹ As a consequence, the enactment decrees, which were the results of the negotiations within these joint commissions, did not need to be discussed in (or even adopted by) the national parliament, although they are formally part of ordinary law. Therefore their deliberation could be kept outside of normal political business; and experts from both sides could be involved in their elaboration. Due to their special procedure and agreement-character, it is generally recognized that they cannot be changed unilaterally by the State,¹² which is, in addition to the possibility of bringing disputes to the Italian Constitutional Court,¹³ an important guarantee of the legal framework of South Tyrol's autonomy.

This special process was embedded in international guarantees: once the negotiations had begun, the “soft” pressure from the “Protecting Power” Austria certainly contributed to keeping Italy's interests in the fulfillment of the obligations alive. The necessity of a formal declaration of conflict-settlement – by both Austria and the South Tyroleans – after the implementation process had been concluded, was an important incentive for Italy to settle the conflict. This procedure of consensus and collaboration between the various actors – representatives of the minority, the majority and of Austria, a foreign state – upon which the autonomy is based, as well as the resultant possibilities for control, ensured that the process of minority protection with its long-term orientation was not destroyed in the last link of the chain, i.e. in its concrete implementation (Feiler 1997, 35 f.).

3. MAIN FEATURES OF IMPLEMENTATION

In order to characterize the main focus and intentions of conflict settlement in South Tyrol, at least four different levels should be distinguished which will be briefly characterized.

¹¹ The so-called Commissions of six and (where powers of the Region were involved) of twelve [members], art. 107 ASt. See Lampis 1999, 30 ff. and 38 ff. and Palermo 2001, 826 ff.

¹² For the special character of the enactment-decrees as a legal source *sui generis*, see Lampis 1999, 38 ff. and Palermo 2001, 826 ff.

¹³ These guarantees do, of course, depend on Italy being a democratic State under the rule of Law, recognizing linguistic minorities in article 6 of its Constitution, and on the Constitutional Court being an independent authority.

3.1. *Relations between Minority and Kin-State*

The Autonomy Statute does not contain any provisions regarding contacts between the German speaking group and its kin-State, Austria. There are, however, some bilateral treaties promoting economic relations and recognizing educational and vocational diplomas. Economic cross border activities with the Austrian *Land* North Tyrol were possible and undertaken even prior to the Austrian EU-membership (Zeyer 1993, 195 ff.), and are now intensified within the framework of a “Euroregion”, which includes the Trentino.

3.2. *Influence on Central State-Decisions*

Due to its relatively small size in both territory and population, there are only few provisions dealing with the representation and participation of South Tyrol on central level. South Tyrol is represented by the Province’s President in meetings of the Italian cabinet, whenever questions of the Province’s interest are discussed (art. 52 Autonomy Statute). Because of the political instability which has characterized Italy over the past decades (more than 50 governments after WW II), the members of Parliament elected in South Tyrol often had great political influence, their support being potentially decisive for the survival of the Italian government. In addition, South Tyrol is one of the most active entities in defending its rights against the State before the Italian Constitutional Court and has thus contributed significantly to the evolution of Italian regionalism as a whole.

3.3. *Scope of Autonomous Powers*

The desire to conduct one’s own affairs on the basis of independent responsibilities and through independent representatives can generally be regarded as a basic goal of minorities. South Tyrol’s autonomy satisfies these aims through its key features: autonomy of legislation and administration, proportional ethnic representation, and a commitment to bilinguality (Feiler 1997, 35). Finally, but certainly fundamental, is the generous financial basis provided for the implementation of these provisions.

South Tyrol’s autonomous powers are quite outstanding,¹⁴ not only when compared to other minority-situations, but even with regard to its northern neighbor North Tyrol, a member state of federal Austria. South Tyrol’s **legislative powers** are primarily concerned with economic, social, and cultural matters, e.g. place names, local customs and usages, town

¹⁴ Of course, only a very brief overview of the most important features can be given, for further information see Hannum 1996, 435 ff. and Magliana 2000, 50 ff.

and country planning powers, environment, mining, agriculture, tourism, communications, and transport (areas in which the province has primary competence) and elementary and secondary education, commerce and public health (the Province only has secondary competencies). The Assembly (Provincial Council) is the law-making body and elects the Provincial Government which carries out the **executive functions**.

In South Tyrol German and Italian – which is the **official language** of the State – have equal standing in the Region (articles 99 and 100 ASt), and all regional and provincial laws are thus published in both Italian and German. In order to meet the objective of a bilingual public administration, all public officials in the Province have to pass a compulsory language test to prove their knowledge of both Italian and German,¹⁵ and residents have the right to use either language before all courts and authorities.

The Autonomy Statute also includes detailed provisions on the **financial resources** available to the province (art. 69 – 86 ASt). Although the province itself has only limited powers to impose taxes, it is entitled to receive – from the State – a substantial portion of certain taxes levied in the province, including 90% of property tax and income tax. The province also receives 1.61 % of the sectoral government expenditures, as well as certain sums for farm modernization measures and for other programs from the European Union.¹⁶

3.4. Relations between the Different Groups Residing in the Autonomous Entity

With regard to the relations between the various language groups,¹⁷ two different levels of the conflict must be distinguished: the first deals with the German/Ladin speaking minority in South Tyrol and the Italian nation-state, and the second deals with the relations within the province itself. On the latter level, the German/Ladin speakers are a majority, and

¹⁵ This does not only guarantee every South Tyrolean the right to communicate with authorities in his own language, but also gives applicants from other Italian provinces fewer chances in comparison with job-seekers resident in South Tyrol when applying for positions in the civil service.

¹⁶ See Lampis 1999, 89; Lapidoth 1997, 110; Hilpold 1996, 138 f.

¹⁷ The importance of language, which becomes the criterion for establishing ethnic identity and the line of demarcation determining the socio-cultural identity of the individual must be acknowledged. Language is held to be both a sign of the desire of the individual who speaks it to identify himself or herself with a particular culture and a means of determining individual membership of a specific social group (Cavagnoli/Nardin 1999, 19, Pizzorusso 1993, 188). Although the Autonomy Statute refers to the ethnic and cultural characteristics of the various sections of the South Tyrolean population (art. 2), it also refers to “language groups” in order to indicate the Italian-speaking, German-speaking and Ladin groups living in South Tyrol.

the Italian speakers, which also consider South Tyrol to be their homeland, increasingly feel like a minority. There is hardly any awareness of these two levels: until the present, German and Ladin speakers did neither distinguish between Italians in South Tyrol and Italians in general, nor between the Italian people and the Italian government.¹⁸ On the other hand, being a minority seems in a strange way attractive to the Italian group because of the “victim-status”, which generates the idea of need for protection (Baur/von Guggenberg/Larcher 1998, 42 f.).

In South Tyrol, a complex and highly differentiated legal system has been created which calls for a mix of rotation, parity and proportional representation,¹⁹ and which might be characterized as “**tolerance established by law**”. As a result of this system, the conflict was to a certain extent civilized and institutionalized, and transformed into one between politicians over the interpretation of the Autonomy Statute (Kager 1998, 8). The main ingredient of the system is power sharing, or “consociationalism”, which includes the diffusion of power from the center to the periphery, and comprises four main-elements,²⁰ all of which are present in South Tyrol:

- (1) Participation of the representatives of all significant groups in the government, through jointly exercising governmental (and particularly executive) power, e.g. grand coalition cabinet:

According to the **power-sharing model**, the composition of the South Tyrolean Government must be proportional to the ethnic groups in the Council;²¹ the presidency of the Council rotates between members of the different groups (art. 49).

- (2) A high degree of autonomy for the groups (especially for issues which are not of common concern):

The principle of **cultural autonomy** is established by art. 2 ASt, which states that the parity of rights of citizens of all language

¹⁸ Kager 1998, 5 and 9. Besides the fact that an Italian resident of South Tyrol usually will not be considered a “Südtiroler” (South Tyrolean), as this term has been historically reserved for South Tyrolese of German mother-tongue, there does not even exist a common denomination for the Italian speaking residents: “altoatesini” (derived from the Italian name for the Province, “Alto Adige”) is quite frequent, even though there is also the usage of “sudtirolesi” (drawing on the German name “Südtirol”). Nevertheless, in Italian as well as in German most often simply “Italians” is used, even when referring to residents of the province.

¹⁹ For an overview see Hilpold 1996, 117 ff.; Palermo 1999, 9 ff., Lampis 1999 and Marko/Ortino/Palermo (eds.) 2001, who are all giving an interpretation of the development of the autonomous regime, which is characterized by an increasing accentuation of functional criteria rather than focussing exclusively on minority-protection.

²⁰ According to Lijphart 1977, and Lijphart, 1991, 492-494.

²¹ Art. 50 ASt, a similar principle applies to the municipalities, art. 61 ASt.

groups is recognized, and “their ethnic and cultural characteristics are protected”. In other words, the differences between the three cultures are recognized and the “value” of this diversity highlighted. The cultural autonomy and the provisions for the protection and promotion of cultural characteristics, including the system of separated schools, are typical expressions of group-protection. All decisions in these fields require a wide consensus within the respective group. (Lampis 1999, 19 ff.)

As was already established by the 1946 Paris Agreement, a fundamental principle of today’s autonomy is that elementary and secondary **education** be provided in the mother tongue of the child. Consequently, instruction in South Tyrol is given in **separate** German and Italian schools (art. 19 ASt) and language instruction in the second language of the province is mandatory. Furthermore, all teachers must be native speakers of the language they teach.. In principle, parents are able to choose the school system which they would like their children to attend; a child can be refused only because of insufficient knowledge of the language of instruction in order to guarantee the character of the school and the efficiency of the lessons.²²

- (3) Proportionality as the basic standard of political representation, public service, appointments, and allocation of public funds:

The Autonomy Statute provides for a system of **proportional representation** of the language groups for public employment and for the allocation of funds for cultural activities of the groups, as well as for social welfare and services (i.e. housing), which has been consistently upheld by the Italian Constitutional Court.

At the time of the census, every resident must make a formal declaration as to his or her language group, which is the basis for the right to stand for public office, to be employed in the public administration or as a teacher, and to be given social housing.

The principle of ethnic proportions, which has to be applied to all state and semi-state bodies operating in the province (art. 89) as well as to the provincial administration, was introduced to gradually revert the Italian dominance in the public service.

²² For details see Rautz 2000, 76 ff. A number of parents, especially from the Italian group, are sending their children to schools of the other language in order to favor the bilingual education of their children, see Weber/Egli 1992.

The representation of language groups in their respective proportions in all these areas must be achieved within 30 years of the implementation of the second autonomy statute (i.e. by the year 2002).²³

- (4) Minority veto as the ultimate weapon for the protection of vital interests, however only on issues of fundamental importance:

The principles of **equality** of all residents, regardless of their group affiliation (art. 2 ASt), and the **quasi group-personality** of the language-groups counterbalance the provisions on proportional representation (Lampis 1999, 29 ff.). This is particularly true for the right to request separate voting by the language groups in the Regional or Provincial Council, whenever a draft-law is judged to be in violation of the parity of rights or the cultural characteristics of one group. The ultimate means available to the language groups is an action before the Constitutional Court, founded on the same motivation.²⁴ These are emergency-mechanisms in case the normal means of consultation in the organs should not work.

4. A SYSTEM OF BALANCES – A BALANCED SYSTEM?

The combination of minority-protection – i.e. the protection of persons and groups – and the principle of territoriality has led to a unique institutional mix and balance of the fundamental principles of segregation and integration under international guarantee (Marko 1999, 257).

Following the Austrian tradition of **minority-protection**, a precondition for the cultural and linguistic protection of minority-members is their declaration of belonging to the group.

This practice, namely the interpretation of everything in terms of ethnic categories is favored by the system of ethnic proportion, which, based on the census proportions, makes the organization of the South Tyrolean society dependent on a declaration of affiliation with one of the language groups.²⁵ The emphasis placed on language rights and on the rights of

²³ Hannum 1996, 438. Positions which are vacant because of a lack of qualified applicants from an ethnic group can only be filled by members of the other ethnic group for a non-renewable twelve-month period. There are recently some cases, especially in the Public Health service, of a more flexible interpretation and application.

²⁴ There are additional rights which can be made separate use of by the language groups, like articles 19, 54 and 84 ASt.

²⁵ Kager 1998, 1 and Baur/von Guggenberg/Larcher 1998, 29, and, more optimistic, Rautz 2000, 81 ff. After ongoing public discussions before the last census, in 1991 a 4th category, “others” was created, which can be chosen in alternative to the three groups, a possibility especially for the increasing number of bilingual people with parents from different groups. In that case, however, in the line below, a “second choice” of “aggregation” with one of the three

language groups is intended to preserve the status quo. In the name of protection, a strict interpretation of provisions often tends to produce a defensive attitude and resistance of the group to changes or innovations (Baur/von Guggenberg/Larcher 1998, 29).

Thus, the dominant cleavage within the society remains ethnicity; other cleavages, such as class, are subordinated to ethnic polarization. Both the German/Ladin and the Italian groups have built up their own organizational structures and societal subsystems: kindergartens, schools, political parties, trade unions, public libraries, youth clubs, sports clubs, media, and churches are mono-ethnic. There is not much contact between the groups, for structural reasons (urban-rural antagonism and divided economic structure) and due to linguistic difficulties (fluency in both languages is still not reached, especially with the elder generations).²⁶ The reality is therefore characterized by “parallel societies” (Langer 1996, 171); often heard is the allusion to different “clubs”.

This segregation is, at least in part, counterbalanced by the **territoriality-principle**, which adds a functional dimension, related to the territory as such, and to the application of law in the autonomous entity. Participation, integration and co-responsibility are achieved through the equality and equal standing of all citizens. (Baur/von Guggenberg/Larcher 1998, 29). The territorial dimension also offers the chance of a frequent exchange between majority- and minority-positions: a German-speaking resident of Bozen/Bolzano, for instance, is a member of a minority in Italy, at the same time a member of the majority on provincial level, and again part of a minority in the city of Bozen/Bolzano.²⁷ This should also help to understand the positions of others.

An example of the dual character of the Statute-framework are the provisions on the use of language: These are in part individual rights, formally reserved to the members of the minority-group, a, for instance in art. 100 ASt: “German-speaking residents of the Province [...] are entitled to use their language [...]”. The territorial dimension, on the other hand, is expressed in art. 99 ASt, which prescribes the equal standing of both languages. Consequently the enactment decree on the use of language

groups has to be made for the purposes foreseen by the Autonomy Statute. Statistically only the three language groups are considered for the distribution of resources and the allocation of funds. The declaration cannot be changed for ten years (until the next census).

²⁶ Kager 1998, 9, also insists on ethnicity, because of a policy of “voluntary apartheid”, which a “majority in both ethnic blocks” still believes in.

²⁷ The demographic composition of the capital Bozen/Bolzano is opposite to that of the Province in general: it is inhabited by two-thirds Italian speakers and one-third German speakers.

(d.p.r. 574/1988) does not distinguish between members of the minority and other residents, so that everyone has the choice between German and Italian.²⁸

Regarding the public administration, the combination of both principles is visible even in the system of proportional representation, which was adopted as a repair-mechanism, correcting historical inequalities and disadvantages, in order to reach a higher representation of Germans and Ladins. A higher proportion of German speakers did of course contribute to the objective of a bilingual administration, too. The mandatory language-test for all new public servants is again a clear expression of this functional dimension.

To sum up: a peaceful coexistence (*Nebeneinanderleben*) was established as a basis for the cohabitation of the groups (*Zusammenleben*) by paying particular attention to security and to other sensitive interests of the groups and by following a step-by-step policy. Already from the beginning, however, the Autonomy Statute did require cooperation and contacts between the groups (Böckler 1999, 98 f. and Palermo 1999, 14 f.). Whereas in the past emphasis was above all placed on the aspects of minority-protection, the possibility of a more flexible and functional interpretation for the future, based on the principle of territoriality, or better said, of “normal governance” does already exist.²⁹

5. FURTHER EVOLUTION: “DYNAMIC AUTONOMY” AND RECONCILIATION?

Time is a very important factor for resolving conflicts. Over the past several decades, the province has seen rapid economic development, a significant amelioration of ethnic tensions and increased cooperation between local and State authorities. The package of measures for the South Tyrolean population, introduced in 1969 to provide German and Ladin populations with a better protection in the framework of the Italian constitutional system through a larger territorial self-government, can be considered, at least from a legal point of view, fully implemented and thus fulfilled.

²⁸ The European Court of Justice recently extended this right to German-speaking EU-citizens (judgment of 24/11/1998 in the case Bickl/Franz, 274/96).

²⁹ This emphasis on functional criteria might already be visible in a more flexible application of the proportional representation-principle, especially in the Public Health Service (doctors in hospitals), and in a reform of the mandatory language test, which stresses communication skills instead of a mere translation. In general, there is increasing public debate on the census (the next is due in 2001) and the proportion-system.

This was confirmed by the formal declaration of conflict-settlement given by Austria in 1992 (after previous approval of an SVP assembly). It marks the beginning of a period requiring new orientation and new objectives. After reaching the aim of full implementation of the second autonomy statute and subsequent to the establishment of a satisfactory standard of protection, there have been indications of a period of opening up and of (increasing) normality. From the institutional point of view, however, despite important changes in the legal environment, on national and European level, hardly anything has been changed. Overall, the legal and political system has remained the one established thirty years ago.

5.1. Few Changes in the Institutional Sphere

In the last thirty years, the legal context has changed radically at all levels asking for new orientation and a change of perspective.

At **local level** not only a satisfactory standard of minority protection, but also a high level of self-government has been achieved which continues to develop and is sometimes even seen as a model case for further decentralization or federalization of the Italian State as a whole (thus showing that autonomy is not a concept limited to the protection of minority groups, only).

However, despite the 30 years-term set for achieving the proportional representation of all language groups in the public administration (i.e. by the year 2002, or at least within 2006)³⁰ and with these proportions actually reached in most areas, there is no public discussion on replacing this system by softer instruments which would encroach less on individual rights. While the purpose of compensation for historical injustice has been reached, there is now a perception of the quota-system as a general distribution mechanism and it is even stated that today it serves more to the protection of the Italian group (which is demographically on the decline). Even though there are a number of problems in recruitment of qualified personnel (in the – not so well paid – State administration nearly half of the posts marked for German speakers is currently deserted; in the hospitals it is increasingly difficult to find German speakers for leading positions), the solution is sought in a more flexible application, but not in a general reform of the system, still declared to be one of the “pillars” of the whole autonomy arrangement.

At **national level**, important reforms towards a federalization of Italy have finally been adopted. In the last five years, South Tyrol had already

³⁰ The date depends on whether reference is made to the entry into force of the Autonomy Statute (1972) or rather to the entry into force of the enactment-decree regarding the details of implementation (D.P.R. 752/1976).

received a number of additional powers from the Italian State on a bilateral basis (e.g. roads, electricity, teachers and school-staff). After the “administrative federalism”-reform (i.e. full decentralization in the administrative sphere), which had begun in 1995, three constitutional laws have been passed in the last years.³¹ Despite the fact that there is still some way to go until Italy can be considered a federal State, these reforms will change Italy’s regional system profoundly, especially by giving more powers to the ordinary regions and by raising the issue of fiscal federalism. In the context of general reform of Italy’s regional system, the reform of the Statute of the Autonomous Region Trentino-South Tyrol has been limited so far to some amendments in the institutional sphere and created the preconditions for the reform of the Autonomous Region — today an empty shell and a mere roof-structure. The chance of the amendment of the autonomy statute has not been used for adapting the autonomy by introducing some substantial changes.

Finally, the legal framework has also changed due to the **progress of European integration** which provides for new opportunities, but may also be a source of trouble. The opportunities are especially reflected by the increasing interest in cross-border cooperation between the three Alpine neighbors North Tyrol, South Tyrol and Trentino. The experience in this field can be subdivided into three phases. Already foreseen by the Gruber-De Gasperi agreement and finalized in a bilateral agreement, the so-called “Accordino” from 1948, the “soft” cooperation in the working groups Arge Alp and Alpe Adria, embedded in a greater Alpine regional context, stood at the origins of this cooperation. It was followed by the idea of an institutionalized form of CBC across the Brenner, widely known as “Euregio Tyrol”, which was controversially discussed because of its high degree of institutionalization and the clear reference made (even by name) to the historical entity of Tyrol. This experience, and the resistance it created, finally led to a third phase, currently under way, characterized by concrete projects with a functional dimension without a “hard” institutional design. In this context, also the successful, but initially contested, experience of a joint representation of the three entities at European level, by means of a Bureau in Brussels, should be mentioned.³²

³¹ Cf. for an overview on the reform-process: Woelk, 2000 108: Const. Law 1/1999 (regarding the ordinary regions), Const. Law 2/2001 (regarding the special regions, including Trentino-South Tyrol, art. 4) and Const. Law 3/2001 (regarding amendments of the Vth Title of the Italian Constitution: Relations between State and Regions).

³² The opening of this Bureau in 1995 created suspicion and resistance by both Central States, led to a judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court and was finally “legalised” by a change in Italian legislation which from 1997 allows all Italian regions to establish such contact-offices in Brussels.

But there have also been two recent judgments of the European Court of Justice, interfering with the autonomy-system, dealing with the questions of language rights and the obligation of bilingualism. Both judgments did not contradict the autonomy-provisions, but saved their conformity with EC-Law by extending their scope of application (including EU-citizens) or by generous interpretation (the certificate of bilingualism released in the province is no longer the only proof of a sufficient knowledge of both languages, other language-certificates have to be also admitted).³³ Nevertheless, they were intensively discussed and there are certain worries that other instruments might be in contrast with the free movement of persons and services in the common market (also due to the fact that there is still no provision in the Treaties expressly protecting minorities).

An explanation for the relatively few changes in the institutional sphere cannot overlook the **“ethnic governance” in the political system**: all candidates have make their ethnic affiliation public in order to stand for election and the most important institutional functions are ethnically marked. The uncontested political quasi-monopoly of the South Tyrolean People’s Party (SVP), still voted by the overwhelming majority of German speakers (i.e. the absolute majority of all voters in the province), has helped in the past as a strong and united political representation in front of the Central State authorities and politicians. But still today, according to the party’s own understanding as an “umbrella party”, political pluralism is an exclusively internal affair.

Another important structural factor explaining why there have been so few changes is the important role of the joint commission: devised as a preferential channel for communication and consultation between State and autonomous entity, it continues to regulate a large number of important political issues even after the full implementation the autonomy statute.³⁴ Despite the fact that the six experts nominated in equal number by the Province and by the Government (three German speakers, three Italian speakers) only have a consultative role, they are usually acting as the real drafters of the enactment laws.³⁵ This negotiation-like procedure

³³ ECJ Judgments *Bickel/Franz* (see Toggenburg, 2000, 242), *Angonese* (see Palermo, 2000, 969). For the impact of EU-Law on minority-protection and the South Tyrolean autonomy system— in general — see Toggenburg 2001, 139 ff.

³⁴ See Palermo 2001, 826 ff.

³⁵ The enactment decrees are formally adopted by the Government under the form of Presidential Decrees on the basis of the consultation. Because the decrees are only implementing the provisions of the Autonomy Statute and have already been foreseen in the political compromise, the “Package”, during the implementation-phase this was not seen as problematic in terms of democratic legitimacy, but — on the contrary — permitted to keep delicate issues out of national politics.

did not change substantially after 1992: on the contrary, new powers were in part allocated by this method and enactment decrees substituted or amended. This did not leave much room for important decisions of the elected assembly, the Provincial (or Regional) Council. In addition, there is hardly any transparency in the work of the commissions and their members are often no longer experts, but politicians, thus the problem of democratic control of an organ with quite far-reaching powers becomes evident.

5.2. *Parallel Societies instead of a Multicultural Society*

The civil society is still characterized by a segregated way of living together in the same territory. Issues of multiculturalism are more or less confined to the major towns and cities, where the Italian group is concentrated. Quite surprisingly, people from mixed marriages or families do not have a major public and/or political impact.³⁶

Apart from the private economy, where skills and bilingualism are often de-facto mandatory, there are some interesting developments in the **cultural sphere**: after decades of fruitless discussions the Free University of Bolzano (three Faculties: Teacher formation, Informatics and Economics) has been founded in 1997 and offers courses in three languages, not only aiming at local students (see Woelk 2001, 870 ff.). There are also some experiments regarding second language acquisition in the (Italian) kindergartens and schools, the first signs of asymmetry in a parallel, but separate education system. On the whole, however, the actual separated system is still justified through historical experiences, namely the prohibition of the use of German in public, and the consequent secret underground-schools set up during the period of forced assimilation by the Italian fascist regime.³⁷

Historical experiences often have a great influence on public discussions about ethno-national problems. Traumatic historical experiences and antagonistic interpretations of historical events block the understanding between the different ethnic groups. This is also true, at least to some extent, for South Tyrol, where the actual debate on **toponyms** (place names) demonstrates very clearly that a return to ethnically polarized political policies is still possible: The German place names in use, which have been

³⁶ There are no official figures, because the census does not consider these people, but it is estimated that around 10% of the population are living in a bilingual family or marriage.

³⁷ It was thus quite a surprise when only recently the President of the Province, Luis Durnwalder, on 11th February 2002 broke a taboo by making the proposal of a mixed, i.e. bilingual, school. Even though it was aimed exclusively at children from immigrants coming from Non-EU-countries, the proposal was immediately turned down.

substituted by Italian translations during fascism, are still not official. A provincial law would be sufficient to officially reintroduce them and to legalize them, given the respective power in the Autonomy Statute (art. 8 no. 2). Because Italian place names had been imposed (and sometimes invented) by the Fascists, to simply uphold the actual bilingual denomination everywhere, is unacceptable for a number of German-speakers, which would see such a move as an explicit recognition of historical injustice. The dilemma is that a number of local Italians would feel deprived of their (young) roots and their rights of identification, if the territory would legally become (mostly) monolingual and thus react quite harsh.³⁸

This discussion, kept alive by political interests and the media which are likewise creating parallel and different worlds of public opinion “filtering” the perceptions of the other group,³⁹ clearly shows that the transition from reconstruction to a further phase of reconciliation is, at best, not yet concluded. By referring to the historical traumata in today’s situation this controversy on symbolic issues does not only represent the old schemes of domination of one group or the other. It is also totally neglecting the experience of thirty years of peaceful reconstruction on the basis of the autonomy statute which is generally accepted by nearly the entire population. This demonstrates again that a multicultural and plurilingual society, despite the changed reality and the fact that a growing number of people are already living it everyday, is still not overall accepted and definitively not a declared political goal for the leading political elites and parties.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The conflict in South Tyrol has been successfully “settled”, but there is still a way to go in order to reach reconciliation. There is a number of open, but substantial issues which are currently under discussion, but the incentives for change just do not seem strong enough. Political interests in “ethnically divided governance” are still prevailing on nearly all sides,

³⁸ Two basic compromises are discussed: one approach is to have official bilingualism for the 600 names (out of 7000), which are most frequently used and to leave the decision about the rest to the municipalities. another is distinguishing between official (always bilingual) and private toponyms (monolingual possible).

³⁹ The local public TV and Radio station (Rai Bozen/Bolzano) is divided into an Italian speaking and a German speaking part, each sending their respective programmes; there are two local Italian daily newspapers (*Alto Adige* and *Il Mattino*), one major German speaking paper (*Dolomiten*, politically traditionally close to the SVP) and one smaller daily newspaper (*Tageszeitung*) as well as one German speaking weekly magazine (*FF-Südtiroler Illustrierte*), both the latter closer to the opposition. For further information, see the media guide: <http://www.provinz.bz.it/lpa/downloads/medienverzeichnis%202001.pdf>.

because change could mean less control over the distribution of rich resources which determine the political control of respective group.

There is no doubt that the settlement of the conflict by the 2nd Autonomy Statute was a first and necessary step. Italy's German and Ladin minorities were no longer threatened by assimilation. Achieving a compromise solution accepted by the majority of all those concerned – Italy, Austria and the South Tyroleans – was certainly due to tolerance and goodwill on all sides (Kager 1998, 1). The same should be true for the preservation of the achieved results and their gradual development towards a society more characterized by interethnic interaction and cooperation. After 30 years the time seems to be ripe for a second step to resolve the ethnic division of the society in order to reach an even higher level of peace.⁴⁰

Autonomy is a dynamic process, balances established in a certain situation and a specific context can and must change, if their preconditions change. Only such processes will inspire and maintain public confidence which are inclusive of those concerned. Given the fact that territorial arrangements – in most cases – do not only concern the minority group, but the whole population, functional criteria and conditions of tolerance, but also the perception of pluralism as a basic value, play an important part.

The recent changes at local, national and supranational level provide that South Tyrol today is no longer surrounded by “enemies” (the Italian State for the German/Ladin minority, Austria as a threat for the integrity of the Italian nation), but by partners with whom it can cooperate in managing certain governance functions. In this light, it makes sense to think of changing some principles and rules of cohabitation which still express a defensive attitude and substitute them by other, more flexible and functional-oriented principles which do not stress ethnicity as the main distinctive criterion any longer. A shift of balances towards the territorial principle is needed in order to succeed in the transformation from a post-conflict situation to a society which does not only accept the presence of different groups on the same territory as a matter of fact, but appreciates plurilingualism and multiculturalism as basic values and enriching factors.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Gruber-De Gasperi Agreement (including English original text): http://www.regione.taa.it/giunta/normativa_it/normat_pag_it.htm
2. Autonomy Statute Trentino-South Tyrol, d.p.r. 31/8/1972, no. 670 (text in English):
 - http://www.provinz.bz.it/lpa/autonomy/autonomy_statute_eng.pdf

⁴¹ A policy for the final resolution of the conflict is suggested by Kager 1998, 9 ff., who underlines the importance of interethnic social movements by concentrating on the youth.

- Hannum, Hurst (ed.), Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1993, p. 460-495
- Magliana, Melissa, The Autonomous Province of Bolzano-Südtirol, Quaderno/Arbeitsheft No. 20, European Academy Bozen/Bolzano 2000 – Appendix, p. 167-195
- 3. Alcock, Antony Evelyn, Geschichte der Südtirolfrage. Südtirol seit dem Paket 1970 – 1980, Wien 1982
- 4. Alcock, Antony Evelyn, "South Tyrol", in: Miall, Hugh (ed.), Minority Rights in Europe, London 1994, p. 46-55
- 5. Alcock, Antony Evelyn, The South Tyrol Autonomy. A short introduction, May 2001, <http://www.provinz.bz.it/lpa/autonomy/South-Tyrol%20Autonomy.pdf>
- 6. Baur, Siegfried/von Guggenberg, Irma/Larcher, Dietmar, Zwischen Herkunft und Zukunft. Südtirol im Spannungsfeld zwischen ethnischer und postnationaler Gesellschaftsstruktur, Meran/Merano 1998
- 7. Bertelsmann Foundation, On How to Settle Ethnic Conflicts in Eastern Europe. Theses, Gütersloh 1998
- 8. Böckler, Stephan, Das Autonomiestatut für Trentino-Südtirol – Ein Modell für die friedliche Regelung des Kosovokonflikts? in: Marko, Joseph (ed.), Gordischer Knoten Kosovo/a: Durchschlagen oder entwirren? Völkerrechtliche, rechtsvergleichende und politikwissenschaftliche Analysen zum jüngsten Balkankonflikt, Baden — Baden 1999, p. 87-104
- 9. Böckler, Stephan, The South Tyrol: 75 years of Ethnic Conflict and Peaceful Coexistence, in: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (eds.), Status of Minorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Belgrad 1996, vol. 19, p. 597-606
- 10. Böckler, Stephan/Grisenti, Rita, Lo Statuto di Autonomia del Trentino-Alto Adige: un modello di pacificazione etnica per l'area centrale danubiana? / Das Autonomiestatut für Trentino-Südtirol: ein Modell für die Befriedung ethnischer Konflikte im mittleren Donauraum?, Milano/Berlin 1996
- 11. Cavagnoli, Stefania/Nardin, Francesca, Second language acquisition in South Tyrol: Difficulties, motivations, expectations, Multilingua 18-1 (1999), p. 17-45
- 12. Dinstein, Yoram, Autonomy, in: Dinstein, Yoram (ed.), Models of Autonomy, Tel Aviv 1981, 291-303
- 13. Feiler, Michael, South Tyrol — Model for the Resolution of Minority Conflicts?, in: Review of International Affairs, vol. 28 (1997), 1053-1054, p. 10-35
- 14. Hannum, Hurst, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: the Accomodation of Conflicting Rights, Philadelphia 1996
- 15. Hilpold, Peter, Die rechtliche Stellung der Deutsch-Südtiroler in Italien, in: Europa Ethnica 1996/3-4, p. 117-130
- 16. Kager, Thomas, South Tyrol: Mitigated but not Resolved, in: Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 1998 1.3.
- 17. Lampis, Antonio, Autonomia e Concivenza, Quaderno/Arbeitsheft Nr. 17, European Academy Bozen/Bolzano 1999
- 18. Langer, Alexander, Miteinander, Nebeneinander, in: Baur, Siegfried/Dello Sbarba, Riccardo (eds.), Aufsätze zu Südtirol/Scritti sul Sudtirolo 1978-1995, Meran/Merano 1996
- 19. Lapidoth, Ruth, Autonomy. Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts, Washington D.C. 1997
- 20. Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies, New Haven 1977
- 21. Lijphart, Arend, The Power Sharing Approach, in: Montville, Joseph V. (ed.), Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, New York 1991, 491-510

22. Loughlin, John/Daftary, Farimah (ed.), *Insular Regions and European Integration: Corsica and the Aland Islands Compared*, ECMI Report No. 5 (European Centre for Minority Issues), Flensburg November 1999
23. Pizzorusso, Alessandro, *Minoranze e maggioranze*, Torino 1993
24. Magliana, Melissa, *The Autonomous Province of Bolzano-Südtirol: A Model of Self-Governance?* Quaderno/Arbeitsheft No. 20, European Academy Bozen/Bolzano 2000
25. Marko, Joseph, *Autonomie und Integration. Rechtsinstitute des Nationalitätenrechts im funktionalen Vergleich*, Wien 1995
26. Marko, Joseph, *Equality and difference: political and legal aspects of ethnic group relations*, in: Matscher, Franz/Cede, Franz (eds.), *Wiener Internationale Begegnung zu aktuellen Fragen nationaler Minderheiten*, Schriften des Österreichischen Instituts für Menschenrechte, vol. 07, Kehl 1997, p. 67-97
27. Marko, Joseph, *Kosovo/a – Ein Gordischer Knoten? Zusammenfassende Analysen und Politikempfehlungen*, in: Marko, Joseph (Hrsg.), *Gordischer Knoten Kosovo/a: Durchschlagen oder entwirren? Völkerrechtliche, rechtsvergleichende und politikwissenschaftliche Analysen zum jüngsten Balkankonflikt*, Baden-Baden 1999, p. 231-259
28. Marko, Joseph, Ortino, Sergio, Palermo, Francesco (eds.), *L'ordinamento speciale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano, (Ius publicum europaeum, 03)* Padova 2001
29. Palermo, Francesco, *Die zwei Dimensionen des Zusammenlebens in Südtirol*, in: *Europa Ethnica* 1999/1-2, p. 9-22
30. Palermo, Francesco, *Diritto comunitario e tutela delle minoranze: alla ricerca di un punto di equilibrio*, in *Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo* 2000/III, p. 969
31. Palermo, Francesco, *Ruolo e natura delle commissioni paritetiche e delle norme di attuazione*, in: Joseph Marko, Sergio Ortino, Francesco Palermo (eds.), *L'ordinamento speciale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano*, Padova 2001, pp. 826-844
32. Palermo, Francesco, *Il diritto all'uso della lingua nei confronti dell'amministrazione e nei procedimenti giudiziari*, (with J. Woelk), in: Joseph Marko, Sergio Ortino, Francesco Palermo (eds.), *L'ordinamento speciale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano*, Padova 2001, pp. 717-745
33. Pallaver, Günther, *South Tyrol, the "Package" and its ratification*, in: *Politics and Society in Germany, Austria and Switzerland*, Vol. 2 No. 1/2, Spring 1990, p. 70-79
34. Rautz, Günther, *Das Zusammenleben in einem mehrsprachigen Gebiet am Beispiel Südtirol*, in: Marko, Joseph/Burkert-Dottolo, Günther R. (eds.), *Multikulturelle Gesellschaft und Demokratie*, Schriftenreihe Ethnische Minderheiten und Regionale Autonomien, Band 4, Baden-Baden 2000, p. 69-83
35. Toggenburg, Gabriel, *Horizontale Drittwirkung der Personenfreizügigkeit vor dem Hintergrund der Südtiroler Autonomie*, in *European Law Reporter*, 2000, 7/8, p. 242 ss.
36. Toggenburg, Gabriel, *Diritto comunitario e tutela delle minoranze in provincia di Bolzano. Due aspetti inconciliabili di un (unico) sistema*, in: Joseph Marko, Sergio Ortino, Francesco Palermo (eds.), *L'ordinamento speciale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano*, Padova 2001, pp. 139-194
37. Wakenhut, Roland, *Modernisierung und ethnische Identität bei Jugendlichen in Südtirol*, in: Wakenhut, Roland (ed.), *Ethnisches und nationales Bewußtsein. Coscienza etnica e coscienza nazionale*, Frankfurt am Main 1995, p. 139-154
38. Weber Egli, Daniela, *Gemischtsprachige Familien in Südtirol/Alto Adige. Zweisprachigkeit und soziale Kontakte*. Meran/Merano 1992
39. Woelk, Jens, *"Verwaltungs föderalismus all'italiana"*, in *Jahrbuch für Italienisches Recht* (13), Heidelberg 2000, p. 108 ss.
40. Woelk, Jens, *Südtirol: ein Lehrbeispiel für Konfliktlösung?*, *Die Friedens-Warte* 1/2001, pp. 101-124

41. Woelk, Jens, From Ethnic Minority Protection to Cohabitation, in: Agency of Local Democracy Subotica (ed.), *Essays on Regionalisation. A collection of reports submitted at the International Conference: Regionalisation in Southeast Europe – Comparative Analysis and Perspectives*, Subotica 2001, pp. 107–128 (Serbian translation: *Od zaštite prava manjina do suživota*, in: *Ogledi o Regionalizaciji*, pp. 107–128)
42. Woelk, Jens, La Libera Università di Bolzano e l'istruzione superiore, in: Joseph Marko, Sergio Ortino, Francesco Palermo (eds.), *L'ordinamento speciale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano*, Padova 2001, pp. 870–891
43. Zappe, Manuela, *Das ethnische Zusammenleben in Südtirol. Sprachsoziologische, sprachpolitische und soziokulturelle Einstellungen der deutschen, italienischen und ladinischen Sprachgruppe vor und nach den gegenwärtigen Umbrüchen in Europa*, Frankfurt am Main, 1996
44. Zeyer, Christof, *Der völkerrechtliche und europarechtliche Status von Südtirol*, Frankfurt a.M. 1993

MELITA RICHTER

PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF TRIESTE, ITALY

SIGNIFICANCE OF WOMEN'S NETWORK FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE CULTURE AND TOLERANCE: EXPERIENCES FROM THE TERRITORY OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

One of the most difficult tasks that face the societies which have participated and experienced the atrocities of war is the postwar process of establishment of justice, catharsis, national and interethnic reconciliation, and promotion of the ideals of tolerance and peace. Indeed, we have witnessed how much time was needed for the ideas of peace, justice and especially responsibility, to take root in the countries involved in the Second World War, and when I say this I primarily mean Germany and Italy. That is the reason why I consider today's Round Table organized by Belgrade Centre for Peace and Development an exceptionally significant step in the direction of attempted normalization of national and interethnic relations, and relations with neighbouring countries. Any experience that an international meeting such as the present one can bring, is welcome and highly instructive. But, it is certain that the incentive for essential social changes must come from social reality itself, it must be endogenous — and here in Serbia and Montenegro, and in the broader region of former Yugoslav countries, we are talking primarily of the need for changes or, even better, deconstruction of cultural patterns, ideological and value systems that have produced war and war crimes and that are still justifying them.

What I wish to point out in this short presentation is the need to hear out the experience of others, but most of all to record and collect the experiences of how resistance was offered to war and the so-called good practices in one's own environment. And many have been mentioned here today. Not one "among other", but the first and the most significant one is what women's peace and feminist organizations and movements have induced, along with women's network of solidarity on the territory of whole of Yugoslavia. The example that cannot be disregarded are "*Women in Black*", the activists who are for 14 years already active primarily in Belgrade, although they have also taken action on the entire territory of Serbia and Montenegro, in Kosovo, and jointly with other women's organizations, on the territory of other republics, nowadays independent national states. Let us mention some associations from Zagreb (...), Sarajevo (...), links with feminists of Slovenia, women of Macedonia. The guiding prin-

ciple of their activities is the feminist idea of peace based on clearly defined ethical principles. One of them “*Not in our name!*” was introduced by them into public spaces, squares and streets of a country that pursued a war-mongering policy, that created “enemies” with whole-hearted dedication of mass media, that invested great efforts into militarization of the society and of the citizen’s mind.

Women of Serbia were the first to oppose the war, they were the first to initiate an antiwar campaign in the effort to deconstruct nationalistic mythologies. They evaded the eternal role of victims assigned to them by patriarchy and the war, and converted it into resistance and action. In this way they became *political subjects of history*. In their continuous presence in public spaces of many cities where they have organized protests, performances, petitions, resistance to forced call-up, collection of signatures in favour of legal provisions on conscientious objection and similar, they are engaged in a daily struggle against political exclusion of the Other and the Different and against the policy of imposed collective identity erected on the hatred of the Other. Active participants in their ranks are women of different ethnic origin, age and social background. That which was the most difficult to do during the war – point the finger at one’s own nationalism, at the regime which is the most responsible for war devastation and war crimes against other neighbouring nations – in the postwar period has not become any easier: to fight against the reluctance of the new regime to radically discontinue the policy of the former regime and against ideological justification of its war policy.⁴¹

Nowadays, these issues, like any other meaningful, coherent reflection on the future, must be given exceptional attention and efforts must be invested in the establishment of capabilities of the society to face the past and restore the feeling for justice. It is necessary, as Nenad Dimitrijević has put it, to make *the past become the subject of moral reflection of autonomous individuals*⁴² that does not avoid the question of responsibility for war crimes, nor attempts to deny it or relativize it.

⁴¹ In an interview to Dani, magazine from Sarajevo, Latinka Perović said the following about that: “*The present Government denies crime (...). Crime is not regarded as such, but as an instrument of a policy that was defeated only by facts, but not in the minds of the people. One should not be deceived: what has happened is a deep regression of consciousness*”, “Dani”, Sarajevo no. 277, 3. October 2002.

⁴² Nenad Dimitrijević, „Konstrukcija kolektivnog zločina i konstrukcija kolektivne moralne odgovornosti”, u: *Suočavanje s prošlošću: feministički pristup*, Ženska mirovna mreža, Žene u crnom, (“Construction of Collective Crimes and Construction of Collective Moral Responsibility” in *Facing the Past: A Feminist Approach*, Women’s Peace Network, Women in Black), Beograd, 2005, p. 146.

Finding ways to live together is closely linked to disassociation from perpetrators of crimes, to making a distinction between collective identity and individual responsibility. The capability to face these issues are indicators of development of society, its maturity for interrelations with others and the different. And, as stated by Latinka Perović, the question of crimes is *the question of all questions*. “Breaking up with the policy of crime is not a pragmatic issue, that is, the issue of Serbia’s joining the European Union. It is a question of values”. And it is equally important for all national subjects on the territory of former Yugoslavia.

Development of a culture of peace, co-existence and tolerance is not possible if crime is denied or if it is left unpunished. This is not an exclusive demand for Serbia alone, but for all countries in the region that have participated in the war. That is the reason why civil society in these countries has the obligation and the responsibility to exert permanent pressure on state institutions to have all the organizers and perpetrators of crimes punished.⁴³

Further on I would like to underline some of the modalities of mutual relations in the region which I believe might be useful examples of contributions to relieving of tensions and reconciliation of the people in this part of the world.

1. MOBILITY AND CROSSING BORDERS

At the time immediately after the war members of various women’s and peace associations organized travelling caravans through the so-called inimical regions with the intention to *cross the borders that had been established – really or imaginarily – between their countries and communities. Their objectives were to engage with one another’s reality, to bring to light the truth about the recent wars and the question of responsibility, and to assist one another in their respective struggles.*

As reported in the book ⁴⁴ published after their extraordinary experience the participants of the journey were from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. For two weeks they suspended their professional and family lives to make a statement of their commitment in a journey of almost 3,000 km, meeting activist women

⁴³ See in: Staša Zajović, „Feministički pristup suočavanja s prošlošću i tranziciona pravda- iskustva Srbije” – prilog Konferenciji međunarodne mreže Žena u crnom (“Feminist Approach to Facing the Past and Transitional Justice – Experience of Serbia” – contribution to Conference of International Network Women in Black), Jerusalem, Israel, 12–16 August 2005.

⁴⁴ Ghislaine Glasson Deschaumes and Svetlana Slapšak, *Balkan Women for Peace*, Trans-europeennes, Paris 2003.

*belonging to more than 70 NGOs, along with some local politicians, government officials and representatives of international community. They also visited memorials to the civilian victims of war. The kind of the reality they were getting closer to, in this way, had previously been remote, or even abstract, but they did not want to overlook it. Their intention was to give these question the maximum amount of publicity upon their return home.*⁴⁵

We believe that such practice of crossing borders and joint mutual relations and activities in war-divided areas is an extremely desirable practice of learning about others, compassion, confrontation, disassociation or identification, appreciation of collective and individual memory of others and the different.

One of our proposals to this gathering is to evaluate this special women's experience of mobility and crossing all types of newly created borders and apply it to the generation of the young from different social, ethnic and national environments.

2. SHARING OF NARRATIVES

I would like to point out to the precious work and experience in the domain of post-traumatic consequences of professor Dan Bar-On⁴⁶, native from Haifa, historian who studied the after-effects of the Holocaust. He brought together a small group of second and third generation of survivors and descendants of Nazi perpetrators and tried to discover if they could work through some of the burdens of silence and its after-effects by sharing their family stories. This experience of *story-telling method* he later applied to current conflicts in areas as the one of South Africa, Northern Ireland and Palestinians and Israelis. In this last case, he started to create an oral history database of life stories of Jewish and Palestinian refugees. The project started in 2000 and was especially interested in life stories of Jews and Arabs who lived in the same neighbourhood prior to the 1948 war. The research brought him to explore his own life in Haifa which he had never examined – especially how Jews and Arabs lived together before most of the Arab population fled (in 1948).

Besides discovering that there are still alive the basics of Jewish and Arab coexistence, Bar-On also noticed that Jews and Arabs have different and separate narratives of the past as well as of the present. At the end of the research, he wrote:

⁴⁵ Deschaumes, G. G., and Slapšak, S., op. cit. p. 7.

⁴⁶ Dan Bar-On, professor at Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Israel.

“By conducting interviews I learned what I never really knew:

- 1) The suffering of the Arab population in Haifa.
- 2) The different nuances between the Muslims and the Christians.
- 3) The different perspectives of Haifa’s Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews.

But I did not only gain new insights into the history of my own hometown. I also learned how our views of events that happen today are colored by simplified and ignorant views of our past. In that sense I believe that the complexity displayed by the different narratives of what had happened in Haifa prior to 1948 may help other Israeli Jews and Arabs understand the pillars upon which their current understanding of social and political issues is based.”⁴⁷

The application of similar methods of story-telling for the purpose of creating an oral history database of life stories of members of all our peoples, but especially the ones that are most affected by war devastation of social tissue and historical experience of coexistence would be absolutely necessary for overcoming the burdens of silence and could contribute to the recognition of the memory of peoples and places.

Let us mention that this method was actively applied by women’s network in Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. An example is the meeting organized by “Women in Black” with women of Srebrenica on April 6, 2002, in Belgrade Centre for Cultural Decontamination on the topic “Testimonies on the Massacre in Srebrenica“. The meeting had a historical significance because for the first time life stories of survivors could be heard in the heart of the country which the crime originated from.

In 1995, also in Belgrade, a small but significant book⁴⁸ was published, that brought together memories of women refugees from Bosnia. Each one of them begins her story with the words “I remember...” and records images of a life in happier times when human relations came down to values that were not ethnically marked. As the editor of the book Radmila Žarković says: “In these stories you will find longing, so strong that one can’t forget it, you will find sorrow for leaving, pain caused by separation from their dear ones and the surroundings they have belonged to; the joy of remembrance as an unexpected present...”

⁴⁷ Dan Bar-On, “Haifa – The City of Missed Opportunities: Jews and Arabs from the 1940s to Today”, paper presented at The International Society of Political Psychology, 25th Annual Silver Jubilee, Berlin, July 16-19, 2002.

⁴⁸ Radmila Žarković (edited by), *Sjećam se* (I remember), Žene u crnom, Beograd, 1995.

3. ON RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

To speak about religious tolerance which exceeds the ideological utopistic level is especially hard. For several reasons. I will list just a few.

- 1) The role of the Church in dark times of war. According to the statements of two independent intellectuals, Nataša Kandić, Director of Humanitarian Law Fund from Belgrade, and Zoran Pusić, President of The Civil Human Rights Committee from Zagreb, this role was assessed in the following manner: „The Orthodox Church played a negative role. (...) Some Orthodox priests sent off volunteers and various paramilitary units to war and while doing it gave speeches in which they in fact stirred up animosity against others“. “I don’t believe that the Catholic Church stirred up violence, but it was silent about violence and missed the opportunity to rise in defense of unprotected people whose lives were in danger.”⁴⁹ In this way both churches failed to play the ecumenical role they often referred to. What Christianity potentially has in itself was neither historically nor currently practised.
- 2) Numerous believers have taken part in orgies of state, para-state and re-privatized violence in one way or another. In Croatia like in Serbia, criminals sought support in some ideology in order to show that what they were doing was for some higher cause, and for that they reached out for the backing of church symbols.
- 3) Abuse of church insignia and symbols. On this topic, sociologist of religion Srđan Vrcan notes that nowadays the cross is mostly presented as a sign of profane victory and points out to its abuse: “For many the cross has become a frivolous gesture, a movement with political secular interest, in many places it is not just frivolous, but also an esthetically and religiously grotesque symbol. It is raised as a sign of conquered territories, and many monument-crosses in our country are reduced to a sign or symbol of national pride and defiance, often harbouring a grudge, and therefore, contain a warning only for others, and even tend to be a reservoir of revenge.”⁵⁰
- 4) Hiding of indictees for war crimes is often linked to their protection and support of Church institutions.

⁴⁹ Conversation with Zoran Pusić and Nataša Kandić on topic: „Zločinci kao heroji“, (War Criminals as Heroes), Zarez, Zagreb, no. VII/149, 24. February, 2005.

⁵⁰ Srđan Vrcan, „Kršćanstvo i čišćenje pamćenja“ (“Christianity and Cleansing of Memory”), Zarez, Zagreb, br. VI/143, 2004.

- 5) Weakening of the secular character of the state. Interference of the Serb Orthodox Church into state affairs in Serbia, and interference of the Catholic Church into political and public affairs in Croatia, especially into the system of up/bringing and education of the young.

Discussions are rarely initiated on the complexity and discrepancies that are nowadays distinctive of the Church. Having been a *claimant to the monopoly on the truth* for centuries, the Church reluctantly accepts critical views which for instance German university Professor Bremer speaks about: "The truth may be grim, and the truth on the history of the Catholic Church has a fair amount of grim moments, without it there can be no reconciliation, and therefore no peaceful or stable development. That is why it is the interest of the Catholic Church, as it is the interest of any other group, to critically examine its history, to allow the memory of its own guilt and to face it".⁵¹ It is almost unnecessary to say that this demand equally refers to the Catholic, the Orthodox and the Islamic community, and that public debate should include Catholic, Orthodox and Islamic intellectuals, priests and layman.

4. PROMOTION OF INTER-NATIONAL FORUMS FOR PEACE

Let us go back to the experience of women who, through women's associations and lobbies and Centers of Women Studies, promoted international and interethnic meetings where all significant issues linked to the historical moment and status of women in the newly created situation were discussed.

I will mention two such meetings. The first was held during war years in Zagreb (October 1996), and the second in the postwar period in Sarajevo (November 2004).

The meeting in Zagreb titled „International Women's Forum: Women and Politics of Peace“⁵² dealt with questions such as the following:

- How do women articulate peace?

⁵¹ Citation from Vuleta, B., Anić, R., Milanović Litre, I., (ur.) *Kršćanstvo i pamćenje. Kršćansko pamćenje i oslobođenje od zlopamćenja*, Zbornik radova s međunarodnog simpozija (*Christianity and Memory, Christian Memory and Liberation from Long Memory*, Collection of Papers from International Symposium), Split, Zagreb, Hrvatski Caritas i Franjevački Institut za kulturu mira, 2004.

⁵² Contribution to this gathering are published in the Collection of papers: *Women and the Politics of Peace. Contribution to a Culture of Women's Resistance*, (Biljana Kašić, editor), Centre for Women's Studies — Zagreb, Zagreb 1997.

- What are the reference points of women's perspective when considering notions such as war, peace, pacifism, violence, international security and peace process?
- How do women live and become aware of the processes of changes in their own identities in the circumstances of war?

All these questions represented the framework for a search of public **responsibility for peace** as an unquestionable value.

The meeting in Sarajevo promoted by Forum Bosnia organized The First Balkan Feminist Conference which brought together scientists from the region and the world to discuss history, politics and cultures of Balkans from a gender point of view. This scientific conference held in Sarajevo, in "the heart of Balkans", opened a discussion about an issue of sex/gender roles in a discourse of balkanization and tried to find answers to the following questions:

- How is the articulation of feminist and gender theoretical/critical perspective important in democratization process of countries in transition and how to think differences within cultural and social constructions concerning imagining the Balkans?
- How to mobilize cooperation in the region based on a live dialogue on technologies of lawful repression and how such a lawfulness can be understood?
- How to actively construct a figure of a "neighbour" and how to invest it in a dispossession of balkanization discourse?
- How to recognize oppressive and discriminating strategies and what types of resistance do we have at our disposal?
- How to create, advocate and transform into action available feminist and non-feminist theoretical-critical concepts?
- Who are the victims of dominant discourses and how that we are not only to advocate their right to have their own story but, to support their right to self-creation of their own struggle against stigmatization, as well?

The topics of these gatherings mentioned just as an example of the activities of women's organizations and movements *across and despite* all newly created state borders, exceed an academic and ideological discourse, they revert to an **experiential comparative approach** and combine women's experiences in the newly created national states on the territory of former Yugoslavia. These experiences are also reflected in international knowledge of women in other parts of the world in connection with a war and post-war period which is strongly marked by the experienced trauma, polarization of society in relation to the past and separation of collec-

tive memories. By the introduction of these and similar topics into public discourse of the countries where women's organizations and movements operate, preconditions are created for theoretical establishment of a policy of peace, and for assuming responsibility for the construction of a future.

I believe that such practice must be perceived in a broader social framework, that it must spread like a capillary network and involve young generations, and that its continuity must be ensured.



ALPAR LOŠONC

PROFESSOR AT THE FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF NOVI SAD,
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER OF MULTICULTURALITY IN NOVI SAD
AND THE MEMBER OF THE EXTERNAL CORPORATION OF THE HUNGARIAN
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

VOJVODINA OR A REGIME OF TOLERANCE IN CRISIS

A region of Serbia located in the north of the country, called Vojvodina, is exposed to proof. To be more precise, the regime of tolerance in Vojvodina is questioned due to certain tendencies loaded with violence-related events. Vojvodina is characterised by unique ethnical cohabitation (actually, we could notice more than twenty ethnicities) of several ethnic groups and is often described as the European-like region in Serbia. By emphasizing the specificity of Vojvodina the regionalists in particular intend to construct and endorse the distinctiveness of this region, due to its codes of tradition, in which the ethnical pluralism has played a crucial role. There are even a lot of intellectuals and politicians engaged in regional identification pointing out that Vojvodina may easier integrate into a European framework, but that is another, and very long story.

Let me notice, that the situation in Vojvodina arouse the systematic interest of European institutions. For example, in accordance with a September 16, 2004 resolution adopted by the European Parliament (EP) on "the harassment of minorities in Vojvodina", a five-member fact-finding delegation went to the province January 28–31, 2005 to investigate the situation. The mission's findings concurred with the information detailed in some report regarding the types of incidents: vandalism of monuments, graffiti, verbal attacks, physical attacks, threats against minority leaders. On June 2005 the head of the EP Delegation, reinforced the institution's commitment to closely monitor the situation in Vojvodina. She also stated that she will be contacting Serbian officials regarding continued concerns, particularly in the areas of education and the administration of justice.

Recently, the European Commission emphasized in its evaluation that a more committed, or self-confident policy is needed in order to prevent the negative trends in Vojvodina. Requiring a more consequent engagement from the political authorities of Serbia European Commission calls for the set of constraints, rules of engagement, for the participating parties. But the main purpose of the mentioned Commission is to restore the peaceful coexistence as the necessary condition for the flourishing of the region. This interest of this European institution could be explained as

the part of intensified attention paid to the country suffered by war during the 90s. It is a well-known fact that this was the only war in Europe after the II World war, and it is understandable that war-like events produced extremely tempting tendencies for Europe and even for the international political community. Given the socio-cultural conditions in Vojvodina the break-up of the war is out of question, but as a number of studies accentuate some forms of ethnical tensions can not be ruled out. The vanishing of the intercultural trust is well documented by insightful studies and the loosening of common ties is mapped out. Some collective orientations are, no doubt, narrow-minded, interested in nothing beyond the advancement of their own group. The circumstances in Vojvodina could be explicated as the disappointed proof of the fact that five years after the transformation of the political regime in Serbia a number of regressive tendencies take place. The processes of adopting proved to be more difficult and longer than it was thought and predicted. The citizens of Serbia have been involved in the exposure of the repeatedly failing socio-economical and socio-cultural transformation. One may contrast the legacy of Serbia to the Hirschman's treatment of disappointment as a central element of human experience.

At the same time, the Commission's interest could be treated as the monitoring of the country that intends to hold the status of candidate in respect to the joining to the European institutional system. Thus, there are a numerous interpretative positions that provide diverse perspectives for the evaluation.

In addition there are interpretative conflicts in relation to the relevance of this violent ethnical incidents. The discursive space of Serbia is determined by the debates focused upon the elucidation of the meanings of ethnical incidents that demonstrates the ambiguity of the ongoing situation. In accordance with authorities in Serbia the negative assessments of the case of ethnical incidents is exaggerated, and the European commission based its evaluation-practice depending on the overstressed facts. This authorities accused of the NGOs (for example, Helsinki Committee of Human Rights) interested in the analysis of the situation of minorities that they did not offer adequate data to European Commission and attaching too great importance to the events make available inaccurate account on the constellation in Serbia. It is even repeated the old arguments that any demand to act out in the name of minority victims in public is likely to produce anxiety among the majority and that victims were provoking the attacks.

Turning to the other side, the NGOs I referred to criticize the authorities because of the apologetic rhetoric intending to hide the deep de-

ficiencies of the system of the minority protection in Serbia. They pointed out that the insufficient efforts made by authorities are the serious symptom of the inconsequent national politics. Some principles are declared, of course, but only slowly and imperfectly enforced and the authorities minimized the severity of the incidents, fail to rigorously pursue and conclude investigations. The slow pace of the putting up of the remedies by the authorities was the result of incapacity to provide adequate responses to postwar and post communist pressure. It is beyond doubt that there were alerting signs that needed earnest consideration: every research dealing with the youngsters confirmed the extremely high and continually existing rate of intolerance. This type of intolerance is not only ethnical-related, but reveals an indication of confusing value-based orientation that could generate the phenomenon of ethnical intolerance. During the 1990s Serbia was subordinated to the destroying of the value-systems and frustrating social dynamics. The value-systems are not restored yet. The politics of education system is one of key area where the new orientation, a complex set of rules, norms, codes and matrixes were to be installed. Actually, this complexity of norms etc. is to provide competences for the a) discursive culture, b) everyday culture, c) civic culture. Besides, the projected hope indicated that people, who managed to pass through certain toleration programs strengthened by the experience, are educated for a more modest commonality. But lacking the far-reaching politics of education the constellation with the youngster remains unchanged in its main perspectives. The critical interpretations bring into considerations the deficiencies in relation to the judicial system in Serbia that is congested with the residual elements of the previous political system and demonstrate systematic shortcomings. In fact, there is a lack of stabilized judicial system that could react promptly, consequently and in accordance with the general norms of declared political orientation. The greatest problem is still a too passive attitude of the prosecution, which can encourage perpetrators. There is a great difference concerning the assessment of the so-called internationalization of the ethnic incidents in Vojvodina. In accordance with the authorities of Serbia, the internationalization strengthened the crisis and opened the door for the further incidents. In line with the influential NGOs the so-called internationalization has brought a considerable decrease in the number of the incidents, although the sharp division in everyday life between the members of different national communities remained.⁵³

⁵³ Centre for the Development of Civil Society, *Overcoming of the Ethnic Tension in the North of Vojvodina*, Draft, 2005.

If we go further with diagnosis, there is even difference between the rhetorical strategies of politicians. The regionalists emphasize the fact that the unpleasant situation proves to be the sign for the regional autonomy that could successfully deal with the regressive inclinations. There is a noticeable divergence between the rhetoric of the President and of the Prime minister of the Republic of Serbia. In addition, we are witnessing the discursive clash in relation to the naming of the events. On one hand, the leaders of minority parties or certain influential intellectuals denote the affairs as the “ethnic atrocities” or “ethnic harassment”. On other hand, the authorities insist on the using of the term “incidents” that is much more neutral (from the critical standpoint: euphemistic) without any value-based connotations. Some NGOs are using the term „ethnic tension”. In other words, these conflictual tendencies demonstrate the well-known fact that political quarrels are always concerned with the symbolical geography and the fighting for naming of the occurrence is of crucial importance for the political agents. We should bear in mind that each time is necessary to consider as well how the arrangements are experienced by different participants – both groups and individuals, both whose and those who are armed – and then how they are seen by outsiders.

We are always challenged by robust difficulties when the interpretation does not allow any impatience and one-sidedness. Concerning the issue of Vojvodina we are confronted with the similar complications. The explanation is simple: the situation bears the marks of hybridity, and ambiguities. It could not be neglected that it is always possible to re-actualise Vojvodina as a regional, and multiethnic locus where different cultural, social, and political items are exchanged. In order to depict the specific aspects of Vojvodina properly, wide-ranging everyday and economic relations between the members of different ethnic groups should be mentioned. The comprehensive communication and well-coordinated realisation of some common interests illustrate habitual behavioural patterns. This means that it is necessary to observe both the elements of micro-history and the impact of the accumulated social capital that underlay the political history. The inclusion of such underlying elements in the tradition of customary interactions highlights the complexity of Vojvodina as a historically specific region. But, the path-dependent propensities that lead to the spiral of violence always bring into being a variety of irreversible traces for the memory that could be mobilised in the interacting between the ethnicities. Actually, the emerging violence for all time threatens to overrule the regimes of toleration and to determine the socially conditioned communications.

Therefore, it seems to me that situation in Vojvodina has need of an alternative treatment in relation to the discernible management in the public of Serbia. First it necessitates some historical reconsideration, second it is indispensable to contextualise the issue named Vojvodina within the transition processes in Serbia. Consequently, it could not be an adequate amount if we concentrate only upon the recent occurrences. There are a lot of pro and contra arguments copying with different diagnosis but my interest is not the comprehensive analysis thus I give up any ambition to demarcate the strength and weaknesses of the manifested arguments. My hypothesis is that the problems in Vojvodina are to be seen in the perspective of the dynamics of the regime of toleration. Without immersing into the empirical findings and data (that are easily available for the interested one although this data are the source of different misunderstanding) I apply only for the framing of a disputable topic. Using the phrase “regime of toleration” I follow a famous political philosopher Michael Walzer who designates social arrangements through which one incorporates difference, coexists with it, allows it a share of social space. As we see the regime of toleration contains very broad arrangements with political, educational and some other aspects. I do not claim that it is possible here to enlist exhaustively the dimensions of the mentioned social arrangements, only that first of all it is needed to *frame* the problem.

The contemporary situation in Vojvodina is deeply determined by the crisis of the previously existed regimes of toleration. Every type of crises is characterised by the situation “in-between”: the previous norms do not function and orientate anymore, but the future norms do not operate yet. The constellation in Vojvodina demonstrates such a crisis-like state of affairs and the chance for the profound correction of the existing situation is in reinventing the regime of toleration.

* * *

Let me first to allude to some historical facts although my analysis is realized in a very rough fashion.⁵⁴ The history of Vojvodina bears the hallmark of the political, demographic and cultural dynamics of different political regimes, and empires (such as Habsburg Monarchy, or the ex-Yugoslavia).⁵⁵ Given, the historical dynamics, every type of political regime

⁵⁴ Throughout the article I follow certain ideas developed in A. Losonc, Vojvodina as a realm of regional tendencies, in: *Between Authoritarianism and Democracy* (Ed. by D. Vujadinovic, L. Veljak, Vl. Goati, V. Pavicevic), Beograd/Podgorica/Zagreb, 2003, 351–371.

⁵⁵ About the political state of affairs between the Wars, see R. Končar, *Opozicione partije i autonomija Vojvodine 1929–1941* (Oppositional parties and the Autonomy of Vojvodina 1929–1941), Novi Sad, 1995.

was some form of toleration in Vojvodina. We could draw this figure of toleration throughout the history: imperial form of tolerance, tolerance within the nation state, ideologically based tolerance. Obviously, mixed regimes are always possible, and my classification is determined by combining historical and ideal-typical accounts. This orientation that I defend is a contextual account of tolerance and coexistence, one that examines the forms that these have taken and the norms of everyday life appropriate to each. In addition, the micro-history or the history of everydayness cannot be identified with the political articulation and their divergences and convergences ought to be dealt with separately. This is an added complicatedness we are confronted with in interpretation but we should not eradicate it.

It is not of relevance here to make a through analysis of the relations between the majority (Serbs) and various minorities (Slovaks, Ruthenians, Hungarians etc.), but it is important to note that the history of ethnical relationships was burdened with the tendencies of the unquestioned acceptance of the exclusivistic patterns of nation-building. After World War II, Vojvodina was subordinated to the Communist rule and later it gained a regional outline within the Yugoslav state structure. Vojvodina has remained multi-ethnic despite the numerous challenging tendencies and events. Vojvodina emerged from World War II with painful scars and serious losses. No doubt, the events of World War II were marked by violence and inter-ethnic hatred and are still a source of conflict-inducing memories. Yugoslavia was one among a few states with federal structure with a considerable degree of decentralisation but always within the Communist ideological frames, i.e. the regionalisation was carried out in compliance with the standards of the Party-power preservation. This meant that the region was understood as an organic part of the ideological structure and had to be integrated in the territorial distribution of power. All Vojvodina elements – historical and territorial codes – had to be fitted in the ideological construct of the Yugoslav reality. Obviously, the territorial differentiation was a network of channels for the division of power in the Communist creation of reality. The classical principles of a federation, like subsidiarity or the power control, had to be rewritten according to the altered imperatives of political action since the word ‘control’ could not be used and had to be reworded into ‘the territorial distribution of power’. The broad political context demonstrated the paradoxical meanings of nationalism: official ideological rhetoric strongly excluded nationalism from the public sphere, but made it stronger underground.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ At this point I agree with, D. Jovic, *The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, A Critical Review of Explanatory Approaches*, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 2001, 4(1), 5. An assess-

During the 1980s the ethnocentricity discourse gradually won the public support in Serbia and, finally, gained 'street', populist forms. This period was loaded with the elements of armed ethno-anarchy. By this, I understand that ethnocentrism targeted institutions it perceived as a limitation to the strengthening and affirmation of the ethnic essence. This can explain the collapse, the destruction of institutions and the instrumentalization of the state. Furthermore, it was necessary to convert the segments of everyday reality into signs of ethnocentric practices, which entailed discursive strategies witnessing about relationships between the rediscovered unity of blood and territory. Such a constellation opened the door to mythpolitical discourses. It was not a question of a return to the past, or to history, but rather of an integration of history and historicity into mythpolitical media. With the overthrow of Milošević's regime the deliberations on regionalism entered a new, post-Milošević stage. Having become a topic of current political conflicts, the state of affairs in Vojvodina has shaken the very foundations of Serbia, which is trying to re-associate with European tendencies. Although more or less all politically relevant actors admit that some changes are inevitable, the range of such changes is still unclear. Finally, it should be taken into account that the structure of inter-ethnic relations has changed. Indeed, if we examine earlier periods, the genesis of 'a multi-ethnic community free of domination of any one particular group' can be perceived.⁵⁷

However, even a superficial look at the statistic data for the 20th Century reveals the changes that have brought about the development of the majority and of minorities amongst which the biggest is Hungarian, then Croatian, Slovak and Romanian minority. Demographic processes, assimilation trends, modernisation influence as well as the populating policy have changed proportional relations between ethnic groups and their opportunities to make use of the resources. The statistics also reveals that the minority population has shrunk considerably which points towards certain political influences which, along with 'natural' assimilation tendencies, have instigated the change in the ethnic pattern (namely, the percentage of the minority population decrease ranges from 7% to 17%

ment on Russia, *mutatis mutandis*, could be applicated to the case of Yugoslavia, too, "far from suppressing nationhood, the communist regime institutionalized it", R. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 17.

⁵⁷ See Ch. Ingrao, Istorijski preduslovi regionalizacije: Vojvodina, nasleđe Austrijske Monarhije i njene južne strategije (Historical preconditions of regionalisation: Vojvodina, or the heritage of Austrian Monarchy and her strategy for South), in *Ogledi o regionalizaciji* (On regionalisation) (ed. N. Ćuk Skenderović) Subotica, 2001, 191.

for a ten-year period). It is evident that the reflections on the regionalism in Vojvodina cannot be immersed in an abstract equality discourse, but should rather enjoy an asymmetry created by the relations between the majority and the minorities. Minority groups are unequal by virtue of their numbers and could be democratically overruled on most matters of public culture and status. The guaranties of minority rights during the war were chimerical. National minorities were the groups most likely to find themselves at risk. The changes during the 1990s were seen by the minorities as contributing factor towards a process in which the position of minorities was being significantly eroded and in relation to the public sphere even threatened.

The most relevant result of the recent past is that the major orientations of the formerly existing regimes of tolerance were destroyed, although some traces of all previous regimes remained. Hence, the ongoing social dynamics is characterised by different, controversial tendencies with the lack of clear and coherent political orientation that could transcend the negative constellation and put up the new regime of toleration. There are a lot of unresolved dilemmas we are challenged with, and these problems include the meanings of loyalty of minorities, the acts of its adhesion, the installation of the inclusive political models.

* * *

A note is essential here: the regime of tolerance is every time exposed to the danger in multicultural society when the frame of nationality is not stabilised and the fear can mobilize strong feelings. If the significant social discontent that has built up after the political changes in Serbia is taken into consideration, it is clear that references to nationalism as the cement of “reforms” have a “seductive” meaning in the discursive sphere. It is wrong to take for granted that ethnic tensions are always detonated because of the strong boundaries or clear distinction between the national communities. Sometimes it is of relevance to take into account that there is fight for the clear boundaries. This reminds us that in such cases the boundaries between “us” and “them” are exactly what these tensions are about. Some theoreticians draw attention to the fact that the national conflicts have become more acute while cultural differences are diminished.⁵⁸

We should bear in mind that Serbia due to its history (and to the failures of its political elites) is an unfinished nation-state and issues related to the territorial frame of nation-state appear whenever the trans-

⁵⁸ S. Tempelman, *Constructions of Cultural Identity: Multiculturalism and Exclusion*, *Political Studies*, 1999, 17–31.

formations of its structure become evident. Remember that there is a lack of consolidated constitution-structure in Serbia that is connected to the instability of its territoriality. The experts expressed several times that the constitutional achievements are weak. There is a widespread suspicion that the country's territorial integrity may suffer a deep change and its national essence may be irreversibly damaged. This situation continually generates intense conflicts, focusing on questions of regional loyalty, and national identity, among intellectuals and politicians. We could speculate here in line with Gellner's idea that "de-territorialization of nationalism" and "de-fetishisation of land" is crucial in the attempt to find solution to the national problems. Additionally, we could further rely upon the other Gellner's proposals, too. That is, Gellner suggests that there are remedies for calming "ethnic conflicts", or following my term, for the crisis of regime of tolerance: a) political stability and continuity, b) economic affluence.⁵⁹

Taking these statements as a standpoint, it is to be accentuated that the regime of tolerance is not independent from the macrosocial dynamics. Actually, the regime of tolerance as the fragile constellation could be disturbed by displaying of ethnocentric orientations, but the deficiency concerning a certain level of political stability, and economics affluence. The situation in Vojvodina reminds us that the social dynamics includes multifarious mechanisms with complex interactions between initial conditions, policy-based measures, intentions and results. The events in society are marked with the strategy and the tactics of political agents and determined by the intentional and motivational structures of the same agents. But it would be very reductive if we avoid confrontation with the results, or by products of the intentions of social agents.

It sounds very simple but the situations in the discursive map of Serbia necessitates that I put emphasis on this statement. For example, the political authorities explaining the "ethnic incidents" repeatedly pay attention to the motivational structures of the perpetrators. They spend considerable energy on demonstrating that the failed interpretations on the situation in Vojvodina mispresent the data. But trying to disprove the domination of the ethnical aspects in some of this "incidents" they substitute its role with the role of judiciary system. Naturally, the judicial system is committed to weigh the motivational dimensions of the agents in different situations, because the judicial judgment is obliged to take in account every important aspect with respect to the concrete situation.

⁵⁹ E. Gellner, *Culture, Identity, and Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

But the political authorities should administer the governmentality of the regime of toleration.

The responsibility of the political authorities goes far beyond the concrete situation; the task assigned to these authorities includes the raise of conditions of tolerance or affirming the existing setting of tolerance. Following this line of mentioned substitution-practice, the confusion of competences is clearly perceptible. Perhaps not surprisingly this situation does not contribute to reinventing the regime of tolerance. The crisis of the regime of toleration did not spring out of clear strategies of social agents, or deliberative orientations, but is a complex result of intersecting tendencies. Besides, the regime of toleration is a dynamical stance, not a static condition. Many participants in the discussions on the “ethnic incidents” agree with the assessment that the “incidents”, “atrocities” etc. were not directed from above and did not originate from the deliberative practice of government. But this statement is of little help if the authorities do not make effort to confront with the depth of the crisis. The belief of lack of incentives for government officials to provide efficient treatment and enforcement and admittedly the limited capacity of the state due to absent legal and administrative skills find their corollary in persistently low levels of trust in public institutions. This in turn would reinforce the difficulties of relying on formal institutions to facilitate the emergence of extended trust in formal networks, and public officials.

With regards to the economic situation there is a general consensus amongst the scientists that economic affluence contributes to the soothing the ethnical conflicts by lowering forms of frustration. What is evident, Serbia, as well as Vojvodina, is economically less egalitarian place in 2000s than fifteen or twenty years ago. There is a deep abyss between the official narration of success and the demonstration of the favorable statistical numbers and the subjective perception of citizens. As observers contended the economic hardship and the tendencies of impoverishment in 1990s are connected to the deep cynism, insecurity, and the sources of authority is eroded. The war as the domain for robbery and producing of capital maintained the state of later diffusion of violence. Certain group was doing well out of the war and the new class of winners came into existence. As it is several times reiterated, the growing public satisfaction with the social reforms can lead to the situation of profound despair and the rise of social demagogues can offer simple answers to multifaceted social problems. Turning to the future is to be based on the ethical overcoming of the legacy of past loaded with unethical aspects, connection amongst the war, criminalized economic activities, and moral crisis

of society. The deep ethical reflection calls for the constitution of the new social environment.

The regime of tolerance requests cooperation-practice. To cooperate is to act together in the sense following from sharing a collective goal. But, the social stratification and divergent interests in the fragmented society impeded the collective action, and demonstrated the lack of satisfactory consensus for societal transformation. The widespread abstention from civil initiatives, and civil sphere on the side of business was the consequence of struggle for survival, prevention of poverty, and the fear of the uncertain future. In addition there the Olsonian logic of collective action was at work up to the end of 1990s: people even with high awareness of the inevitability of transformation, tended to not participate in joint actions when the cost of their participation was high and effect of their participation was marginal. It is indicative that after the political transformation the organizational density and the overall strength of civil society are not great. Although the civil society is celebrated in Serbia during the 1990s, today it is a weak readiness in civil society to react in relation to the risks of social dynamics. It would be more satisfactory if we say that we need more associations, not fewer, powerful and cohesive ones, too, with a wider range of responsibilities. And more groups being at risk must be brought into the business of welfare provision. The presence of these groups should increase the space and the range of institutional functions, and therefore the opportunities for available resources.

* * *

I was trying to demonstrate that the regime of tolerance in Vojvodina is put into crisis. This constellation is the result of a very complex process, and is to be treated not as an ad hoc situation but as the *vicious effect* of the long run social dynamics in Serbia. In this paper I intend to avoid the victims-based narrations and concentrate only upon the framing of the topic. In explaining the crisis-like processes I pay attention to the inter-playing dimensions of the national politics, contested state constitutions (actually, contested boundaries of the state), political stabilization, and economic affluence. The logic of national politics alone is insufficient to account for the whole process. It must be acknowledged that I could only call for the illuminating analysis that wants to explore the complexities. But the emerged situation compels us to be more ambitious than the recently proposed explanations.

Normatively speaking, in the society led by multicultural commitment no group is allowed to organize itself coercively, to seize control of public space, or to monopolize public resources. These principles are very

demanding and require consequent long-run engagement. The political environment is what it is and it does not offer much short-term hope. But this statement does not endorse the idleness; on the contrary it calls for the multiplying the opportunities for action in common. It is an empirical knowledge that the common political identity in a plural society has to be negotiated. Such litigations are rather to be understood as a *process* than a completed situation, they are negotiations on political standards rather than a mere territorial decentralisation. As a final point, the aforementioned litigation ought to extend to various spheres, from everyday life to other areas. The normative projection offered here revives the old Tocqueville's idea of various forms of *self-government*, which enable the affirmation of cultural identities. Not one single instance of Vojvodina's past corresponds to this idea. Cultural identities and ethnic-minority patterns in Vojvodina could gain their full meaning only through a network of various forms of self-government, institutions and civil associations.

SAMIR N. BANOOB

PROFESSOR OF HEALTH POLICY,
MANAGEMENT & BEHAVIOR UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT ALBANY, USA

THE ROLE OF HEALTH DEVELOPMENT IN IMPROVING WELFARE AND RECONCILIATION OF COMMUNITIES

Health and Economic Development:

The World Health Organization, in its 1948 Charter, defined “health” as: “physical, social, and mental wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” This continued to be the fundamental goal of the international community, where all countries of the world are challenged to achieve the best levels of health for its citizens. National health systems are challenged by ensuring universal coverage of individuals with the most achievable quality services as measured by the current professional international standards.

The relation between health and wealth in populations is well established. Poverty is always associated with ill-health. Child mortality and infant mortality are closely related to the Gross National Product (GNP). Life expectancy at birth is lower by 10–20 years in the least developed countries as compared to the developed ones. These relationships are logical since healthier individuals are more able to produce, and thus increasing their income and national wealth, and at the same time they consume more goods and services leading to more economic development. At the same time, health care is becoming more effective and advanced than ever. People live longer and survive chronic diseases that used to be major killers of human beings leading to premature deaths. A patient with diabetes, coronary heart disease, hypertension or even cancer has now more opportunities to live a longer and healthier life. These advancements in medical technologies are miraculous, and at the same time are most expensive. Modern diagnostic, surgical and therapeutic procedures can only be afforded by financially able communities and individuals.

This is why low income countries are fighting to ration and rationalize their limited resources allocated to health care. The Commission on Macroeconomics and Health clearly described these facts, indicating that investing in health is essential to promote economic development and to reduce poverty, and concluded that extending the coverage of crucial health services to the world poor should save millions of lives every year,

reduce poverty, spur economic development and promote global security (1) (Figure 1).

The Millennium Development Goals:

The leaders of world met under the United Nations umbrella in 2000 to discuss and develop global strategies for the world development in the 21ST century. Realizing that there has been a dramatic reduction of extreme poverty in countries such as India and China, yet at the same time many countries have become poorer, with more than a billion (one 6th of the world), still lives on less than one dollar a day, lacking the means to stay alive in the face of chronic hunger, disease and environmental hazards period. The World summit adopted the following eight goals for world development in the new millennium: (2)

1. Eradicate extreme poverty.
2. Achieve universal primary education.
3. Promote gender equality and empower women.
4. Reduce child mortality.
5. Improve maternal health.
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.
7. Ensure environmental sustainability.
8. Develop global partnership for development.




FIGURE 1. Health as an Input into Economic Development

It can be noticed that four of these eight goals are strictly health goals. (Goals 4–7). On the other hand, goals 1–3, are directly related to health and health care. Poverty is a direct cause of under nutrition, hunger, unsafe water, and limitation of resources to provide child immunizations and basic primary care services. These factors alone lead to an annual death of 11 million children below 5 years in the world (2). On the other hand, education is a major determinant of health. Most national statistics demonstrate higher mortality, morbidity, disability, and more hospitalizations among the less educated. The third goal relates to elimination of gender inequality and disparity in higher and secondary education. Such goal can dramatically reduce infant and child mortality, controlling the population explosion and high fertility in less developed countries, and improve family health in every society. The 8th millennium goal addressed partnership among countries to reduce poverty and promote trading and financial systems. One of the targets of the global partnership goal is cooperation with pharmaceutical companies to make essential drug available to developing countries. Therefore, the global community, represented by the world leaders, emphasized the strong relation between health and socio-economic development by setting up goals that are health or health related goals. Investing in health development is not considered a humane aspect or a charity service to the sick, but it is rather an essential investment in human resources that constitutes the major determinant of socio-economic development.

Health and Peace:

Wars and political unrest have direct adverse impact on health status of communities involved. The immediate results are reflected as mortality, morbidity and disabilities due to injuries and diseases resulting from war assaults, mass dislocation of populations under unsanitary conditions, hunger, famines, mental and social disorders and lack of health services. The world suffered from wars since its ancient history, yet surprisingly, this suffering continues to date, where wars are waxing and waning in many parts of the world. The old suffering from wars cannot be compared with the current suffering, where weapons became more destructive. In addition, some parts of the world are now facing ethnic conflicts, religious intolerance, racial confrontations, and/or an increasing threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism attacks. Nations engaged in such wars, political unrest or threats, whether they are on the offense or the defense, are exposing their populations to deaths, disease, disability, distress and discomfort, the 5 D's that severely deteriorate health status of the community.

In addition to the physical and mental harm to human beings, these wars deplete the national resources, where major resources are re-allocated to armament and defense, shifting human, industrial and financial resources from social and economic development to the war operations and battle zones. These wasted resources are used to finance the war expenses, to rehabilitate its associated destruction, and to prevent or to protect from wars and terrorism threats. The health budget is often the first to suffer cuts at times where more services are needed, and the health care cost is astronomically rising. Global military expenditures alone amounted to \$ 950 billions in 2003. At the same time, the price tag on the Millennium goal of eliminating severe poverty and hunger to the year 2015 is \$ 19 billions. It was also estimated that less than 19 days of global military expenditure is all it would take to meet the additional cost of providing access to food, clean water and safe sewers, basic health care, reproductive health care for women and basic education for everyone around the world. (3). By the end of the cold war, the world expected that military expenditures and preparedness will be reduced, shifting these resources to human development. To the contrary, global military expenditures increased by 6% annually during the last 3 years, and by 23% during the period 1995 to 2004 (4). Table 1 show that the neediest countries are the mostly affected by such increase.

Table 1. World and Regional Military Expenditures Increase, 1995–2004

REGION	% INCREASE	REGION	% INCREASE
Central Asia	+ 73	North America	+ 34
Africa, North	+ 65	Central/ East Europe	+ 22
Middle East	+ 40	West Europe	+ 4
Sub Saharan Africa	+ 29	The World	+ 23

Source: Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI) (4).

Table 2 presents evidence on the impact of wars and political/ ethnic conflicts on health. While most industrial countries are spending from 8-15% of its GNP on health, most of these countries are spending less than 2% on military affairs. To the contrary, in some developing countries, health spending is comparable to, or even less than the military spending.

Table 2. Basic health indicators and spending

COUNTRY	GNP (\$)/ CAPITA*1	HEALTH % OF GNP*2	HEALTH % PRIVATE*3	DEFENSE % OF GDP	> 5 MORTA- LITY/ 1000	LIFE EX.P.	
						AR BIRTH	
						MALE	FEM- ALE
Industrial:							
- Switzerland	34,621	11.2	42	1	5	78	83
- France	22,753	9.7	23	2.56	5	76	84
- Germany	21.764	10.4	21	1.38	5	76	82
- Japan	33,520	8	22	1	5	78	85
- USA	36,562	15.4	55	3.2	9	71	76
Balkans:	1,349	6.1	61	1.49	21	69	75
- Albania	1,349	6.1	61	1.49	21	69	75
- Bosnia & Herzegovina	1,300	9.2	50	4.5	17	69	75
- Bulgaria	1,834	7.4	47	NA	15	69	75
- Croatia	587	7.3	19	2.39	7	71	78
- Macedonia	1,755	6.8	15	6	12	69	75
- Serbia & Montenegro	1,184	8.1	27	4.8	14	70	75
- Slovenia	10,400	5.9	19	1.7	5	70	78
- Greece	11,477	9.5	47	4.9	6	76	81

Sources: (5), (6), (7).

Notes: *1-GNP / capita in US \$, estimates of 2003 (5).

*2-Total Health expenditures, public and private including out-of – pocket.

*3-Percentage of the private share of health spending (non-governmental).

Data for Health expenditures are for 2002, for child mortality and life expectancy are for 2003 (6).

Data on defense spending as related to the Gross Domestic product (GDP), estimates for 2003–2004 (6).

For example, in 2003, military expenditures in North Korea were 33.9 %, Mali 15%, Saudi Arabia 13%, Ethiopia 12.6%, Oman 12%, Israel 8.75% and Jordan 8.6% of the GNP. Some of these countries are spending less than 1% on health. In the European region, countries such as Armenia, Macedonia, Greece, Bosnia and Herzegovina spent between 4.5-6% of their GNP on armaments and defense in 2003, which was much higher than the global average that was 2.6%. It should be noted that while the health expenditures estimates are for total public and private expenses, the presented military expenditures represent the governmental (ministry of defense) budget in most cases (7).

In the Balkan region, the military expenditures in 2003 were as follows:

	US\$ million
- Albania	57
- Bosnia & Herzegovina	234
- Bulgaria	356
- Croatia	620
- Macedonia	200
- Serbia & Montenegro	654
- Slovenia	<u>370</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	2,491

If reconciliation, acceptance and tolerance of ethnic and religious differences are achieved leading to a reduction in defense spending by 50% in these countries, it is a saving of \$ 1.25 billion every year. This is more than adequate to establish and maintain regional and national projects of reforming health systems and prevention and control of AIDS/HIV, substance dependence, hypertension, diabetes and cancer – the major killers of populations in these countries. In addition, such achievement will ensure economic development, save lives and establish the peace of mind for all citizens.

Estimates of deaths and casualties of these local wars are in millions or 100,000's, other than the permanent disabilities, mental disorders and chronic diseases. Perhaps, initiating and getting involved in wars and killing are the most evil acts of mankind. While health scientists and workers are spending their lives in promoting health and happiness of human beings, hate and intolerance are driving some people in the global community to destroy humans and expose others to intense suffering. Health for all is unachievable unless peace between countries and ethnic groups is to be achieved (8), (9).

The ECPD Project for Global Health Development:

The European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD), established by The United Nations University For Peace in 1985 is active in establishing and offering successful programs in the fields of Human Resources Development, Natural Resources Development, Economic development, Cultural development, International Law and Diplomacy, Business administration and health. In particular, the health component has always been a major field of academic and scientific activities of ECPD in recognition to the role of health care in community development and welfare. These activities include graduate degree and certificate programs, seminars, symposia, summer institute, conferences and training courses to serve the

Balkan region. The programs are supported by major cooperation agreements with distinguished institutions from all over the world (10).

In 2005, ECPD embarked on a thorough review and reform of its health programs, creating the ***Global Health Development Program*** as justified by the following:

- Assessment of the future needs of the Balkan region for health development and health reform, focusing on priority common health problems and health systems' needs in the region.
- Strengthening the role and functions of ECPD as an international organization by expanding its relation with international organizations and academic institutions in the health field in Europe and the World.
- Developing and applying the new academic standards adopted by universities and academic institutions in Europe.
- Recognition of the current and future environment of professional education and training to prepare qualified leaders for health care, tailoring the programs to progressive continuing education that can lead to graduate degrees suitable for part-time learners, and introducing distance learning and on line courses.

Guided by these principles, the ECPD strategic plan for Global Health Development identified the following academic components for the next 5 years:

1. *Education and training:*

a) Degree seeking: Post graduate diploma that can lead to a Master & Ph. D in:

- Health Management.
- Family Practice.
- Gerontological Health.

b) Continuing Education and training:

- Certificate programs in hospital management, addictive disease, alternative medicine, sports medicine, chronic disease.
- Other topics as feasible.

2. *Research:*

- Applied research in health systems, health financing, quality of care, cost efficiency and effectiveness, elderly care.
- Other topics as feasible.

3. *Special Projects*

Grants or contracts involving research, planning, implementation and training projects in the health field.

4. Publishing

Books, proceedings and periodicals to serve the educational needs.

This program is aiming at serving the mission and goals of ECPD, and contributing to health development in the Balkan Region and Europe.

Conclusion:

- Human suffering in the region needs to come to an end through better understanding and adoption of civilized acts of acceptance and tolerance of differences in religion, ethnicity, gender, age, social class and culture. Establishing trust and reconciliation is the only way to ensure stability and to reduce military expenditures, saving these resources to be allocated to health and human development.
- Health Development is a major tool for socioeconomic Development that can convert community sufferings into physical, social and mental wellbeing of populations.
- The Balkan nations are urged to cooperate in the field of health development collectively since their health needs are similar, and where cooperation and coordination, or even integration of certain regional health projects are needed. This is most effective for groups of countries for the scale of economy, and since sharing of experiences provides significant gains by learning from success and mistakes.

Examples of priority regional projects:

- Reforming health systems to create successful models of public-private partnership, alternatives of health financing and health insurance.
- Strengthening efficiency and effectiveness of health services through preparation of trained leaders and managers of health programs and institutions.
- Reforming medical education and training of family practitioners that can respond to the community needs.
- Conducting joint research on major priority problems in health systems and medical care.
- Strengthening long term care to the rising volume of elderly populations in the region that promotes better functional and healthy life and reduces institutionalization.
- Sharing of costly health resources that may be difficult to afford by one country such as advanced medical referral centers for sub specialties or reference laboratories and research centers.

REFERENCES

1. Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, "Macroeconomics and Health: Investing for Economic Development" World Health Organization, Geneva, 2001: 1–26
2. United Nations, "We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in The twenty – First Century", United Nations, New York, 2000
3. Women's International League, Peace Movement, Aotearoa, New Zealand, (2000) "Say no To Militarism and War", <http://www.wilpf.org>
4. Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute, "World and Regional Military Expenditures" SIPRI Year Book, 2005, Stockholm 05, Appendix table A, BA1& BA3
5. Countries Of The World, "Gross National Product Per Capita – 2003", www.studentsoftheworld.info
6. CIA World Fact Book, "Military Expenditures- Percent of GDP", Nationmaster.com
7. World Health Organization, Office of Europe, "Basic Health Indicators in the WHO European Regional Office", World Health Report, Copenhagen, 2005
8. Banoob, S., "No Health for All without Peace for All" World Health Forum, World Health Organization, Geneva 7:1, 1986
9. Banoob S., "Expenditures on Armaments and Health: Where is The Priority for Industrial and Developing Countries?" Florida J of P.H, May 1990
10. European Center For Peace and Development, "Activities of The ECPD 1985–2004", ECPD, Belgrade 2005

RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS AND RECONCILIATION IN THE BALKANS

If we adopt the premise that religious wars are only those wars that originate from religious disputes and unresolved issues, then the Balkan wars of the 1990s were not religious wars (at least not in a narrow sense), because they were not instigated by religious problems. Thus, they differ from religious wars in the past. For example, the religious wars in the 17th century in Europe could not be possible without the Protestant Reformation, which *de facto* represented an act of a *religious* reform and transformation. Furthermore, if we accept that the importance of the religious dimension of a conflict increases in proportion to the extent to which the religious structures within a state coincide with the power structures (the thesis of the German theologian Heintz-Günther Stobbe)⁶⁰ then the former SFRY is definitely not a good example of that. Secularization was a predominant process until the late 1980s, while an increased religiosity mainly coincided with the transition from one quasi-religious system (i.e. ideology of Communism) into another (i.e. nationalist ideologies).

Communism and nationalism, as well as religion, are the symbolic systems on which any broader functional definition of religion could probably be applied. Today, the boundary between the religious and the quasi-religious is very thin. If beliefs and rituals are the major elements of any religion, one could claim that the quasi-religious systems, such as Communism and nationalism, include those elements as central for both ideologies. On the level of belief and dogma one may clearly recognize the utopian-eschatological patterns that, in fact, represent the religious heritage, especially the one derived from the "Abrahamic tradition" of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In the area of ritual one identifies a parallelism between the religious and political rituals, i.e. the initiation rites patterns, the rites of passage and the glorification of a religious, military, political leader in his earthly or posthumous existence. It is certainly not an acci-

⁶⁰ See Heintz-Günther Stobbe, "The Religious Implications of the Conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe", in *Steps Towards Reconciliation*, Ecumenical Council of Churches in Hungary, Budapest, 1996, p. 108.

dent that the military hierarchy of the former socialist Yugoslavia, at least ideologically, relatively easily and painlessly survived the transition from the Communist into the nationalist quasi-religious patterns. To a certain extent, Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, as well as Islam, filled an ideological empty space left after the demise of Marxism-Communism.

However, despite the similarities between the religious and quasi-religious systems, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia could hardly be characterized as inter-religious. After all, the religious communities themselves issued various appeals to reconciliation and joint prayers even during the war. In this respect, the Yugoslav case was specific in comparison with other modern wars.⁶¹ On the other hand, a great number of temples and religious facilities were destroyed in these conflicts, while some priests were also mistreated or killed. In some cases, the members of the high clergy even appealed to the continuation of conflicts when it was possible and realistic to make truce, or adopt a peace plan. Viewed from this perspective, at least some religious representatives or individuals could not be easily amnestied from their responsibility for war. Unfortunately, the misuse of religion may equally well ascribe religious connotations to any conflict.

However, if the religious elements were more important in this context, religion should have been singled out, as a significant factor, in the process of stabilization of South Eastern Europe. This would, at least, apply to official documents, such as the Dayton Agreement or the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Interestingly enough, religion is mentioned only a few times in the Dayton Agreement in a rather general context (in the Constitution and Annex on Human Rights), whereas in the Stability Pact religion and churches are not mentioned at all.

In order to clarify the dilemma regarding the role of religion in the Yugoslav wars, let us note that the majority of conflicts in the world, in which religion represents a significant factor, are not waged for religious reasons. This is primarily the case with the so-called “identity conflicts”, where religion may serve as a convenient *differentia specifica* that perhaps more easily articulates much more complex reasons for a conflict, including the warfare. This, I would contend, was the case with the Balkan wars in the 1990s.

A highly secularized society of the 1960s and 1970s, in which the Communist, atheist ideology left its mark on the political, as well as cul-

⁶¹ This was aptly pointed out by Thomas Bremer in “Why is the Reconciliation among the Religious Communities in South-Eastern Europe so Complicated?”, *Regional Contact* XII, no. 13, 1998, pp. 30–39.

tural, national and religious levels, suddenly faced, in the late '80s and early '90s, a massive ethno-mobilization, the ghost of nationalism and the politically imposed identification of religion and nation. This society also faced its own semi-literacy regarding religious matters, providing, thus, a secure refuge for an ecclesiastical nationalism and nationalist populism. Therefore, it was possible that in this region, under the conditions of a fratricidal war and long-lasting politicization of religion (First in the Communist, and then in the nationalist key), one witnessed a subsequent, secondary "religization" of politics and interethnic conflict. This, of course, has found its expression in the theories concerning religious roots of the Balkan wars. They, however, primarily resulted from the political and inter-ethnic conflicts. Religion appeared as a significant element of ethnicity, and this is probably the reason why these wars have sometimes been labeled as inter-religious conflicts.

Speaking of the temples destroyed during the conflicts let us have in mind that this was primarily a *symbolical* act: the temples were not destroyed so much as religious facilities, but as the national and ethnic symbols of a community's presence on a certain territory. In the perception of some churches, the war was also experienced as a *territorial issue*. In such a perception, it gained legitimacy, because it was necessary to defend, as it were (unfortunately, at the cost of war-crimes), one's presence, one's physical and spiritual survival on the "fatherland".

In order to support and illustrate my thesis, let me quote a sufficiently characteristic, sufficiently official and sufficiently general document released by the Serbian Orthodox Church in the summer of 1994. The *Appeal to the Serbian People and World Public* of the Bishop's Conference of the SOC (July 5, 1994) reads as follows:

"With full responsibility before God and our people and history of mankind we invite all Serbian people to take a stand in defending the centuries-long rights and freedoms, its own vital interests necessary for the physical and spiritual survival on its fatherland and grand-fatherland... as the people and the Church, deeply rooted in the martyred country Bosnia-Herzegovina, today we may not accept the Geneva imposed decisions on percentages and maps and, thus, remain without our: Žitomislići on the Neretva, or Synodal Church in Mostar, or Church Sopotnica on the Drina, Monastery Krka, or Krupa in Dalmatia, Ozren and Vozuća in Bosnia, Prebilovci in Herzegovina or Jasenovac in Slavonia".⁶²

⁶² *Glasnik SPC*, October 1994 (in: Milorad Tomanić, *Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj*, Beograd, Krug, 2001, p. 123).

In this appeal, the Church, therefore, invites “*all Serbian people* (M.V.) to take a stand in defending the centuries-long rights and freedoms, its own vital interests necessary for the physical and spiritual survival on its fatherland and grand-fatherland”.⁶³ This actually meant that all Serbs, both in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and beyond it, should have taken arms in order to avoid the implementation of the Contact Group peace plan. This was, in fact, an open invitation to continue the war that, fortunately, this time did not find response among the Serbs. Tragically enough, what wasn’t clear to the representatives of the SOC in 1994, became clear only after the war, in 1996:

“Notwithstanding the dissolution of the Versailles Yugoslavia, i.e. the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church still extends to all the Orthodox on that territory”.⁶⁴ In other words, the *ecclesiastical* jurisdiction does not necessarily imply the *state* jurisdiction on a given territory. After all, one of the greatest Serbian sanctuaries, the Hilandar Monastery, is not on the territory of Serbia, but Greece.

In the light of these reflections and examples, it is clear, I think, that a war should not be directly waged for religious reasons, in order to acquire, in any of its phases, its religious dimension. It seems that the role of religious aspects of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia should be viewed in such a context. Although the religious structures did not essentially coincide with the political power structures (as was the case, for example, in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution of 1979), in some of its phases, the war indeed acquired religious characteristics. On the one hand, this was manifested by the mistreatment and killing of priests, as well as in the destruction of temples and other religious facilities as the recognizable symbols of presence of an ethnic, national or religious community on a given territory. On the other hand, as we have seen, the religious communities themselves experienced the war as a territorial issue that could have affected the jurisdiction of a religious community, especially in those cases where the territorial organization was inherent to the church organization.

II

What are the possible ways in which religious organizations could come forth as agents of reconciliation between the conflicting ethnic and political communities (states)? Are there, indeed, space – and, more impor-

⁶³ *Ibid.*, str. 120.

⁶⁴ *Glasnik SPC*, June 1996, *Ibidem*, p. 123.

tantly, readiness – for reconciliation, and what would be the potential role of religious communities in such a process?

During the last fifty years, only a little care was taken of an authentic, direct dialogue between representatives of various religious communities that lived and operated together in the former Yugoslavia. Before, and after the conflicts and wars, which marked a greater part of the last decade, the gatherings of religious communities' representatives, as well as of scientists and religious experts, were more "cosmetic" and, quite often, very politicized in the light of current events. In such a confused atmosphere, it happened that the churches themselves did not make enough efforts to prevent, or at least react to, the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Consequently, we may hear some scholars often posing the question whether religious communities contributed to this problem, or were at least part of it. Notwithstanding various perspectives and scholarly debates regarding this controversial issue, it is clear that churches and other religious communities could do much more in the field of reconciliation, as well as in healing the consequences of the war.

An especially important problem in this context is certainly the question whether religious communities may independently, without the pressures of international community (including various ecumenical institutions), prompt not only the profound and continual inter-religious dialogues, but also reconciliation, forgiveness, repentance and joint activities that could prevent re-emergence of such conflicts in the future. In this sense, it is very important to refer to the historical and practical experiences of other European and non-European countries that had experienced similar ordeals in the past. All this, of course, demonstrates immense significance of independent, non-political (non-politicized) and continual gatherings of religious communities, scientists and other experts for religion, ecumenical dialogue and culture of peace and tolerance.

In conclusion, I will try to formulate only several presuppositions that might, perhaps, provide some basis for an unbiased inter-religious and inter-confessional dialogue in our region.

Many experts relate the process of reconciliation to the time that needs to pass before some basic presuppositions for the dialogue are set and defined. However, it seems that it is more important to have an unbiased, direct insight into the facts and events that led to a conflict, as well as to embark upon the rational consideration of those facts and events. The time itself may not bring results unless there is readiness of all the conflicting parties to mitigate antagonisms and solve problems that led to the conflicts.

The responsibility and guilt may not be sought only, or exclusively, in “others”, notwithstanding their objective responsibility for our own affliction and tragedy. It is important to express readiness for examining one’s own role and responsibility for conflicts and wars. This, again, may not be accomplished without realizing the value and importance of a different view that is rooted in a tradition different from our own. Therefore, it is necessary to approach the dialogue with a self-critical spirit. This may ultimately lead to some joint insights of both sides in the dialogue that result from their respect for differences and religious, ethnic and political pluralism.

A dose of inconsistency may sometimes prove to be helpful in inter-religious relations. Let me refer in this context to the essay *Praising Inconsistency*, written by Leszek Kolakowski back in 1958. In this essay Kolakowski claims that the humankind survived on earth owing to its inconsistency: “Absolute consistency is identical with practical fanaticism, while inconsistency is the source of tolerance”.⁶⁵ Some of the absolutely consistent people are, for example, various fanatics and terrorists, loyal police informants, killers and torturers. On the other hand, claims Kolakowski, a breed of inconsistent people is “one of the main sources of hope that humankind might perhaps survive”. Those are the people who believe in God, but do not demand stakes for heretics; or do not believe in God, but revolution, albeit rejecting the changes that demand violation of their basic moral principles. “Inconsistency is simply a tacit awareness of world’s contradictions”, infers Kolakowski. It is, in fact, one of the ways to avoid those contradictions. Does this mean that a moral person is never expected to be fully consistent? Not at all! There are some basic, boundary situations which require a consistent moral stance from such a person, notwithstanding the circumstances. A person may, for example, consistently oppose murder, torture or military aggression, because, according to Kolakowski, in these basic situations inconsistency is not valid any more. One should, therefore, be inconsistent even in one’s own inconsistency, because only such an inconsistency gives full strength and rationale to this principle in its practical application.

Although it is difficult today to speak of a collective guilt of any people, nation or community, the question is often raised as to what extent the acts of repentance, forgiveness and redemption may have a collective effect or significance. At any rate, all religions are concerned with the problem of an individual’s facing his/her own conscience, while the responsibility is something linked not only to a concrete misdeed or crime,

⁶⁵ Kolakovski, Lešek (1964): *Filozofski eseji*, Nolit, Beograd, p. 126.

but indifference, silence and closing one's eyes at the moments when a moral person should condemn a misdeed or crime.

One of the main presuppositions of any serious inter-religious dialogue is the awareness of the dialogue participants of their own, as well as others' religious freedoms. Such awareness is best reflected in readiness to protect others' freedoms as one's own, which is, indeed, an ultimate test of tolerance for every religious community. As much as these communities are ready to support rights and freedoms of their sister churches and other religious communities, they have a developed sense of their own rights and freedoms.

Apart from the importance of various ecumenical meetings and conferences on international and regional levels, the practical work of the churches on the local, grassroots level is even more significant. Due to the local communities' respect for their religious leaders and care that they express for their neighbors of the same, or other confession, it is perhaps much easier to attain some more concrete, visible results here, than through the national or international institutions, commissions and bodies.

Finally, one should never forget that – even under the most ideal circumstances for the dialogue, which may lead to significant concrete results – religious communities do not have the political power and weight of the states and their institutions or representatives. The decisions that they make have predominantly the moral and symbolic importance, although we know that, owing to the tight connection between religion and politics in a series of recent international conflicts, the power of churches and other religious communities should not be underestimated. Thus, the scholars, politicians and other experts are invited to carefully re-examine the political role and political potential of religions in the new century.

NEEDS MORE TO BE DONE IN THE ARENA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

It is indeed a great honour and a true pleasure for me to be present here today and to share a few thoughts with this distinguished audience.

I am reminded today of my previous visit to Belgrade with my family, which took place during the last conflict in the Balkans. At the time, a gathering such as this would have been inconceivable.

The mere fact that we are gathered together here only a few years later, united in our aim to promote peace, reconciliation and religious tolerance among the peoples of the region, is by itself a non-negligible and noteworthy achievement.

However, it is clear that more needs to be done, particularly in the arena of religious tolerance.

It is along these lines that I would like to address you today, sharing with you the Bahá'í perspective on inter-religious dialogue. I would also like to address the crucial role that must be played by the world's religious leaders in influencing the construction of a durable peace.

Arguably one of the greatest heritages of the twentieth century is that the peoples of the world began to consider themselves as part of a single human race, and began to consider the earth as their shared homeland. Although wars and violence are still a part of human experience, it seems that prejudices we once thought of as inherent to man's nature are slowly but surely being broken down everywhere. As these prejudices disappear, so do the obstacles that had so long divided the human family into a confusion of cultural, ethnic, and national identities.

Tragically, organized religion—whose primary mission is the establishment of brotherhood and peace—too often acts as one of their greatest obstacles, in particular by having condoned fanaticism for a long time.

The situation has not suddenly improved for the better with the passing of the twentieth century and the painful lessons learnt. Many people still suffer the destructive effects of established prejudices of ethnicity, gender, nation, caste and class. It seems inevitable that these injustices will last so long as the society's institutions and standards are not ready to ensure a new world order free of these ailments. At the opening of the

twentieth century, it seemed that of all these prejudices, the most likely to give way to modernization was religious prejudice. In the West, impressive and groundbreaking scientific advances had dealt serious blows to long-established pillars of religious and sectarian exclusivity. The most interesting and promising religious development appeared to be the inter-faith movement.

However, in contrast to the unification processes that are transforming the rest of humanity's social relationships, the suggestion that all of the world's great religions are equally valid in nature and origin is stubbornly resisted by entrenched patterns of sectarian thought. The progress of racial integration does not stem from an expression of sentimentality but from the recognition that all the peoples of the earth form a single species and that their physical variations have no bearing on their worth. Similarly, the emancipation of women requires from both society's institutions and popular opinion to accept that there are no biological, social or moral grounds to deny women full equality and opportunities with men. Again, although some nations do make substantial contributions to the advancement of a growing global civilization, there is no basis for the archaic prejudice that other nations have nothing to bring to world culture.

A similar and fundamental reorientation in religious terms is now necessary. However, it seems that religious leadership appears, for the most part, unable to undertake it. Such reflections, painful as they may be, serve not as an accusation of organized religion, but rather as a reminder of the unique power that organized religion represents.

We believe that religious leaders must respond to this historic challenge in order for them to secure a significant place in the new global society that is emerging from the experiences of the last century. Evidently, more and more people are coming to the realization that the underlying truth of all religions is essentially one. This recognition was not a result of theological debates or disputes but rather a deep intuitive awareness stemming from greater international interactions and the belief in the oneness of humanity.

For religious leadership to rise to the challenge of this new perception, they must first acknowledge that religion and science are the two necessary knowledge systems by which one develops the potentialities of consciousness. Far from being in conflict with one another, these fundamental modes of the mind's way of exploring reality are mutually dependent and they have been the most productive in those rare but happy periods of history when their complementary nature was recognized and they were allowed to work together. The insights and skills generated by scientific discoveries should always look to the guidance of spiritual and moral

commitment to ensure their proper or appropriate applications; similarly, religious convictions, no matter how cherished they may be, should willingly and gratefully submit to impartial testing by scientific methods.

We owe it to ourselves and to our fellow human beings in this common effort, however, to state clearly our conviction that if interfaith discourse is to contribute meaningfully to healing the ills that affect a desperate humanity, it must immediately, honestly and in a straightforward fashion address the truth that brought the movement into being: that God is one, and that beyond all the diversities of cultural expression and human interpretation, religion is also one.

With every passing day, the danger is more real that the rising threats of religious prejudice will erupt into a worldwide conflagration with dramatic consequences. Civil government alone cannot overcome this danger. We should not delude ourselves that simple appeals for tolerance can quench these animosities that claim Divine sanction. This crisis calls on religious leadership for a break with the past as decisive and final as those that allowed society to deal with the equally corrosive prejudices of race, gender and nation. The only justification for exercising influence in matters of conscience is for serving the well-being of humanity. This service is even more important at this critical juncture in history.

“The well-being of mankind, its peace and security, are unattainable”, Bahá’u’lláh urges, “unless and until its unity is firmly established.”

PEACE AND LOVE IN THE PRINCIPLES OF LIFE

Setting And Development Of The Formula Of Reconciliation And Peace As Points
On The Scale Of Progress Towards More Beautiful, Better And Fairer World

I. HISTORY OF WARS AND VIOLENCE – PROOFS

Human world, according to our belief, did not understand in full brightness and extent the voyage and breeding of the idea of peace as complete devotion to the ideals and values of existence and life. Three major proofs are in favour of the above stated.

The first proof. The history of the world and man, in its whole, is the history of wars. Hence, the history of mankind in its whole and essence is the history of killing and destroying people and property. Obviously, even in such circumstances, our world created magnificent examples of the gifted people, but there is no history of peace.

The second proof. Only one statement is in fact true and sufficient as a task for the human world: Scientifically and economically, but without including Ethics, all suppositions are made for the Earth to be left without man, by the presence of several tons of explosive per capita. It seems that this truth does not disturb authoritative human world. Long time ago, the great dialectician Heraclit concluded: "Much knowledge does not lead to reasoning". This, perhaps boring, statement did not, by breeding the idea and practice of peace, touch the conscience, soles, minds of people inhabiting our Planet.

The third proof. Breeding of peace sinks under the "success" of the production for mass destruction of people, civilization and culture that man has conquered through his existence.

For the first two proofs I found an intellectual and logical support in the theology and philosophy of a shepherd, herdsman Mihej, VIII century before Christ, who by the power of God's inspiration prophesied the destiny of peace.

The map of the human world looks gloomy, so do we think, without the foundation of the philosophic scale, as well as theology of peace and logic of the process.

II. MAKING WAY TOWARDS PEACE

The poetry the purpose of which is the peace of the world and man is powerful, but, evidently not enough that the world does not look so dangerous as to prevent the peace to have the advantage.

Therefore, let us present, conditionally, the graph of the road that, with requirements and circumstances, leads to the beginnings of drawing a map for the peace, durable and fair, without violence and plunder of any kind.

Ad 1. EXISTENCE, RECOGNITION OF SIN

If by continuous education and upbringing for peace, culture of peace and tolerance we reach the gnoseological moment in which sin, evil and death are the moments caused by war as well, then it is a sufficient proof that the world and man understand, in essentially different way, the position of a man in the world and his recognition of what he is supposed to do for his own fate.

Ad 2. RECOGNITION OF SIN AS AN OBJECTIVELY-SUBJECTIVE CATEGORY

The scale under this number, objectively depends on the structure of a person, its intellectual and functional readiness to face an unfavourable kind of human world which causes resistance of perception towards the existing state of affairs in the person and surroundings. Recognition is the second step on the way towards reconciliation which still does not mean reaching peace as a different state of affairs, different relation towards people and values, in civilizational and cultural sense.

Ad 3. PENITENCE

Penitence for the sins done, for the offences committed against other people, against one's brothers. This third stage on the way towards the idea and practice of peace is one of the most difficult moments on the scale leading to peace as a higher form of life and existence. For a number of people, where those of the highest education could be included as well, to express **penitence** means an act of weakness, slippage, humbleness, defeat. In that sense the very act of penitence is ascribed to religious factor, but nothing is wronger than that. Well, people also repent without religious concern for committed misdeeds that caused damage to other people, persons. So, penitence is, objectively and critically analyzed, the deepest humane act, where man admits himself ability for the deeds that devastate his personality. The ability for penitence is sui generis demonstration of the person's strenght to face himself and, in a way, to declare war to

himself, that he would not commit misdeeds anymore by which he causes damage to other people.

Ad 4. FORGIVENESS

Forgiveness is, objectively, the most difficult aspect of so called breaking of personality on the way to reconciliation. According to our belief, almost according to philosophical and theological attitude, in contemporary societies, with respect to personal thoughts and conceptions searching for truth on reconciliation, the notion of reconciliation is not understood as conditions and relations that help to establish reconciliation as one of the highest values in the system of values in general. If reconciliation is to be seen and understood as a new stage in this phase of development and staging, then it is necessary to have in mind previous steps so that the reconciliation is to be truly stable, honest, complete and anthropologically ordered.

Ad 5. RECONCILIATION

Reconciliation is like a step in the development of person's activity which considers a new state of sensation, a new understanding and meeting with the object opposed to the previous steps that mean advancement towards the idea and practice of peace. Reconciliation is not and cannot be the aim in itself. That is a process leading to a stronger existence than itself- that is the scale of peace.

Thus, we think that it cannot be talked about some new state of affairs if reconciliation is understood as the final act in a process which painstakingly, through stages, achieved its aim-in logical and ethical dimensions. If we live in a world, according to the episcopo Nikolaj, in which everything became more expensive, and only man became cheaper, then staging, ethical, economic, historical and sociological means to impose reconciliation as the fifth stage without foundation, because it is based on the negation of the previous step values and gnoseological support. This specially refers to economic problems which roughly educate people's conscience that everything except economics belongs to the marginal world. Economics without ethics seems not to be some serious anthropological category or state of human relations which in the world of values deserves a serious recommendation. But, it is another field, important for the areas that develop successively and at the expense of other complementary personal and social relations. In order to reach the world of reconciliation, personally and socially, it is necessary, first of all, to establish a completely different world of social and political relations that really wants reconciliation to be a truly human world, complete, just, opulent and dignified.

Ad 6. PEACE

We think that without immersing into the scale of peace, into its stages, steps-it is not possible to penetrate into the very essence of the notion, problem, world, practice and way of peaceful life as a reached level of reconciliation and all previous points of the scale.

FINDING OF PEACE IN ONESELF AND ONE'S SURROUNDINGS is the first act of meeting this vitally important notion, problem of very complex structure and human world of a great mystery which that world still did not reach enough by its intellectual forces and civilizational and cultural powers. Our gathering here and today is, probably, one of the modalities of the efforts to come to the essence of the notion of peace. Peace in oneself and in one's surroundings, in one's family, is the elementary act of readiness to truly build and construct peace, part by part, step by step, area by area...

Discovering peace in oneself and one's surroundings is a sign of complementariness, natural connection on the way to building peace on a broader plan. Well, we talk about building peace in one's own surroundings as a link, one would say, towards national and world process, through stages. Accordingly, there would be, in sum, certain beginnings in searching for peace as a world that might one day, but not so soon and not completely, cover all earthly regions.

Ad 7. GROWTH

Growth-to grow, to thrive, to get bigger, to sprout, to grow up, to increase. Encyclopedists of the English language give special attention to this notion. Its meanings are numerous, as well as its branching. When this term and notion is used as subject matter of philosophy and economics, then one should be very careful having in mind its incorporation into the tasks and aims of the mentioned academic discipline. The best, although not completely adequate, solution for this term and for the subject of philosophy of economics is understanding of growth as prosperity and increase on the plan of tasks and aims of the subject. Although, riches, to become rich, is not far from the use of this notion and term.

Ad 8. DEVELOPMENT

Development has the meaning: evolution, growth, progress, branching, expansion- engaged in the development of one's business-busy by growth, by development of one's business; the development of human mind; the development of civilization. But, it is also taken as an explanation for the development of a plant.

The closest sense and meaning of the notion development is its placing in the area of human mind and business. There it reaches full maturity and touches the essence of the phenomenon and notion. Terminologically, it fits well.

III. KRUŠEVAC-PEACE MESSENGER CITY-RESULTS OF THE EFFORTS MADE

In triade- Peace-Growth-Development, when we arrive there by means of a scale of peace, there begins, for the world and man, a new era, new horizons, new possibilities.

1. GATHERING CREATIVE ENERGIES IN BUILDING PEACE

Discovery of one of the points of support in one's own surroundings, in the city of Kruševac (Serbia), as a motive for the work on building peace, is the main thing that gathers positive creative energies on the field of peace, growth and development.

The despot Stefan Lazarević LETTER OF LOVE is one of the cornerstones for the work on building peace in one's surroundings and tendency for joining the other civilizations of peace, growth and development worldwide. To be clear, nobody can, at least that is what we think, build peace for other people, without previously solving that problem in his own surroundings. Accordingly, there is the birthplace of the idea of peace and the field for work towards visible success in that direction.

Carrying this idea in myself, as a small sprout of my Serbian people, first of all I wanted, as a secondary school and university professor, to point to supports in cultural, spiritual subjects of my people. Only after that, in accordance with my possibilities, I refer to civilizational and cultural achievements of other nations and people from our surroundings, specially on the West Balkans, with whom we live and have to live; but a must transforms peace into the wish to live, to work, to create, to grow and to develop mutually.

Mobility of the idea of peace, the idea of peace as a product of human mind of the concrete human relations, led me to the paths of searching, in a parallel world, in order that, through trends of philosophy, theology and anticipated science on peace, try to conquer at least some moments of importance for the power and size of the idea of peace, which until now did not inhabit our Planet. I have started from the cultural and spiritual history of the city of Kruševac as some kind of convergent lens that gathered all relatively important aspects of the idea of peace in the subject, no-

tion, significance and aim. It is in the nature of ideas to move constantly, to travel towards some aims and in the best sense of the word to open new spaces, if their target is the world of goodness, understanding of both peace as goodness and its ideals.

2. EDUCATION AND UPBRINGING FOR PEACE AND TOLERANCE AS A CORNERSTONE AND STARTING POINT IN BUILDING WORLD OF PEACE, GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

The moment of inspiration-Eureka, I discovered, I found, cannot be applied, as it is the case in natural sciences, before discovering the idea of peace. Painstaking efforts for the realization of this essential idea in human world really has sense only and just only if thorough education and upbringing for peace and tolerance starts through the complete educational system in all countries, and only then could occur meeting and exchange of the ideas and achievements on the plan of the idea of peace, growth, and development as the very constitutive elements and moments in the structure and practice of the notion of peace.

Generations of people from Kruševac, pupils and students, creators of a vision, lay foundations for the growth of new peacemaking values in the spirit of their cultural history, its spirituality and results of the toponym of peace known in other nations and their visions: scientific, artistic, religious.

In its surroundings, Kruševac pays tribute to the Charter of the United Nations by giving name „United Nations“ to a modern, new settlement. In that Settlement appear streets with the names of ex UN Secretaries-General: Trigve Li, Dag Hamarsheld and U Tant. As it is known, Dag Hamarsheld is the winner of the Nobel prize for peace. The kindergarten has a name „*Dove of peace*“, and that is special kind of school in which peace is taught from childhood. In that area appears Park of peace and friendship among people, and the first tree was planted by Mr Pol Lusaka, the then President of the UN General Assembly who declared: „In Kruševac I found the Charter of the United Nations“.

The idea of the Monument of Peace, not monument to peace, citizens of Kruševac realize on the Square of Peace. That is non-commemorative Monument in the centre of Kruševac, unveiled in 1997 during the Session of the Executive Bureau of the International Association of the cities, designated by the UN General-Secretary as Peace Messengers, held in Kruševac.

The authoritative peacemaking world continues to respect peacemaking achievements of Kruševac and during 1999, soon after the NATO aggression against our country, appoints and holds the General Assembly

with very successful work and outcome. The delegations from all continents have arrived.

3. SQUARE OF PEACE-MONUMENTS

WORK ON THE IDEA OF MONUMENT AS A SUI GENERIS INCENTIVE TO WORK ON PEACE AND TOLERANCE. The Monument of Peace, placed and unveiled on the Square of Peace, is only one of the recognizable signs of memories on the future which would probably come – to the world without wars, hatred, intolerance.

The monument Mother Serbia and Mother Greece is a certain contribution to the new times, in order that all people, nations and states should essentially change their attitude towards the idea of peace in themselves, towards their surroundings, people, state. The monument is also reminder that mothers do not give birth to children for wars, but for peace, joy, health, happiness, friendship, cooperation. That is the given hand to all people of good will to begin to think, in an essentially different way, of peace as a way of life, as, basically, the life itself. The Mother is a set of civilizational, spiritual and cultural suppositions for a better and fairer world. On principle, the same arguments stand for all mothers in the world, all nations, races, religions. That firmly stands for the very act and notion of understanding of the role and significance of the religious factor on the West Balkans. Mothers shaking hands on the commemorative place, give hope, spread love, strengthen the emotion and ensure safety to the life and world. In Kruševac, they set and developed the idea of Mother Serbia and Mother Bulgaria, Mother Russia and Mother Serbia. The idea encompasses by its message that whole world should be covered by the monuments-meetings of mothers of the world for a fairer and better life.

4. EDUCATION FOR PEACE AND TOLERANCE

4.1. Department for the Culture of Peace and Tolerance and the Museum of Peace as Educational and Scientific Institution of Serbian people

All schools, faculties, universities-should begin to include in their syllabus and curriculum, equally with other educational and scientific subjects, programs for research, reconsidering and practising reconciliation and peace, as the real existential and value categories. Philosophy of Economics, Philosophy of Peace, Peace will be the Work of Justice and Pedagogy of Peace-are the books by which we tried, educationally, to set and develop idea of peace and tolerance as the very constitutive elements of a human being. The practice of the world and man, political and scientific practice, we believe, do not work very much on that. Accordingly, that means that history of peace cannot begin. The history of peace cannot begin as a true

and complete negation of the history of wars that covers whole field of the history of humankind. Kruševac, by fraternization with Stara Zagora, Republic of Bulgaria and Volgograd, Russia, made peacemaking steps of that kind.

4.2. Philosophy of Economics and Myth on Tolerance

At the University of Niš, Faculty of Economics, I have founded Philosophy of Economics as an academic discipline. By this academic discipline, I laid academic foundations for education and upbringing for peace, cooperation and tolerance among economists. I specially developed the area of meeting Ethics and Economics and principles of their mutual pervading. With my students, at a time, I established in Niš the Square of the United Nations, as a kind of school for peace, meeting and tolerance of people from all countries. It was open by the UN missioner and Secretary General, Mr Nabuaki Oda, respectable Japanese diplomat.

4.3. Separation of Peace from War in Conceptional Pair

4.3. Separation of peace from war in conceptional pair is one of the basic scientific and cultural starting points, aspirations and logic of the process. Why? Putting peace in conceptual pair with war is its devastation. It remains unclear how the world, and man in it, so easily accepted to put peace in the conceptual pair with war, when there is no any logical, scientific, existential basis for that. In conceptional pair with war should be: War-not-war! The place for peace is in the mosaic of vital and existential values, with health, joy, love, man's dignity, cooperation, Peace-happiness, Peace-health, Peace-joy, Peace-humanism. In the conceptional pair with war cannot be put any of these values.

4.4. By Education and Upbringing for Peace and Tolerance we come almost to the Major Aim: To Discover and Understand an Ordinary Man as an Exponent of this World Of Peace and Creator of the World Of Peace and Equal International Cooperation and Whole Ethics of life

Reconsidering, studying, teaching, discovering, searching and creating vision for the ordinary man, humbled and offended during his biological history, should, as we think, be the sense of elementary educational efforts.

History of world and man up to now, did not notice the ordinary man as promordial force for the works of importance for the history of mankind. That ordinary man, here and worldwide, with sui generis university for peace in his sole, who by his victim marked the history of the world and man, is worthy of conscience and responsibility for the generational works and landmarks of the history. Great number of highly

educated people put their major spiritual and intellectual potentials in the service of globalization of fear, in the service of hatred, evil and death. Thus, they became the basic threat to the world and man.

5. RECOGNITION FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS

For the work on establishing new peacemaking values and traditions and visions of cultural and spiritual history of Serbian people, and for understanding of peace as fundamental origin of the national history of Serbian people, the United Nations honoured the city of Kruševac, Peace Medal in 1986 and Peace Messenger in 1990: In token of recognition of significant contribution to the improvement of peace in accordance with the declaration of the General Assembly at the occasion of International year of peace, Secretary General declares the city of Kruševac to be “Peace Messenger”, signed by Peres de Kueljar, 18th September, 1990. That honour for new understanding of peace in its people and a way towards man.

RECONCILIATION: CAN NATO HELP?

I would like to thank ECPD to give NATO an opportunity to explain its role in the Balkans in the process of reconciliation which is the ultimate goal of all its interventions.

I will not focus my briefing exclusively on the Balkans but I want to underline that NATO is clearly an organisation devoted to European peace, security and freedom. Thus the present peace process in the Balkans remains an absolute priority for NATO.

NATO can go worldwide, lead an operation in Afghanistan and help in Darfur or Pakistan. But its existence is clearly founded on the European area and, in Europe, its main objective is to help to restore or maintain peace.

I would like also to recall that NATO works under United Nations' mandates. So the part NATO is now playing in the Balkans is performed in accordance with the United Nations' goals and aims.

I have at last to point out that it would be wrong to expect too much from NATO related to the world security. NATO cannot do everything, everywhere for every purpose.

NATO's primary goal is not directly to reconcile people, communities or groups which are in fighting process. We must be clearly aware of that and not ask NATO more than it can give. But NATO is helping or can be helping in the process and thus provide support to the will to reconcile as soon as this will exists because there is no reconciliation without the will of the people to reconcile.

In this way, I would like to develop the following points:

- The NATO's interventions and operations paves the ground for reconciliation;
- NATO provides time;
- NATO creates consensus;
- NATO achieves tasks that do help in reconciliation.

* * *

I) *The NATO's interventions and operations paves the ground for reconciliation*

NATO's operations are performing one of the prerequisites for reconciliation. The role of NATO is to build a strong basement to reconciliation in stopping war, persistence of violence and bringing a lasting peace.

It may seem obvious for us around this table, but sometimes what is obvious is easily forgotten: reconciliation needs peace and peace sometimes needs to be restored or even created as a stable and permanent situation.

It was not obvious for NATO after the end of Cold War to turn itself to crisis management and peace restoration. But it was felt necessary as a way to ensure democracy in the whole Europe that was the primary goal of NATO.

The first prerequisite for any kind of reconciliation is that anyone can be ensured that if, for any reason, his trust has been misplaced there is a legitimate organisation able to use force to protect him.

NATO is not perfect to this respect, but it assumes its duty. For example, it committed in Kosovo to defend any threatened person and not to back only one community's rights, which may seem difficult to understand by the other community.

It is a new role for NATO. Up to 1989, during the Cold War, NATO as such was devoted to ensure security of Western Europe from the military threat of the Warsaw Pact.

And, when Yugoslavia burst out and unrest turned into a civil war with atrocities, massacres and bloodsheds, the United Nations, not NATO were asked to restore peace. They were and still are the only international organisation which holds the legitimacy to send forces in a country or a territory against the will of its authorities, they are legitimate or illegitimate. NATO acknowledges this legitimacy and cannot intervene if not tasked by the United Nations, apart when the security of its members is directly threatened.

But then, in 1992, the United Nations was overwhelmed by the armed forces acting there and could not handle the job with its own means. So the United Nations called for NATO because of its military capabilities and its legitimacy on European affairs.

NATO got more and more involved in the duties of peace restoration and peace enforcement as the proper organisation to deal with these tasks.

In this perspective, NATO is at the first step of the process. As soon as it is possible, NATO leaves as a leader of operation, as was done in

FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and BiH, to handle the task to the European Union which is using more police and civilian means.

NATO has only paved the way to peace and future reconciliation. But, we like it or not, it has been first necessary to impose peace by force because rivalries were so deep, so old, so strong and so violent. Only NATO was and still is, for the time being, able to use military force efficiently.

NATO works under the United Nations' mandate. Such mandate requires an agreement in the Security Council where a balance of powers, a balance of interests and a representation of the world diversity is achieved. Inside NATO, the consensus is required.

So whatever are the feelings of any state, NATO cannot be acting for a community against another one; NATO always remains under a strict mandate and is acting to restore peace according to the international Law in respect with a requirement of democracy that is the respect of minorities' rights.

Confidence by minorities will rise from the insurance that NATO gets permanence in this task.

Mission proved, as usual in these matters to be longer, more difficult and needing more means than what was expected at the beginning. But NATO could follow and developed an expertise to assume this next task because NATO is made for working on the long term.

II) *NATO provides time*

One of the most important conditions for reconciliation is also to ensure stability for a long time. Even with the best will, one cannot expect reconciliation to be an instant phenomenon. It takes time, time to forget or forgive according to its convictions the harm done and received and most of it time to forget the fear. Because fear more than memory prevents reconciliation.

NATO can commit on the duration because it organises rotation of the tasks among its member's states which are now twenty six members plus twenty partners and even more co-operant countries. The system of rotation equalizes the burden among the members and therefore allows acting on the long run.

If the rotation of the military forces in operations every six months offers some inconvenience, it ensures than no country is overcharged by a contribution to any operation.

The system can last as long as necessary but it does not imply that NATO is ready to stay longer than necessary: NATO has no interest in

staying and can handle the job to European Union as it did in Bosnia when it has performed its duty. But it can also stay.

For a state, to be a member of NATO means to commit to take a fair share of the common burden and to give NATO the means of its commitments.

To go further, since NATO works on consensus, it is reliable on the long term: when a coalition of the willing is asked to operate for peace enforcement, no one knows for how long each country will feel committed. Intervention in Iraq by such a coalition proved that many countries can step out of the intervention when their international policy changes or if the political parties on power change through elections.

When NATO commits to an operation, its members feel committed legally through NATO and also through the United Nations tasking NATO. Before starting to operate, NATO builds consensus among its members and is careful to take every country's concern into consideration.

It makes a huge difference on the long run and every one can see that NATO has kept to its commitment during eleven years in Bosnia without any intention of withdrawing from any of its members. Consensus lasted and SFOR could hand over the job to European Union with the same consensus as at the starting.

Reconciliation needs the insurance of security and safety for as long as necessary. NATO can and does provide this insurance.

Without time and without security for to-morrows, to-day's reconciliation is not possible. NATO provides both.

III) *NATO creates consensus*

NATO has also been set up to create consensus.

I would like to underline this point which may be the most important assets of NATO: NATO organisation is a structure which creates and fosters consensus.

NATO in its present shape has become a consensus builder, not only among its members but in the whole European era.

Let us take an example going back to the first years of NATO. At the starting of the Atlantic Alliance, it was not felt possible to include Germany because the reconciliation of Germany with its neighbours was not yet realised.

NATO has not been the only channel for the reconciliation of Germany with its European neighbours but it was one of the most efficient.

The Federal Republic of Germany started a general process of reconciliation with its former enemies who became its new allies in democracy building and constructing a new Europe. NATO helped strongly.

NATO was in 1955 the first security organisation that Germany could join. And once in, Germany used it as leverage for easing and speeding reconciliation.

The organisation itself helped to create a day-to-day process. From within the summit decision body, the North Atlantic Council to the humblest committees, commissions and workgroups not to forget the military integrated structure, Germans and their neighbours started to be speaking to each other, exchanging views, ideas and living together on a daily basis. Reconciliation needs a common goal, the insurance of a common future, but still more the day to day use to work with the other.

Joint exercises, joint trainings and all kinds of interoperability necessary for working within NATO obliged military and civilian staffs to work together and to realise they were alike facing the same problems and the same threats, engaged in the same challenges and building the same future for the generations to come.

Acting together is very important for reconciliation.

When in the Balkans or anywhere else, a state, an entity or any group starts to work with NATO, it engages to work within this process and is preparing to work with its former enemies, as France and other countries did when Germany joined. The same situation aroused when the former Warsaw Pact countries joined the Partnership for Peace.

I have been attending last month a seminar in OHRID, Macedonia organised by the Atlantic Treaty Organisation which set up an informal group, the Balkan Mosaic. The Balkan Mosaic includes NATO members, Romania and Bulgaria, Partners countries, FYROM, Croatia and Albania and also countries with specific co operations with NATO as Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It even includes Kosovo.

This seminar was open to young people, future opinion leaders and youth just entering professional life which is the ideal target for starting reconciliation. The dialogues were sometimes difficult, but it is important that all parties came, and sat for three days at the same table and shares the same discussions and reflection about future. Kosovo and Serbian representatives did so without any problem, doing more to reconciliation than so many statements.

To this respect, in BiH also now NATO maintains a small civilian team to implement the defence reform and to compel responsive authorities from “Republika Srpska” and from the Federation to work together. This is also a strong contribution to reconciliation.

So NATO does not provide time in a passive way; it is also an important mechanism in the very process of reconciliation.

IV) *The virtuous circle of reconciliation*

The intervention of NATO in a conflict resolution would not mean much if it was not starting a general process of reconciliation whenever necessary.

I will only take an example: When the president of the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Boris Trajkovski asked for help from the international community, against rising unrest in his country, he got a positive answer by NATO through a the United Nations' mandate as necessary.

But NATO did not only send forces to Macedonian territory against potential troublemakers. NATO assessed that peace could not come only by showing or even using force.

In that respect, NATO's intervention was submitted to the condition that acceptable life would be guaranteed for minorities. It implied that the authorities had have to reach an agreement among all communities and thus to modify the constitution in order to better ensure the rights of all citizens.

Doing that, NATO was not only performing its usual job to restore peace using its military capabilities. It also paved the way for reconciliation through a satisfactory balance of rights for all the inhabitants of the country.

Reconciliation has not been organised only by NATO; but a reconciliation process has been started as a condition for NATO's intervention.

It is a virtuous circle: the desire for peace and protection induces to call for NATO and the condition for NATO to agree is to have actual foundations for a democratic country which implies reconciliation. From the desire to be protected from the other rises a process of taking into account other's rights of everyone, and from the acknowledging of the rights starts the reconciliation process.

Then, most of the job is done. The intervention of NATO is better and better understood and less and less necessary.

In the example of Macedonian, the presence of NATO in Macedonia did not last very long, which is the best proof of success.

To this respect, NATO of course remains committed as well towards the minority as to the majority. If the process goes the wrong way NATO can come back, which happily, never happened. NATO everywhere could decrease and withdraw its forces in a satisfactory length of time. The European Union can come after with the use of NATO's means.

As a conclusion, I would just like to say that NATO can bring its own stone to the process of reconciliation. If all of us around this table strongly believe that only a democratic, open and free state can harbour reconciliation process, NATO has to play a part, as far as the Balkans area is concerned. NATO is one actor in the establishment of democracy and strengthening of democratic states. NATO works under the United Nations' mandate, NATO works through consensus. And NATO commits itself on the long run. It commits to act as long as necessary, and also to react to any evolution.

To this respect NATO can help. NATO will never be a substitute for the will of a population and its leaders. NATO does not create reconciliation. NATO is just giving a helping hand, but this is a strong hand.

INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION OF RECONCILIATION

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

A war can be started by every fool. That is exactly what our fools did. By abusing their nationalist memory, transformed into vengefulness, they staged an undeclared civil war. Its pretext was the incorrect distribution of ethnicities due to which they were robbed. The war of “blood and soil”, accompanied by all forms of ethnobanditry, acts of genocide and Asian torture, started with the euphemism “resettlement of the peoples”. The tyranny of the stronger achieved a triumph and that was especially true of plundering, as the immanent companion of every war. Since that was essentially a civil war, in which there is no victor, we all were defeated on such a scale that the international community, which was not innocent in all this, had to establish the International War Crime Tribunal. However, it also imposed an armistice, which has been going on like an unfinished war, while the process of reconciliation has so far been too slow. Reconciliation must be organized institutionally, because the newly established states, stand behind the crimes and criminals, hiding them shamelessly, protecting them and glorifying them, or subsidizing their defence. Neither the return nor the restitution of property are adequately carried out. Since there is no act of statesmanship in the process of reconciliation in the newly established states, because the former “dogs of war” cannot turn into the “Gods of peace”, we must force them to do that by using their institutions, norms and laws. Namely, the states are abusing their institutions in the process of reconciliation, because they have allowed the war-mongers and intellectual criminals to establish themselves. In that way the politicians remain in power by instinct, since politics is a profitable business regardless of the effects of one’s political conduct. They do not care about public welfare, but only about their own interests, petty politics and undemocratic methods. In so doing, they are destroying their own society, instrumentalizing the state and its institutions. Thus, this society is being impoverished and becoming corrupted. Namely, there is insistence on historical hatred for which there are no grounds. The only way

out is through normalization and the renewal of the role of institutions. I point out specifically that ethnicities do not hate each other as much as the stolen property is loved. When it is insufficient, the property of one's own ethnicity will be seized. To tell the truth, the peoples did not wage war against each other. They were forced to wage war by being drafted into the disaster and due to repression. All plundered goods were not dispensed to the people so as to satisfy their needs; instead, they went to the well-established elite, which can keep it only through the further instrumentalization of institutions.

Let me remind you that on the eve of the war, after the historical scientific verification of Schliemann's discoveries, Troy was discovered in Herzegovina and the Holy Virgin appeared in Međugorje. The voice was raised only by a few people. It was evident that were stumbling down to unimagined forgeries, while at the same time scientists and their institutions were keeping quiet.

INSTITUTIONAL RECONCILIATION

We lived in a common state for 70 or so years. Our language is almost the same. We have the same history, common law, customs and mentality. We belong to monotheistic religions, whereby Christian ones are dominant. Let me paraphrase in passing the scholar and poet Mija Mirković that these regions and peoples are not linked by religion, or the state, or the laws so much as by the same living conditions (the anthropogenic origin of land). Consequently, the joint conquest of the plot. But, we are tardy people and I must remind you that we have not yet shifted to the metric system of land measurement. We still have twenty units of measurement: acre, ral, day's plowing, dunum, motika, etc. We do not have any written agricultural history.

There is an interesting example from Croatia. Namely, the greatest crimes were committed at Islam Grčki, where the ethnic distances are the smallest. Attacks were carried out both on historical buildings and a well-known poet. Or another example – Vukovar. Out of 10,000 marriages, about 7,000 were mixed. That is where crime scored a triumph, but the propagandists tried to prove that mixed families are defective, that they even have one chromosome less. This shows unambiguously that the war incited to such an extent that it can be still carried on. "Whoever did not hate was hated". And whoever was not engaged in ethnic cleansing was stigmatized. In this way the state began to destroy its own society. This went so far that even the churches were straying away from their mission,

from God and the Holy Gospels, from the altar, and were approaching the ideology of hatred, the fathers of war and the authorities so as to have their share of the plunder. So, one church prelate said for the usurped property: "I will rather kill a Serb than give him the house back!" And the archbishop, his superior, did not degrade him either under common or cannonic law.

I point out that ethnic cleansing was not only the means to obtain the national state. It was the strategic aim. That is why it became the crime of the century.

Our wars were interwoven with the quisling chetnik-ustasha syndrome, which still survives and is even peeping from churchyards. By using it and various institutional means, the states and church institutions are recycling the war. They even confront the victims, the same war matrices. Especially by prevalently applying usurpative law. Contrary to the constitutional provisions and related regulations, usurpative law is triumphing. The civil sector of non-governmental organizations is weak, small, financially dependens on states and poorly interlinked. Our civil sector has also been nationalized, since it depends on state sinecures. It has been proscribed, because "it is betraying our cause". At the same time, countries are finding a way out by setting up parastatal institutions (national minority councils) of the civil sector, without funds and influence, so that they can govern in an undemocratic way, based on false models of false democracy and false tolerancy. They are doing this especially before the arbitrators of the international community. Consequently, the hypocritical states manipulate with "reconciliation that has no alternative", while at the same time undermining it both politically and morally by legal means. For there is no repatriation or restitution of property according to the needs and possibilities. It is a fact that none of the newly established states even tried to condemn the nature of the war, its instigators, intellectual criminals and the like. Moreover, there is no public condemnation of war mongers, intellectual criminals.

1. We need a joint multidisciplinary research institute that will deal with the nature of the war so as to avoid political manipulation with the war and its consequences. Let me give you an example – what did Serbia get with the slogan "All Serbs in one state!" and what happened to the Serbs in the crippled states? Serbia also destroyed a part of its own state. What did Croatia achieve with its national state, "One's wallet in one's own pocket!" for which it paid an enormous price, with the casualties and museum of crime for millenium-long remembrance on one-third of the terri-

tory which was ethnically cleansed from the Serbs. Today, Croatia has no bank in its ownership, no larger hotel complex, no more propulsive industry; it has got nothing from sovereignty. It has become a subcolony. This must be scientifically verified so as to prevent the fetishization of the state and its raising beyond the life and death of its citizens.

When I said in public that it was a civil war, that it was started by civilians and that they were both the victims and criminals even when they wore uniforms, it almost cost me my life. For the state has its Declaration of the Patriotic War. That holy cow falsifies its own history. So, it states that Croatia did not attack Bosnia, although the graves point to the contrary. If we fail to elucidate the nature of the war, our history will be written by others.

I am convinced that only science, which is neither national nor anational, but represents man's most important and most powerful objective lever, can help us now to overcome the brutal consequences of a civil war.

2. All states must enact the denazification laws, so that "the word is not retracted". After all, Germany was able to get rid of nationalist plague only in that way.
3. Non-governmental organizations of the civil sector, Helsinki Committee, Amnesty International and human rights associations must be the moderators of all civil associations within the non-governmental sector, because they have experience with civilized conduct. They are tied institutionally to the territory but, due to their essence, they are not governmental institutions but civil ones. They have made the greatest progress in perceiving the common good, because they are not inhibited by religion, nation, race, territory or strict local interest, by the greatest human values. After all, we have a common ancestor. However, within our non-governmental sector there is no true coordination for true reconciliation in the whole territory. It is segmented and reduced to "our problems". And the problems we have are common.
4. Cultural and Professional Associations:
 - a) Our academies (Serbian and Croatian), traditional and important institutions, have proved to be the most conservative. Over the decades they had joint members and yet they were ready for the war of our or your extermination. They negated each other in every respect. They have brilliant members, but they do nothing with respect to institutional reconciliation. Practically, they do not communicate with each other.

- b) The situation is similar with respect to Matica srpska and Matica hrvatska, which did so much for this region but, unfortunately, they plunged deep into civil collision. They believe that the neighbour can be chosen and not used and respected and that he cannot be conjured up. Ominous recyclers and manipulation with victims come just from there. And victims are victims only because they could not defend themselves and, thus, have no nationality. We must get these institutions to work on reconciliation and the condemnation of crimes. Therefore, I insist on setting up a research institute like the Wiesenthal one, like an *amicus curiae*, so that each of us condemns and prosecutes one's own criminals.
- c) The universities are obliged, as scientific and educational centres, that is, the centres for upbringing and education *ex profeso*, to organize the process of reconciliation, since they are dependable and knowledgeable. They know the methodology and this especially applies to those having courses in social sciences. They know each other and managed, in the past, to surmount the same or similar problems. Unfortunately, there is no true cooperation, let alone the logic of reconciliation.

Consequently, should the faculty departments and research institutes begin to apply the logic of reconciliation, as the only alternative to the life in this region, we will be able to close the wide circle of experts who know how to make reconciliation possible.

By the same token, other non-governmental organizations, general, special and individual, as well as professional and trade associations would net the whole society and reconciliation would establish itself as the necessity of life and the situation in the region could be normalized.

When watching the registers of free, autonomous, professional associations in the newly established states, I am amazed that there are so many of them and that none of them work on reconciliation (in Croatia and Serbia there are about 15-20,000). When we add to them church and religious institutions, the number of them for peace-making netting is even greater. In that context, the Helsinki Committees, Amnesty International and civil associations could play a Messianic role as moderators.

Let me give you an example – for 10 consecutive years I have been attending the International Rural Sociological Symposium at Vlasotinci (southern Serbia). A special international rural sociological school has also been founded there. Scientists come from all parts of the world, but none of them from the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The West saw

the end of peasantry, but here its traditional forms still survive. However, our scientists, who were on friendly terms with each other and conducted joint research until recently, are not interested in such locality any more. Isn't that absurd?

I must point out that the former common state had over 200 research institutions, over 60,000 doctors of science and medicine and 500,000 university students and that the association of engineers and technicians had about 1,700,000 members, that there were 106 agricultural journals. Don't they represent a huge human and intellectual energy which is necessary for reconciliation. It seems, however, that all of them failed. I could list all necessary institutions for the assignment, because that was widely practiced in the past – by theatres, script writers, publishers, non-fiction writers, journalists, mass media in general, professional associations of historians, lawyers, sociologists, political scientists, economists, ethnographers, ethnologists, anthropologists, philosophers, etc. They had joint institutions, journals, editorial offices, symposia, etc. There is nothing any more. Consequently, we must rally them around their own subject area, their own benefit, interest and need, if we wish true reconciliation. In other words, everybody, from the society of pigeon breeders to the society of songbirds, must be mobilized so as to help normalize the situation and deny the right to immature politicians that the state should manipulate with the war and its implications. That is possible only by means of science – that the truth also becomes its own judge in this region.

I am disgusted with the fact that the oldest philosopher has been prosecuted by the court for four years, which points to culturocide, biblocide. What can one say if the state prosecutor, minister of science, minister of culture and minister of justice do not respond to forty scientists who have turned their attention to attempts to “erase the memory” (the destruction of 3,000 anti-fascist monuments) and to the setting of hundreds of thousands of books to fire. Why an individual has to bring charges against the army general who ordered the destruction of Haidedin's bridge? Or the destruction of the monument to Vojin Bakić, or the Ferhadi Mosque? The state which does not protect the world heritage does not deserve to be called as such and we must acquaint it with that fact. In such cases, we begin to wonder what has happened with art historians, poets as the “conscience of the nation” and scholars. It is tragic for culture that Nikola Tesla cannot have the museum in his homeland and, accidentally, he was of Serbian descent. How absurd it is to despise one of the architects of civilization.

Unfortunately, when reconciliation was imposed, the chetnik-ustasha syndrome survived, so that the states legalize reconciliation between par-

tisans, liberators, and quislings, racists, unpunished. Where are research institutions to which historical distance and great knowledge prove that there is no excuse for criminals. And that quisling syndrome in this war not only held us back, but also disgraced us in the eyes of the world.

You may find this concept naive, but keep in mind that “to the naive even the Gods forgive!” I have no illusion yet I will remind you of a passage written by the Nobel Prize winner, Ivo Andrić, about the ant that wanted to see the world, “on the sacred path of peace”. Everybody scorned it: “You are so small that you will not succeed in it during your lifetime”. And the ant answered in a lapidary style: “It will be recorded that I have started”. I also wish us to get started. That is the only innovative path to reconciliation, which is significant due to the number of institutions, their power and role, as well as the size of the human factor. For it is not an individual who needs reconciliation but – peoples.

While combatting against the senseless war, analyzing its severe consequences, which will be felt until the 22nd century, and preparing a selected bibliography of intellectual criminals, including their inclusion in the state system, since I know many of those who were ordering crimes, I keep believing in the morality of the majority and cognitive apparatus of learned people. I hold that the denazification laws must be adopted, so that “the word is not retracted” and that we must use the creative energy of learned and social institutions for reconciliation and the normalization of life in this region.

Science and only science can help us to deal with this Rashomonian problem.

ROMA IN MACEDONIA (1953–2003)⁶⁶

Roma (Gipsies, Czigany), as they are most often called, are a tragic people in the modern world. Moving from India and Egypt to the West and East for some reasons, they were settling in small groups all over the world and, at times, living like nomads. Over the past centuries, however, they have been increasingly living on the outskirts of small and large settlements, engaging in various service trades (like blacksmiths, locksmiths, plumbers, etc.). For this and other reasons, they have remained one of the marginal groups (peoples), if not the most marginal one, in all societies and countries of the world up to the present. Although, according to the official statistics, there are about 10 million of Roma in Europe. So, Roma do not have their own country, although there are several millions of them, unless one considers as such those democratic countries (there is quite a number of them today) in which, under the Constitution and relevant laws, they are “the citizens enjoying the same rights”, as well as those rare democratic countries in which they are treated as special ethnic communities to which their specific ethnic rights are guaranteed. The marginality of this ethnic community (insofar as its members in each country are concerned) is evident in all spheres of social, political, economic and cultural life: the members of this ethnic group who have been “honoured” to become the citizens’ representatives in city councils, parliament or government are rare. The same applies to those who managed to break down high social barriers to their path to higher social level by becoming professors, lawyers, judges, managers in medium-sized or large companies, physicians, and higher-ranking military officers. The fact that it is not the question of some genetic problem of this people is best evi-

⁶⁶ As for the number of Roma living in the Republic of Macedonia, three figures are usually in use: according to the official data of the Republican Bureau of Statistics there are 52,103 Roma (the 1991 census), while different centres and political organizations operate with about 80,000 and about 130,000. In census-taking, many Roma declare themselves as Turks or Albanians and some of them as Macedonians if they are Orthodox. On the other hand, some members of the Roma people do not participate in census-taking due to their high internal mobility. It will not be a big mistake if one assumes that their actual number is somewhere in between, that is, about 80.000.

denced by the success of some of them in the field of culture, where life is more liberal (let me mention the world-reputed American actor Yul Brynner and the Pralipe Roma Theatre in this region, which was founded, run and developed by Burhan Rahim, a member of the Roma community in Skopje, in Macedonia).

Naturally, in the second half of the 20th century, the Roma people in the European countries was not deliberately marginalized so as to be exploited for so-called “dirty jobs” (such as the cleaning of cities and flats, municipal cemeteries, sewage, etc.). On the contrary, in the 20th century, the legislation of all modern countries (especially European ones and the United States) set the basic conditions for helping this people to get out of its centuries-long civilizational backwardness and social poverty. The Balkan countries (which were “socialist ones” for 50 or so years), including the modern Republic of Macedonia, are also among them. In the meantime, however, hardly anyone wondered (which may apply to the Balkan countries, in particular) why almost nothing changed in the social status of Roma for almost 50 years of socialist rule and for 15 or so years of transition in those countries, including the Republic of Macedonia. On the contrary: the galloping progress of information technology, communications and the like has been widening a civilizational gap between Roma and other citizens in all these territories and in all countries although, in recent years, Roma have entered the Parliament and Government, as a part of Macedonia’s state and political development. These examples only point to the lagging of Roma behind other peoples on an increasing scale in the 20th century. And, naturally, this alarm does not mean that we are the only ones who have pointed to this anachronism of the 20th and 21st centuries – the living conditions of the Roma people resembling those in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries and today, when the latest information revolution is in full swing, at least in three-quarters of the world. Namely, there are increasingly more evident signs of the increasing awareness of governments and society as a whole of such anachronous backwardness of Roma and the fact that their civilizational and social problems are also their own problems. And, I daresay, that they will slow down their own civilizational progress up to paralysis at a certain point in history, due not only to the accumulated discontent of that ethnic group, but also to the fact that the group will become a real obstacle – something like the race of a two-wheeled cart racing against a Formula 1, for example. However, this problem should not be dramatized, although it is the result of the current situation of Roma in the Republic of Macedonia. Despite the fact that the Government has made the initial effort by preparing the document entitled “ROMA STRATEGY IN MACEDONIA”, it is also necessary to take

resolute steps so as to apply this strategy in practice, without unnecessary (and useless) rhetoric. And without an illusion that negative energy, which has been accumulated through the centuries, can be eliminated overnight, but with the society being aware that it has to embark on a long and difficult path to conquering the space of which Roma will become an integral part. Progress has to be synchronized and continuous. That will be the stake for the future of the Roma people and society as a whole.

Here are the basic assumptions, which are not optimistic. However, they are realistic and, thus, necessary for perceiving their potentials, without which the first, pragmatic and productive step cannot be made.

Let us first examine the basic demographic data on Roma in the Republic of Macedonia for the period 1953–1994, which are based on the records of the Republican Bureau of Statistics:

1953	1961	1971	1981	1991	1994
20,462	20,606	24,505	43,125	52,103	47,363

First of all, let us make a few observations about these statistical data, which will tell us the most about the mentality of Roma in Macedonia (and, probably, in general) and their attitude toward government institutions, including the Republican Bureau of Statistics and census-taking. Let us consider, for example, the data on Roma between the first census (1953) and the one taken in 1961 (20,462 vs. 20,606). One can see with the naked eye that things are not quite in order. During that period, population growth, which was recorded for all other ethnic groups, was not so slow as that of Roma (only 144 people). It is well known that during that period there was no dramatic migration in the region, which especially applies to Roma. The only possible explanation is that it was very difficult to count the Roma people at that time due to their way of life, that is, to their more pronounced nomadic life. The subsequent census-taking year (1971) already points to much greater “lawfulness” of the natural movement of the Roma population within itself and relative to other ethnic groups. So, during this period, the Roma population increased by more than 20%, that is, at a more intensive rate in comparison with other ethnic groups, excluding the Albanian one. However, such a trend was dramatically changed during the subsequent period (1971–1981), since the growth rate reached an unbelievable 80%, which certainly attracts the attention of statisticians, sociologists, psychologists and the political elite in the country. The explanation would have been rather simple if this dramatic increase in the Roma population in Macedonia had been recorded in 1971

and not in 1981, i.e. eight and not 18 years after a disastrous earthquake which destroyed the Macedonian capital, Skopje. Namely, the day after the catastrophe, tens of thousands of people from all parts of Yugoslavia and a broader Balkan regions swarmed literally into the city in search of “bread and water” for bare existence and there is no need to emphasize that such a situation was perfect for the Roma population in this region which was, I daresay, absolutely marginalized everywhere. And the fact that this massive migratory movement of Roma, which took place during the period 1961–1971, was entered in the statistical records as late as 1981 is explained by the problems faced in gathering the statistical data on Roma, as it has already been mentioned.

However, the reason for showing the statistical data on Roma in this table lies in the high rate of their mechanical growth, which certainly occurred in 1963, the year of a devastating earthquake in Skopje. According to the intensity of their growth rate, Roma come right after Albanians and are ahead of all other ethnic groups comprising the Macedonian population: Turks, Serbs and Vlachs, for example. Naturally, not one strategy of population or economic development in such a small country like the Republic of Macedonia (about 2 million people) should disregard this natural, dramatic fact about Roma, especially if one considers the tradition of their marginalization and self-marginalization in the country and society aspiring to change their status dramatically. Finally, let us look at these data in the following way. Namely, during the period 1953–1991, the number of Macedonians increased from 860,000 to 1,409,389, Albanians from 162,524 to 484,228, Turks from 203,938 to 82,976 (their number declined due to their large-scale migration to Turkey during the 1950s), Roma from 20,462 to 52,103, Serbs from 35,112 to 42,775 and Vlachs from 8,668 to 7,764 (their number dropped again). In other words, the percentage share of each of these groups in the Macedonian population changed in the following way: the share of Macedonians increased from 66% to 66.5%, the share of Albanians from 12.5% to 23%, the share of Turks from 15.6% to 3.9%, the share of Roma from 1.5% to 2.6%, the share of Serbs from 2.7% to 2.1% and the share of Vlachs from 0.7% to 0.4%. This means that the share of each ethnic group in the total population was either stagnant or was declining. At the same time, the share of Albanians increased in the 1:3 proportion and that of Roma in a similar one. However, this comparison of Albanians and Roma show that an increase in the Albanian population was more radical, since its number almost tripled, while the number of Roma only doubled, plus half the original figure. Naturally, in the case of these two groups of Macedonian citizens, one must bear in mind that their number in this time interval (1953–1991) also increased

mechanically to a significant extent (due to immigration in 1963 and in several consecutive years).

Nevertheless, the position of Roma and its evolution (especially the intensity of that evolution) will be much better perceived on the basis of the data on their education, employment (and its structure), health care, housing and the like. At the very beginning it should be emphasized that in all these respects the life of Roma is very difficult, despite some efforts of the government and, to a degree, the international community to change it. Although the life quality of other ethnic and social groups in this country has not changed significantly over these 15 years (on the contrary, there has been a reverse trend in some respects), its lagging cannot be compared with that of Roma, who regard even the slightest improvement as a “revolution”). But, let us start from the beginning:

Education

Beginning this short empirical analysis of the life of Roma in Macedonia with their education, we wish to emphasize the significance of this sphere of life from two aspects: education appears to be the major indicator of the social situation of Roma in general and, at the same time, the basis for their inclusion in all spheres of life or, in other words, the basic assumption of their more adequate presence on the labour market, which entails two other consequences related to the assessment of life quality.

Consequently, let us move on to the heart of the matter.

1. In 1991, the number of Roma children attending elementary school amounted to 4,956, or 1.9% of the total number of children attending elementary school (that same year, the number of Serbian children attending elementary school was 3,865, or 1.5%, which points to the rather high education attainment of Roma children in view of the fact that Serbian children live in much more advanced cultural environments.
2. During the next four school years, the situation remained almost the same, both in relative and absolute terms: 1.7%; 1.8% and 2.1%. At the same time, the share of Serbian children was as follows: 1.5%; 1.4% and 1.3%. This means that the efforts of the government and parents relating to the implementation of the legal provision on compulsory elementary education bore fruit in the case of Roma, at least when the enrolment in elementary school was in question. The data on the functioning of “elementary school” in the case of Roma show that the situation is quite positive (i.e. with respect to the drop-outs among Roma children

during eight-year elementary education and relatively poor results of those who completed it, which is mostly due to the objective problems relating to their living conditions, low educational level of their parents, child labour due to the poverty of their families, etc.). This will certainly be confirmed by the number and percentage of Roma children continuing their education at the secondary level.

In the school year 1991/92, secondary school was attended by only 306 students, or 0.4% of the total number of Roma children continuing their education after elementary school. At the same time, the number of Serbian children, who enrolled in secondary school that same school year, amounted to 1,553, or 2.2% of the total number of children in the Republic of Macedonia in this year of education. These figures for the next three school years (1992/93, 1993/94 and 1994/95) were as follows: Roma 251, 250 and 26; and Serbs – 1,374, 1,310 and 1,235. In percentage terms, the results were as follows: Roma – 0.3%; 0.3% and 0.4%, and Serbs 2%; 1.8% and 1.6%. Small differences by year in both groups are not relevant for this analysis, since they are due to various natural and accidental events. Before we address the next issue in our analysis of the educational situation of Roma (i.e. to higher education), let us take a look at the following table, which shows the trends in the education of young people in the Republic of Macedonia, based on its ethnic composition, thus being able to make a better comparison. The trends are shown for the comparative years 1991/92 and 1994/95.

	Enrolment in elementary school in the Republic of Macedonia	Enrolment in secondary school in the Republic Macedonia
	1991/92	1994/95
Macedonians	166,186	61,807
Albanians	70,567	4,559
Turks	9,878	706
Roma	4,956	306
Vlachs	273	101
Serbs	3,865	1,553

In relative terms, the greatest number of children enrolling in various secondary schools after completing elementary education accounts for Macedonian, Vlach and Serbian children, while the number of Roma children is the lowest, both in relative and absolute terms. Almost every third Macedonian, Vlach and Serbian child continues its education at the

secondary level, as opposed to Roma children among which only every sixteenth child enrolls in secondary school after completing elementary education. Among Albanians and Turks this ratio is negative, but not as dramatic as in the case of Roma (in the former case, this negative ratio is mostly the result of Muslim cultural tradition, that is, a conservative attitude toward the education of female children, which is still present).

The lagging of Roma in respect of the quality of life is nowhere evident so much as in the data on higher education of Roma in the Republic of Macedonia. In this regard, let us not forget that the starting point is the total number of Roma in Macedonia: in 1953 – 20,462 and in 1991 – 52,103. According to the 2002 census (the last census taken in the Republic of Macedonia), there are 29 Roma with higher education. This number is much lower in relative terms, as compared to other ethnic groups, and shows dramatically that Roma in this country in which, in a regulatory and political sense, there is a high level of awareness of social marginalization of its citizens – Roma in all spheres of social life, which is at the lowest level, as well as why it is difficult for Roma to raise beyond that level and why they are so much afraid of such a level. The number of Roma students who have acquired a university degree over the past years will show almost the same figures: 1997 – 3; 1998 – 2; 1999 – 2; 2000 – 3; 2001 – 5; 2002 – 8; and 2003 – 3 students again. This is far below the critical mass in the country with more than 2 million inhabitants in which the following number of students graduated during the past few years: in 1999 – 3,687; in 2000 – 3,706; in 2001 – 3,446; in 2002 – 3,603 and in 2003 – 4,382 students. The number of Roma who graduated from the institutions of higher learning in the Republic of Macedonia during the observed years can be regarded as a stroke of fate and not as the result of certain efforts of the Macedonian society to provide material and other conditions for this “sleeping” and utterly marginalized group, thus waking up from its profound sleep induced by its tragic history for which it cannot be blamed. I do not know whether all of us will become enthusiastic about the fact that over the past few years there has been a much greater number of students enrolling at Macedonian universities, as compared to the preceding few years. But I do know that this trend must be given both moral and financial support, since its strengthening and deepening will arouse the hope of change that will be in the interest of all members of the Roma people (here and in the rest of the world), as well as in the interest of our whole society – now and in the future. Whereas in 1997/98, that is, in 1998 and 1999, 19.30 Roma enrolled at Macedonian universities, the figures for 2000, 2001 and 2002 were as follows: 126, 136 and 93. Despite being insufficient, such a trend announced rather vaguely the beginning

of a change in their status, which is most likely the result of the increased influence of Roma in the political hierarchy (each time they obtain one or two deputies to parliament), whose voice is also often heard in the Central Parliament and which, hopefully, will not be ignored for long. We can only imagine how the overall situation might change if only a radical change occurs within a few years, thus enabling Roma to continue their education after elementary school at the secondary and university levels, and if the quality of eight-year elementary education of Roma is improved by only one or two degrees.

Employment

As is well known, the level of employment in developing countries (especially in transition ones) is closely correlated with the level of education. Insofar as Roma in the Republic of Macedonia are concerned, this correlation is very dramatic. The basic data on it for the last three years at the end of the 20th century (in 1998, 1999 and 2000), as well as the ratios for the first five years of the 21st century, which have been showing a downward tendency, are given in the following table:

	Total in RM	Macedo- nians	Albanians	Turks	Roma	Vlachs	Serbs	Other
1998	284,064	187,743	61,275	10,036	12,115	598	4,240	8,057
1999	261,450	176,297	52,782	9,500	11,337	533	4,116	6,885
2000	261,710	180,164	52,062	7,833	9,776	734	4,277	6,864

When one takes into account the total number of Roma in the Republic of Macedonia in 1991 (52,103), it turns out that every fifth member of the Roma people was seeking a job, while in the case of Serbs (whose number here is somewhat lower), it appears that every ninth Serb was seeking a job. There is a similar correlation, with somewhat lower values, in the case of other ethnic groups, beginning with Albanians, Turks, Vlachs and, naturally, Macedonians. One might say in a somewhat emotive and dramatic way: a real disaster. Such a situation may persist without much turbulence due to a higher rate of general unemployment, as well as the fact that Roma do not fall into the category of so-called large ethnic groups in Macedonia. Imagine the situation that, regardless of high unemployment in Macedonia in general, every fifth Albanian seeks a job. That would be an army of 100,000 people. Imagine also that those who seek employment, excluding children and elderly people, come out into the streets of the capital. That would be a great problem!

Naturally, the social status of Roma is also unfavourable if one considers the occupational structure of the unemployed — three-fourths of the unemployed Roma are unskilled. This means that the employed members of Roma families can contribute very small amounts of money to the family budget, which does not change the picture about Roma as the most destitute people in this country, but diminishes the possibility of their subsistence on the basis of clan solidarity in difficult social and economic situations.

Such a disastrous occupational structure of Roma entails a very unfavourable structure in the labour and employment sector and the situation on the Macedonian labour market was already difficult from 1990/91 to 1995. In Macedonia, which has about 2 million inhabitants, about 300,000 of them seek employment. This means that, on the average, every eighth citizen is a member of this large army. According to the 1991 census data, there were 8,520 employed Roma, or 16% of the total number (i.e. the number of full-time employees). On the other hand, according to the same census, the share of Serbs being employed on a full time basis was 23%, although the total number of Serbs in the country was lower than the total number of Roma by one-fifth (RM focusing on the Poor, Volume II, June 1999, HOSU). The picture also does not change when it is the question of poverty measurements and analyses, especially with respect to the Roma people's financial status, housing, food, health care, death rate, etc.

* * *

Such a dramatic social status of Roma, as shown by means of numerous figures, ranging from their total number (which is not exact just because of their way of life) to the number of Roma university students, requires a few commentaries:

1. Although the current situation of Roma in Macedonia (which does not differ very much from the situation in other Balkan countries, that is, in the countries of South Eastern Europe), improved after World War II, there are no sufficient reason for satisfaction (self-satisfaction). In general, this can be explained by the so-called general and cultural backwardness of Macedonia, but it is a fact that throughout this period other "backward" groups made much greater progress in their development efforts than Roma, both in quantitative and qualitative terms.
2. However, despite a negative general picture about Roma that one might get, it cannot be said that the government kept the Roma question aside throughout that period. This is also shown by the

fact that the Republic of Macedonia ratified all Roma documents which have been adopted by the United Nations, Council of Europe, OSCE and UNESCO, as well as the fact that Roma in the Republic of Macedonia, as a part of the Roma people, have found their place in the Preamble to the Macedonian Constitution and other constitutional provisions stipulating all specific rights of the Macedonian ethnic communities (politics, education, culture – especially the language, etc.) in daily social and political life of all citizens. There are also some positive trends in this sector (ranging from an increasing number of Roma children completing elementary education – up to the fourth grade – to a certain increase in the number of Roma enrolling at Macedonian universities), not to mention improvements in their health care. It seems, however, that a more resolute step was made only in the first decade of the 21st century (2004), when the Macedonian Government (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy) adopted the document entitled “ROMA STRATEGY IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA”. We are deeply convinced that this document expresses the sincere wish of the Macedonian Government to address the Roma question in the coming decade (up to 2013/15), so that after EU accession Macedonia will not have to keep knocking at the door of the EU Commission for Social Policy in that connection. Instead, it will provide scope for talks with the Commissioner about other relevant issues that will be put on the agenda. The above mentioned document gives a very realistic picture about the position of Roma in Macedonia, which is disturbing not only because of its dramatic effect, but also because of its long history. However, it can also be viewed from another aspect – it provides a sound basis for launching the initiative that will bring about complete change. Everything will now depend on the Government or, to be more exact, on the bodies of local self-government in the Republic of Macedonia which, under the new laws on local self-government, have supreme authority in this area.

3. This analysis of the situation of Roma in the Republic of Macedonia made me to conclude that all material and moral possibilities were not sufficiently used during the past 60 or so years (especially during the past 15 years) due to the lack of moral and intellectual potentials within this group. As we have already seen, the number of Roma with a university degree could be counted on one's fingers throughout that period, so that they cannot

launch necessary initiatives in their community, or arrange for their implementation should they reach other institutions and actors. The next year and the next decade should see the emergence of the Roma elite which will (first in parallel and then autonomously) bear the responsibility for the general emancipation of Roma and their integrated inclusion in the overall life of the state and society and their institutions. The society and the state have now been put to the test. Naturally, the same applies to the small Roma elite, which has been developing over the past 60 years and especially over the last 15 ones.

P.S./1.

We have already mentioned that the cultural and economic emancipation of Roma is of great significance for the promotion of democratic relations in the Republic of Macedonia: a significant group is “getting included” in this great civilizational process which started in the Republic of Macedonia during the 1990s and within which some positive steps have already been taken so as to make the country and its society closer to the European standards. Only its truly democratic inclusion will be an indicator of the emancipation of Roma from the zone of so-called social and political marginalization. What is especially important, in our view, is the fact that the overall process in the country is becoming increasingly more compact, thus ensuring its more authentic and better adjusted development. For its distortions create a wrong picture about the overall process and cause a reaction to it in view of the fact that it is the question of a relatively small area (or, in other words, of a very small country) where all people know each other and the institutions can easily be recognized. Let us now give an example from the last local elections (2005), which will show very well “where we are and what we should do”.

It is well known that in politics, especially when elections are to be held, all political elites like to manipulate the voters in various ways, in their struggle for each vote. So, they make various promises, which are forgotten once the elections are over, because they were not realistic and, thus, were not serious. But the citizen-voter, who already has experience, easily recognized the nature of such election-“democratic” logic. And, naturally, if the cultural level of a constituent body is lower (and this is especially true of its socio-economic level), the game between the political elite and voters will last longer (pre-election promises – voting – fulfilment (of the promises). If a voter lives at the subsistence level, he will grasp at any straw (which may or may not be quite realistic). He does not believe in such promises as: “We’ll build a new school!”, “We’ll build a new

health center!”, “We’ll pave the streets!” and the like. There are various forms of manipulation. It has been proven that the voters from the Roma community are highly susceptible to bribe (which is, naturally, the result of their unfavourable social status and not of their genetic predisposition). At the second multiparty parliamentary elections in the Republic of Macedonia already (1994), one candidate for a deputy from a typical Roma-populated municipality, who was coming from the lowest social class but, in the meantime, managed to climb up to the upper middle class (by the Macedonian standards), concluded a few days between the elections that the best thing to do was to have the voters’ families find one or two bags of flour, 5–10 kg of oil, sugar or some other goods on the threshold of their houses in the morning. And he was not wrong! He won the elections, although his opponents had higher education and were coming from this community. Another example is the case of local elections held 10 years later in the same municipality. Namely, after the third round of voting, which was marked by numerous irregularities and abuses in the first and second round, the mayor became a person who was sentenced to prison for a rather big theft. So, it happened that he was elected mayor of the municipality and then had to go to prison. Naturally, local elections will be repeated, but damage was done (moral one, in the first place). It was done not only to the municipality and Roma ethnic community, but also to the country as a whole, because the whole political world heard about the 2005 local elections in the Republic of Macedonia, which could not be regarded as regular ones without reservation. This led to the negative assessment of the country’s development in general and slowed down its accession to European institution, etc. Naturally, this is not only the result of these local elections, because there were drastic irregularities in other communities too, but the reasons were different. Therefore, this case serves as a typical example of social poverty and political manipulation, that is, the distortion of the process of democratic consolidation in the newly formed countries of South Eastern Europe.

This analysis is based on the data of the Republican and Municipal Bureaux of Statistics, that is, the Bureau of Statistics of the City of Skopje, as well as on the document “ROMA STRATEGY” prepared by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OHRID ACCORD^{*}

INTRODUCTION: OHRID FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

We have to bear in mind that it is **difficult to come up with a precise conclusion** about the impact of the so far influence of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (FA) on the conflict prevention and thus on reconciliation and tolerance, as it is the **process that is yet to be completed**. However, it is my hypothesis that although the process continues, the **FA depending on its sustainability provides a guideline for the evaluation** of its impact on conflict prevention, reconciliation and religious tolerance.

The **means used and goals attained** with the FA, offer a good basis for the evaluation of the effects of FA. Success with FA depends on the wisdom with which such means and ends are employed and on the susceptibility (demand) of the society in question to the changes being fostered.

Means used with the adoption of the FA and its implementation – which broadly speaking at the **strategic level are**: a long-term political perspective for EU membership, international support for implementation of its provisions; and at **sub-sectoral level** including: OSCE, EU, NATO support programmes, financial assistance and resources committed, EU special representatives; and **goals** to be attained – which are in the case of FA included:

1. **Stabilisation of the country;**
2. **Building a multiethnic state; and**
3. **Leading the country into the European integration agenda.**

I. FA AND STABILISATION

Macedonia experiences the calmest period in its post-communist history. International and domestic agreements and arrangements ending the conflicts and confrontations in the country, mainly **FA largely is respected**

^{*} The views expressed in the paper are of the author, and do not represent the views of the organizations that he works for.

and to a great extent implemented, that in turn marks, in principle, the end of an era of post-conflict reconstruction in the country.

Armed insurgents or secessionist movements no longer challenge Macedonia. The country earlier passed the “**existential test**” of its transition; there is no question anymore about the prospect of its future existence. What it faces now is the **risk of breakdown of law and order** in parts of its territories, and the **risk coming from the spread of organised crime and corruption**. This is not to say that these risks dominate the agenda of the country and that they are issues exclusive to it. What is important is that its law enforcement institutions, prosecutors’ offices and judiciary are unable to apprehend, investigate and prosecute the criminals.

The FA as a conflict prevention tool and as a document that was later incorporated into the country’s constitution, **was a new business** for the whole Balkan region, and needed some serious work and commitment to become more than a mere promise. It was a challenge for Macedonia and for the IC to form a clear vision as to **how self-sustaining domestic structures can deal with the challenging demands of the FA**. With the FA, framework was there, what it needed was ways for its practical realisation. Ownership and its inclusion into domestic legislature was the key of this endeavour. Thus, the case of FA, suggests that the peace agreement supported with the domestic complementary tools, can play a significant role in transforming the local governance systems.

II. BUILDING A MULTIETHNIC STATE

FA ceased the hostilities and led to the constitutional and administrative changes in order to meet the grievances of the ethnic Albanian and other minority groups. The Agreement included provisions mainly about:

- Devolving more powers to the local jurisdictions;
- More representation of minority representatives in the state administration;
- Education and
- Use of minority languages in the state and local level institutions and other procedures.

FA opened a new era in Macedonia’s transition as it brought **major change in the Macedonian polity**. The Agreement is currently an important framework upon which the progress of the country in **moving towards a modern democracy** is measured. Reform environment brought with the implementation of the Agreement led to some **genuine compromises** in the Macedonian polity. For instance, it led to power sharing

arrangement that included the former Albanian guerrilla group turning into a political party. Also, the international community, including EU, became more involved in the country as it also was one of the signatories of the Agreement.

In this context, **FA has played a key role in three issues** that continue to be crucial in the case of Macedonia:

- First, building public support for meeting the demands of the minorities and providing sustainability of the undertaken changes following the adoption of the Agreement;
- Second, building confidence among the country's ethnic groups particularly in the areas that were affected by the hostilities in 2001. Although most of refugees and displaced people have returned to their homes after the end of the conflict, damaged trust prevented hundreds of people following the suit; and
- Third, providing support to the state institutions, including the Ministry of Interior that came to be pillar for the future stability of the country.

One thing is certain: we will only master the challenge of overcoming inter-ethnic tensions anywhere in the world, but particularly in the region of western Balkans, if each ethnic group is being given equitable representation in the state administration.

The efforts and changes undertaken since 2001 in addressing the issue of **equitable representation of citizens from minority ethnic groups has served to the most direct and obvious political and security interests**: a **political interest** in successfully providing legitimacy to the public goods produced by the state institutions; and **security interest** in stabilizing the country through employment policies that in fact remains a key challenge to the country: high level unemployment rates coupled with interethnic tensions.

The government of Macedonia took robust actions in this direction by launching training programs that aimed to include minority representatives in the state administration. The recruitment and training of hundreds of minority civil servants was a key target of the government that was achieved with the implementation of FA in order to rectify those conditions that led to the hostilities, fighting, and general unrest that paralyzed parts of the country throughout much of 2001.

Clear **commitment of the government in this regard** has become critical ingredient of success as it has served as an overall **driver of ethnic reconciliation and democratic consolidation**. It has established incentives that have **compelled all ethnic communities to make policy choic-**

es that will put them on the road to overcoming hostile relations between ethnic minorities and majorities. **Giving confidence back to state institutions rather than to para-structures**, have triggered an irreversible process in facilitating the smooth **political transition of the country from conflict-ridden weak state, to functioning democratic polity.**

Security aspect of the **multiculturalism in Macedonia is related to very survival of the multicultural state, and multicultural society.** Integrating non-majority members into the state structures of Macedonia, as a multicultural process, is to serve for the increasing confidence of the communities to the state structures that in turn enhance the security and stability in different parts of the country.

Macedonia is in the point of transition with regard to its multiculturalism as when it is at stake we are dealing with the issue that has security dimension that in turn **requires engagement not only of the regular domestic institutions** and political instruments, but also external, supporting national and international institutions.

Diversity and multiculturalism has always been there in Macedonia, but with the turn-of-the-century, **it has become a major characteristic of the country** taking various dimensions at the state, society and at the citizen's level. It has **grown in depth and breadth during the last three-four years and is gaining strength as a characteristic in the country.** Particularly, multiculturalism has been **absent at the governance level, a gap that is being recovered currently.**

The first security strategy of Macedonia, National Conception of Security and Defence of June 2003, which is an overarching document of the country's strategic policies, puts the development of multiculturalism as a *vital interest* of Macedonia.⁶⁷ The same or similar sentences and provisions can be found in other strategic documents of the country.

III. FA LEADING THE COUNTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AGENDA

It was the FA that brought Macedonia into the agenda of the EU and thus into the agenda for further enlargement. FA has been there in all **conditionalities** put by the government and its implementation has been seen as a **basis that will provide Macedonia a European future.** It is the belief that with the implementation of FA, Macedonia has **fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria.**

⁶⁷ National Conception of Security and Defense of the Republic of Macedonia, 11 June 2003, point 7.

As the implementation was processing, what followed was **application for membership** and then the **Questionnaire**. Questionnaire process for the first time examined thoroughly the functioning of the political, economic, and social and security system in the country. It discovered deficiencies, discrepancies, duplications and others in the works of the state institutions.

In this context, it makes virtually impossible to disentangle the impact of the FA from the processes of European integration that have dominated much of Macedonia's recent political landscape. Thus, there has been number of **indirect effects of the FA** on the country:

First, there has been **growing role of the wider society** in the policy processes of Macedonia, reflected with the heavy deployment of the international community, and the rise of NGOs.

Second, the **decentralisation** reform package that has been directly associated with the Ohrid Framework Agreement, but which in the same time is related to the European integration processes, have had cumulative effect in loosening the grip of the capital Skopje in the policy processes and balancing the power of the central and national institutions.

Third, transnational networks provided with the engagement of the country for FA implementation such as regular meetings with the IC, have provided an important channel for socialization of the political elite of Macedonia. This influence deriving from ever closer contacts have had systemic implications.

Fourth, recently, we have been witnessing intensive efforts by Macedonia with the effect of the success in implementation of the FA to foster the **regional cooperation** particularly with the countries of the western Balkans with the aim to enhance the joint efforts towards the common priorities, such as integration into EU or NATO. Regional cooperation has been success in the case of Macedonia that with the regional cooperation has internalized some of the regional challenges into its domestic polity and, in turn, has enhanced its capability to deal with the post-conflict challenges in the country.

THE PARADIGMS OF FOREGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION IN THE WISDOM OF PEOPLE'S PROVERBS

Ancient Rome forged the universally-known saying about what should be done to preserve peace. Throughout millennia, this axiom upheld the principle that: **"Si vis pacem, para bellum"** (If you want peace, prepare for war!). The militarist nature of this axiom expressing the logic of "armed security" and modeled on the archetype that the "house without weapons is not a home", escalated rapidly in the race for „atomic" and general armaments in the second half of the past century. Yet this was the time of the United Nations Organization established in the name of world peace by means of agreement and tolerance. The paradox of the feverish arming of some states for the sake of a "secure peace" in ruling others, runs counter to the increasingly significant messages of fairness, forgiveness and reconciliation as a condition for survival.

This paper is only a modest contribution to the selection and analyses of paradigms which as a warning "conditio sine qua non" (condition for survival), emerge from many centuries of experience and wisdom compressed in proverbs and sayings of the peoples of the world and of the Balkans. I hope that we have thereby pointed to valuable guideposts and to the enormous human and inhuman choices within the perplex of the past and the future of each and all the peoples and of humanity as a whole.⁹⁰

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

We are initiating this discussion in view of the age-long agony of the whirlpool of internal conflicts among peoples and states on the soil of so-called "Southeastern Europe" of simply the Balkans at the giant crossroads of continents, cultures, em-

There can be no peace without war.
(Africa, Mongo)

⁹⁰ The results of this study first announced in June 1999 at a course on "Spirituality and Social Work" at the International University ō Dubrovnik. The full text has not yet been published.

**When two men
fight, the third
reaps advantages.**

(Croatian, Ser-
bian...)

Divide et impera!

(Divide – and
rule!)

**A clash between
woodcocks and
mussels – ready
benefit for the
fisherman.**

(Japanese)

**Do not pour oil
on a flame.**

(French)

**Who sows discord,
is Satan's servant.**

(Alsatian)

**Proverbs say what
peoples think.**

(Swedish)

**To catch a domes-
tic rabbit, you
need a domestic
dog.**

(Afghanistan,
Pushtutska)

**Proverbs are the
lamps of word.**

(Žarap)

**The voice of the
people is louder
than the roar of
canons.**

(Armenian)

pires and religions. These Balkans have been and have remained, to themselves and to nearly all others outside them, a real enigma. This is perhaps so also because in ancient times by accumulating knowledge, portents and messages from the Near East, Egypt and northern Africa, the Balkans became the source, the sower and inspiration of the entire "western" civilization of Europe and the world it defines.

So wealthy and powerful inside and even more so given their ever-present interests outside, the big powers are endeavouring increasingly more deftly and unscrupulously to sharpen conflicts through manipulations as well as to dominate peoples everywhere and certainly also with such "ideal" opportunities for the tactical implementation of the well-known ancient and Roman maxims advocating that only by preparing for war can peace be secured!

It is as if that ancient long extinct precursor of the European Renaissance has too long been seething in the restless mixture of peoples, religions and states filled with deeply hidden, often opposing and discordant but still living and preserved individual archetypes. Thus, by force of circumstance, the Balkans have been proclaimed a "barrel of gunpowder", an area full of roadless mountains, "uncivilized" people with no rule of law, of experts who flee to the developed world, a territory abounding in perceived but unrealized riches. In brief, one of the incomprehensible and to many outsiders an exotic "twilight zone" of Europe with, at times, a harmonious, and at other times, quarrelsome countless mixtures of peoples, religions, ethnic groups...

However, those who are acquainted with this colorful entanglement of peoples and cultures will hearken to the wealth of its proverbs, sayings, toasts, curses, greetings... and will discover their specificity as well as their universality which in-

tertwines them with the world's peoples both as regard nature, society or the very human morals and spirituality.

In a sea of countless highly condensed proverbial messages, at times very difficult to translate, an attempt has been made to sort out those that express the sources of conflicts in the nature of human aggressive rapaciousness, the senselessness of "justified" violence, etc. In this manner, a series of specific paradigms were obtained, namely, patterns of forgiveness and reconciliation essentially expressed either in multilayered, witty metaphors or else in the sharpness of a literal statement.

This contribution is based on a voluminous, only just touched upon wealth of folk proverbs and sayings. For this reason I am presenting only the first preliminary selection of proverbs which as germs of quintessential experience and popular wisdom shine of equal importance both to humanity as well as being unique to every individual societal area. In origin, they are so authentically similar just as with their numerous differences they complement each other and approach the conditions for their applicability, in a given time and space.

The paradigm of forgiveness and reconciliation contained in the wisdom of proverbs and sayings, stem primarily from the logic of the proverbial statement itself. Phenomenologically, they are most often uttered as witty, picturesque metaphors and as literally acceptable "instructive" pictures born of understanding and pronounced as utmost essential rules stemming (sometimes in differing variants) from age-long, accumulated popular experience. It goes without saying that proverbs are subject to the selection of time and the conditions in which peoples live.

The knowledge and use of proverbs and sayings are an integral part of the culture, morals and spirituality of daily life in any human community. Understanding them is based on conceptions and

Beating breaks bones but not vices.

(Africa – Bambara)

Who does not love peace cannot win a war.

(Hungarian)

Quarrels and reconciliation are brother and sister.

(Serbian)

Who causes war, has the duty to make peace.

(French)

Who has the land, also has war.

(French)

The wise man who does not apply knowledge, is like the bee that does not produce honey.

(Persian)

Contention and reconciliation are brother and sister.

(Bulgarian)

Reward him who prevented a fight.

(Africa Mongo)

**The fish smells
from the head
+ it is cleaned
from the tail...
+ the head is cut
off...
+ the gall and
innards thrown
away**

**Even one hair
throws a shadow**
(French)

Do not split hairs
(Serbian, Croatian)

**Panic in the ba-
zaar, a joy for
thieves.**
(Ethiopian)

**One does not die
of hunger, but of
humiliation.**

(Jewish)

**One hand cannot
clap.**
(Arabic)

**Water for fish,
air for birds, the
whole world for
man.**
(Russian)

**Wings for birds,
the brain for man.**
(Russian)

**Men meet but
mountains do not.**
(French)

applications of the logically analytical possibility to discover the multiplicity of meanings of the paradigmatic character of their message.


Here we shall select only a series of proverbs and sayings of peoples as distinct rules, patterns that are mutually concentrically linked, that affirm the synergy of facts in the nucleus of the span of the relationship between forgiveness and reconciliation. Not denying the significance of official international declarations and political manifestations in the cause of mutual relations leading to forgiveness, I am of the opinion that even in this "parade" form, proverbial paradigms can become unexpectedly clear criteria (even though in political hypocrisy, they are vacuous ruses). In this context, I take as my starting point some reflections regarding forgiveness and reconciliation as they persevere or are forgotten by the peoples themselves.

These are provocative situations of the past (and even future) decades in the Balkans when proverbs about forgiveness and reconciliation need to be remembered and particularly in direct daily relations among people. I feel that it is of particular significance to nurture the culture of knowing, accepting and reciprocally calling upon people to observe the principles of reconciliation and forgiveness. Their already mentioned social, moral, and spiritual influence upon numerous deep-seated but invisible injuries could perhaps more readily surmount suffering rather than shallow propaganda exhortations. In this sense, I here stress the following paradigms as principles for reconciliation:

The principle of reconciliation can be effective not only as a "good-doing" fact but also as a condition of maintaining evil.

In the very nature of man, sometimes covertly and frequently in the cry of conflict, the explosion of hatred and fear, monstrous conflicts arise ranging from insults to injuries as well as to sow-

ing death, as only a perverted human being can think up, realize and carry out. Curious means of increasingly rapid ways to harness nature into the intended aims of human growth, due to the fate of numberless contradictions within human nature itself, pervert many authentic creative goals of man's achievements into horsemen of the Apocalypse. Do we hear their clatter? Can we stop them? How? by association over and above senseless disputes, by strengthening concord, by harmonious action, in contrast to the ostensible, everlasting evil that rests upon human discord, but which in a curiously slow yet attainable justice, devours itself. This is contained in the ancient but still living and proverbial message of many Balkan peoples regarding the fact that the quality of virtue and decency in cathartic interaction can in no wise be compared with the semblance of the effective



value of technically harmonious "purification". In contrast to this simple fact, it is as if obsessed by the moral beauty and loftiness of reconciliation, we stubbornly forget the analogous instrument (imposed upon us and mutually controlled) of the reconciliation of all kinds of evil in the name of the internal action of the universal law of one's survival.

We are living at a time of much-praised "workshops" of vivisection of the human body, culture, conscience, of politics, needs and inter-

The tree leans on a tree and man on another man.

(Croatian, Serbian...)

The hand washes a hand, both wash the cheek.

(Balkan peoples)

Power does not pray to God. God does not love power.

(Balkan peoples)

Two men are good: one has died, the other is not yet born...

(Indian)

Who does not punish evil, invokes it.

(Germany)

Many hands in one pot, quickly overturn it.

(Jewish)

Too many cooks, spoil the broth.

(Balkan peoples)

Science without virtue is a devil's sword.

(Polish)

Do what is right, and fear no one.

(German)

**Man's heart like
the sea's bottom
cannot be exam-
ined.**

(Russian)

**To the avaricious
man, even the
grave is narrow.**

(Taghistan)

**An apology can-
not feed a hungry
man.**

(Arabic)

**To forgive does
not mean to for-
get.**

(German)

**Who forgets evil
– let his eye be
gouged out, but
who mentions
it to cause evil
– both eyes!**

(Old Russian)

**The fool's apology
is worse than his
fault.**

(Persian)

**Between the word
and the act, the
sea is in the mid-
dle.**

(Italian)

**Feel sorry for oth-
ers as for yourself.**

(Vietnamese)

ests of egocentrism and sociability, of morals and spirituality, etc. I do not deny their (one-sided) achievements nor the need for abstraction within the indispensable process of deepening knowledge about (anyway inseparable) elements of man's nature. However, we should never overlook the fact that these elements can (and perhaps must) be perceived as endless "monads" that make a man what he is, while all of them, notwithstanding the purblind "sages", as in some kind of microcosm they reflect the substance of man's unique never repeatable totality. To isolate man from any one of the properties of his nature, is impossible without perverting it, just as an 'anthropocentric' separation of man from the totality of nature leads to the catastrophic alienation and perversion of the "all-powerful" conceited and above all, proud ruler of the world, the man-God. He certainly needs no forgiveness nor least of all reconciliation.

The principle of the triad of apology and forgiveness through the process of the act of making peace leading to reconciliation

Within the time and space allotted for this report, I stress the universal principle of the paradigm of the triad of apology and forgiveness as a process towards reconciliation that can lead to the establishment and maintenance of reconciliation on the assumption that there is a linkage and permanent (controlled) action of a series of special facts. In this diagram we see the principle of the basic triad of the tension that leads to reconciliation through the process of peaceableness and underlines its basis: the twofold character of an (often mutually necessary) relationship between apology and forgiveness, by literally encompassing all mutual injuries and evils that men from the "trifles" of daily life to genocide, inflict upon each other by harming their person, their communities, ranging to irreversible pollution and destruction of their social and total living environment.

In this diagram the "porous", broken lines form a triangular logical whole. From a basic, two-fold relationship of forgiveness and attitude, they strategically define the key objective in the process of the act of forgiveness which is to realize the act of reconciliation. The disregard of this most often occurs due to the inadmissible superficiality, vulgar ignorance and even conscious propagandistic and demagogic political hypocrisy found in many, shallow declarations. The consequences of this are significant as is the influence exerted by those who use it: from a show of shameful comedy to a deliberately caused tragedy.

However the mentioned "porosity" in this diagram has a special meaning. It is meant to signify, in the process of the synthesis of apology and forgiveness, as basic factors on the road to reconciliation, the tactical indispensability of "introducing" other numerous basic elements of personal and social features.

In this phase of the initial studies of popular proverbs and sayings that refer to the act of (re)conciliation, out of many hundreds, I have selected only 24 "key" words and notions. The proverbs and sayings I have consulted clearly indicate the numerous specific factors in human relations, the moral and spiritual reliance that can also be the principal burdens in a societal world replete with contradictions and conflicts. These factors must be either prevented or upheld depending on the specific circumstances of discord and conflicts and therefore should be rationally and gradually introduced into the reconciliation process, in keeping with unique human nature. Starting from complete openness that calls for all well-founded additions and corrections, I here underline the following:

- | | |
|---------------------|---------------|
| – Adjustment | – Hostility |
| – Acceptance | – Humiliation |
| – Confidence, trust | – Justice |
| – Consciousness | – Pity |

If you forgive the fox for the chicken, he'll grab your sheep.

(Georgian)

Who excuses himself, accuses himself.

(Alsatian)

Thousands of curses have not torn even one shirt.

(Arabic)

A good politician is a bad Christian.

(Russian)

To forgive is to teach.

(Ethiopian)

A strict justice – great injustice.

(German)

Equally divided injustice, is justice itself.

(Persian)

If you can't help me, don't make it worse.

(Balkan peoples)

A king without justice is like a river with no water.

(Arabian)

If it is black, it doesn't have to be the Devil.

(Balkan peoples)

Forgiveness is the most beautiful flower of victory.

(Arabian)

The Devil is not so black as he seems to be

(Balkan peoples)

God forgives those who admit their faults.

(Arabian)

Forgiving never meant forgetting

(German)

You can always take from me by force, but you can never give to me in that way.

(Balkan peoples)

If justice doesn't help, injustice won't either.

(Balkan peoples)

Hasty revenge – huge damage.

(Montenegro)

Before you judge others, look into your soul.

(Balkan peoples)

- Conscience
- Dignity
- Duty, obligations
- Excuse, apology
- Forgiveness
- Friendship
- Guilt
- Hipocrisy
- Reconciliation
- Remorse
- Rights
- Rigidity
- Shame
- Sincerity
- Tolerance
- Victim

Here, in alphabetical order, are given the initial steps in the selection of key words from among several hundred proverbs and sayings, the proverbs that express the inescapable facts of human properties and of relations in the act of conciliation. Nearly each of them among the scores of the narrow chosen ones, represent a sum, or one of the essential, unavoidable principles vital for systematic and comprehensive activity on the road to peace.

Naturally, here it is not possible to delve deeper into the meanings of these key-notions (not to mention those not included in this list). These are specific principles underlying the understanding, the methodology and even the skill of social, moral and spiritual foundations of the Sisyphean human destinies in the attempt to revive the harmonization of mutual relations within the many facets of social relations. A creative procedure in every concrete case requires a corresponding nuance in the importance and in the differing variants of irenologically-based combinations and the sequence of action – adapted influences (or else the solving of the complexes) of these principles. In his voluminous work "Metaphysics of Forgiveness", Alain Gouhier emphasizes that the private and public life are the inseparable faces of one and the same reality. Therefore, he stresses that, on the other hand, to proclaim the end of ideology on the pretext of organizing a just peace and rationalizing economy in a world where the majority of people are dying due to the lack of food or erroneous care, means

to forget that the wish to attain these goals presupposes ethic choices.

Understanding Paradigmatic Expressions of People's Proverbs on Forgiveness and Reconciliation

Inexhaustible modalities and transformations of the contradictions of man's personality and communities "produce", as a historical constant, not less numerous and versatile interpersonal conflicts which, by their nature, tend toward further multiplication and intensification. As is well known, these conflicts actually take place in extremely intricate fields of social life. It is the question of such a range of »qualities« and intensities of mutual injuries (or: *evil-doing*) as can be inflicted by man's diabolically perverted "inhuman" nature, awakened up by conflicts, with the pathology of its increasingly destructive power.

Therefore, I am convinced that we are now aware, more than ever before, of indispensable social, moral, spiritual and numerous other values of a (*good-doing*) system of those interpersonal relations which enable a call for forgiveness, as well as the very act of forgiving. Due to their modesty and greatness, moral simplicity and unexplored secrets of fine spirituality, they are as much a "simple", spontaneous or requested procedure in daily life as the most difficult decision and a vital prerequisite for peace between individuals, families and peoples being in blood feud.

Due to the tragedy of the Yugoslavian soil, we are faced once again with the effects of the curse of mythological accumulation of mutual injustice, suffering and hatred. And an unending renewal of irrational ethnic, religious, political and inter-state conflicts, which are stirred up both from outside and from within, is too heavy a burden to everyone and especially to small and intermingled nations being extremely "great" as far as their pride is in question. The insanity of

Water never cleans the face of the man of bad conscience.

(Balkan peoples)

Water takes all away, but the shame.

(Balkan peoples)

Water cleans all but the sin itself.

(Balkan peoples)

Sinful words come out of the mouth, not in it.

(Balkan peoples)

Justice should imitate sandalwood: it perfumes the axe that cuts into it.

(Indian)

You can wash your clothes, never your conscience.

(Persian)

Old sin, – new shame.

(French)

Shame is as quick as the fire flames.

(African)

Blood stains cannot be washed off with blood.

(Georgian)

**If a dog bites you,
don't bite it back.**
(Thai: Indian)

**As the water slides
down the moun-
tains, a wish for
vengeance slips
quickly out of a
good heart.**
(Chinese)

**A man has four
limbs, the fifth one
is the shame.**
(African)

**Shame is as quick
as the fire flames.**
(Berber – Africa)

**If you play with a
donkey, don't get
offended if it farts.**
(Turkish)

**One that sees heav-
ens in water, sees
fishes on trees.**
(Chinese)

**Be merciful to oth-
ers as you are to
yourselves.**
(Vietnam)

**Peace nourishes,
troubles consume.**
(Icelandic)

**Doubt is the key to
all knowledge.**
(Arabic)

such a course of events affects us especially on the threshold of the third millennium when the year of the culture of peace was proclaimed. Therefore, I took the liberty of pointing - on the basis of my research into the vast tradition of the peoples on this soil and in the rest of the world - to the logic and ethics of extremely penetrating, specific yet universal and paradigmatically formulated popular proverbs on forgiveness and reconciliation. There are numerous principles of forgiveness and reconciliation which are either neglected or unknown to many of them. They can be found in thousands of authentic, or varied and analogous proverbs of the peoples in the Balkans and the rest of the world and which have only been mentioned in this paper.

The Levels of Forgiveness and Reconciliation in the Entanglement of Social, Moral, Spiritual and Other Factors

Our studies of popular proverbs and sayings exceeded our expectations by facing us with profound messages of multi-layered wisdom concerning forgiveness and reconciliation. They provided such material whose analysis and careful synthesis can create a basis for the development of a scientifically based, applied theory and the skill of providing support to the harmonization of social life in various communities. The essence of this multidisciplinary support lies in the methodology of social, educational, ethical and psychological orientation of a series of interdependent interpersonal actions, leading to the harmonization of disrupted relations, ranging from an absolutely innocent to extremely tragic manifestation.

The first level raises the *consciousness* of the nature and spiral of the effects of an act that has hurt or is hurting others by employing a socio-analytical method and plenty of information. At the same time, in the very essence of this con-

sciousness, we are faced with the raising of moral *conscience* relating to a need for and comprehensive knowledge about mutual benefits to be derived from synchronous yet specific actions that, as a rule, “buffer” a conflict on another, qualitatively new plane of social relations. By presenting these actions in this way, we have followed their sequence in an extremely abbreviated form. We have presented only the basic ideas of a categorical nature. Considering the conditions for presentation in this context, numerous realistic variations have been abstracted. And they depend on essential factors such as the nature and degree of “evil-doing”, which caused the syndrome of conflict spreading and intensification, the spiral of its effects and their actors, a number of direct and indirect social, cultural and other conditions which influence autonomously the entire process.

The peace of two worlds rests on two words: benevolence towards friends, tolerance towards enemies.

Taking the first steps towards raising consciousness and conscience, unilateral or mutual *reconsideration* (the test of conscience, repentance, regret and the like), expression of regret, a call for forgiveness (and its principled acceptance), is unavoidable and decisive for any further steps at the first level. Considering the decisive and extremely sensitive nature of radically new relations with respect to the sources of crises, conflicts and injuries, numerous steps are conceived (and taken) in a very discrete manner at this level. Otherwise, we could apply the rule that as much as public boasting about evil deeds is monstrous, their persistent hushing up is ominously announcing even more evil ones.

The second level is, naturally, concerned primarily with the deepening and consolidation of the elements secured at the previous level. Depending on the number and characteristics, per-

All the goods of this world are only borrowed.

(Arabic, Maori)

Sad is only he who has understood.

(Arabic)

What is visible is ours, but what is hidden is God's.

(Arabic)

Hunger drives even the wolf out of the forest.

(French)

A shy cat – brazen mice.

(Gallic)

Give salt and advice only to him who asks for it.

(Italian)

In doing good, you will also find evil.

(Arabic)

A thorn pains only the barefoot.

(Berber)

Who lives on hope, dies of wishes.

(Italian)

Where the wolf finds one lamb, he will seek another.

(French)

**In harming others,
do not expect any
good.**

(Ubushka – Ana-
tolia)

**Even small snakes
have poison.**

(Kurdish)

**Of friends speak
nicely, of enemies
say nothing.**

(English)

**The Queen bee has
no sting.**

(Portuguese)

For man to live ???

(Jamaican)

**Better it is to
praise the virtues
of enemies than to
flatter the failings
of friends.**

(English)

**A sincere enemy is
worth more than a
false friend.**

(African)

sonalities or communities involved in a conflict, as well as on the seriousness of unilateral (or reciprocal) injuries, it is gradually including an increasingly broader circle of persons, who were direct or indirect participants in the conflict. Otherwise, this is the level at which, in most cases, everything is said in public, in addition to the clearest possible differentiation with respect to those forms of consideration of a conflict which actually attempt to maintain it or even stir it up either openly or covertly. The latent possibility of maintaining the climate of mutual distrust and tension, in addition to establishing its factors and reasons due to which some actors maintain this state of affairs, points to the possibility of failing to solve the problems causing a conflict to the end. The second level of the project relating to forgiveness and reconciliation anticipates their harmonized solution, or consideration of the methods for long-term control of the influence that should be exerted if these problems cannot be solved over a short term due to their nature.

As a rule, specific concentric “circles” are formed around the core of the parties in conflict (two or more of them), depending on the significance of that conflict on a broader scale. They are directly or indirectly included in different ways as the external factors of the conflict, in their functions ranging from stirring up and supporting the conflict to exerting influence on its outbreak. At the second level of forgiveness and reconciliation,

direct external participants in the previous unilateral or mutual evil deeds act together towards, inter alia, these “circles involved in the conflict” in an attempt to provide support for a new quality of the reconciliation of relations.

One of especially sensitive steps, which are, fortunately, taken only in extreme cases (and which commence at the first level already), is to single out the persons and institutions that should be automatically persecuted due to the seriousness of their acts, as well as those holding higher and the highest positions in an organization, control and decision-making hi-

erarchy, and who are – due to evil-doing, wrong doing or non-doing - especially responsible for the outbreak of the conflict and its possible tragic outcome. This is the walk of justice which is certainly the most difficult and most painful among the “steps” being considered. However, without its specifically objective cathartic influence, it is not possible to conduct and sustain the necessary and elevated process of forgiveness and reconciliation.

The third level anticipates the achievement of harmony and cooperation arising from everyday life and economic and social development, as well as specific, preventive joint activities relating to the possible re-emergence of the effects of causes and circumstances of the previous conflict. Considering the existence of “time distance”, it is possible to analyze the whole complex of pathological and other factors of the past conflict. Depending on the nature and seriousness of the otherwise resolved problem, this analysis will, as required, determine a range of indicators that should announce a threat of the renewal of the previous or similar conflict on time and in an efficient manner.

At the typically “open”, third level, the relevant activities will result in the elaboration of preventive and development programmes - in the fields of education, news and entertainment media, in addition to amateur and other cultural activities – which will be devoted, inter alia, to the circumstances of the past conflict, as well as experiences in its settlement.

Questions and Dilemmas of Man’s Consciousness and Conscience in the New Era

On the threshold of new humanism, transformed by comprehensive knowledge about one’s own “microcosm”, it seems that man’s consciousness, with conscience in its essence, is reaching out, more and openly and clearly, for the interfering and universal, analogous modalities of achieving harmony in the totality of nature, mankind, man’s opinion and spirituality. However, this attempt is challenged by a global threat posed by an inconceivable technological power despite numerous but ineffective warnings. This power can also be placed at the disposal of the already mentioned alienated, extremely perverted and diabolic inhumanity which could only be sensed in ancient times, but has now become apparent. The end of “modern times” is also marked by a global threat of blind technological and social manipulation with everything, including human consciousness. The lead was taken by quasi-scientific, specialized “fools”, new servants of the ruling economic, political, technological and ideological forces, whose consciousness seems to have definitely lost its moral conscience. We do not feel better after learning that this skyrocketing power,

resembling a penetration into the very origins of creation (and, thus, destruction) of nature itself, poses an irresistible challenge to the innocent, immature, spoiled and violent human child that would like to "play" the Creator. We are faced with the greatest dilemmas about man's destiny that is concealed as much by ambiguities and partialities of modern science as by the treasures of ancient popular knowledge about the nether world, nature, society and man. Therefore, it seems that we have no other choice but to reconsider the long history of resistance to the destruction of man's unique material and spiritual consciousness and conscience. The quality and steadiness of moral conscience of modern man, amidst amazing yet frightening and ever-increasing technological power, are **tempting** to an extreme his ability and readiness for individual and collective self-examination, making apologies and amends, forgiveness...

The time ahead of us requires systematic studies of the neglected millennia-long wisdom of popular tradition. This is also the time for a systematic scientific and popular education, information and critical surveys of the culture of peace based on the modern system of humanistic sciences, as well as on the achievements of popular wisdom from ancient times to the present day. Their complementary and comparative values are indispensable.

SELECTED USED LITERATURE

1. Abel Olivier dir., „**Le Pardon**“, Paris, Ed. Autrement, 460 pp.
2. Asceaux Marcel, „**Ah! Ces Proverbes...**“, Subervie, Rodex, 1955, 50 pp.
3. Bedir Khan Kamuran et Margueritte L.P., „**Proverbes kurdes**“, Paris, 1937.
4. Бударев Т.С.Б., „**Отвествующие пословиц и сказания разних народов**“, Улан-Уде, 1962, (4000 пословиц), 216 стр.
5. Daničić Đura, (na svijet izdao) „**Poslovice**“, u Zagrebu, 1871, 160 str.
6. Dimitrijević Hadži Todor, „**Vranjske poslovice**“ I deo, iz zbirke otkupljene od strane Srpske Kraljevske Akademije Nauka, Beograd, 1935, 192 str.
7. Fallon S.W. „**A Dictionary of hindustani proverbs**“ Bénarès, 1886, (12.500 proverbs).
8. Finbert J. Elian „**Dictionnaire des proverbes du monde**“, Laffont, 1965, (6000 proverbs), 450 pp.
9. Garrigues A., **Essais parémiologiques**, Paris, 1936
10. Gouhier Alain, „**Pour une métaphysique du pardon**“, Paris 1969, Editions de l'Epi, 619 pp.
11. Illberg G. „**Proverbes et Vieux Dictons**“, Bonne, 1962, (800 proverbs...)
12. Ilg Gerard, „**Proverbes français suivis des équivalents en allemand, anglais, espagnol, italien, néerlandais**“, Elsevier, 1960, (607 proverbs).
13. Jouniaux-Dufresnoy Fabien, „**Grains de bon sens**“, Liget, 1967, 144 pp.
14. Kalma Maurice, „**Trésor des pooverbes et locutions du monde**“. Le Prat, 1961, 240 pp.
15. Kapetanović Ljubušak Mehmed-beg (Sakupio po Bosni, Hercegovini i susednim krajevima, te izdao), „**Narodno blago**“ Štamp.Špindlera i Lešnera, Sarajevo, 1888g., 396 str.
16. Karadžić, Vuk Stef. „**Srpske narodne poslovice**“, Beč, štamparija Jermenskog manastira, 1849 g, 362 str. (Reprint – Nolit 1977)

17. De Lincy (De) Le Roux „**Le livre des Proverbes Français**“, Édit.Chez Paulin, Paris, 1942, 895 pp.
18. Maloux Maurice, „**Dictionnaire des proverbes, sentences et maximes**“, Larousse, 1960, 628 pp.
19. Montreynaud Florence, Pierron Agnès, Suzzoni François, „**Dictionnaire de proverbes et dicton – La sagesse du monde entier**“, Robert, 1989, (11.400 proverbes), 759 pp.
20. Martinović Dr Niko „**Evangelje po narodu – Antologija crnogorskih poslovica i izreka**“ (Izbor i predgovor Dr Niko Martinović), Izd. Grafički Zavod Titograd 1969, 361 pp.
21. „**Narodne drame, poslovice i zagonetke**“, Matica Hrvatska – „Pet stoljeća hrvatske književnosti“, Zagreb, 1963, 370 str.
22. Polenakovik Dr Haralampije i Kiril Penušliski (vo redakcija) «**Makedonski narodni umotvorbi**», Tom IV, Knj.I, „**Poslovici**“, Knigoizd. Kočo Racin, Skopje, 1954, 302 str.
23. Rezvanian M.H. „**Grains d'humour et de sagesse persane**“, Maisonneuve et Larose, 1976, (2500 proverbes)
24. Vervin Claire et Roy Claude, „**La Sagesse des nations**“, Club des Libraires de France, 1959, (2000 Proverbes parmi 60 pays).



In recognition of
a significant contribution to
the programme and objectives of
the International Year of Peace,
proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly,
the Secretary-General designates

European Centre for Peace and Development



as a
Peace Messenger

Javier Cuéllar

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

15 September 1987

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN PROMOTING ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS RECONCILIATION: LESSONS, WARNINGS AND TIPS FROM THE JOURNALIST PERSPECTIVES

Imagine that you work as editor-in-chief of a major media in Serbia. You have heard about an incident in which three youngsters were killed. You have just received the following press statement by a “yahoo.com” email address:

“The murder of the three youngsters is the latest work of a religious sect called “The Cult” linked to the party of the ethnic Slovak party called “The Slovak popular party”.

The statement is signed by an unknown group called “The Defenders”. As an editor-in-chief you are alarmed not only because of the gravity of the incident, but also because there have been three similar unresolved cases recently. The public is impatient to find out what is going on.

How do you treat the subject? Do you want to risk, try to beat the competition and be the first to publish the info or do you verify the information? Can an email from an unknown organisation on a yahoo.fr address be a credible source? Do you verify the information or call the police? How do you avoid creating hysteria? Is it a trail, a speculation or a case of religious, ethnic and political hatred?

Indeed, here you are facing the risk of religious, ethnic and political hatred, the risk of heightening tensions in the public opinion and the risk of being manipulated.

As an editor or as a journalist in this situation, you have to overcome the following problems:

- 1) **Time pressure:** Do you publish immediately to impress the public and beat the competition or do you lose the competition battle but opt for a more balanced and truthful information? The answer is: it is always better to wait, verify and risk losing the competition battle than to be first to incite hatred.
- 2) **Dangerous words:** Do you find yourself obliged to publish the information that are injurious, that can incite hatred? The answer is: no, you do not have to publish potential hate speech, especially if it comes from unknown sources.

- 3) **Quality of sources:** How do you evaluate the quality of sources? The answer is: it is important to qualify the source, give the public elements to judge the quality of the source, find alternative sources, contact your colleagues, verify the source by email, interrogate the source, find confirmation of an electronic address by the internet access provider, ask for opinion from academic specialists/experts, official and civic organizations, authorities.
- 4) **Competition:** Do you follow the competition or think of you own? The answer is: you always have to think about the credit you should give to your competition. Do not automatically follow them, especially in sensitive issues.
- 5) **Context:** How do you explain the importance of the story? The answer is: by providing context, be it historic, cultural or political, by identifying the main actors and explaining it to the public.

In brief, it is key to do a maximum of research, of contacts and verifications before publishing the kind of information that can provoke an avalanche of hatred and intolerance towards people who could be perfectly innocent.

I. TRAPS FOR JOURNALISTS

I propose thus the following frame for treating the problems that journalists face in trying to provide ethnic and religious reconciliation in tense, conflict-prone situations.

These problems can be divided in four groups, depending on which situation a journalist finds himself:

1. When a journalist does not know everything

- 1) **BAD SOURCES OR A LACK OF SOURCES:** Often, in crisis situations, we do not have the opportunity to get to all the sources of information. The sides in conflict sometimes do not want to give access to the sources of information or simply a journalist for different reasons cannot get to them. Immediately, a journalist can fall in the trap of a lack of objectivity. Also, bad sources (most often anonymous) can represent a big problem because they can easily manipulate and they do not take responsibility for the correctness of the information. It is thus very important to have credible sources of information – from the witnesses to events, to state organs and others.
- 2) **DISINFORMATION:** Very often, for the purpose of “higher” national, state or political objectives, state propaganda or the prop-

agenda of the warring sides tends to strangle journalism which becomes a simple carrier of information or position of a political group or state. Disinformation exists everywhere, let us not forget all the disinformation that took place in the US and Britain before and during the war with very often superficial and wrong information about the danger from weapons of mass destruction which were put out to justify state interests and the occupation of Irak.

- 3) **SPIN BY PR AGENCIES:** Very often in crisis situations, PR agencies – be it state agencies or agencies hired by the warring sides – spin the stories, that is put the events in the context that is convenient to the needs of their clients.

In case of an unpleasant information, the goal is to create confusion. In case of a positive information, the goal is to accentuate a big victory.

2. When a journalist knows everything, but he cannot say it

- 1) **PRESSURE AND CENSORSHIP:** In crisis situations, pressures from the state, the warring sides, lobbyists, the army and the police are very present. These actors seek from journalists and editors a positive coverage of their interests and a negative about the interests of the opposing side. In the case of the non-acceptance of such reporting, there could be more or less forceful attempts to make the media comply – be it through threats of closing down the media outlets, imprisonment or violence.
- 2) **TERROR OF UNIFORMITY:** The terror of “mainstream thinking” is today present more than ever in the world’s media. If the leading world or national media proclaim that someone is a bad guy, less known media will to a large extent follow, sometimes because they agree, but often also because they do not have the strength to oppose this opinion. They have to accept the mainstream thinking or face criticism of “extremism” or “partiality”.

3. When a journalist knows everything but does not want to say it

- 1) **PARTIALITY (NATIONAL, IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL), ACTIVISM.** Objectivity in journalism is a goal that every journalist tends to achieve. That is at least what is said in journalism handbooks, that is how journalism is taught in schools, those are the directives of all the professional editors. To have various sources and a balanced text is achievable in a great number of cases. It is really not that difficult to call someone to get a reaction on accusations, for example. But the problems arise in crisis situations.

Very often in wars, for example, it is not easy to reach the warring sides. In these kinds of situations, objectivity is easily lost. During the wars in former Yugoslavia, the principle of objectivity was rarely followed. Serb reporters usually had only Serbian sources, Croat journalists Croatian sources, etc. Foreign journalists also often failed miserably and often provided one-sided coverage, thus inflaming the situation. The so-called “activist” approach was very present. This approach perhaps has a humane note in the conflict, it accentuates the suffering of the victims, but it also very often falls in the trap of partiality, which can bring to dangerous consequences.

- 2) **HATE SPEECH, INCITING VIOLENCE.** Inciting hatred on any basis – national, religious, racial or else – is one of the major problems facing journalism ethics. The criticism of another nation, religion or race is not disputable, it is a right, and sometimes is useful. But, the problem is that too often the blaming of “the other side” is full of simplified stereotypes. “Our” guys are good, “theirs” are bad. “Our” guys are only defending themselves or want to save the world from evil, “theirs” only want to conquer others or want to destroy the world. Most of the conflicts are pictured in this black-and-white. However, this kind of picture generates conflict, incites wars. You all recall the case of Rwanda, where the International War crimes court has condemned to prison journalists from a radio station which through its programs called for murders and massacres in 1994, during the genocide in Rwanda.
- 3) **CORRUPTION.** Unfortunately, like in all spheres of society, corruption is present among journalists as well. Being bribed to write sometimes even false information is present in everyday journalism, but is particularly dangerous in crisis situations, when consequences of reporting are much greater than usual.
4. **When you said it all, but maybe you should not have**
 - 1) **GIVING OUT SENSITIVE INFORMATION:** In conflicts, journalists often gather information which publishing serves one side in order to locate the other side’s troops or find out any other information of vital importance. Sometimes it is impossible to avoid the publishing of this kind of information, but very often journalists – even unconsciously – publish information which resemble much more to spying collaboration than to journalism.
 - 2) **SENSATIONALISM AND BLOOD-THIRSTY REPORTING.** Journalists often publish texts and photos which serve much more

to cheap sensationalism than to a real understanding of a serious crisis situation. The emotional reaction of the public and of the members of the families are often forgotten. A rush for emotions and profit gets priority over the consequences for the quality of reporting.

II. POST-CONFLICT KOSOVO: THE ABSENCE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND SENSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

The example of the media coverage in the UN-administered province of Kosovo in the post-1999 period is a striking example of the absence of responsibility and sensibility for human rights abuses. It can perhaps be explained by the deep roots from the early 1990s, but these should by no means serve as a justification for the flagrant violation of ethical and professional codexes.

The unbalance between Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanians (but also later Croats and Bosnian Muslims) in the means put into PR advocacy campaigns and lobbying efforts has led to a one-sided media war in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Unable and perhaps uninterested to seek allies and promotion in Western capitals, the official Belgrade lost the media war for the context of the future Yugoslav successor wars even before the first bullet was ever shot: the Serb demands were sidelined and they were portrayed from the outset in a negative context. Serb causes, views and victims became “unworthy” in the eyes of key Western political and media factors.

Serb frustration with Western analysts and media led to a PR self-isolation, even autism in certain periods of the 1990s, thus allowing a vicious circle to develop in which international media bias put more oil on the fire than contributed to a just and long-lasting solution to conflict. No matter how complex the conflict was, no matter the fact that crimes were committed on all sides and a fierce war was fought also by the Kosovo Liberation Army in which atrocities could hardly be avoided, the Kosovo Albanians were simply perceived as only “good guys”, the Serbs as only “bad”.

With the end of the NATO 1999 bombings and the retreat of the Yugoslav army from Kosovo, the Serb capacity to “cause damage” disappeared. The remaining, unarmed Kosovo Serb population became protected by NATO troops and a orchestrated campaign of ethnic cleansing began: killings of Serb peasants in the fields, shootings of Serb children,

kidnappings of Serb workers, bombings of Serb houses, terrorist attacks against Serb buses, forceful takeover of Serb apartments, destruction of Serb monasteries and graveyards.

Despite a change of regime in Belgrade with the arrival of reformists in power in 2000, the substance of the Western media approach to the situation in Kosovo remained unchanged:

- 1) Stories about the violence against the remaining 100,000 Serbs and human interest stories about their fate in Kosovo remained rare. The same occurred with the situation of the more than 200,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians who were expelled towards central Serbia and could not return to their homes.
- 2) Rather, more place was given to bureaucratic, public relations-optimistic statements offered by UN administrators about the “constant progress” in the province.
- 3) Albanian violence was justified through the formulation called “revenge attacks”.
- 4) Ethnic persecution became “inter-ethnic conflict”.
- 5) The division of the northern town of Kosovska Mitrovica – the last remaining urban area where Serbs still live in Kosovo – was seen as the key obstacle to stability instead of the ever-lasting campaign of anti-Serb violence throughout the rest of the province.
- 6) The orchestrated campaign of “ethnic cleansing”, as NATO Admiral Gregory Johnson called the three days of anti-Serb violence in March 2004, became ultimately seen as a result of “Albanian frustration with the lack of progress towards independence”.
- 7) There was a clear failure to explain who was behind the anti-Serb attacks. If the international community accepts that there is an orchestrated campaign of violence implicating 52,000 perpetrators/participants, there must be organizers? Who are they, the Western media never asked.
- 8) There was a lack of explanation of problems in the Albanian society – from the question of organized crime, drug trafficking to the questions of ethnic intolerance. The capacity of the Kosovo Albanian political and paramilitary circles to export violence into neighbouring southern Serbia and Macedonia was rarely examined.
- 9) The failures of international administrators and peacekeepers in Kosovo were only scarcely analyzed by the academic community and mainstream media.

- 10) The drawing of the line and the eternal question: “Is this what we fought for?” became practically invisible in most of the Western media reports. Western allies who had advocated bombings as the means to create a solution and had invested so much prestige and money in the international missions in Kosovo saw it in their interest that a) this general image was continued and b) that, by and large, the media attention to Kosovo reduced steadily over time. Other issues and hotspots, be it September 11, 2001, other bombings and the war on terror attracted the media’s attention.

III. THE WAY OUT:

The Kosovo example is a regional case study, but it should not be seen as a exception or a specificity. Rather, it opens a debate on the kinds of methods necessary to overcome these problems.

Here are six of them:

- 1) Journalists should be able to **provide context with a minimum of spinning** and black-and-white simplification.
- 2) Journalists should be **taught conflict analysis**. Very few of them have actually had the chance to learn more about conflict resolution, and thus cannot fully understand their responsibility in conflict and post-conflict situation.
- 3) **Foreign journalists have a role but also a responsibility for the coverage** – not only local journalists.
- 4) **Media watch organizations should be set up, strengthened by the civil society, but without having behind them a strong ideological slant** which would jeopardize their objectivity. Their goal should be professionalism nova ideological or political agenda.
- 5) Journalists, editors, media and the public should **try to step out of the blood-thirsty style of reporting on conflict or post-conflict situations**. There should be a diversification of positive stories and features.
- 6) Journalists should learn **to evaluate the ethical and professional cost and benefit of working closely with the officials** and find the best modalities of cooperation.

This is due to the fact that in conflict-prone situations:

- journalists often **cannot report without help from officials – be it in terms of security or logistics;**

- journalists often **rely on official sources for information** and this reliance becomes a necessity when there is a lack of other sources of information;
- journalists often **fall pray to the agenda of the officials** through information selection, manipulation, spinning, disinformation, censorship or other forms of pressure, intimidation or influence.



THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN THE BUILDING OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND THE PROMOTION OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

The theory of mass media points to their importance in the contemporary social context. Modernity is inconceivable without the mass media function and their daily presence. With their high speed, the mass media have turned the world of *graphosphere* into the new world of *videosphere* within which the categories of time and space have been changed. Today, it takes only a few minutes to have a news/picture travel around the planet Earth and turn any of its inhabitants into the witness to an event, regardless of its location.

This transition from the period of *graphosphere* to the period of *videosphere* has introduced some important elements that have determined the method of perception, as well as the model of behaviour and understanding of the world. Whereas the paradigm of attraction in the period of graphosphere is *logos* (system, programme), in the world of videosphere that is *image* (excitements, phantasies); symbolic authority in the graphosphere is *legible* (logic truth) and in the videosphere *visible* (event); the control of information in the graphosphere is political and in the videosphere *economic*: in the graphosphere the myth serving for identification is *hero*, as contrasted to the videosphere where the myth is *star/personality*.⁶⁸

The use of the mass media and the consumption of their contents is becoming increasingly more frequent. A significant number of people uses the mass media on a daily basis; the viewing of television broadcasts is increasing. So, the television broadcast of the Princess Dianne⁶⁹ and Pope John Paul II was viewed by hundreds of millions of people from all parts of the world and the same applies to sports events (the last sports events, which distinguished themselves in that respect, were the European Soccer Championship in Portugal and the Olympics in Athens in 2004).

The functioning of the mass media and mass communication are based on several components. First, mass communication has been organized and institutionalized, which means that for the development of mass media and mass communication it is necessary to have a well-developed structure, capital and production resources. In the contemporary context, this resulted

⁶⁸ See: Debre, Režis (2000): *Uvod u mediologiju*. Belgrade: CLIO, p. 66.

in the structuring of large media systems, structured under the sponsorship of large interest groups of a political or economic character.

Second, the use of the mass media has a public character. This means that messages transmitted through the mass media contents are public and intended for all groups and sections of the public. Being public in character, mass communication implies that “communication interaction with the global society or its sections and that it occurs on the basis of the generally accepted values, views, opinions or expectations”⁷⁰, so that it is subject to public control and evaluation.

Another characteristic of mass communication is that its messages are **topical**. That means that the mass media transmit information about an event with high speed, so that the relevant message reaches its recipients within a relatively short time, or even simultaneously with the event. The fact that the mass media messages are topical implies that the media can play an important role in the formation of public opinion and that topicality reflects a daily event due to which the message itself may have an ephemeral character and represent “an escape from the crux of the problem toward the outside, toward sensationalism” (Vreg, 46).

Mass communication covers a great number of people, so that it can be said that the mass media have a wide and heterogeneous audience. However, the media try to adjust their programme contents according to the needs of the specified sections of their audience, so that the latter, which has a loose structure, is formed on the basis of the programme, that is, the column, which the media create within their supply. Differentiation of the audience is important for media development policy and that component also has specific significance for the West Balkan countries.

Before we define the role of the mass media and mass communication in the context of political and other events in the West Balkan region, it is necessary to define the mass media functions. Their classification includes implicitly those functions which are immanent to the mass media (informative, orientational and action); social and political functions (which are related to the processes of socialization and integration) and cultural and educational functions.⁷¹

⁶⁹ It is estimated that the television broadcast of the funeral of Princess Dianne, in September 1997, was viewed by about two and a half billion people. For more detail see: Kvin, Dejvid (2000): *Televizija*. Belgrade: CLIO, p. 13.

⁷⁰ Vreg, France (1991): *Demokratsko komuniciranje*. Sarajevo: Faculty of Political Science, p. 46.

⁷¹ These functions may also be classified in such a way that social functions are separated from those arising from man's social activities (political, economic, cultural, educational, scientific, religious). For more detail see: Vreg, France, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

The informative function is one of the most important immanent functions of the mass media. This function enables us to be informed about the events, processes and phenomena taking place around us, whose impact may have certain consequences. Just this mass media function points to the extent to which the media are important for (dis)informing about the issues that determine the future and life quality of a community.

If the informative function of the mass media is not professionally conceived, one cannot speak about the development of an entity. All political, economic, cultural and problems in a community can be solved in a responsible, high-quality and efficient way only if their solutions are based on the greatest possible amount of information. If the number of sources of information is reduced and the flows of information cut off, public decision-making must also be limited by certain interests – local, party, national, religious.

The mass media transmit information to the recipients and, in that process, select the sources of information and the information itself, thus modelling new reality (in the modern context it is often called virtual reality as well), which the audience and general public accept as something real, which determines their fate, behaviour and reactions. This process is very important and its negative, exclusively manipulative role becomes dominant if the mass media do not transmit information in accordance with the principles of *impartiality, complexity and intelligibility*.

The immanent functions of the mass media are also orientational and action functions. The media may present the events and phenomena in an impartial and intelligible way, so that the recipients of messages obtain new data and expand their knowledge, that is, the audience acquires the necessary knowledge about a specified problem by means of this function, which then it tries to solve in an adequate way. Informing and commenting by the media contribute to the better understanding of a problem. At the same time, the recipients are encouraged to form their own judgement and react.

The social functions of the mass media anticipate that the latter are an active component of the whole process of socialization of the citizens, that is, members of a community. Although the beginning of socialization, its essential element, is related to the family as the basic unit, the media are increasingly gaining in importance in the integration of people into a community, as well as in the process of defining the structure of social values.

Namely, the modern mass media, especially television, are now attractive to children to such an extent that they spend the same number

of hours (or even more) on one of the mass media like on school.⁷² In such circumstances, we can speak how the elements of informal socialization (in that group the mass media are becoming the most influential) are becoming more significant than the elements of formal socialization (school, family). Therefore, one should not be amazed at the statement that the media have become a real and strong factor in determining what is (un)acceptable for a community.

The mass media also have their **political function** on the basis of which they form public opinion and enable a high-quality and responsible political debate over the solving of public problems. The media enable that social problems become public and, through their intermediation, interaction among different actors, which act within the political function (political parties, government, parliament, non-governmental organizations, numerous interest groups and associations) is made possible.

Within their political function the mass media play an important role in the process of political socialization of their recipients. Through that process the media may support the spread of political culture and political education, enhance the understanding of political issues, provide assistance and support to the citizens so as to find the best solutions to the existing political problems and increase the participation of citizens in political processes and political decision-making.

The development of the social and political functions of the mass media also implies that the latter may exert influence on the development of social empathy, the notion of social responsibility, as well as on the development of a sense of belongingness and feeling for communication and social interactivity in general. In that context, the modern media can make a significant contribution to the affirmation/negation of specified values and direct individuals toward the desirable patterns of behaviour.

The mass media should enable the expression of opinions, views, needs and interests of different social groups (Vreg, 57). Thus, the media enable interaction among numerous political and other interest groups, establishing a pluralist framework for the presentation of different ideas and programmes. In addition, the media may determine, in large measure, the model of public criticism and public control over the political and other functions in the society, thus contributing to its overall democratization.

Namely, the mass media have the right and, according to the most codes of practice, duty to inform the public about all issues being in the public interest. Although it is difficult to define the public interest in every

⁷² See: Erjavec, Karmen (2000): *Teorija in praksa*. Ljubljana, p. 673.

situation, this role of the media helps the public to control and criticize the government and its representatives. At times, the media turn this role into sensationalistic reporting, but the essence of this media function lies in its enabling the greatest possible number of citizens to participate in monitoring, criticizing and controlling the work of public bodies in a high-quality manner.

In addition to the **educational** one, the **cultural function** of the mass media is one of their most important functions. The media participate directly in the transmission of cultural heritage, thus preserving the cultural identity of a community. The media also promote the dissemination of information about culture and art, thus contributing to the advancement of culture and better understanding of different cultures. In that way, the mass media also improve communication among various cultural entities and their democratic interrelations.

The media gather information, process them and disseminate them as the perceptions and ideas related to education and scientific and technological achievements. They enable the general public, as well as that with specific interests and status to follow and get acquainted with the latest achievements in the fields of science and education. The educational and cultural functions of the media provide an opportunity for the creation of a more affluent and pluralist space in which cultural identities can preserve their authenticity, while at the same time being open to other cultures.

Negative Function

Consequently, the mass media have several important functions as regards the functioning and efficiency of the whole of society. However, the media often perform their functions in a negative way. Namely, through unprofessional and unethical activities, they direct the society toward specified ideological aims. Although there have been many examples through the history, the events taking place in the territory of the former Yugoslavia during the last two decades of the 20th century are very instructive.

Namely, during that period, certain media simply turned into an instrument for propagating the ideological-political programmes and aims. In his Preface to Mark Thompson's book *Forging War*, William Shawcross says that it should serve as a warning of "the terrible, destructive power of incitement to ethnic hatred when the mass media are controlled by nationalist governments".⁷³

⁷³ Shawcross, William, Predgovor knjige autora: Thompson, Mark (1995): *Kovanje rata*. Zagreb: Article 19, International Centre Against Censorship.

Naturally, the media are never so strong that they can form the views and sentiment of the whole society, thus exerting a decisive influence on its members when the (non)acceptance of specified values is in question. During the past centuries, the cultural matrix in most countries of the former Yugoslavia was based largely on two collective myths. One of them was the **traditional** myth of an epic-liberation character (the period of liberation from foreign rule) and the other was a **revolutionary-social** one (the period after the coming of communists to power).

Both myths have been modelled as collective entities on the basis of which the cultural matrices and value systems have been formed. The individual and his responsibility have been excluded from that system, so that the notions such as *true*, *ethical* and even *beautiful* have been defined as collective categories and instant ideological-political recipes. At the same time, through education, the processes of socialization and media functions, the core within the value structure was formed with a view to determining what would be *false*, *unethical* and *ugly*.

Collective myths have also determined the (un)desirable patterns of behaviour, so that the individual, that is citizen did not have to evaluate and criticize anything, because all social problems have been set and solved by the collective entity (nation, class). In such a context, it is no wonder than the communist ideologists went over to the nationalist political camps within a relatively short period.

Although the “conversion” of some communists, who changed their anational political programmes for radical nationalist ones, seems like a paradox, it is still the question of the fusion of nationalists and communists, that is, of the overlapping of two collective myths. That process anticipated the change of certain elements of the political-ideological vocabulary, while at the same time preserving its basic character and essence.

This means that political discourse in the greater part of the Former Yugoslavia after the Second World War changed the objects of criticism and outward indication, while its character and evocational cores remained the same (Žanić, 215). In the context of these two collective myths, traditional and revolutionary, we can identify similar components of the cultural core, on the basis of which the value system will be developed. The characteristics of that culture are: anti-intellectualism, social organization in the form of patriarchy with supreme authority and the government regarded as a war trophy.

The role of the mass media becomes very important just in the period when one value system and one collective ideological matrix give way to another value system and another collective myth. The struggle for the communist and allegedly class interests is replaced by the struggle for the

national interest, whereby the media turn into a powerful instrument for (dis)informing and propagating the political (national) aims.

A certain number of mass media, including several very influential ones, became part of the political-national headquarters in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia. Those circles began to develop and support the ideas about “threats”, “enemies” and “national interest”, all of which began to exert influence on the public, inciting hatred and a militant atmosphere. In so doing, the media completely neglected their informative function or, better said, they performed it, but contrary to the professional and ethical standards.

Impartiality and truth were neglected, so that the following statement should not be a surprise: “Media ‘campaigns’ were the forerunner of military campaigns. Verbal violence engendered physical violation” (Thompson, 2). Information is turning into disinformation and often into a lie (information is misinterpreted; the given sources are irrelevant and certain events and information are not revealed if they are “unfavourable” from the viewpoint of the dominant political option).

On the other hand, the authorities tried to establish full control over certain media,⁷⁴ modelling their development policy, method of work and personnel structure: journalists who dissented from the official views were relegated; those employed in the government-controlled mass media were demoted and sacked, while some were pressured to leave” (Thompson, 48).

Although the mentioned situation culminated in Serbia, such practice also existed in the Republic of Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Within their political and informative roles, the mass media laid emphasis on a biased approach, partial and false reporting, frequently using the language of hatred. In that way, some media and journalists were directly violating the basic standards of journalist profession and ethics.⁷⁵

The media propagated the stereotype and wrong ideas about the whole nations as “enemies”, “ustaše”, “četnici”, “mujahedin”, “irredentists”,

⁷⁴ So, the author Mark Thompson writes about the attitude of the then Serbian government toward the media, and states that only four media were important to the Milošević regime. RTS and *Večernje novosti* were directly government – controlled, while *Politika* and *Politika ekspres* were controlled indirectly, through the most responsible people in the Politika Group; *ibid.*, p. 113.

⁷⁵ Suffice it to read Article 1 of the Declaration of the Journalist Rights and Responsibilities, the chapter under the heading “Declaration of Duties”: “1. To respect the truth, regardless of the consequences that he/she might bear, because of the right of the public to learn the truth”, and realize the extent to which some reports on the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were not true and had warmongering contents. See: Korni, Daniel (2000): *Etika informisanja*. Beograd: Clio; pp. 145–147.

whereby every effort to give a different, critical and impartial opinion was labelled as the “betrayal of the national and patriotic interests”. There is no doubt that the media alone could not develop such ideas and prejudices and then impress them into the peoples’ minds, but they could affirm/reject the values within the matrices modelled by other sources of socialization and political indoctrination.

Thus, at the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century, the territory of the Former Yugoslavia was turned into a proving ground where everything was ready for that irresponsible and inefficient politics, based on intolerance and aggressive rhetoric, to evolve into a true war and ethnic conflict, which had not been seen in Europe since the Second World War. Threats, lies and libels, which were reproduced through the mass media, became the instructions for the armed formations which had to carry out the “sacred” national assignments ending in blood and, very often, in crime.

Amidst all this, the voices of the religious communities against the conflict and influence of political-national programmes, were rare, or were not heard at all. The religious communities were not strong enough to speak in the name of tolerance and humanity, thus preventing bloodshed and a great human catastrophe. However, in some cases those communities, or their representatives promoted the political and nationalist aims, regardless of whether they were based on hatred, intolerance and conflict.

The fusion of national political leaders with certain media, intellectuals and representatives of religious communities was carried out as a “natural” process in which everything was subordinated to the “national interest”. Such a process implied that everything that was contrary to that interest, even truth, impartiality or ethnic and religious tolerance had to perish.

In other words, this meant that the religious communities were also politicized, which would not be the biggest mistake had they not completely “forgotten” about ecumenical teaching, humanity, peace and the spread of faith and love among people in certain cases. This is why such politicization got the religious communities into a situation that its representatives engaged in the struggle for the defence of the national interest even in the cases which, to say the least, were regarded as dubious by modern civilizational and legal standards.

If one goes back to the genesis of that fusion of the religious communities with the nationalist-political circles and ideas, it can be observed – in the case of the Serbian Orthodox Church – that many political rallies

in 1990 were organized on church holidays.⁷⁶ In this context, it is interesting to point to the view of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Academician Muhamed Filipović about the transformation of the Islamic Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina,⁷⁷ as well as to the commentaries on the politicization of religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina written by foreign authors.⁷⁸

Although some of these elements seem accidental and marginal and only a part of certain manifestations, with the intensification of the conflict, the engagement of some representatives of religious communities took a concrete political form. So, after the attack of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Croat villages in the Neretva valley, the retired priest Ante Baković gave this army “the only proper name now and today – the Osmanlis”, and called on the Croats to adopt that term (Žanić, 150-151).

The identification and analysis of the responsibility of the religious communities for the wars and crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, especially its degree, require much more serious research. However, it is a fact that, in most cases, the media in the Republic of Srpska and in the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as the Serbian Orthodox Church did not react in accordance with the professional standards and religious tolerance when the Catholic Churches and Mosques were destroyed.⁷⁹

The influence of the religious communities on political processes remained even after the wars in the former Yugoslavia. It is felt not only in the relations between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church or in the context of protection of Orthodox Churches and monasteries in Kosovo, but it also became a part of everyday life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So, the latest election of the Reis-ul-Ulema, leader of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was often commented by two main candidates for this position in terms of political engagement.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ On the organization of rallies by some political parties (especially the SDS in Bosnia and Herzegovina) on the holidays of St Panteleimon, the Assumption and the Transfiguration, see: Žanić, Ivo (1998): *Prevarena povijest*. Zagreb: Durieux; p. 57.

⁷⁷ *Feral Tribune*, „Bosna je prodana država”, Republic of Croatia, 13 September 1999.

⁷⁸ *Dani*, „Tako je govorio Džemaludin”, from a series of articles: „Bosanski islam: politička i/ili vjerska revolucija” autora Havijera Bougarela, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 August 1998.

⁷⁹ Although there were similar cases in other regions, the data on the destruction of mosques point to the large proportions of destruction of the Muslim monuments in the regions where the Serbian population constituted a majority. So, in the territory of the Banjaluka-Bihać muftiluk, from the beginning of the war until the middle of 1995, 205 mosques were destroyed. See: Žanić, Ivo, op.cit., p. 106.

⁸⁰ *Dani*, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 23 and 30 September 2005.

However, one of the major indicators of the current (ir)rational and (in)tolerant attitude of the religious communities towards democratic and modern political processes in the region is reflected in their attitude toward the persons indicted for war crimes. Some representatives of the religious communities announce themselves (in)directly in the media, defending some indictees from the list of the International War Crime Tribunal in The Hague. Suffice it to say that those “protected” are just the members of their own nationality and religion.

So, in the media in the Republic of Croatia one can hear the statements such as this one: “With her statement Carla del Ponte paid us a compliment which we do not wish from her. The friars would be honoured to hide the hero of the Patriotic War, General Ante Gotovina, but he is at a safer place than our monastery”.⁸¹ The fact that Patriarch Paul signed the petition of Serbian intellectuals and renowned public figures that Radovan Karadžić should be relieved of any obligation to the Hague Tribunal, can also be viewed in that context.

In such circumstances, the media cannot exert a more significant influence on public opinion and change the stand of the dominant social matrices on important political, ethical and legal issues, such as the trials for war crimes committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. That is the position based on wrong syllogism that one is allowed to kill (and order killings) in the name of the national interest, especially if the victims are “others” – members of other nations and religions.

Tolerance as the Future

In such a context, a very important question that imposes itself is the extent to which all social factors, those in government institutions as well as the religious communities, general public and media are ready to give up specified territorial claims. Such political options, which were dominant in some political establishments during the past years, are still (in)directly trying to obtain legitimacy, especially in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Namely, in this state it is still impossible to form a modern state union in accordance with the EU standards, so that the EU door remains closed for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁸²

⁸¹ The statement of Fra Andrija Bilokapić, Abbot of St Francis Monastery in Zadar, *Feral Tribuna*, 23 September 2005.

⁸² The last example dates from 3 October 2005, when the EU countries’ foreign ministers refused to start the negotiations on stabilization and association with Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the Government of the Republic of Srpska (the smaller entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina) refused to carry out its police reform in accordance with the EU principles.

The division of Bosnia and Herzegovina along national lines is something that can certainly slow down its development and bring the process of national reconciliation into question. This problem can best be perceived in the field of education. Namely, despite the promises made by politicians and statements of domestic intellectuals about the need to modernize education at all levels, the educational system in Bosnia and Herzegovina looks like the most primitive model of segregation in many respects.

The words of the reputed professor Lamiya Tanović sound catastrophic – Bosnia and Herzegovina has something that will be a novelty even for “Ku Klux Klan members: three different languages, three different geographies and three different, ill-intentioned histories which blame others, living in the other part of the building, or under the same roof, for all hardships”.⁸³ The efforts to expel such ugly and aggressive politics from schools remain unsuccessful.

Douglas Davison, Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, shares this opinion and calls attention to the obligation assumed by Bosnia and Herzegovina before the Peace Implementation Council as early as 2002: “We shall make every effort to ensure that all children gain access to high-quality education in integrated multicultural schools, freed from political, religious, cultural and other prejudices, where the rights of all children are respected.”⁸⁴

Being exhausted by the war and divided along national lines, Bosnia and Herzegovina can hardly meet some of the standards of modern politics, such as: rationality, efficiency and responsibility. On the other hand, the question imposes itself as to the extent to which the current model of education can ensure the prosperity of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the extent to which it actually functions and can support the patterns of behaviour that follow and affirm specified political-ideological programmes.

Insofar as the mass media in Bosnia and Herzegovina are concerned, it must be noted that their work and the work of electronic media, in particular, depend on the assessment of the bodies managed by international representatives. So, in 1998, pursuant to the High Representative's Decision of 11 June 1998, the Independent Media Commission was set up. It operates in accordance with the Broadcasting Code, which was drawn up after the European Convention on Human Rights, observing the generally accepted freedom of expression and the principles of fairness and accuracy.

⁸³ *Dani*, „Dogovor škole razdvaja”, 23 September 2005.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

In the Broadcasting Code special attention is devoted to the issues concerning the observance of ethnic, cultural and religious differences in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is emphasized that radio and television broadcasters will not broadcast any material which, by its content or tone, “carries a clear and immediate risk of inciting ethnic or religious hatred among the communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Article 1.1). The Code also emphasizes that “the language which could incite violence, disorder or hatred must not be used” (Article 1.2).

Bearing in mind the specificity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the need to insist on tolerance and dialogue between the religious communities in the public communication space, the Code has a special article (1.3), with the headline “Religion”, which reads as follows: “The belief and practice of religious groups must not be misrepresented, and every effort must be made to ensure that programmes about religion are accurate and fair. Programmes must not denigrate the religious beliefs of others”.⁸⁵

The influence of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has contributed in large measure to the professionalization of the media and the adoption of the principles on which the relevant conventions on human rights insist, as well as of the codes of professional journalist associations (such as the Declaration of the Journalist Rights and Responsibilities of the International Journalist Federation). The 2003 report prepared by RAK (the Regulatory Communication Agency, which took over the IMC functions) points to a decrease in the number of cases of unethical, unlawful and unprofessional behaviour of the media relative to the previous years.

However, an increase in the number of violations of the rules (the RAK report for 2004), violation of the Code in the case of RTV Alfa,⁸⁶ as well as the whole social and political context, point out that the process of democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its harmonization with the European standards are still far from the necessary one. Namely, although the media do not propagate aggressive political, national and religious messages, their positive role cannot contribute very much to the overall process of reconciliation and the promotion of tolerance.

⁸⁵ The Press Code, which was signed by six journalist associations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1999, has similar provisions against discrimination and fomentation.

⁸⁶ RTV Alfa from Sarajevo was punished by the RAK and had to pay KM 50,000 because, on 3 November 2004, it broadcast the programme in which the values of another nation were negated (the guest was speaking about aid to the Iraqi and Palestinian peoples, while at the same time making negative comments on the Jewish people).

The views that some media insult one of the nations⁸⁷ do not have to be correct. But, in any case, they must be based on arguments, so that all institutions and agencies in charge of ethical, legal and professional standards can react and sanction such practice. In addition, in the process of national reconciliation and the promotion of religious tolerance, the media can play a positive role only if all important social factors wish sincerely that tolerance and democratic relations become a part of regular social practice.

National policies, as well as the activities of religious communities, both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in other West Balkan countries, must take a different attitude towards the “other” and “different”, if they really wish to form communities based on tolerance and open dialogue. Such a context means a free movement between cultures and the co-existence of special and general, national and regional/local.

This may be reduced to the principles of *postmodernity*, which insists on pluralism, openness and diversity, but also on the experience that every monism (class, religious, national, ideological) may become *exclusive* and *totalitarian* quite easily. The analyses which insist that the countries of the former Yugoslavia should provide conditions for the observance of constitutional democracy and legal protection of religious and national differences, as well as enable those countries to accede to the EU⁸⁸ are certain indicators of a better future.

Like other factors that participate in the processes of socialization and education, the media can also contribute to inter-ethnic reconciliation and the development of tolerant models for the settlement of social conflicts. However, in a community where hatred and aggressiveness are reproduced, the media also transform their role and acting as an instrument of manipulation. In that case, the community turns into something that the theologian Thomas Morton and the author Mirko Kovač call “hell”, since “hell is there where nobody has something in common with anybody and where everybody hates everybody, but cannot go away from each other or from oneself”.⁸⁹ Here the question imposes itself as to how the life in this region really resembles such hell.

⁸⁷ The view of the Vrhbosna Archbishop, Cardinal Vinko Puljić, which was expressed on the occasion of the Church's marking the World Day of the Mass Media that “the printed media in Sarajevo hurt the feelings of Catholics”, *Dnevni list*, „Sarajevski mediji vrijeđaju Hrvate”, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁸⁸ From the analysis of the author Neal Riemer, “Toward a Creative Breakthrough in Bosnia and Kosovo”, published in RESEARCH PAPERS, Human Rights Conflict Prevention Centre (HRCPC), Vol.1, No.1, 2000.

⁸⁹ Mirko Kovač (1997): *Cvjetanje mase*. Sarajevo: Bosanska knjiga, p. 18.

References

1. Debre, Režis (2000): *Uvod u mediologiju*. Belgrade: CLIO
2. Kvin, Dejvid (2000): *Televizija*. Belgrade: CLIO
3. Vreg, France (1991): *Demokratsko komuniciranje*. Sarajevo: Faculty of Political Science
4. Erjavec, Karmen (2000): *Teorija in praksa*. Ljubljana
5. Thompson, Mark (1995): *Kovanje rata*. Zagreb: Article 19, International Centre Against Censorship
6. Kornj, Daniel (2000): *Etika informisanja*. Belgrade: CLIO
7. Žanić, Ivo (1998): *Prevarena povijest*. Zagreb: Durieux
8. RESEARCH PAPERS, Human Rights Conflict Prevention Centre (HRCPC), Vol.1, No.1, 2000
9. Kovač, Mirko (1997): *Cvjetanje mase*. Sarajevo: Bosanska knjiga
10. Vrcan, Srdan (2001): *Vjera u vrtlozima tranzicije*. Split: Glas Dalmacije

Printed Media

1. *Dani* (Bosnia and Herzegovina – Sarajevo)
2. *Oslobođenje* (Bosnia and Herzegovina – Sarajevo)
3. *Dnevni avaz* (Bosnia and Herzegovina – Sarajevo)
4. *Dnevni list* (Bosnia and Herzegovina – Mostar)
5. *Nezavisne novine* (Bosnia and Herzegovina – Banja Luka)
6. *NIN* (Serbia and Montenegro – Belgrade)
7. *Politika* (Serbia and Montenegro – Belgrade)
8. *Jutarnji list* (Republic of Croatia – Zagreb)
9. *Feral Tribune* (Republic of Croatia – Split)

Reports

Reports by RAK (Regulatory Communication Agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina) for 2002, 2003 and 2004.

Codes

1. Press Code (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
2. Broadcasting Code (Bosnia and Herzegovina)